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ABSTRACT 
The Federal Republic of Germany has coped with indigenous left-wing 
terrorism for several decades and not lost its liberal democratic 
character f which raises the question of why terrorists continue to 
attract recruits to fight the state. This case study of terrorist 
motivation also elucidates the concept of identification, the lasting 
influence of someone, some group f or some idea on others, to aid the 
understanding of motivation and responses to terrorism. Identification 
also enables the integration of three entwined levels of terrorism 
study- -individuals, groups and society. 
Elucidation of left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of 
Germany shows that a wide variety of persons became terrorists. The 
important factors in becoming a terrorist were the influence of 
'significant others' both in the decision to join a terrorist group! and 
later wi thin the group! as well as the perception that terrorism was the 
only available option. The terrorist groups fonned 'macronarrati ves r 
based on the group members' shared history and culture which supported 
their decisions to offer incentives and sanctions to group members to 
enable their underground existence. Not all of the groups sought to 
influence public policy. The Red Army Faction was mainly interested in 
group survival! as was the Second of June, while some of the 
Revolutionary Cells and Alitonamen followed their self-interest in 
commiting terrorist acts. Other Revolutionary Cells and Autanamen 
groups, however! sought public policy changes through terrorist acts in 
support of protest groups. The other groups had limited concepts of the 
'public'! which reflected their group direction. 
The government of the Federal Republic responded to left-wing 
terrorism with short-tenn paramilitary options taking precedence over 
the long~tenn socio-economic considerations. The Gennan government 
generally has perceived all left-wing terrorist groups as the same! and 
not given due consideration to the different terrorist organisations 
perceptions of the 'public'. A clearer perception of left-wing terrorism 
in the Federal Republic of Germany shows the usefulness of the concept 
of identification in the study of terrorism, and highlights the 
processes involved in terrorist motivation at individual, group and 
society levels. 
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Preface 
This thesis deals with the Federal Republic of Germany which used to 
be colloqually named 'West Germany'. On 3 October 1990 the newly created 
five Laender (states) which fonnerly comprised the German Democratic 
Republic acceded to the Federal Republic via Article 23 of the Basic 
Law. Now there is no longer a 'West f and 'East Germany'. The result of 
these changes on the thesis are that 'West Germany I is used in the 
thesis to denote the old borders of the Federal Republic and 'Germany' 
is used with regards to the new borders of 1990. 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Galileo: 
There is already much discovered I but there is more 
that can still be discovered. 1 
The Three Agitators: 
That the shorter path is better than the long one I no 
one denies. 
But if someone knows it 
And does not point it out to uS I what good is their 
wisdom?2 
1. Thesis Aims and Goals 
1 
This thesis examines the motivation of indigenous left-wing 
terrorism in the western half of the Federal Republic of Germany. This 
state has coped with indigenous left-wing terrorism conducted by groups 
espousing anarchist I socialist and communist ideologies ( as well as 
right-wing terrorism by groups espousing racist and fascist ideologies I 
and acts of terrorism by non-German terrorist groups) for over twenty 
years without losing its liberal democratic character. This provokes the 
question of why I if terrorists have not proven successful at subverting 
the state in the past I they continue to attract recruits in their fight 
against the state. 
This search for the motivation of left-wing German terrorists 
elucidates a theoretical approach to the study of terrorism. The thesis 
introduces the concept of identification to show its usefulness in 
understanding the motivation ofl and responses tOI political terrorism. 
This study shows how people develop ties to individuals I groups and 
societies I and why these occurred in the Federal Republic amongst the 
leftist terrorists in the areas which they did, and what influence these 
had on their activities. Similarly, the concept also explains the public 
and government response. 
The elucidation in the case study begins with an examination of 
left-wing terrorism in West Germany. This involves a historical and then 
an analytical study. The former places the events into their larger 
context, while the latter details the protest issues raised by the 
terrorists and the extent of left-wing terrorism. The historical context 
highlights the identifications' origins, and the analytical section 
shows how the terrorists employed these in their activities. 
1 Bertolt Brecht, "Leben des Galilei", in: Die Stuecke von Bertolt 
Brecht in einem Band (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag I 1978), 491-539, 
493. 
2 Bertolt Brecht I "Die Massnahme", in: Die Stuecke von Bertolt 
Brecht in einem Band (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1978), 255-268 1 
265. 
2 
Both the historical and analytical chapters serve as an 
introduction for the analysis, theory and examples that follow in 
chapters four through seven which cover individuals, groups I government 
measures I the media and the public. The last two (government measures, 
and the public and media) are seen as society' s response that I along 
with groups and individuals I form three entwined conceptual elements of 
terrorism analysis I which must always be reflected in the study of 
terrorism. 3 Chapters four to seven I which discuss individuals, group 
dynamics I government measures, the media and public responses l will each 
form a layer of the concept of identification. The result should be an 
understanding of how identification contributes to the motivation of, 
and responses tOI political terrorism. 
Chapter four focuses on individual processes and characteristics to 
uncover potential psychological motivations and socialisation processes 
that potentially motivate individuals towards terrorism. After 
discussion of the 'psychologically disturbed' and 'rational-idealist I 
positions, biographical and psychological characteristics are examined 
in light of identification to point towards the role of 'significant 
others' and available options in peoples' lives. 
In chapter five the movement of a person from entering to leaving a 
terrorist group is followed to highlight group organisational 
differences and the limiting and supporting effects of these on members. 
The position of the group with regards to outsiders is also discussed I 
as is the role of dissension wi thin the group. Throughout the chapter 
the effects of individuals identifying with the group I or with members 
within the group, and how the group identifies with its own ideal in 
opposition to other possibilities I are constant themes. 
Chapters six and seven cover society' s response to terrorism and 
how this affects terrorists' motivation. Chapter six, the dynamics of 
government measures towards terrorism, highlights the conflicting 
identifications between the terrorists and government in an examination 
of government counterterrorism policy. Chapter seven shows how the 
public, the subject over which the terrorists and the government 
struggle for identification and legitimacy of control I responds to 
terrorist overtures and government counterterrorism measures. The media 
is seen as an 'identification machine' that can be employed to convey 
measures of identification with the government or the terrorists. 
3 Martha Crenshaw I "Questions to be Answered, Research to be Done, 
Knowledge to be Applied" I in: Walter Reich (ed.) I Origins of Terrorism: 
Psychologies, Ideologies, Theories, States of Mind (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990)1 247-260 1 249-250. 
3 
Chapter eight brings together a summary of the case study analysis 
and of the theoretical concepts. It also offers practical applications 
for the Federal Republic, and theoretical ones for future research on 
identification and terrorism, because research should be cumulative, not 
disparate. Therefore "any and all promising information, perspectives! 
disciplines and methods" are used in the thesis. 4 This is not to suggest 
an overgeneralisation, nor that the thesis conclusions will be 
applicable to all other forms of terrorism. Rather it is hoped the 
thesis provides a conceptual starting point for other studies of 
political terrorism. 
2. Literature Review 
Left-wing terrorism is a sub-section of the wider topic of 
extremism in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) that covers the far 
right and left as well as terrorism. Two authors in particular, Backes 
and Jesse, have mapped out this area of study in their joint projects of 
1989. The first was a three volume set5 that reviews the literature on 
ideology, organisations, activities and extremist threat in volume one. 
Volume two is the authors f own contribution to the discussion with a 
chronological analysis of extremism in the country that concludes with 
an explanation and review of the constitutional state. The third voluTIe 
is a reader in original extremist documents from far right, far left and 
terrorist organisations, which ends with biographical sketches of some 
extremists. 
Backes and Jesse also began a yearly project on extremism and 
democracy6 that seeks to shed light on the far left, right and terrorism 
as a discussion forum, reference work and orientation aid. It forms 
annual additions to their 1989 three volume work with updates on 
analysis, literature reviews and documentation. 
Left-wing terrorism is also a sub-section of the wider literature 
that examines the state security apparatus with regards to civil 
liberties. This type of literature was already established in the 
seventies with books and articles which argued that the state is 
conservative, and possibly on the road to fascism. They also argued that 
the state used the far left as an excuse to defend itself, while 
ignoring the far right, who are just as, if not more dangerous than the 
4 Bowman H. Miller, "Terrorism and Language: A Text-Based Analysis 
of the German Case" Terrorism 9 (4) 1987, 373-407, 375. 
5 Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse (eds.), Politischer Extremismus in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland Band I: Literature, Band II: Analyse, Band 
III: Dokumentatian (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1989). 
6 Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse (eds. ) , Jahrbuch Extremismus und 
Demokratie (Bonn: Bourvier Verlag, 1989 IV). 
4 
left.7 This tradition continued into the eighties with concerns over 
computerisation of the security services and the resultant transparency 
of public life, which are also linked with how the government controls 
demonstrations and responds to terrorism. 8 
The literature on specifically left-wing terrorism can be broken 
into three broad categories: journalistic, academic and terroristic. Two 
authors, Aust and Becker, stand out amongst the journalists for their 
detailed analysis of the rise and fall of the Rote AImee Fraktion (RAF, 
Red Army Faction) under Baader and Meinhof in the seventies. 9 Becker 
seeks to explain the events in light of the main characters and their 
parents' past, which she perceives as being influenced by the shadow of 
the Third Reich whereby the early RAF became 'Hitler's children' as they 
sought to provoke fascism in order to encourage dissent. Aust relates 
terrorist events in a study of the internal group acti vi ties, and how 
these were affected by government counterterrorism policies. However, 
both of these studies limit themselves to the seventies, and no 
comparable work exists for the eighties, or for the Bewegung 2. Juni 
(B2J, Second of June) or Revolutionaerer Zellen (RZ, Revolutionary 
Cells) apart from the short, broad overview of leftist terrorism offered 
by Kah1. 10 
The academic studies of left-wing terrorism are reviewed in the 
Backes and Jesse volumes mentioned above, so the following only 
discusses the more important works. In 1978 the government commissioned 
academic studies into West GenTIan left-wing terrorism in the country. 
The results were five volumes in a series entitled Analysen zum 
Terrorismus that approached the subject from the different perspectives 
of terrorist ideology ,11 individual life histories, 12 group dynamics, 13 
7 See Peter Brueckner, Alfred Krovoza, Staatsfeinde: Innerstaatliche 
Feinderklaerung in der Blmdesrepublik (West Berlin: Verlag Klaus 
Wagenbach, 1972); Sebastian Cobler, Law, Order and Politics in West 
Gennany (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1978); Peter Brueckner, 
Versuch, uns und anderen die Blmdesrepublik zu erklaeren (West Berlin: 
Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1978, Neuausgabe, 1984). 
8 See Rolf Goessner, Buerger kontrol1 ieren Polizei ( eds. ) , 
Restrisiko Mensch: Volkserfassung, Staatsterrorgesetze, 
Widerstandsbekaernfung (Hamburg: Instituts fuer Sozialforschung, 1987). 
9 Jillian Becker, Hitler's Children: The Story of the Baader-Meinhof 
Gang (London: Granada Publishing Ltd., Second Edition, 1978); Stefan 
Aust, The Baader-Meinhof Group: The Inside Story of a Phenomenon 
(London: The Bodley Head, 1987). 
10 Werner Kahl, Vorsicht Schusswafen! Von kamn.mistischen 
Extremismus, Terrorismus, und revolutionaerer Gewalt (Munich: Guenter 
Olzog Verlag, 1986). 
11 Iring Fetscher, Guenter Rohrmosser (eds.), Ideologien und 
Strategien (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981). 
12 Gerhard Schmidtchen, Herbert Jaeger, Lieselotte Suellwold (eds.), 
Lebenslaufanalysen (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981). 
5 
the relationship between violence and legitimacy,14 and that between 
protest and government reaction. 15 Each of these brought new light to 
the subject in thorough studies of their particular topic, but the 
series as a whole suffered from the lack of a volume that brought the 
diverse subjects together into a conclusion. It also does not appear 
that the same intensity and thoroughness will continue in goveD1ll1ent 
supported study of terrorism in the eighties. 16 
A postscript of sorts to these studies can be found in the first 
volume of a two volume 1988 work on terrorism,17 which covers 
theoretical approaches to terrorism and includes a case study on the 
FRG. This brings together some of the diverse macro and micro levels of 
study found in the Analysen series and seeks to offer conclusions about 
the processes involved. However, this leftist view of terrorism which 
points towards an institutionalisation of terrorism ends wi thout any 
presciption. The second volume of the set is perceived as a comparison 
study reader with case studies of the neighbouring European countries of 
Italy f France and the Netherlands. 
English language academic treatments of left-wing terrorism in West 
Germany have produced short case studies in general volumes on 
terrorism, 18 or focused on specific aspects such as intellectuals,19 
literature analysis,20 or government response. 21 This thesis thus offers 
one of the first book length English language studies of left-wing 
13 Wanda von Baeyer-Katte, Dieter Claessens, Hubert Feger, Friedhelm 
Neidhardt (eds.), Gruppenprozesse (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982). 
14 Ulrich Matz, Gerhard Schmidtchen (eds.), Gewalt und Legitimitaet 
(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag! 1983). 
15 Fritz Sack, Heinz Steinert (eds.), Protest und Reaktion (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984). 
16 The series Texte zur inneren Sicherheit is aimed towards 
continuing the research first conducted in the Analysen zum Terrorismus! 
but on a smaller scale. J. Kurt Klein, "Die geistigen und poli tisch-
sozialen Ursachen des deutschen Terrorismus", in: Bundesminister des 
Innern (ed.), Texte zur inneren Sicherheit: Gewalt und Terrorismus- -
aktueller Stand (Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, 1990), 7-36, 8. 
17 n. n. Angriff auf des Herz des Staates: Soziale Entwicklung und 
Terrorismus (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag f 1988). Two volumes. 
18 Raymond R. Corrado, "Ethnic and Ideological Terrorism in Western 
Europe", in: Michael Stohl (ed.), The Politics of Terrorism (New York: 
Marcell Dekker Inc., Second Edition, 1983), 255-326; Geoffrey Pridham, 
"Terrorism and the State in West Germany During the 1970s", in: Juliet 
Lodge (ed.) f Terrorism: A Challenge to the State (Oxford: Martin 
Robertson, 1981), 11-57; Eva Kolinsky, "Terrorism in West Germany", in: 
Juliet Lodge (ed.) The Threat of Terrorism (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books 
Ltd., 1988), 57-88. 
19 Julian Roberts I "Terrorism and German Intellectuals" Journal of 
Area Studies 3 (Spring) 1981 f 21-5. 
20 See B.H. Miller (1987). 
21 Kevin G. Horbatiuk, "Anti-Terrorism: The West GenTIan Approach" 
Fordham International Law Approach 3, 1980, 167-191. 
6 
terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany that brings together the 
diverse components on the subject.22 
The last type of literature is that written by terrorists and 
former terrorists, which can be divided into operational statements and 
memoirs. The first category includes communiques and pamphlets 
describing the group and what they seek to achieve. 23 These all offer 
subjective perspectives of the groups and their audiences as they 
compete against each other. Despite their sometimes contradictory 
arguments, and their inaccurate 'evidence f, they provide insight into 
their perspective. 
The same holds true for the memoirs of former terrorists of the 
Second of June, 2 4 Revolutionary Cells, 2 5 and the Red Army Faction. 2 6 A 
novel written by a RAF sympathiser about the group relates the RAF 
experience from an insiders viewpoint. 2 7 These all portray individual 
experiences and explanations for what occurred. 
These are the general categories of literature on West German left-
wing terrorism: journalistic, academic and terroristic. The thesis draws 
on each of these. The thesis relies on the journalistic works as a 
chronological fr~uework, but also uses press contributions to elucidate 
on areas the other journalists do not cover. The thesis synthesises the 
22 John D. Elliot, Terrorism in West Ge:rmany Ph.D. Thesis, (George 
Washington Uni versi ty , 1981) , is the only thesis referenced in the 
literature, but I was unable to locate a copy. 
23 Red Army Faction, texte: der RAP (West Berlin: no publisher 
given, ueberarbeitete und aktualisierte Ausgabe, 1983). [Originally 
Malmoe: Eo Cavefors, 1977 ] ; Jean Paul Marat ( ed. ), Widerstand Heisst 
Angriff! erklaerungen r redebeitraege, flugblaetter und briefe 1977-1987 
(Amsterdam: Biblitheek voor Ontspanning en Ontwikkling, 1988). Second of 
June, Der Blues: Gesammelte Texte der Bewegung 2. Juni (No place/date of 
publication) ; [I was unable to obtain a copy of this. ] Revolutionary 
Cells, RZ: Geschichte, Kri tiken, DoJru:nente (Oberursel : Westdeutsches 
Irlandssolidaritaetskorrnnitee (WISK) Vertrieb, no date given, but after 
February 1985); n.n. Das Tapfere Schneiderlein: Organ der 
Unverbesserlichen (No place/publisher, but appeared June/July 1978); 
n.n. Guerilla Diffusa: In Bewegung bleiben (Bremen: no publisher, 1981). 
24 Michael 'Bommi f Baumann, TeITOr or Love? The Personal AcCOl.Hlt of 
a West GeIman Urban Guerrilla (London: John Calder Publishers Ltd., 
1979). 
25 Hans Joachim Klein, Ruckkehr in die Menschlichkeit: Appell eines 
ausgestiegene Terroristen (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1979). 
26 Peter-Juergen Boock, Abgang (Bornheim-Merten: Lamuv Verlag, 1988) 
is a semi-autobiographical novel. See Peter-Juergen Boock, Heinrich 
Lummer, If'Die RAP war nie ein Gefahr fuer den Staat f If Stern 41 (39) 22-8 
September 1988, 270-3. I did not obtain Klaus Juenscke, Spaetlese: Texte 
zur RAP und Knast (Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag Neue Kritik, 1988), which is 
reported to be a collection of interviews, letters and essays that have 
appeared in the press, and not a a memoir itself. See Backes, Jesse 
(1989 IV), 220-2. 
27 Christian Geissler, kamalatta. ranantisches fragment (West 
Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1988). 
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German and English language academic literature to provide a theoretical 
framework for the case study. Some of the fr@nework portions are new as 
described in chapters four through seven in discussions on individuals, 
groups, government response and public and media reaction are covered. 
The communiques and other writings of the diverse left-wing terrorist 
groups are comprehensively used by including those of the Second of 
June, the Revolutionary Cells and the Autonanen, which have generally 
been ignored by academic writers,28 in favour of those by the Red Army 
Faction. The discovery and arrest of former RAP members in the former 
German Democratic Republic provided more autobiographical articles by 
former terrorists, which added more examples for the historical and 
theoretical frameworks. 
The resultant synthesis of these information sources produced a 
thesis that does two things. First, it elaborates on left-wing terrorism 
in the Federal Republic of Gennany with the benefit of new materials. 
Second, the theoretical context lifts the thesis fran a pure case study 
to one which examines general motivation processes in terrorism. This 
relieves the West German case study of the problem of covering the same 
ground as previous studies because it approaches the questions from new 
perspectives in light of new theoretical approaches. 
3. The Study of Terrorism 
Terrorism is a subjective emotional experience. What terrorises 
one, may not terrorise another. 29 Its subjectivity extends to the 
public's perception of terrorists' capabilities, and contributes to its 
perception as a world-wide menace, and its impact beyond the actual 
target audience of the terrorists and their victims. 3o 
Subjectivity also extends to the perpetrators with the oft repeated 
claim that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom-fighter'. This 
implies that terrorism has no agreed upon moral position, because the 
well-wishers on both sides allow the perpetrators to be either of these. 
This problem arises because terrorism is not derived from any particular 
ideology, or religion. Many ideological or religious perspectives use 
terrorism to support their ends. 31 
28 Except for David Th. Schiller, "Germany' s Other Terrorists II 
Terrorism 9 (1) 1987 (II), 87-99, which covers the RZ and Autonanen. 
29 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (London: 
Macmillan Education Ltd., Second Edition, 1986), 11-2. 
30 Nehemin Friedland, Ariel Mehari, liThe Psychological Impact of 
Terrorism: A Double-Edged Sword" Political Psychology 6 (4) 1985, 591-
604, 592. 
31 Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1987) , 7 i Martha Crenshaw, Terrorism and International 
Cooperation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 5-6. 
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The result is that terrorism research is hindered by moral 
stumbling blocks over what terrorism is and is not, based on the 
researchers' nonnative assumptions over what types and forms of 
poli tical violence constitute terrorism. 32 This is further complicated 
by the question of cogni ti ve terrorism typologies, who labels whom 
'terrorists', and what type of activities fall within the heading of 
'terrorism'. The two phenomena, how it is conceptualised, and the 
acti vi ties it includes, are connected33 as is shown in the 'freedom-
fighter' versus 'terrorist' debate. 
Despite these hindrances, research on terrorism has continued 
unabated, with terrorism research placing terrorism in political, 
criminal, and various war ( civil war, guerilla war and wars of 
infiltration) situations. Its theoretical content, as in other social 
science disciplines, is akin to 'current thinking' and interpretations 
of terrorism. To avoid the danger of generalisations within the topic 
which blur differences! and bring illusions of a mastery that does not 
exist, a basic conceptual and theoretical groundwork to form a solid 
framework for future analysis of terrorism is required. 34 
There is disagreement over definitions of terrorism, and there is 
deficient theorising about terrorism. As the two problems are related 
because the breadth of the definition will determine the research and 
response focus,35 the question is, how to resolve them and move forward 
in the study and research of terrorism. Should the question of 
definitions be resolved, or should one use what consensus there is on 
definions as a position from which to build up a theory of terrorism?36 
32 Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory f tactics! and counter-
measures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Second Edition, 1989), 
4. 
33 Ronald D. Crelinsten in: Yonah Alexander, Jakov Katwan (eds.) f 
"The International Scientific Conference on Terrorism, Berlin" Terrorism 
3 (3/4) 1980, 179-351, 203. 
34 Martti Sirrala in: Alexander, Katwan ( eds .) (1980), 327; Denis 
Szabo, Ronald D. Crelinsten, "International Political Terrorism: A 
Challenge for Comparative Research" Terrorism 3 (3/4) 1980, 341-8, 342; 
Alex P. Schmid, Political Te:rrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, 
Theories, Data Bases, and Literature (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Books, 1983), xiii, 160-1. 
35 ibid., 168; Alex P. Schmid, "Force or Conciliation? An Overview 
of Some Problems Associated with Current Anti-Terrorist Response 
Strategies" Violence, Aggression, and Terrrorism 2 (2) 1988, 149-78, 
150. 
36 Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New 
Guide to Actors, Authors I Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature 
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, Revised, expanded and updated 
edition, 1988), 3. 
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3.1 Definitions of Terrorism 
Numerous definitions of terrrorism abound37 so unanimity in the 
usage of the term is unlikely. This leaves two options. One is unanimity 
amongst social scientists, who can then all pursue research wi th the 
same focal point. Another option is to leave the political definition of 
terrorism to the policy-makers, who are responsible for justifying 
responses to suspected terrorist acts. 38 
Leaving aside the policy-makers for a moment, consensus amongst the 
social scientists in terrorism research is found in a 1985 questionaire 
mailed out to around two hundred researchers on political terrorism. The 
result was that, while 81% found the provided definition partially or 
fully acceptable, almost two-thirds could not entirely agree with it. 39 
The researchers then rewrote their definition with the study results in 
mind to arrive at this definition of terrorism: 
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated 
violent action, employed by (semi- ) clandestine 
individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, 
criminal, or political reasons, whereby- -in contrast 
to assassination- -the direct targets of violence are 
not the main targets. The immediate human victims of 
violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of 
opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic 
targets) from a target population, and serve as message 
generators. Threat- and violence-based communication 
processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) 
victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the 
main target of demands or a target of attention, 
depending on whether intimidation, coercion or 
propaganda is primarily sought.40 
This definition explicitly states that there are different types of 
terrorism, some of which are political. As this thesis restricts itself 
to political terrorism in general, and left-wing terrorism in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the appropriate government definition 
should be compared to the above definition to uncover any possible 
differences. 
The Interior Ministry annual reports on political violence in the 
Federal Republic, Verfassungsschutzberichtef state that terrorism is 
the sustained battle waged for political goals, that 
with the help of supporters is to be carried out 
against life, limb and property of other people, 
especially through serious criminal acts f such as those 
named in Para 129a Art. 1 of the Criminal Code Book 
37 see Schmid (1983), 119-158, for 109 definitions; and Schmid, 
Jongmanf 32-38, for 35 more definitions. 
38 Schmid (1983), 6; Wardlaw, xiii. 
39 Schmid, Jongmanf 2-3. 
40 ibid., 28. 
(particulary murder f killing, extortionate kidnapping, 
arson, causing explosions wi th explosives) or through 
violent acts that aid the perpetration of such criminal 
acts.41 
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The government definition refers to paragraph 129a of the Criminal 
Code Book which covers terrorist organisations, and lists specific 
acti vi ties that could be means by which individuals and groups pursue 
ends. Unlike the first definition, there is no interest in whether the 
victims are the targets to be influenced ( i . e., the audience). The 
government is interested in what is done, not the reasons for the 
actions. Governments and academics appear to be interested in two 
different aspects of political terrorism. 
3.2 Theoretical Approaches to Terrorism 
The question then remains, can the first definition offered, which 
has at least some consensual legitimacy, be used to form the basis for a 
theoretical framework? The answer necessi tates an examination of the 
existing theoretical framework. 
A review of terrorism literature shows ten broad categories of 
theories on terrorism: terrorism as part of political violence, 'common 
myths/wisdom', state and regime terrorism, terrorists' own theories, 
psychological theories, surrogate ( internal) war theories, conspiracy 
theories, communication and sociological theories. 42 In order to build a 
framework for a general theory of terrorism, these need to be reduced to 
one theory that explains why and predicts when political terrorism 
occurs. 
One way to begin this process is to work towards a theory of 
terrorism for a particular case, such as this thesis seeks with left-
wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany. In this situation, 
some of the above theories obviously do not apply. This is not a case of 
state or regime terrorism, nor do 'common myths/wisdom' of 
interconnected propositions apply. The conspiracy thesis, that the 
Soviet security services ( or its obverse f the American intelligence 
services) are the directors of terrorism, is shown in chapter two to be 
inoperative. Admittedly, the East Germans partly financed the RAP and 
had arrangements for them to pass information to the East Germans with 
41 Bundesminiterium des Innern (ed.), Verfassungsschutzbericht 1987 
(Bonn: EMI, June 1988), 72. VerfasslIDgsschutzbericht 1989 (July 1990, 
76) excludes spontaneous activity in the course of demonstrations 
turning violent. 
42 Scruuid (1983), chapter two. 
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regards to some RAF target areas, but there is no indication that the 
East Gennans (or the Soviets via them) directed the group. 4 3 
Terrorism as political violence can be reduced to its basis in 
psychological factors on a mass scale, and sociological theories can be 
seen as the setting for communication theories. Terrorists' own theories 
overlap with communication theories as propaganda, and surrogate (or 
internal) war theories because they seek to provoke internal repression 
to force mass participation. 
This reductionism has left only psychological, communication and 
surrogate (or internal) war theories. Psychological theories seek the 
answer within the individual terrorists. Communication theories view 
terrorism as a fonn of propaganda to spread particular political 
messages, and war theories view terrorism as military instead of 
political violence. The first raises personal questions, whereas the 
other two raise questions about the function of terrorism. Each of these 
raise research questions that lead in different directions. 
If one assumes that terrorism is a type of war, then questions of a 
military and paramilitary nature are raised in research that seeks to 
contain and counter terrorism with police and paramilitary measures, or 
expounds on terrorism's suitability as a type of warfare in special 
situations. If terrorism is seen as a tactic used to gain attention from 
official authorities by those who see no other means, then the study 
focuses on communication channels, sociopolitics, psychology, authority 
and power. The use of violence in this case does not necessarily signal 
the pursuit of military goals. Knowing that they cannot win militarily, 
terrorists can use violence and force rhetorically.44 
The psychological theories are linked to the 'terrorist 
personality' question, which has only produced generalisations, 4 5 and 
allows simple answers: yes I they are 'psychologically disturbed', in 
which case the governments can disregard the terrorists' demands, or no, 
as a rule they are not 'psychologically disturbed f, in which case the 
43 "Lauschen untenn pflaumenbaum" Der Spiegel 26 (24 June) 1991, 92-
5. 
44 Szabo I Crelinsten, 346; Ralph E. Dowling, "Terrorism and the 
Media: A Rhetorical Genre" Journal of camrunication 36 (1) 1986, 12-24, 
13. 
45 Laqueur, 76-77; see also Martha Crenshaw, "The Subjective Reality 
of the Terrorist: Ideology and Psychological Factors in Terrorism", in: 
Robert O. Slater, Michael Stohl (eds. ) , CUrrent Perspectives on 
International Terrorism (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1988), 12-46, 28-
9. 
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government has to take the terrorists' positions, statements! and their 
implications into account.46 
The reductionism must proceed further to bring these three theories 
of terrorism together to form a model that explains individuals, groups! 
society and how they intertwine. The model needs to account for the 
interactions between many persons and collectives, involving 
psychological effects and subjective evaluations of many, in an attempt 
to explain the behaviour of few: why do some resort to political 
violence and terrorism, while others pursue other means?47 
The 'psychological' component focuses itself on individual! group 
and government responses in an eXffiuination of their subjective 
posi tions. The 'communication' aspect explains the sociologial context 
of group and individual situations in society. It and the 'war' theories 
also explain government and society's responses to terrorism. 
Therefore, it is necessity to examine theories which bring these 
three concepts! 'psychological', 'communication' and 'war' together in 
one model which involves individuals! groups and society. Two 
possibilities appear, one sociological and one social psychological. The 
sociological model is less a luodel and more a list of stages on the path 
to terrorism that begins with social protest .and ends with an active 
terrorist groUp.48 
(1) There is a broad social movement. 
(2) Some members of the social movement experience repressive 
violence in conflict with their adversaries which leads to 
radicalisation and public discussion of counterviolence. 
( 3) A lack of response from the addressed audience of the social 
movement leads to frustration and increased determination of the social 
movement, some of whom discuss tactical violence to achieve their goals. 
(4) The decision of some, but not others! to tread this path needs 
to be uncovered in individual biographies. 
(5) The nascent violence promoting group within the social movement 
uses models of the Tupamaros, Palestinians and others as examples of the 
possibilities available to them. 
46 Raymond R. Corrado, "A Cri tique of the Mental Disorder 
Perspective of Political Terrorism", International Journal of Law and 
Psychiatry 4, 1981! 293-309, 293. See also Walter Reich, "Understanding 
Terrorist Behavior: The Limits and Opportunities of Psychological 
Inquiry", in: Walter Reich (ed.)! Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, 
Ideologies, Theories, States of Mind (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), 261-79. 
47 Wilkinson (1986), 31. 
48 See Schmid (1983), 233-4. 
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(6) The first acts by this violent group test the responses of the 
public and government as to the group's potential and freedom of action. 
( 7 ) The furthe.r development of the violent group is influenced by 
dynamics between the group and state reaction. Action deened successful 
by the violence promoting group affirms their choice, but state 
prosecution isolates them in the underground. 
( 8 ) The violence promoting group is the focus for others to join 
them via the media. 
e 9 ) The life span of the violent group is detennined by police 
effectiveness, and public resonance and support. 
This provides a general idea of the processes involved, but does 
not address particulars. It addresses individuals only vaguely and does 
not explain how individuals become attached to groups, whose internal 
dynamics are also ignored. Instead the focus is on society and how it 
does not respond to the social movement, wi thout any attention paid to 
the possibility that the group initiated the cycle. The 'psychological' 
component is obliquely addressed in individual biographies, while 
'communication' is attended to in the idea of the group message, and 
with 'war' included as the goverrunent response. 
The social psychological model addresses each of these particular 
concerns, individuals, groups, government response, and public and media 
reaction, as is shown in chapters four through seven. Each i tern is 
discussed generally and then with relevance to left-wing terrorism in 
the Federal Republic of Germany . Individual attention to these topics, 
as mentioned previously, is not enough, because of their s~ubiotic 
relationships. Therefore a concept that joins them together is also 
requisite. 
3.3 The Concept of Identification 
In an attempt to overcome some of these problems this thesis 
furthers the concept of 'identification', a tenn from social psychology 
that refers to the influence one person can exert on the behaviour of 
another person, group or society, or any combination thereof. Some 
people identify with victims of terrorism out of compassion (or the fact 
that they may have been victims too), while others identify with the 
terrorists because of the power they appear to have, or because they 
felt the victim was 'guilty'. Identification can be influenced by 
several factors with one or two key factors (class, race, nationality, 
or party) being the decisive ones for most people. 49 
49 ibid., 195-6. 
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The concept of identification used here is an amalgam of theories 
about thesourcea of personal and group identities, which concentrates 
upon the relationship between individuals, groups and society. Personal 
identities arise from an individual's perception of one's present self-
image in relation to one's past self-image and development towards one's 
future self-image ideal, whereby progress towards a confident identity 
depends upon the continual synthesis of the past self into the present 
self and a path the individual's identi ties are detennined by 
lifestyles, experience and the cultural and historical context. 50 
The fonnation of individual's self-images is influenced by one's 
posi ti ve and negative interpretation of entities ( individuals, groups, 
institutions), and how one resolves conflicts between the perceived 
'good' found in negative role models and the 'bad' found in positive 
ones, whereby the detennination of positive and negative entities is 
influenced by social relations. 51 These social relationships maintain 
and modify individual indenty, because individual identity is a 
continual process of reflection and adaptation to the perceived 
reception of oneself by others deemed significant by the person. 52 Thus 
individual identity is a group identity, which is fought and strived 
for, and which expresses desires from which demands and actions 
follow. 53 
The usefullness of identification in the study of terrorism arises 
out of the overlap of the focus of the two on the relationship between 
individuals, groups and society and how each of these influences one 
another. For example, within this thesis processes of identification 
which transfer a love of mankind to terrorism may be explained by 
problems with family, class or social group identifications. In West 
Gennany in the late sixties and early seventies this could be 
particularily difficult because of the Nazi legacy resurfacing as fonner 
Nazis were rehabili tated and took up posts in government and society. 
50 Peter Weinreich, "Identity Exploration in Adolescence" 
International Journal of Molescent Medicine and Health 1 (1/2) 1985, 
51-71, 54-5; see also: Peter Weinreich, Manual for Identity Exploration 
Using Personal Constructs (Binningham: SSPC Research Unit on Ethnic 
Relations, University of Aston, 1980). 
51 Kannela Liebkind, M:inority Identity and Identification Processes: 
A Social Psychological Study (Helsinki: The Finnish Society of Sciences 
and Letters, Commentationes Scientarum Socialium no. 22, 1984), 50, 55-
6. 
52 Peter L. Berger, Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of 
Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge (Hannondsworth: 
Penguin Books Ltd., 1971), 194. 
53 Friedrich Hacker, Terror: Mythos, Realitaet, Analyse (Reinbek: 
Rowolht, 1975), 131; Erik H. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1968), 300-1. 
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The left-wing groups offered individuals the Third World as an 
alternative. 54 The protesters viewed the goverrunent as imperialists who 
endangered society and the Third World. In response the protesters chose 
to identify with the Third World revolutionary movements that offered 
them alternatives to the National Socialist past. 
At societal level identification explains how terrorists use this 
concept to gain sympathy and new members from supporters f while also 
arousing fear in their target audiences. 55 These processes could be seen 
in the kidnapping of Schleyer in the seventies. The government was to be 
fearful of certain types of behaviour and action that would endanger 
people if they did not release the imprisoned terrorists. Particular 
government officials responsible for sentencing or apprehending 
terrorists [ or high persons in the business world who have links with 
goverrunent and industry were to feel threatened that they might be the 
next victims. These identification messages showed terrorist supporters 
that the group was active and needed more members to further the 
struggle [ while the public was to see (in the government I s actions) that 
the terrorists were the ones who deserved and needed public support. 
Terrorism [ in the above context, is a communication tool used to 
manipulate target audiences with the threat and/or use of violence. The 
government [ tries to counter these efforts wi thout allowing change in 
the power (who governs and implements policy) and social structure 
(policy content and resource distribution). Each side struggles to 
discredit the other to receive and retain legitimacy with audiences [56 
through the use of labels to steer identification. 
One linplication of this labelling process for the state (and state 
terrorism) is public difficulty in positively identifying with 
bureaucracies they hold responsible for activities. Therefore [ in state 
terrorism it is likelier that the victim and targets will gain the 
audiences I sympathy and support [ rather than the regime or state. 5 7 The 
institutionalisation of social functions may also contribute to this as 
people lose their 'role:-distance I. The bureaucrat has his regulations [ 
and cannot do otherwise [ or he may be seen to act out of resignation 
because he weighs the options and calculates the risks and benefits to 
national interest. Individual terrorists [ on the other hand [ are 
54 Schmid (1983)[ 199. 
55 ibid. [ 200. 
56 Ronald D. Crelinsten, "Terrorism as Political Communication: The 
Relationship Between the Controller and the Controlled" [ in: Paul, 
Wilkinson, Alasdair M. Stewart ( eds . ) [ Contemporary Research on 
Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press[ 1987)[ 3-23, 7. 
57 Wardlaw, 7-8. 
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sow.et:iJ1~s ~een tp a~t ()n.,~emotfon or psychosis. The situation and the 
) 
structures are both detennining factors. 58 
"'" -':: 
III summary, Figur~ 1.1 (page 16 }::shows it is possible tq construct 
-," "I •. ; 
a .tentative diagram of . identification and its levels of operation. 
Figure 1.1 shows why subjects ;Ldentify with objects, be they terrorists']! 
the general public, government Rupporters, or others. Where the subject 
is a terrorist, group Qr scx.::iet;y (the social basis for sympathisers and 
, ., 
the general public) I. then the matrix.. provides reasons for them to 
support: :the individu?ls ,group or society. The matrix also explains why 
, . 
~e ~~verage.persQnin the street I ,.,or other category Will identify with 
the,j:;I?r.r:orist;s I opponents. 
, ," ,.Allindividuals, groups and societies that" ,fill the boxes in the 
matrix are prone. to iq.~alisation which facilitates identification. 
" -
'Victim I (s) are polished when subjects perceive them as any iD;ciividual 
or. group of society:y/hich is the object of perjorative specialt:r;-eatment 
or attention, This may be murder, or ill treatment, as well as, in.the 
ca\36 ,of society, a terrorist campaign which leaves the target 
iJ;l<iividuals or groups with the feeling that they are in the same 
pituation. 
Figure 1.1 Identification 
Object 
All five terrorism participants: the perpetrators, the immediate 
victims, 'the wider target group (or society that is to be intimidated), 
the 'neutral I bystanders wi thin society, and the international opinion 
that maybe aware of the events59 are thus affected by identification. 
58 H.C. Greisman, IISocial Meanings of Terrorism: Reification, 
Violence, and Social Contror l Contemporary Crises 1, (1977), 303-18, 
303, 304, 308. 
59 Paul Wilkinson, IIForeword- -Terrorism: An International Research 
Agenda? II , in: Paul Wilkinson, Alasdair M. Stewart (eds.), Contemporary 
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The terrorist perpetrators seem to be in a no-lose situation: 
identification with victims brings psychological humiliation, 
disorientation and intirnidation- -a victory for the terrorists. Direct 
identification with the terrorists brings them new supporters. No 
'neutral' bystanders can exist because of the polarisation of terrorist 
violence. 60 This applies equally to international opinion and other 
groups. The requirement is to understand why people identify with the 
reference group tha:!;: they do, and what facilitates or causes a change in 
reaction from positive to negative. 
Identification processes work at the three levels the thesis 
examines: i:ndividual, group and society. A person can join a group 
because they see themselves similar to others. The group can identify 
with other .groups, and society can cause some people to disassociate 
themselves from it. 
For these. reasons it seems appropriate to attempt to use 
'identification' as a linking concept to formulate the motivation of 
left-wing terrorism. While the thesis will not offer a theory of 
terrorism applicable to all terrorisms, a theory for West German left-
wing terrorism can become a building block for other theories of 
terrorism, and perhaps lead to a new path that negates this apparent 
terrorist success with identification. 
The thesis therefore examines left-wing terrorism in the Federal 
Republic of Gennany and the applicability of identification as an 
overarching concept to this type of political terrorism. While the 
results of the case study influence the descriptive ability of the 
concept as a whole, they do not limit the power of the sub-concepts 
discussed with regards to individuals, groups, government, society and 
the m~dia. Each of these also has relevance to the study of terrorism in 
highlighting different areas of the multifaceted phenomenon. 
Be~o~e moving on to these theoretical discussions it is first 
necessary to found these discussions on the case study. This takes two 
forms. Chapter two relates an overview of the conditions in which left-
wing terrorism in West Germany arose, how it developed and what groups 
were involved. Chapter three examines the extent of left-wing terrorism 
in the country and the particular areas of concerns to the terrorist 
g:r;oups with a discussion of the issues they have sought to raise with 
the public aI:!d the government. 
Research on. Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), xi-
. - .. -:. '.' , '. 
XX, Xl. 
60 Alex P. Schmid, "Terrorism and the Media: The Ethics of 
Publicity" Terrorism and Political Violence 1 (4) 1989, 539-565, 541). 
CHAPTER TWO: LEFT-WING TERRORISM IN WEST GERMANY 
THE HISTORY 
we are worldwide, only not yet here. here we fight .... l 
How should we ever find it out, if we do not first try? 
That the FRG is one of the last countries, in which a 
revolution is imaginable, means only that here every 
attack counts twice. Here is the brain of the monster, 
I think, the blows hurt him more here, than when 
something happens somewhere in the jungle on the other 
side of the world. You can already read that in what 
the pigs invest in searches for uS ... Do you think they 
would do that, if they were secure on the chairs they 
throne their fat arses on ... ?2 
... here you defend the houses, your houses, our houses, 
off we go. then the bulls [pigs] come, banging on the 
shields I after two stones k. runs ... 
-and when you close the door behind you, stumbling in 
the dark hallway with the beams in front, then you're 
not in just any house, any old rubble i this house 
doesn't belong to the state any longer, it is a house 
outside of it. 3 
18 
This chapter presents a historical analysis of the major events and 
developments in left-wing terrorism in West Gennany as a basis for later 
analysis in the remainder of the thesis, and to highlight the sources of 
terrorist identifications in their activities. The chapter examines the 
sources of left-wing terrorism from the late sixties onwards, and the 
development of the Red Army Faction, the Second of June Movement, the 
Revolutionary Cells and Autonomen. This is done first for the sources of 
terrorism in the sixties, then the development of the terrorist groups 
in the seventies with a section about West German and Palestinian 
terrorist cooperation included. Discussion about terrorism in the 
eighties also includes 'Euroterrorism' developments, and the cooperation 
between the Red Army Faction and the East German security service. The 
details of individuals, group dynamics, government countermeasures, 
public and media reaction are discussed in later chapters. 
1. Pre-Terrorism Developments 
The structures of the left-wing terrorist groups in the Federal 
Republic of Germany arose out of the situations in which the groups were 
1 Geissler, 267. There is no capitalisation in this book. 
2 Boock (1988), 97. 
3 Michael Wildenhain, zum beispiel k. (West Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 
1983), 55. There is no capitalisation in this passage. 
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formed. 4 Each group was a reflection of those it originally identified 
with as a social basis. 
The remnants of the student movement in the late sixties and early 
seventies provided an original base for the Red Army Faction, while the 
Second of June Movement joined with the counter-culture closer to the 
workers. 5 This was the result of the domination of early terrorist 
acti vi ty by two groups: those from mainly uni versi ty and middle-class 
origins that recognised the need for targeted 'counterviolence I by a 
vanguard, and those from the lower classes. 6 
These bases in the student and protest movements of the sixties 
supplied the early basis for terrorist groups and provide clues why the 
terrorist groups felt their violence was necessary and indicate why 
public support did not materialise. 
1.1 The Student Movement 
When the student movement was at its peak in 1968/69 two-thirds of 
the seventeen to twenty-five year old students mistrusted the West 
German political party system. In July 1968 one-third of them 
sympathised with leftist groups. After the Warsaw Pact I s march into 
Prague it was still 28% in December 1968. Demonstrators accounted for 
36% of students in January/February 1968 and 53% in June/July 1968. Non-
academic youths in the S~TIe age group taking part in demonstrations were 
only 5%.7 
Similar movements were underway all around the world. Paris saw 
revolts in May 1968, the American student movement was only the latest 
of a string of events that began in the early sixties with the Free 
Speech movement in Berkeley, California. Japan was also undergoing 
similar events. Connections and identifications between these and the 
4 Hans Josef Horchem, "Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
1985" Beitraege zur Konfliktforschung 16 (1) 1986, 5-23, 7; see also Jo 
Groebel, Hubert Feger, "Analyse von Strukturen terroristischer 
Gruppierungen", in: Wanda von Baeyer-Katte, Dieter Claessens, Hubert 
Feger, Friedhelm Neidhardt (eds.), Gruppenprozesse: Analysen zum 
Terrorismus 3 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982), 393-432, 400. 
5 Hans Josef Horchem, "Terrorism in Germany 1985", in: Paul 
Wilkinson, Alasdair M. Stewart ( eds. ) , Contemporary Research on 
Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), 141-168, 144; 
Peter Brueckner, "Politisch-psychologische Anmerkungen zur 'Roten Armee 
Fraktion" l Soziologisches Jahrbuch 43 (5) 1973, 73-100, 74. 
6 Bernward Vesper, Die Reise. Rananessay (Reinbek: Rowohlt Verlag, 
1983), 689. 
7 Gerd Langguth, Protesti>ewegung: Entwicklung- -Niedergang-
Renaissance. Die Neue Linke seit 1968 (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und 
Politik, 1983), 17. 
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Third World liberation movements also existed. 'One, two, many Vietnams' 
was the slogan, and they all claimed to fight for justice and freedom.8 
The immediate concern in West Germany, however, was local. The 
universities had been established in the aftermath of World War Two and 
not attended to since then as other priori ties such as the Cold War, 
restoration of the country, and the economy called for more attention. 9 
A major problem with higher education in the sixties was 
overcrowding. In 1960 there were 291,000 students, in 1965 384,000 and 
in 1966 over 400,000. The government did not reform the university 
structures in 1966, but limited the number of students for sane studies, 
and introduced time limits on the length of study.10 
Apart from massive overcrowding which caused problems with lack of 
teaching facilities, there were also increasing student-staff ratios as 
staff were not increased. This was further encumbered by outdated 
elitist staff attitudes towards the students, whereby the Ordinarius 
professors were completely sovereign wi thin their deparments as to who 
was promoted, who received academic positions, and who was accepted for 
doctorates. Everyone was dependent upon the Ordinarius, who were 
beholden to no one. The staff were not ready for the general 
intellectual decline of the students, which presumably occurred with 
growing student numbers.11 
The students fel t that in democratic states uni versi ty consumers 
should have a say in their education, and demanded more democracy in 
university administration. The students objected to the bureaucratic 
reforms which they saw as a means of producing "functional elites and 
ideologically conformist experts."12 
Few outside of the Sozialdernokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD , 
Social Democratic Party) sponsored student group, the Sozialistischer 
8 Langguth, 19; Willibald Karl, "Students and the Youth Movement in 
Germany: Attempt at a Structural Comparison" Journal of Contemporary 
History 15 (1) 1970, 113-127, 113; Hans Martin Bock, Geschichte des 
'linken' Radikalismus in Deutschland: Ein Versuch (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Edition Suhrkamp, 1976), 196; Hans Josef Horchem, "Fuenfzehn Jahre 
Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik" Aus Politik lIDd Zeitgeschichte 31 
January 1987, 3-15, 3; Fridrich Mager, Ulrich Spinnarke, Was wollen die 
Studenten? (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Bucherei, 1967), 30. 
9 William David Graf, The German Left Since 1945: Socialism and 
Social Democracy in the German Federal Republic, ( Cambridge: The 
Oleander Press, 1976), 260. 
10 ibid., 261; Uwe Schlicht, Van Burschenschafter bis zum Sponti: 
Studentische Opposition gestern lIDd heute (West Berlin: Colloquium 
Verlag, 1980), 69-70. 
11 Corrado (1983), 303-4. 
12 Schlicht, 91; Rob Burns, Wilfried van der Will, Protest and 
Democracy in West Germany: Extra-Parliamentary Opposition and the 
Democratic Agenda (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1988), 104. 
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Deutscher Studentenbund ( SDS , Socialist G€rman Students), 13 recognised 
these problems in the sixties. The SDS linked them with social values, 
and used it to justify its position that the universities could only be 
changed with society. 
The students believed that, because the universities were part of 
society, they reflected society in the values they promoted. It was thus 
necessary to change the society whose values were reflected in the 
uni versi ty . Furthermore, the student powerbase in the uni versi ties was 
the starting point for this change which would begin by the students 
joining with the workers, whose interests, the students theorised, 
overlapped with their own. The necessary ingredient, according to the 
students, was enlightenment of the students and workers. 14 
The connection between Western democracies and the Third World was 
obvious to the SDS and the left in the early sixties as they began 
discussions in 1960 on liberation movements, colonialism and anti-
imperialism. Foremost in this discussion, which slowly spread into 
society, was the role of the West, and especially of the USA in Vietnam. 
The students called into question the simple East-West relationship 
which prevailed in the Cold War, that the USA and its allies were good, 
while the USSR and the Eastern Bloc were evil. The students saw the USA 
in Vietnam as a traitor to the democratic ideals it propounded, and 
guilty of war crimes and genocide. These ideas made the public uneasy, 
because suddenly all students were suspect: was the student a friend's 
son or daughter, or the person in the street?15 
1.2 The Protest Movement 
Whereas the student movement concerned a wide range of social 
issues, the protest movement was more single-issue orientated. The 
protest movement in the Federal Republic began with the anti-
militaristic and pacifist movement against conscription and 
remilitarisation in the fifties, and the Easter Marches of the sixties 
against nuclear weapons, to end the late sixties in protest against the 
emergency laws in concert with the wider social critique of the student 
movement. 
After World War Two and the founding of West G€rmany the pacifist-
neutralists from the anti-militarist movement held the belief that peace 
13 Unlike the Young Socialists, the SPD' s youth group, the SDS was 
originally formed as an independent group of socialist students. Tilman 
Fichter, Siegward Loennendonker, Kleine Geschichte des SDS (West Berlin: 
Rotbuch Verlag, 1977), 14-5. 
14 Graf, 260-2. 
15 Burns, van der Will, 106; Schlicht, 59. 
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and its continuation should not be left to the politicians, but required 
extra-parliamentary pressure from below. This theme has flowed through 
all anti-militarist protest since then. 16 
The SPD's position on military and other issues changed in the late 
fifties as they effectively dropped any extra-parliamentary group and 
member, who did not support its own changes to a proper Volkspartei 
(people's party),17 which culminated in the new party programme adopted 
in 1959. The new programme allowed the SPD to open new doors and gain 
new members by overcoming religious, business and economic barriers. 
Beyond this the programme re-emphasized committment to parliamentary 
democracy, distancing from communism, protection of individual freedoms, 
striving for social justice, solidarity with the powerless and the 
furthering of science and education. 18 
Those to the left of the new Social Democratic Party position had, 
apart from the illegal Kommunistische partei Deutschland (KPD, Communist 
Party of Germany) which had been banned in 1956 and its cover 
organisations, no coherent organisation, and only a minimal consensus on 
programmes, leaders and mass basis .19 Therefore protest against SPD 
policy had to proceed in a general format outside of the party while 
opposi tion wi thin the party occurred- -for a while- -wi thin the SPD-
affiliated Socialist German Students. 
SDS opposition to SPD changes led to the SPD disowning the SDS in 
1961. The SPD also disagreed with SDS collaboration with the 
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED, Socialist Unitary Party 
of Germany), the East German ruling communist party, the KPD and other 
socialist groups. The SPD was fearful these other groups would subvert 
the SDS, or allow the Christliche Demokratische Union ( CDU , Christian 
Democratic Union) and its Bavarian sister party the Christliche Soziale 
Union (CSU, Christian Social Union) to label the SPD as communist 
sympathisers. 2o 
The SPD wanted to maintain its 'respectable' image and avoid any 
'red' taint it might otherwise acquire, and when the 'right' faction in 
the SDS split away in May 1960 to form the Sozialdemokratischer 
Hochschulbund (Social Democratic Federation of Students), they were 
recognised by the SPD. Their position was reinforced in June when the 
SPD disassociated itself from the SDS by stopping its funding for them, 
16 Burns, van der Will, 73. 
17 ibid., 90-91. 
18 Susanne Miller, Die SPD vor und nach Godesberg, (Bonn-Bad 
Godesberg: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1974), 37-38. 
19 Graf I 224 . 
20 ibid., 258. 
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and in November the SPD added the incompatibility of SPD and SDS 
membership which left the SPD in a publicly securer position. 21 
Choosing the means of extra-parliamentary opposition necessitated a 
consensus on issues of concern. By 1962 the SDS was represented by 1000 
persons at twenty-six universities and colleges. The issues they 
canvassed on then would be with them throughout the sixties and into the 
seventies: cri ticism of internal party organisation, the absence of 
alternative foreign and domestic policies, exposition on restoration of 
the pre-war hierarchy, and refutation of anti -cOiffilunism and Cold War 
premises. 2 2 
The overriding theme of SDS theory was revolutionary emancipation. 
As the group was in the minority, and as some argued, in isolation from 
the masses, they were limited to creating the conditions for the 
revolutionary situation. This was to be done through enlightenment about 
the current system's power and privilege! injustices! and transformation 
of this knowledge into a desire for change. The SDS hoped to 
revolutionise the public by means of provocation, sit-ins! and 
confrontation. The old themes of anarchism! direct action and 
spontaneity also returned23 with the increased extra-parli~nentary 
acti vi ty and self-organisation in the uni versi ty cities. To achieve 
these SDS goals a double-strategy was formulated on the assunption that 
the liberal constitution of the FRG must be actively defended! because 
it expounds liberal rights on the road to socialism! to which it must 
also be actively extended. 24 
The SDS, however, was not the only left of SPD group in the sixties. 
Five opposition forms developed. First! the old left Socialist League! 
was a forum to air socialist theory and ideas! and to cri tique SPD 
praxis outside of the SPD party. Second! the old left Union of 
Independent Socialists, was an undogmatic nucleus organisation to serve 
as the forerunner of a future party by developing theory, programme and 
tactics, while wai ting for the condi tions for socialist transition. 
Third! the German Peace Union and Easter March movement! was a broad-
based minimal consensus organisation and platfonn that would use any and 
all available opposition groups to gain a share of power to achieve some 
parliamentary representation to air vital views. Fourth, the New Left 
around the SDS, developed anti-authoritarian and anti-capitalist theory, 
programme and tactics while forcing the conditions through public 
21 ibid., 230; Burns! van der Will, 103. 
22 Graf, 233. 
23 ibid., 278; Bock, 253! mentioned their spreading via pirate 
pressings of anarchist classics. 
24 Graf! 259-260. 
24 
awareness. Fifth, the idea to form a conspirative, closely knit party 
which would draw its ideology and tactics from outside the party 
organisation developed in the late sixties and early seventies into the 
terrorist organisations, which were unpopular and illegal. 2 5 Together 
the five strands, with the fifth coming from the breakup of the fourth 
in later years, contributed their support to the Ulnbrella protest 
organisation of the Ausserparlarnentarische Opposition (APO r Extra-
parli~TIentary Opposition). 
The APO was a new occurence in the FRG as evidenced by its 
structure, function and methods. Whereas earlier extra-parliamentary 
activity was independent of other groups, or in addition to other 
organisations, the APO was an independent structure with internal 
exchanges within the organisation. 26 
The APO's self-organisation forms and its tactics (provocative 
protest, 'go-ins' ,and 'sit-ins') had not previously been used by other 
institutions and parties. The self-organising format meant the APO was a 
collective learning process, independent of the established 
institutions, against which it organised on behalf of the organising 
persons and groups instead of as extensions of official party-politics 
as in the past.27 
The goal of the APO was grassroots mobilisation of the public 
through information exercises to exemplify and politicise the autonomous 
and solidarity abili ty of the affected groups. This was based upon 
unlimited openness of discussion and decision processes, and the belief 
that through self-participation they could change socialisation 
processes and unwind authoritarian mentality.28 
The growth of the APO was aided by the formation of the Grand 
Coalition between the SPD and the CDU!CSU in December 1966 as the SPD's 
desire to leave the opposition and join the government resulted in their 
proof to the public and their supporters that they could administer the 
government as a viable alternative to the Christian democratic parties. 
The SPD also acted in the belief that more could be achieved by working 
with partners on the inside, than from outside of an administration. 29 
25 ibid., 236-237, 277. 
26 Kar 1 A. Otto, Van Ostennarsch zur APO: Geschichte der 
ausserparlamentarischen Opposition in der Bundesrepublik 1960-70, 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, 1977)r 23-4. 
27 ibid., 24 
28 ibid., 24-25. 
29 Wilfried Roehrich, Die verspaetete Demokratie: Zur politischen 
Kultur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, (Cologne: Eugen Diederichs 
Verlag, 1985), 192. 
25 
Outside of the Grand Coalition many now saw the Social Democrats as 
equivalent to the Christian Democratic parties and lost their belief in 
political change through parliamentary reforms. This led to a search for 
new political opposition forms.30 
The founding of the Grand Coalition had far reaching implications. 
First, it coincided with the end of the economic boom and prosperity as 
recession arrived, and therefore a loss of perspective and direction for 
the CDUjCSU goverrunent. It also became apparent that long overdue 
refonns were needed in education, social welfare, social planning and 
redistribution of social goods. Third, a relaxation in the Cold War 
affected CDUjCSU ideology. Coupled with this was the viewpoint of the 
left that the upper-classes and their parties were reverting to 
authori tar ian measures in the form of the emergency law legislation, 
(discussed further below) censorship, and 'criminalisation' of non-
conformist political groups. Lastly, there was a sense of dissillusion 
with politics and apparently monolithic political parties. 31 
There were fears that the Grand Coalition would lead to the end of 
democratic conflict in the creation of an organised society.32 This did 
not occur. Instead the inner-SPD opposition about participation in a 
government headed by a former Nazi, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, and the APO 
protest movement developments, led to a turn in the development of the 
FRG. The SPD was presented with criticism and poli tical al ternati ves 
from inside and outside of the party.33 
The anti -authori tarian student movement eroded the APO in their 
common work against the emergency laws. The trade union element shrank 
as the student presence grew due to the students' ideas of ' cultural 
revolution'. While the students brought great expectations to their work 
with the workers and unions, the latter did not share the students' 
enthusiasm for 'revolution', and the students remained isolated. It 
explains, to some extent, the movement's abrupt end after the passing of 
the emergency laws in 1968. 34 
Part of this was also due to a clash between the New and Old Left 
over the New Left's strategy of 'liberated areas' within which 'dual 
power' bases could be created in insti tutions by the introduction of 
direct democracy as an alternative to parliament and as a modification 
thereof. The requirement for these changes, according to the New Left, 
30 Langguth, 20; Graf, 275. 
31 ibid., 275. 
32 Burns, van der Will, 106. 
33 Horst Heinemann, Theoriediskussion in der SPD: Ergebnisse und 
Perspektiven, (Frankfurt a.M.: Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, 1975), 26-
27. 
34 Burns, van der Will, 112; Bock, 230. 
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was that 'late capitalism' needed to be revealed to the public by 
provoking the system of 'latent fascism' to become 'manifest fascism' .35 
Once things became worse, the people would see the need to work to 
reform them. 
'Latent fascism' was believed evidenced in the proposed emergency 
laws designed to implement internal controls in the event of domestic 
'emergency' situations, which were drafted in 1958. These constitutional 
amendments required a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag (lower house 
of parliament), thus requiring SPD support to pass them. The SPD opposed 
the amendments in principle until the early sixties, when it formulated 
seven addi tional points to prevent excessive abuse of the emergency 
powers. 3 6 A Grand Coalition thus presented an opportunity to pass the 
legislation. 
These general developments did not lead directly to terrorism, but 
specific incidents aggravated some underlying concerns. The first of 
these specific incidents was the Shah of Persia's visit to West Germany 
in June 1967. The shooting of Benno Ohnesorg by policeman Karl-Heinz 
Kurras at an anti-Shah of Persia demonstration in West Berlin on 2 June 
1967 brought the anti-emergency law campaign into closer alignment with 
the student movement and their call for the expropriation of the 
Springer owned press, which they held responsible for his death. This 
also made the question of violence, already discussed in the movement 
and in the APO, a standard element of discussion. 37 
In September 1967 Rudi Dutschke and Hans-Juergen Krahl of the 
Frankfurt SDS presented a joint paper in favour of urban guerillas 
operating against the executive power of the state to enlighten and 
mobilise the masses. Later these ideas bore fruit in the terrorist 
organisations, but in Hanover the idea of provoking 'fascist' reaction 
with calculated violence brought out the label of 'leftist fascism' .38 
In the meant~TIe, the anti-authoritarian sent~TIent against the 
Springer press led to the expropriate-Springer campaign in the fall and 
winter of 1967/68, with seminars and public education programmes in many 
university cities. The campaign message was to fight for freedom of 
opinion I which was unavailable wi th Springer's monopoly of publishing 
35 Burns I van der WillI 112; Otto I 174; Bock I 245-6. 
36 Graf I 250. 
37 Burns I van der WillI 99 1 110-111. 
38 Rudi Dutschke, "Das Sich-Verwiegern erfordert Guerilla-
Mentalitaet" I in: Rudi Dutschke, Geschichte ist machbar: Texte ueber des 
herrschende Falsche und die Radikalitaet des Friedens (West Berlin: 
Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1980), 89-95; Burns, van der Will, 111; Fichter I 
Loennendonker, 107-9. 
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power. The campaign was most intense in Berlin where Springer controlled 
seventy percent of the daily press. 39 
Between late 1966 and mid-1968 the other major item of discussion 
was the issue of the West and the Third World as represented in Vietnam. 
There had been one anti-Vietnam demonstration of 2000 persons in 
February 1966 in West Berlin, and a Vietnam congress in February 1968 
with German, French and Italian participation brought out 12,000 
demonstrators for a march. 40 
These demonstrations unnerved the public and local government, who 
mostly concurred wi th government support for American involvement in 
Vietnam. The public saw Vietcong and red flags, Rosa Luxernborg and Che 
Guevara photos as the same red flags of the enemy they were trying to 
keep out of West Berlin. The fact that the march went near the American 
forces living quarters was also considered provocative. 41 
The general public of the previous generation had matured in the 
fifties and early sixties when there was a democratic deficit in the 
attitudes of many of the younger generation of the time. As a result of 
the lack of a democratic tradition, because of its interruption by the 
Third Reich, this democratic deficit could be recognized by the 
depoliticisation of much of West German life, which resulted in their 
lower expectations of what democracy could offer. All of this was 
tempered with a strong anti-communist ideology, which was believed to be 
( a) the first line of defence for the new democracy, (b) a sign of 
positive political perspective, and (c) a convincing justification of 
the new democracy. It became instead a sort of 'substitute ideology' .42 
Therefore the counter-demonstration to show West Berlin's true 
orientation in support of the USA, involving right of centre student 
groups, trade unions and the political parties, brought out 68,000-
80,000 participants. The demonstrators carried banners proclaiming: 
'better dead than red', 'no money for long-haired apes', 'Dutschke- -
public enemy No.1'. The forty attacks on long-haired, rimless glassed 
persons showed the demonstrations' 'pogrom atmosphere' which raised 
public emotions. 43 
39 Otto, 162-163; Heinz Schaefer, "Die BILD-Zeitung eine 
Ordnungsrnacht im Spaetkapi talismus , " in: Heinz Grossmann, Oskar Negt 
(eds. ), Die Auferstehung der Gewalt: Springerblockade und politische 
Reaktion in der Bundesrepublik (Frankfurt a.M.: Europaeische 
Verlagsanstalt, 1968), 19-29, 19. 
40 Schlicht, 68-69. 
41 ibid. 
42 Langguth, 19-20. 
43 Schlicht, 69. 
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In this kind of atmosphere an assassination was attempted on Rudi 
Dutschke, a leading public figure identifiable with the APO and student 
movements on 11 April 1968 when he was shot by Josef Bachmann. On 3/4 
April Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, and two others had firebombed two 
Frankfurt department stores, and on 4 April Martin Luther King Jr. was 
assassinated, which was reported widely around the world. These all 
raised the question of violence. 44 
Shortly after the attack on Dutschke, 2000 persons, mainly 
students, gathered at the Technical University of Berlin, and later 
moved against the Springer press buildings as they decided Springer was 
responsible, and that by spontaneously blockading the building they 
would communicate to the public the connections between the Springer 
press and the attack on Dutschke. Several days later at the Easter March 
the SDS had 45,000 persons demonstrating against the Springer press in 
twenty cities. The city and nation were polarised on the issue between 
the young and old. 45 
These were, in theory, the types of actions and situations, the 
emergency laws were designed to handle, and therefore perhaps added to 
its passing in the Btmdestag. This was the first time the police were 
mobilised nationwide in response to internal developments, and not on a 
training exercise. 46 
This and other factors also contributed to the end of the Easter 
March: (1) the Emergency Laws were passed in June 1968 by the Btmdestag, 
which meant that the APO, mainly a protest movement mobilised against 
these laws, had to concede defeat despite having mobilised nearly all 
social strata on the issue; (2) the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 
1968 by the Warsaw Pact countries caused bitter controversy within the 
organisation when the communists refused to endorse any form of 
condemnation; (3) the advent of Ostpolitik and detente' meant some felt 
the organisation was no longer necessaryj (4) the minimal consensus was 
also gone. Ideological divisions were opened every time the question of 
44 Ulrich Chaussy, Die drei Leben des Rudi Dutschke. Eine Biographie 
(Frankfurt a.M. : Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1985) f 195; Dieter 
Claessens, Karin de Ahna, "Das Milieu der Westberliner 'scene' und die 
'Bewegung 2. Juni''', in: Wanda von Baeyer-Katte, Dieter Claesens, Hubert 
Feger, Friedhelm Neidhardt (eds. ) , Gruppenprozesse: Analysen von 
Terrorismus 3 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982), 19-181, 86. 
45 Otto, 172; Schlicht, 72-73. 
46 Eckart Dietrich, "Notstandsuebung", in: Heinz Grossmann, Oskar 
Negt (eds.), Die AU£erstehung der Gewalt: Springerblockade und 
politische Reaktion in der Btmdesrepublik, (Frankfurt a.M.: Europaeische 
Verlagsanstalt, 1968), 42-75, 72. 
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methods of protest were discussed, and violence could not be prevented 
by group members.47 
The actions of the anti-authoritarian movement and the APO became 
more intense in the run-up to the final readings of the emergency laws 
in May and June 1968. The APO brought larger and larger numbers on to 
the streets for these demonstrations: 50,000 in Bonn, 30,000-40,000 and 
60,000 in West Berlin. They felt they were a power that would force the 
government to contend with them. The events in May in Paris, and the 
Prague spring only intensified these false feelings. University 
buildings may have been occupied by students on twenty-five university 
campuses, and ren~TIed after revolutionary heroes, but to no avail, the 
laws were passed. 48 
The passing of the emergency laws brought resignation and a loss of 
direction as the trade unions and others withdrew from the APO. The non-
communists withdrew from national into local and regional projects. The 
integrating power that was there before was lost in the coming years of 
1969 and 1970. 49 
This is why there is no clear direct line between left-wing West 
German terrorism and the protest groups of the left, despi te what 
conservatives and others have stated. Before 1969 f when the Social 
Democratic Party took power with the Free Democratic Party, some people 
went into the SPD f others into cQnmunist groups, and others became anti-
communist publicists, while even fewer became terrorists. The main link 
is the symbolism of the 'spirit of 68' .50 
Sectarianism occurred as the New Left groups fell apart into 
diverse tendencies, which now campaigned separately. The 
unpredictability and the creativeness of the sixties was replaced with 
dogmatism and loyalty to the cadre organisation in pursuit of the 
'correct party line'. A large number (over 100,000 members in the mid-
seventies, which represents roughly 25% of the student population) of 
student communist parties sprang-up with the theory that the working-
class could be reconstituted as a political agent and that class-warfare 
was to be seen both nationally and internationally.51 
A reaction against this dogmatism were the sponti groups that 
followed subjective views of problems with spontaneous (hence the name) 
responses. The spontis did not follow the false ideals of the late 
sixties: Vietnam, Cambodia, and Cuba were not attractive, and in this 
47 Burns, van der Will, 96, 98. 
48 Schlicht, 72-75. 
49 Otto, 175-7. 
50 Pridham, 18. 
51 Burns, van der Will, 115-116. 
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vacuum some spontis fonned land cormnunes, and Mescalero city indians 
city cormnunes. The spontis sought a path between accormnodation with 
capitalist society and the will to change things for all, while trying 
to avoid a loss of their perspective. 52 They were the Autanamen 
forerunners. 
2. TeITOrism in the Seventies 
The above discussion set the context for the following one of left-
wing terrorist group development in the Federal Republic of Gennany. The 
pre-terrorist developments brought forth the idea of provoking reactions 
by the government to bring , latent fascism' to 'manifest fascism', and 
established the connections between Third World development and the 
actions of the West with the idea of demonstrations at home to affect 
changes in the Third World. Lastly, with the end of the APO as the last 
alternative to leftist opposition, there was a loss of direction in the 
far left. 
2.1 Red Army Faction 
This first section on the Rote AImee Fraktion (RAF, Red Anny 
Faction) concentrates on three distinct phases of the group's 
development between 1968 and late 1974. Much of the detail of who, what, 
when and where is available elsewhere53 and is not discussed here. This 
chapter outlines group structure, organisation, and to sane extent, who 
was involved in the original discussions about group fonnation. 
The first phase, the RAF's incarnation, begins with the deparbnent 
store bombings in April 1968 and ends with the freeing of Andreas Baader 
in May 1970. The second phase continued on to the arrest of most of the 
group members in June 1972, was the logistical organisation of the group 
as it acquired the requisite means to conduct a short bombing cffinpaign. 
The last phase continued on until RAF member Holger Meins' death in 
November 1974, and represented the organised anned struggle from the 
prison cells via the torture cormnittees and lawyers. Each of these three 
52 Schlicht, 133-136; Guenter Amendt, "Vater und Erben," in: Frank 
Deppe (ed.), 2. Juni 1967 und die Studentenbewegung heute (Dortmund: 
Weltkreis Verlag, 1977), 19-32, 29. 
53 Aust (1987); Becker; Mario Krebs, Ulrike Meinhof: Ein Leben im 
Widerspruch (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1988); Sebastian Scheerer, "Deutschland: 
Die ausgebuergerte Linke", in: n.n., Angriff auf das Herz des Staates: 
Soziale Entwickhmg und Te:rrorismus Band I (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1988), 193-429; n.n., Der Baader-Meinhof-Report: Dokumente- -
Analysen- -Zusanmenhaenge (Mainz: Hase und Koehler Verlag, 1972) ; 
Reinhard Rauball (ed.), Die Baader-Meinhof Gruppe (West Berlin: Walter 
de Gruyter, 1972). 
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phases required different group organisation and structures that forced 
different operational methods. 
2.11 First Phase, 1968-1970 
The founder members of the Baader-Meinhof-Group, which called 
itself the Red AImy Faction, came together around the 3 April 1968 
firebombings of several Frankfurt department stores, and during the 
trial of those participants, which ended in a prison sentence on 31 
October 1968. Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Thorwald Proll and Horst 
Sohnlein instigated the arson, while Horst Mahler and Otto Schily were 
defence lawyers, and Ulrike Meinhof was an observing reporter. The idea 
for the department store bombing probably came from a court case in West 
Berlin which ended on 22 March 1968, with the acquital of Korrmune I 
members (see Second June section) accused of inciting people to arson. 
Baader, Ensslin and Proll had met the accused that week and left saying 
they were off to play with fire in department stores. 54 
Court appeals allowed the prisoners' release on 13 June 1969 and 
Baader and Ensslin began rehabilitation work with juvenile offenders. 
When the hoped for amnesty and revision of their prison sentences did 
not occur, they did not return to prison as ordered by the courts on 12 
November 1969, and went underground abroad before later returning to 
Berlin. After Baader's arrest on 4 April 1970 in West Berlin the group 
felt they had to free him, which was done on 14 May 1970, the date when 
many feel the group came into existence. 55 
The name of the group was reportedly in honour of the Japanese Red 
AImy, the left-wing terrorist group from Japan. The name also suggests 
that the group belongs to some larger organisation, i.e. an 
international Marxist-Leninist one, with them as the army thereof. It 
is, in fact, neither part of a Marxist-Leninist group, nor is it the 
army of another group. The 'RAF' abbreviation also recalls the British 
Royal Air Force, which along with the group's identification with the 
Red AImy, is an explicit identification with the major aggressors 
against the Third Reich and their parents' generation. Like the Allies 
in World War Two, the original Red AImy Faction also wanted to crush 
German fascism. 56 
54 Aust (1987), 49. 
55 ibid., 71-3, 84-5; Kahl, 40-2. Almost a year later the group 
first uses the Red AImy Faction name in the 26 April 1971 issue of Der 
Spiegel. 
56 Rauball, 30; B.H. Miller (1987), 379; Risto Fried in: Alexander, 
Katwan (eds.) (1980), 237. 
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2.12 Second Phase, 1970-1972 
The operational phase of the original Baader-Meinhof group was 
characterised by logistical and operational requirements in preparation 
for a bombing campaign in May 1972 shortly before the arrest of most 
members in June 1972. 
After the group returned from the Middle East, where they received 
military training in an Al Fatah camp in Jordan between June and August 
1970, they solved their most urgent requirements, arms and money, with 
armed bank robberies in West Berlin. Later some of the group went to 
West Germany to organise safe-houses, and other false identity 
requirements, such as blank passports f and similar requirements for 
vehicle registrations. 57 
New recruits to replace arrested and dead members, as well as to 
swell the ranks of the group, were sought through pamphlets about the 
group and its goals, 5 8 and by forging links and contacts wi th other 
revolutionary minded groups. For example, the RAF provided money and 
safe-houses to help support the Second of June in the early days of its 
formation in 1971 1 and the Revolutionary Cells and the B2J shared safe-
houses several years later. Some people also moved about between groups 
because they preferred one group over another. Other times the group 
leaders of the RAF, the B2J and the RZ would all meet with others. 59 
Belief in the Stadtguerilla (urban guerilla) ability to reproduce 
themselves by their 'actions' of robbery, bombings and other activities 
which attract followers6o in order to gain mass mobilisation 1 was common 
to the various terrorist groups in a form not unlike that espoused 
earlier by Dutschke. However, ideological and operational differences 
prevented the emergence of one terrorist organisation. 
57 Aust (1987)1 89, 96, 113-5; Kahl, 127-8. 
58 The early RAF papers were these: April 1971: "Das Konzept 
Stadtguerilla" 1 in: texte: der RAF (West Berlin: pirate 
pressing/Raubdruck, Ueberarbeitete und aktualisierte Ausgabe, 1983), 
337-367. October 1971: Ueber den bewaffneten Kampf in Westeuropa (West 
Berlin: Klaus Wagenbach Verlag, 1971). April 1972: "Dem Volk dienen- -
Rote Armee Fraktion: Stadtgurilla und Klassenkampf" 1 in: texte: der RAF 
(1983), 368-410 . November 1972: "Die Aktion des Scharzen September in 
Muenchen" 1 in: texte: der RAF (1983) 1 414-447. A full discussion of the 
ideology presented in these RAF (and also RZ) publications is found in 
Fetscher l Rohrmoser (eds.) (1981). 
59 Hans Josef Horchem l "Die Innere Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik" 
Beitraege zur Konfliktforsch'tmg 6 ( 4) 1976 1 45-62, 51; Claasens 1 de 
Ahna l 144; H.J. Klein (1979), 18, 41-2, 168-1721 206, says that he and 
Wilfried Boese were turned off by the RAF because they pressurised 
people 1 so they went to the RZ. 
60 Alex Schubert, "Die Stadtguerilla als revolutionaere Kampfform" 1 
in: Alex Schubert (ed.) f Stadtguerilla: Tupamaros in Uraguay- -Rote 
Annee Fraktion in der Bundesrepublik (West Berlin: Verlag Klaus 
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The main theme running through the early RAF theoretical papers was 
the necessity to begin the revolution immediately, because if one waits 
for the optimum revolutionary conditions to appear it will be too late. 
They also add that you will wait forever, because these conditions can 
only arise out of the revolutionary struggle. Furthermore, it is now the 
responsibility of the vanguard group to set the example of showing state 
vulnerability to the masses by undertaking the armed struggle against 
the repressive state. 61 
The armed struggle, however, had to move beyond logistical 
operations to an offensive campaign. For the Red Army Faction this was a 
bombing campaign in May 1972 , which had two aims. One was to end West 
German support for American involvement in Vietnam, and thus contribute 
to helping Third World revolutions through activity in the West. Another 
aim was to also avenge fallen and imprisoned comrades ( see chapter 
three) . 
Baader and others envisaged a group that was linked into a world-
wide framework of groups that worked towards the revolution. He saw an 
illegal group that could form armed commandoes (the underground hard-
core) that was supplied by a large nation-wide network of safe-houses 
run by legal sympathisers, and which was anchored in legal political 
organisations. The arrest and imprisonment of members in June 1972 
provided an ideal group for public focus, and this led to the setting up 
of the prisoner aid groupS.62 
2.13 Third Phase, 1972-1974 
This phase concentrated on the organised struggle from the prison 
cells as evidenced by increased Red Army Faction influence on the 
prisoner support groups; the organised information network between the 
prisoners 1 their lawyers and free terrorists; as well as the beginning 
of the hunger strike campaigns. The arrest of the majority of members in 
June 1972 , including Baader I Ensslin, Meinhof and Raspe 1 pushed the 
concept of the organised armed struggle from the prison cells to the 
fore of group activities. The imprisoned leaders wanted to ensure their 
control of the group. 
61 Red Army Faction, "Das Konzept Stadtguerilla" (1983), 356; 
Kollektiv RAF (1971), 43; Red Army Faction, "Das Konzept Stadtguerilla" 
(1983)1 350-1; (1971), 13, 32-3, 57 1 64; "Dem Volk Dienen: Stadtguerilla 
und Klassenkampf" (1983), 400-2. 
62 Andreas Baader (assumed) I "Dokumente 12" in: Bundesministerium 
des Innern (ed.), Dokumentation ueber Aktivitaeten anarchistischer 
Gewalttaeter in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn: BMI, 1974), 65-71 f 
70-1; also in Alfred Klaus, Aktivitaeten lIDd Verhalten inhaftierter 
Terroristen (Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, 1983), 44-5. 
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The first of the follow-on groups to rebuild the RAF was so nervous 
and careless that it was arrested virtually en masse on 4 February 1974. 
This encouraged others to be more careful and was always remembered by 
them. 63 Such a security service success has not been repeated. 
Some of the new RAF recruits came from the Sozialistisches 
Patientenkollektiv (Socialist Patients' Collective) after some 
collective members were arrested between 24 and 26 June 1971. Twenty-one 
of the twenty-two member ' inner circle' eventually found their way to 
the RAF. They were the main source of the so-called 'second generation' 
of West German terrorists. They worked through the offices of RAF 
lawyers and organised committees to publicise the terrorists' situation. 
The terrorists' hunger and thirst strikes against 'Isolation Torture' 
and the deaths of prisoners all kept the justice system off balance 
between 1972 and 1977. That the prisoners appeared to be 'victims' 
provided motivation for new members who sought to free imprisoned 
ones. 64 
At first the RAF tried to use whatever organisations were already 
at hand after its members were arrested. Rote Hilfe (Red Aid) was begun 
in 1968 in West-Berlin to help imprisoned leftists materially, 
ideologically, and with legal aid, and had since spread to other cities. 
The RAF used Red Aid to pressure the justice system because of previous 
RAF maTIber contacts with the group. This lasted until 1975 when some of 
its militant maTIbers joined the Revolutionary Cells. 65 
The Red Army Faction also exploited the Infonnationszentrum Rote 
Volksuniversitaet (IZRU, Information Centre Red Peoples' University) 
connected with the Socialist Patients' Collective, which increased its 
denunciations of the FRG 'justice system as a part of the new fascism' 
in their literature in autumn 1972, and their coverage of the 'torture' 
of RAF prisoners in 1973. This connection led active SPK members later 
63 "Der BM-Kode wurde geknacht" Der Spiegel 7 (11 February) 1974, 
29-34; Volker Speitel, "Wir wollten alles und gleichzeitig nichts" Der 
Spiegel 31/1980, 36-49, 44. 
64 Aust (1987), 147-151; Becker, 262; Informationszentrun Rote 
Volksuniversitaet (IZRU), Aus der Krankheit eine Waffe machen. Eine 
Agitationsschrift, (Munich: Trikont-Verlag, 1972), 29; Wanda von Baeyer-
Katte, "Das Sozialistische Patientenkollekti v in Heidelberg (SPK) " in: 
Wanda von Baeyer-Katte, Dieter Claessens, Hubert Feger, FriedheIm 
Neidhardt (eds.), Gruppenprozesse: Analysen zum Terrorisnrus 3 ( Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982), 183-316, 263; Jochen Reiche, "Zur Kritik 
der RAF" , in: Barbara Herzbruch, Klaus Wagenbach ( eds. ) , Jahrbuch 
Politik 8 (West Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1978), 16-23, 22. 
65 Klaus, 62-4. 
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to turn to the 'Ccmni ttees against Torture' as they sought greater 
assistance for the 'political prisoners'.66 
The lychpins of this activity were the RAF defence lawyers, who had 
been co-opted into the structure, or who willingly helped. They were 
central to the group's structure because their offices functioned as the 
heart of an information system designed in March 1973 to keep the 
imprisoned and free RAF members in mutual contact, to maintain the RAF 
as an organisation, and to maintain the political identity of the 
members in collective politicisation. The importance of the information 
system and archive can be measured in the rise of material transfers 
from over fifty letters and information packets between March and July 
1973 between the prisoners, the committees and the other lawyers' 
offices, to 9000 pages of materials by the end of 1974. 67 
In April 1973 other operations were underway to supplant the Red 
Aid and IZRU propaganda efforts with the RAF's own organisations 
established to propagandise the prisoners' posi tion in the aid of the 
struggle. Twenty RAF defence lawyers decided that judicial means were 
inadequate to end the 'torture' in prisons, and regional Kamitees gegen 
Isolationsfolter in Gefaengnissen der BRD (Committees against Isolation-
Torture in Prisons of the FRG) were organised that month. 68 
While the roughly 450 member ccmnittees were single-issue in 
orientation (to aid the prisoners and their struggle for freedom), the 
RAF wanted to involve more than just leftists in the anti-torture 
campaigns. The caumittees sought to construct a wide anti-fascist 
campaign over and above the anti-torture campaign with activities 
covering everything from handbills, money collections and petitions on 
one level; to demonstrations, educational seminars and gatherings with 
RAF lawyers and medical experts on another; all covered by national and 
international press conferences and documentation pieces on the 
'torture' and other 'deadly measures' which they alleged transpired in 
West German prisons. 69 
The brief of the committees was widened in September 1974, before 
the third RAF prisoners' hunger strike, to cover solidari ty with 
revolutionaries of the anti-imperialist struggle and with militant 
66 ibid., 65-6; Baptist Ralf Friedrich, "'Ich bitte um Vergebung'" 
Der Spiegel 34 (20 August) 1990, 52-62, 52. 
67 Klaus, 16-7; Walter Altmann, (ed.), Gegen den Terror: 
TextejDokumente (Stuttgart: Verlag Bonn Aktuell, 1978), 84-5; Pieter 
Bakker Schut (ed.), das info: briefe von gefangenen aus der raf aus der 
discussion 1973-1977 (Kiel: Neuer Malik Verlag, 1987), 5; Horst Herold, 
"Taktische Wandlungen des Deutschen Terrorismus" Die Polizei 67 (12) 
1976, 401-5, 403. 
68 Klaus, 67-70, 77. 
69 ibid., 80-4. 
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attacks against imperialist counter-strategy. Part of this was due to 
the RAF pushing canmittee members also to conduct illegal activity as a 
means of pushing them into the "drift to the underground", which was 
facilitated through work in lawyers offices and contacts with the 
underground established by the lawyers. 7o 
At the international level the RAF prisoners also sought to 
supplant Amnesty International with an international Red Aid type of 
organisation to serve as the legal umbrella for the diverse guerilla 
groups of the world to support their imprisoned members, and to fOTIn the 
base the RAF lacked in the FRG to guarantee safe havens for < released 
prisoners and members of the underground wanted by the authorities. The 
RAF defence lawyers only found weak international support for the 
International Committees for the Defence of Political Prisoners in 
Europe, founded in Paris on 20 January 1975, which only focused on 
prisoners in capitalist Europe. The 'Sektion-BRD' of the International 
Committees was housed in Stuttgart until the end of 1977, ~d functioned 
as a propaganda and agitation centre for RAF members with national and 
international responsibili ties. The breadth and effectiveness of this 
propaganda could be measured by the disturbances around Europe after the 
Stammheim deaths in 1977.71 
The relatives of imprisoned RAF members were also included in the 
group's legal acti vi ties. They were organised alongside the Committees 
to provide similar acti vi ties as well as spontaneous emotional reports 
of the prisoners' conditions, and hand in complaints to prison officials 
and politicians, as they sought to influence the prison,conditions. 72 
Recruitment was boosted after the death of Holger Meins in the 
RAF's third hunger strike (13 September 1974 to 5 February 1975) on 9 
November 1974. Meins' death publicised the terrorists' cause and 
situation more effectively than any other previous activity. Militants 
fel t a need to act immediately to help imprisoned members, because, in 
their eyes, Meins had been murdered, and others could also die if they 
did not assist them.73 Immediately after Meins' death the Second of June 
attempted the abduction of Judge Guenther von Drenkmann, the president 
of West Berlin's highest court, on 10 November. They failed and he died 
in the attempt. 74 
70 ibid., 84; V. Speitel, Der Spiegel 31/1980, 41. 
71 Klaus, 87-94; Volker Speitel, "Wir wollten alles und gleichzeitig 
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2.2 Second of Jlille Movement 
Al though the RAP is certainly better known than the Second of June, 
the latter, in its earlier fOTInations, was the first terrorist group in 
West Gennany. The Second of June Movement was a loose group of people in 
West Berlin in the late sixties, who came together in the counter-
cuI tures that fonned around the student and protest movement. Some of 
the members had come from 'Subversive Aktion' (Subversive Action), the 
West Gennan affiliate of the 'Situationists' who sought to transfoTIn 
society through the freedom of creative subjectivity in the revolution 
of everyday life. 75 
Subversive Action spread their message wi th posted handbills in 
1964-5 in Munich, Berlin, Stuttgart and Hamburg, and as individual 
menbers, joined the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenblilld. This was an 
indication of the politicisation of Subversive Action's original 
cultural criticism. 76 
One Subversive Action member, Rudi Dutschke, became a leading 
person in the SDS, while another, Dieter Kunzelmann, joined others to 
found another famous group of the late sixties, Kcmmme I (Commune One), 
a collective of persons who believed that political and private lives 
should not be separated, but continuous. The commune lifestyle was to 
become an example of how to break out of individual isolation, and 
family and pairing relationships. Kcmmme I (and later Kcmmme II), as 
opposed to WOhngemeinschaften (house or flat-sharing communities), were 
active groups of persons, while the others were living communi ties 
without separate political and private lives. FurtheTInore, when Kcmmme 
I was founded in late 1966, it was an exercise to show the practical 
possibilities of joining the 'struggles in the metropolises' with the 
publicising of 'liberation movements in the Third World'. Kcmmme I's 
example was followed in other university cities with less notoriety than 
the original, which was excluded from the SDS in May 1967 after it 
imperiled the SDS' reputation with its 'polit-clown' activities. 77 
The group achieved notoriety in April 1967 when menbers were 
arrested for an alleged bomb plot against visiting US vice-president 
Hubert H. Humphrey. The ' ronbs' were discovered to be made of pudding 
and yoghurt. On 24 May 1967 the group distributed handbills that again 
brought them to public and judicial attention for saying bolnbS should 
bring the 'Vietnam experience' to West Berlin. They were acquited in 
75 Claessens, de Ahna, 90. 
76 Bock, 209. 
77 Fichter, Loennendonker, 102-3; Burns, van der Will, 109; Bock, 
258-259. 
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March 1968 shortly before Baader and Ensslin firebombed Frankfurt 
department stores. 78 
By the time of the attempt on Dutschke in April 1968, there was 
also the Wieland Commune of ten to twenty people who lived off the 
proceeds from pirate pressings and shoplifting. Some of these members- -
Michael 'Bommi' Baumann, George von Rauch and others- -formed a 
terrorist cell whose first activity was to plant illegal transmitters 
around Berlin for Humphrey's visit and a small bomb that was given to 
Baumann by the securi ty service undercover agent, Peter Urbach ( see 
chapter six). The bomb was inoperative, and the group collected it 
again. Similar baUbs were also found at Kammune I during a house search, 
while the ones in Wieland Commune went undetected. 79 
These people formed the 'Blues', a group of persons that lived 
between the 'high' times and 'blue' (low) times in a counter-culture 
parallel to normal society. These people went on to form the zentralrat 
des Umherschweifenden Haschrebellen ( Central Committee of the Roaming 
Hash Rebels) in early 1969, a part of the 'militant core of the Berlin 
sub-culture' devoted to the struggle against the modern system of post-
capitalism in order to promote free decisions about relationships and 
lifestyles. They had no fixed abode, nor possessions, but passed through 
the numerous large apartments in West-Berlin, and lived in the easy 
going atmosphere of the the time and the 'scene' which accepted people 
using and sleeping where space was available. 8o 
Between October 1969 and April 1970, a group of about thirty 
persons formed the Tupamaros West-Berlin with a core of 'Blues' maUbers, 
four of whom could be seen as the 'hard-core' f and moved between five 
apartments in West-Berlin. 81 Two Tupamaros West-Berlin members, Dieter 
Kunzelmann and Ingrid Siepmann, were trained in Jordan in an Al Fatah 
camp between October and November 1969. Their training was possibly 
arranged via the Palestinian Student's General Union in the FRG which 
maintained close ties with left-wing students with up to 150 left-wing 
students from Europe and the United States attending a special one-month 
training course at the 'European Camp' in Arrnnan, Jordan run by Al-
Fatah. 82 
78 Aust (1987), 48-9; Rainer Langhans, Fritz Teufel, Klau mich: StFO 
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Tupamaros West-Berlin and the Hash Rebels had different viewpoints. 
The Tupamaros West-Berlin members had obtained military training in 
Palestine and pushed the Palestinian perspective over that of Vietnam 
and the Third World in general, while the Hash Rebels had no clear 
political direction! for which they received much criticism from the 
left.83 
The Bewegung 2. Juni (B2J, Second of June Movement) was officially 
created between 16 June and 8 July 1971 with about ten people in two 
groups coming together after release from prison to undertake violent 
illegal revolutionary activity.84 
In its early days the Second of June was a group of three to five 
sub-groups whose members were known to each other, and one of each sub-
group knew a contact person with the other sub-groups. The B2J was then 
only interested in West-Berlin, as it was familiar ground, and wanted to 
anchor itself in Berlin's working class. The B2J was to be worker 
orientated in contrast to the elitist RAP, who had never had contact 
with workers. 8s 
To ensure that the various Second of June commando groups did not 
trip over each other, or endanger another sub-group who was in the same 
area at the time of an operation, B2J used a system of 'supervision'. 
'Supervisors' would also notify the commando groups if they were to 
destroy clothing or other evidence, or to pass on financial 
requirements. 'Supervisors', however, also had the role of pushing newer 
sub-groups towards action. 86 
The lack of a clear hierarchical structure in the Second of June 
was the resul t of several groups coming together to work with another 
established group. The 'supervisor' group was part of the original group 
that undertook violent illegal actions in the late sixties, while other 
groups joined with it to undertake other operations over the course of 
time. In 1972 the structure became more solidified as new groups sought 
membership with the organisation. This was the case of the group around 
lIse Schwipper (nee' Bongartz) in Wolfsburg, which was believed to have 
been responsible for Ulrich Schmuecker's murder in June 1974. 87 
83 Claessens, de Ahna, 116, 121. 
84 ibid., 144. 
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Schmuecker was a group member believed to have turned traitor after his 
arrest and release from prison. 
In 1972 the Second of June was supposed to organise itself into 
small commando groups of three to nine persons in as many West German 
cities as possible f wi th each of these groups working independently of 
the others in the planning and conduct of activities. Only materials for 
forging documents and specialised equipment were to be centrally 
provided by the umbrella organisation. Instead of specialised roles 
wi thin the groups, members were to be trained, as far as possible, to 
become generalists with experience in all matters of underground life. 
B2J actions were to be simple enough for others to imitate and apply so 
that others could continue in their spirit with simple, universal 
logistics in actions against the state. 88 
The B2J was a group that sought to consolidate everyday political 
resistance against the state. The commando units were to exemplify 
possibilities and stimulate other similar responses with their 
activities, as part of the 'general resistance' which fights for its 
perceived rights. The best way to do this was by working together with 
others who had similar ideas. During the Lorenz abduction in 1975, they 
also realised that they could not topple the state. Thus they calulated 
their possibilities of action, and learned from their praxis. 89 
However, the B2J, while begun in the working-class area of Berlin-
Kreuzberg, 9 0 lost this position as it moved further into the isolation 
of the underground with safe-houses and training abroad. 
The height of the Second of June Movement was the abduction of 
Peter Lorenz, the Christian Democrat candidate for the West Berlin 
mayorship on 27 February 1975. After obtaining maximum television 
publicity for their cause by virtually dictating what was broadcast, the 
group obtained the release of five imprisoned terrorists, and a plane to 
fly them to Aden, South Yemen91 (see chapter seven). 
The Second of June also showed its populism and consideration in 
late July 1975 with two bank robberies that gained it attention by 
"Verfahrenseinstellungen- -Schmuecker I radikal, ZSK" Die Rote Hilfe: 
Zeitung der Roten Hilfe e.V. 3, 1991, 9. 
88 Claessens, de Ahna, 156; Baumann (1979), 77, 92-3. 
89 Ronald Fri tzsch, Gerald Klopper, Rolf Reinders, Fritz Teufel, 
"The Berlin Indomitables: An Interview with ... ", in: The Gennan 
Guerrilla: terror T reaction, and resistance (Sanday , Orkney: Cienfuego 
Press, 1981), 68-83, 72-3; Second of June, "Die Entfuehrung aus unserer 
Sicht", in: 'Holger, der Kampf geht weiter!': Dokumente und Beitraege 
zum Konzept Stadtguerilla (Gaiganz!Ueberfranken: Politladen 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1975), 279-303, 280, 284-6. 
90 Baumann (1979), 87. 
91 Aust (1987), 286-8. 
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leaving chocolate kisses behind for the customers and employees: 
'Revolutionary chocolate kisses from the urban guerillas of the Movement 
Second of June I. This type of 'humour I in its acti vi ties and courtroom 
appearances meant it came that bi t closer to the public than the Red 
Army Faction. 9 2 Nonetheless, by now it too was in the underground and in 
the Middle East alongside the RAF and Revolutionary Cells, as is 
discussed below in section 2.32. 
92 Thomas Meyer, Am Ende der Gewal t: Der deutsche Terrorismus- -
Protokoll eines Jahrzents (Frankfurt a.M.: Ullstein, 1980), 142. 
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2.3 Revolutionary Cells 
The Revolutionaeren Zellen (RZ f Revolutionary Cells) appeared in 
1973 and highlighted both the domestic and increasingly international 
character of left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic in their 
contacts with 'Carlos I of the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine-Special Command (PFLP-SC). The first section discusses 
domestic developments, and the second the Palestinian connections of 
'Car los' to the RZ and other Genuan groups. 
2.31 The Revolutionary Cells in Germany, 1973-1975 
The Revolutionary Cells were a response to the hard, violent, 
vanguard approach of the Red Army Faction. Instead of using cells in the 
underground the Revolutionary Cells based their organisation on a group 
of roughly five to eight member cells. RZ members conduct 'nonual' lives 
practicing their profession, be they students, labourers or 
professionals. Therefore they are sometimes referred to as Feierabend 
TeITOristen (Afterhours/Freetime Terrorists) , because they remain 
'legal' for as long as possible. This does not necessitate safe houses, 
stolen vehicles, falsified documents, and the other requirements of 
underground existence. The end result is that the security forces have 
fewer places to profit from RZ mistakes. Each group relies on fewer 
people, and uses fewer materials for their operations, which makes the 
RZ potentially more dangerous than the RAP, because less is known about 
them. 93 
Similarly to the Second of June, the Revolutionary Cells wanted to 
develop multiple centres of counter-power in society to detenuine the 
direction of the social revolution. Like the B2J the RZ also claimed 
that the masses- -which they claimed to be a part of- - should be part 
of the struggle as a sort of 'popular guerilla' which responded to 
general trends of public sentllnent. This sharply contrasted with the RAP 
posi tion that only a select few could lead the masses. The simple 
organisation, and broader appeal of the Revolutionary Cells opened the 
way for many more attacks at lower levels without the difficulties of 
life in the underground. 94 
93 Claessens, de Ahna, 126-7, 129; Langguth, 197; Kahl, 109, adds 
that for emergencies each member had a stolen passport should they need 
to enter the underground to evade arrest. 
94 Languth, 197; Horchem (1987 II), 147; Revolutionary Cells, 
"Fragen an die Stadtguerilla: Interview mit der Gruppe 'Revolutionare 
Zellen''', in: 'Holger I der kampf geht weiter! I Dokumente lIDd Beitraege 
zum Konzept Stadtguerilla. Gaiganz/Oberfranken: Politladen 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1975, 203-229, 209; ,RZ: Geschichte, 
Kritiken, Dokumente (Oberursel: Westdeutsches Irlandsolidaritaetkommitee 
(WISK) Vertrieb, no date given, but after February 1985), 45. 
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The first RZ cells are thought to have been formed by members of 
Schwarze Hilfe (Black Aid), Rote Hilfe (Red Aid), Anti-Imperialistischen 
Kampf (Anti-Imperialist Struggle) , and Revolutionaerer Kampf 
(Revolutionary Struggle). The main areas of RZ activity have been West 
Berlin, the Rhein-Main-Neckar area, and the Ruhr area, with lesser 
activity in the northwest and H@nburg. 95 
However, the Revolutionary Cells were not coordinated into one 
large organisation with a hierarchical structure. They remained without 
a nerve centre to lead the cells in campaigns in the manner of the Red 
Army Faction. The cells acted autonomously. Some supported one issue, 
others another. Usually only one member had contact with another group 
in the organisation, and a very few people knew all of the groups. It is 
also possible that in the beginning there were one or two cells with 
each of the cell members then forming a 'resonance cell' .96 
The feminist orientated 'women of the revolutionary cells' 
organised themselves with a bombing on 4 March 1975 of the Federal 
Constitutional Court, which had restricted abortions, as a first step 
towards moving women from the 'private sphere' of sexual objects and 
child producers to the social political sphere. They believed that the 
private structures enabled the social ones so that emancipation in one's 
private life would enable emancipation in social spheres. The name Rota 
Zora was derived from 'Rota Zora and her band' which stole from the rich 
to give to the poor, and had the same initials as the RZ.97 
The RZ organised an irregular publication, Revolutionaerer Zorn 
(Revolutionary Anger) in 1975 to publicise the views and CQnments of the 
different cells while also providing operational tips. 
2.32 The Palestinian Connection, 1973-1977 
Revolutionaerer Zorn, however, did not discuss the organisation's 
own international aspects. It ignores that the RZ were originally 
divided into two different circles or branches. One as the German, or 
national branch, which operated only in the FRG on a legal/illegal 
existence. The other as the 'Europe' or 'Outside' branch of hard-core 
persons who dropped into the underground because of past experience. 
95 Kahl, 101, 108. 
96 H.J. Klein (1979), 49; Andreas Schmidt, "Die Revolutionarer 
Zellen" Die Polizei 9, 1983, 287-290, 288. 
97 Rota Zora, "Widerstand ist moeglich: Die Rota Zora und ihr 
Selbstverstaendnis", in: Peter Hein ( ed. ), Stadtguerilla: bewaffneter 
Kampf in der BRD und Westberlin: Ein Bibliographie (Amsterdam: Edition 
ID-Archiv im IISG, 1989), 131-4, 131-2. 
44 
This group operated internationally and is associated with the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special Command. 98 
Whereas the RAF and the Second of June went first to Al Fatah 
before ending up with the PFLP 1 the Revolutionary Cells had contacts 
with them from the beginning. Mohammed Boudia 1 working for Dr. Wadi 
Haddad and Georges Habash's PFLP 1 set up contacts with leftist Germans 
and other Europeans. 9 9 Boudia also had the support of Iraq and other 
Arab countries. 100 
After Boudia' s murder by the Israeli Mossad in 1973 1 his 
lieutenant 1 Illich Ramirez Sanchez! better known as 'Carlos', took over. 
The 'outer circle' of groups that Carlos had contact with included the 
regional groups of the Basques 1 Bretons, Corsicans and Republicans in 
Ireland. The 'inner circle' of groups consisted of four left-wing 
terrorist groups: the Japanese Red Army (which had some members in Paris 
then) 1 the RZ 'Europe' branch 1 the Turkish People's Liberation Army, and 
the Italian Red Brigades. Klein reports that also the RAF! B2J and RZ 
worked with the PFLP.101 This network around Carlos formed a logistics 
base of money and goods for the groups! as well as a brokerage for paid 
services by the Germans for the Palestinians /102 presumably in addition 
to the $3000 a month reportedly paid to the RZ by the PFLP.103 
The German terrorists aided Palestinian operations in West Germany 
and abroad. For example, the RZ helped the Fatah backed Black September 
organise some of the logistics for the 5 September 1972 Olympic 
massacre, al though most of it was done by Palestinians, some of whom 
lived in Germany 1 and one of whom worked on the Olympic building 
site.104 The RZ also aided Carlos in attacks on Israeli targets such as 
98 See Revolutionary Cells (1985); Schiller (1987 II), 89. The PFLP 
abbreviation is used in the thesis, because the sources do not always 
specify whether the PFLP in general, or the PFLP-SC is the group 
involved. 
99 Colin Smith, Carlos: Portrait of a Terrorist. (London: Andre 
Deutsch Ltd., 1976), 100. 
100 Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, 
Power and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 148. 
101 C. Smith, 100, 107-8; H.J. Klein (1979), 81, 206. 
102 See the following about the fate of 75 stolen hand grenades to 
five locations on four continents. Kahl, 140; C. Smith, 114, 117, 141, 
167-8; Ray S. Cline, Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: The Soviet Connection. 
(New York: Crane Russak and Co., Inc. 1 1984), 64; and Christopher 
Dobson, Ronald Payne, The Carlos Ccmplex: A Pattern of Violence. 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), 51. 
103 Hans Joachim Klein 1 Jean Marcel Bougereau, "An Interview with 
Hans-Joachim Klein", in: The West Ge1:man Guerrilla: terror, reaction, 
and resistance. (Sanday, Orkney: Cienfuego Press, 1981), 7-61, 44. 
104 H.J. Klein (1981) 44; Aust (1987), 75-6; Serge Groussard, The 
Blood of Israel: The Massacre of the Israeli Athletes of the Olympics, 
1972, (New York: William Morrow and Co. Inc' l 1975), 100-9. 
45 
on 13 January 1975 when two of them shot at a taxiing El Al airplane 
with an RPG-7 at Paris-orly airport. 105 Three West German terrorists 
participated in an attempted PFLP commando rocket attack on a landing 
Israeli commercial airliner in Nairobi, Kenya on 18 January 1976,106 and 
Carlos enlisted the help of Brigitte Kulhmann and Wilfried Boese in the 
PFLP hijacking of the Air France airliner to Entebbe/ Uganda between 27 
June and 4 July 1976.107 
Carlos also gained West German assistance in money raising attempts 
such as when Klein / and Gabriele Kroecher-Tiedemann of the RZ / along 
with Carlos and three Arab terrorists/ took the OPEC (Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries) conference ministers at Vienna/ Austria 
hostage on 21 December 1975. Later in April 1976 the West Germans helped 
in attempts to plant a plastic explosive lined suitcase on a Japanese 
Air Lines plane in order to destroy the plane in mid-air as part of an 
extortion exercise demanding five million dollars to prevent further 
OOIDS on their flights. Had the plan succeeded, the money would have 
gone mainly to the PFLP. A small portion would have gone to the West 
German groups, who were employed because of their ability to enter 
places where Palestinians would arouse too much suspicion. 10s 
The reciprocation for West German efforts occurred between 13 and 
18 October 1977 when a PFLP commando hijacked a Lufthansa plane as part 
of the Schleyer episode. This was both to obtain a ransom and the 
release of two PFLP members from Turkey, and to add pressure to the West 
German government to release its terrorists. Al though it went against 
the grain of RAF domestic actions which sought to avoid injury to non-
participants/ the RAF had coordinated the PFLP hijacking through its 
Palestinian connections. The attempt failed, and the PFLP and West 
German connections were reduced to training and material support. 109 
There is more about this below in section 3.1. 
105 C. Smith/ 185-6; Dobson and Payne (1977)/ 53-5. 
106 Kahl, 156; H.J. Klein (1979)/ 79, 312-4/ 326-8. While two 
sources say the RAF was involved, William Stevenson, 90 Minutes at 
Entebbe (New York: Bantam Books/ Inc., 1976), 23-4/ says this involved 
two of the people who attempted shooting at the El Al airliner in Orly 
in January 1976, which would involve the RZ and not the RAF. Associated 
Press 15 August 1979 says that two Germans, Brigitte Schulz and Thomas 
Reuter/ were arrested and taken to Israel. 
107 H.J. Klein (1981), 18; Becker, 19-20; Goren, 4, but Becker and 
Goren attribute Klein/ Boese and Kroecher-Tiedemann to the RAF. 
lOS H.J. Klein (1981), 31, 44-5; (1979), 199-200. On the OPEC raid 
see Dobson and Payne (1977), 89-123; and C. Smith/ 221-293 and various 
sections in H.J. Klein (1979), and (1981), 23-30. 
109 Kahl, 156; Hans Josef Horchem, "The German Government Response 
to Terrorism", in: Yonah Alexander, Richard A. Kilmarx (eds.) Political 
Terrorism and Business: The Threat and Response (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1979) , 245-256, 249; "Aktion Spindy" Der Spiegel 36 (3 
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Money, weapons, training and safe-havens were the major incentives 
for cooperation with the Palestinians for the West Germans. Despite the 
large amounts stolen from West German banks, and the theft and forgery 
of necessary documents and papers requisite to underground existence,l10 
they needed more. 
2.4 The "Second Generation'! 1975-1980 
This section covers the acti vi ty of the Red Army Faction in the 
second half of the seventies. The 'second generation I are the RAP 
members, who joined the group in the wake of the Committees against 
Torture and hunger strike activity in 1974. They became members between 
1975 and 1977. 
For example, former mernbers of the Heidelberg Committee against 
Torture organised the 25 April 1975 stonning of the Federal Republic I s 
embassy in Stockholm, murdering two embassy officials, and then 
demanding the release of twenty-six prisoners, among whom were the 
leading RAP members in Stalnmheim prison. The government refused, and 
shortly before the SWedish government begun to storm the embassy, the 
terrorists accidently set off the explosives, which killed one 
terrorist, wounded another who later died, and enabled the arrest of the 
other four. Its effect on the supporters alienated some and increased 
the feelings of helplessness amongst others who then joined the 
committees. 111 
Ulrike Meinhof was found hung in her cellon 9 May 1976, and there 
followed large demonstrations in many West Gennan cities and in Europe. 
Although she committed suicide, many believe that she was murdered in 
her cell, or at a minimum, believe she was driven to suicide by her 
prison conditions. 112 
Meinhof's death reverberated through the committees,113 and more 
extortionate kidappings were outlined for the release of those 
imprisoned in Stammheim. When the coded plans for a RAP campaign were 
found on arrested lawyers in 1976, along with money from bank robberies, 
September) 1990, 126-30, 128. See also the letter from Karl-Heinz Dellwo 
found on Stefan Wisniewski when he was arrested on 11 May 1978 reprinted 
as: "Wir wollen nun endlich raus" Die Zeit 23 (2 June) 1978, 3 
110 Horchem (1979), 250, reports that by 1979 the RAP had stolen 
over DM 11 million from banks; Aust (1987), 113-5; and Manfred Funke 
( ed. ) , Terrorismus: Untersuchungen zur Stnlktur und Strategie 
revolutionaerer Gewaltpolitik, (Dusseldorf: Athenaeum Verlag, 1977) 
lists many similar robberies of town halls in the chronology. 
111 Aust (1987), 289-92; Friedrich, Der Spiegel 34/1990, 53. 
112 Becker, 330; Kahl, 115. 
113 Sigrid Sternebeck, "'Dann sind bald alle tot III Der Spiegel 33 
(13 August) 1990, 57-67, 62. 
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the plans were postponed until they went into effect with the murder of 
Siegfried Buback, the Federal Prosecutor General, on 7 April 1977.114 
Three months later, on 30 July 1977, Juergen Ponto, the president 
of Dresdener Bank, was murdered in an attempted kidnapping in his home 
near Frankfurt. Pressure on the government, and more publicity, were 
gained when the RAP began another hunger strike on 9 August. The 
judicial and court system was the object of another attempted attack, 
when a technical fault prevented damage to the Federal Prosecutor's 
Office building on 25 AUgust. 115 
The hunger strike ended on 2 September 1977. Three days later 1 
Harms Martin Schleyer was abducted. He was the head of the German 
Employers' Association 1 and on the board of directors for Mercedes Benz 1 
as well as a former SS officer in the Third Reich. The RAP demanded the 
release of eleven prisoners- -including Baader 1 Ensslin, Raspe and 
Moeller- -as the price for his release. 116 
The government did not give in, and on 13 October the PFLP hijacked 
a Lufthansa plane enroute from Majorca to Frankfurt and demanded the 
release of the same eleven prisoners plus two others in Turkey before 
they would release their planeload of eighty-six passengers and five 
crew members. On 18 October the elite specialist border guard unit, GSG 
9, stormed the plane, which had eventually landed in Mogadishu, Somalia, 
freeing all of the hostages unharmed l arresting one hijacker and killing 
the other three (see chapter seven). After hearing of the rescue Baader, 
Ensslin, Raspe and Moeller attempted suicide- -all but Moeller 
succeeding- -in their prison cells on the night of 17/18 October. 
Schleyer was found dead in Muellhausen l France on the 19th. 117 
Amongst the Left there was much speculation about the Starnrnheim 
deaths as to whether these were indeed suicides or murders. Only 
recently were these confirmed as suicides by the former terrorists 
Susanne Albrecht and Monika Helbing .118 However 1 even this evidence is 
not believed by all. Some people still believe the murder thesis. 119 
The inconclusiveness of the Stammheim deaths at the time provided 
speculation for various theories. If it was suicide, then the deaths 
114 Aust (1987); 400-2; Becker 1 343-5. 
115 Aust (1987), 407-8 1 412-5. 
116 ibid., 424-5, 430. 
117 ibid., 500, 505 1 533-4, 541. 
118 "Suicide Action" Der Spiegel 50 (10 December) 1990, 62-70, 62. 
For a discussion of murder and suicide theories see Christina Ensslin 
(sister of Gudrun) "AIle Kreter luegen ... ", in: Klaus Hartung (ed.), Der 
Blinde Fleck: Die Linke, die RAP und der Staat (Frankfurt a.M.: Neue 
Kritik, 1987)1 86-97. 
119 See "Presserklaerung" Clash: Zeitung fuer Widerstand in Europa 3 
(April [?J 1991), 9. 
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were not heroic and they signalled the failure of the struggle. If it 
was murder, then this too was not a heroic end for the prisoners who 
were so totally isolated that this was easily possible. The prevention 
of similar acts in the future would require a rethink of the prison work 
organised in the past that sought to help imprisoned suspected and 
convicted terrorists. If it was clearly murder, then this represented a 
confirmation of the Left I s hints and accusations of the state IS neo-
fascist character- -a state that would murder its opponents- -against 
the government, which therefore had been hiding behind its mask and 
comfortably going about its business as if it was a democratic state. 
However, the possibility of the mask being torn away could be too 
frightening for the Left, who would then see the state acting as it 
wished without any fear. Instead, it would be far better to believe the 
smaller horror that the prisoners did commit suicide, which would not 
require the Left to reconceptualise its work to change prison 
conditions. The thought that the state committed murder would 
necessitate a reconceptualisation of prison work, because this would 
require that the Left prevent the possibility of the state murdering 
future prisoners. 12o 
The deaths of the imprisoned RAF leaders meant that only general 
instructions about outside operations were communicated from imprisoned 
members to the underground until the eighties. This was shown by the 
discovery of letters from imprisoned RAF members in safe-houses, on 
arrested members, and amongst materials found in prison cell searches on 
25 February 1981 during the 1981 hunger strike. Communication systems 
can only be countered by the contact ban, so it is likely that the 
system continued to operate sporadically.121 
In the late seventies the group was mainly concerned with securing 
its existence in Paris until May 1979 as they worked towards building up 
a logistic structure of apartments and caches in Germany again, while 
also maintaining foreign safe-houses to serve them and Second of June 
members. This proceeded slowly, with setbacks of deaths and arrests 
balanced by new recruits. 122 
120 Oliver Tolmein, Detleff zum Winkel, Nix Gerafft- -10 Jahre 
Deutscher Herbst und der Konse:rvatismus der Linken (Hamburg: Konkret 
Verlag, 1987), 94-6. 
121 Klaus, 49; Horchem (1987 II), 144. See also the Dellwo letter in 
Die Zeit 2 June 1978, 3. 
122 Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung 20 December 1979, 6 January 1981; 
Sternebeck, Der Spiegel 33/1990, 62-4. 
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The group mood altered between continued plans to free prisoners, 
even hiring helicopters to the astonishment of watching policemen, 12 3 
and a resignative mood that even went to contemplating mass deaths in 
one final blow such as a suicide bombing at the annual US Army carnival 
in Heidelberg Castle. Another vengeance idea was to have targets affixed 
to trees surrounded by anti -personnel mines near Frankfurt, Stuttgart 
and somewhere else, with the intention of luring policemen there with 
reports of shooting. According to Werner Loetze this was the idea and 
work of Christian Klar and Monika Helbing. Due to group dissension the 
mines were cleared and the idea shelved because it was feared this would 
discredit the group's image. 124 
The three level structure of the early seventies remained the same 
as the one designed by Baader and in use since at least 1975 to keep the 
original imprisoned RAF leaders in control and contact with its members 
on the outside. In the late seventies there were three levels. (1) The 
hard-core organised into groups of five to twelve persons for 
operations. There were forty members in 1979, half of whom were women. 
(2) The lawyers who acted as liason between the active members, the 
support groups and the imprisoned members. ( 3 ) Lastly, the support 
groups who organised sympathy campaigns both in the FRG and abroad. 
There were also the reserves for future active terrorists. There were 
about 150 of these in 1979, half of whom were wQnen. 125 
In spring 1980 the Second of June ceased to exist. 126 Most of its 
West-Berlin members were integrated in Revolutionary Cells, which may 
also explain the more violent tendencies of the West Berlin RZ as 
exhibi ted in knee-cappings .127 The other Second of June members in the 
FRG joined the RAF.128 However, imprisoned B2J members were already 
123 Hans Schueler, "Kommissar Computer in Noeten" Die Zeit 1 
September 1978, 3; and see the Dellwo letter in Die Zeit 2 June 1978 r 3. 
124 Peter-Juergen Boock, "'Zum Selbstmord bereit'" Der Spiegel 9 (23 
February) 1981, 123-4; 'Suicide-Actions' is what Sternebeck mentions in: 
Der Spiegel 33/1990 r 62; and is confirmed by her husband in Friedrich, 
Der Spiegel 34/1990 r 55; "Aktion Spindy" Der Spiegel 36/1990, 128. 
125 Klaus, 45; Horchem (1979), 247. 
126 The July 1980 issue of Radikal was accused of advertising for 
the Second of June, thus assuming the group existed then. However, a 
West Berlin court dismissed the case by deciding the group no longer 
existed. Die Welt 16 July 1981. 
127 Die Welt 3 November 1986; "Neue Anschlagsphase der 
'Revolutionaeren Zellen' (RZ)?" TeITorisrrrus: Infonnationsdienst 2, 1986, 
5. 
128 Hans Josef Horchem, "Die 'Rote Annee Fraktion': Agitation und 
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1987 I 61-81, 61. Second of June, "Aufloesungspapier der Bewegung 2. 
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integrated into the RAF prisoner structures, and the two groups were 
also combining their logistic networks as evidenced by the arrests of 
B2J and RAF members in a Paris safe-house on 5 May 1980. Such activity 
had presumably been usual practice over the years since the RAF assisted 
the B2J with money, weapons and explosives in the first few months of 
its formation in the summer of 1971.129 This may also be why the ransom 
money from Michael Palmer I s abduction by the Second of June, between 9 
and 13 November 1977 in Vienna, went to the RAF in the merger, instead 
of to those who went to the RZ in Berlin. While the B2J may have been 
independent minded to begin with, they moved closer to the RAF over time 
until a clear division no longer made sense. 
The B2J also shared some logistic bases with the RZ, possibly 
because of overlapping strategic concepts and membership, as exemplified 
by the RZ targeting the court appointed defence lawyers of B2J 
defendents on 31 May 1978,130 which could have resulted in them becoming 
RZ members when the others merged with the RAF. 
(Amsterdam: Bibliotheek voor Ontspanning en Ontwikkleling, 1988), 51-52, 
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130 KahI, 109-110, 148. 
51 
3. Terrorism in the Eighties and Beyond 
In many ways the early eighties were a watershed for West German 
left-wing terrorism. New groups came to dominance and older ones receded 
and then rejuvenated themselves. There was also a shift of emphasis from 
the Middle East to· Western Europe. However, before examining the 
individual groups it is necessary to discusss the phenomenon of 
'Euroterrorism' that became associated with perceived links between West 
European groups in the mid-eighties. It is also necessary to discuss the 
role of state sponsorship in left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic 
of Germany. 
3.1 'Euroterrorism' 
The Red Army Faction had mixed times in the early eighties. 
Underground members attempted the assassination of General Alexander 
Haig, Supreme Allied Commander of Forces in Europe for NATO (North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation), near Mons, Belgium on 25 June 1979. The 
next attacks were the 31 August 1981 RAF satchel bolnb explosion in a car 
at the NATO Air Force Headquarters in Ramstein, and the attempted 
assassination of General Friedrich Kroesen, the Commander of the US Army 
in Europe, on 14 September 1981. Possibly the 1981 and the 1979 attacks 
should have been closer together, but the arrest of five members in 
Paris on 5 May 1980 and the death of two others on 25 July 1980 in a car 
accident may have postponed their plans. Postponement also arose through 
an extended visit by several Red Army Faction leaders to Briesen, East 
Germany for 'strategic discussions' with the East German security 
services between September and October 1980. At some point in 1981 or 
1982 the group was also trained in the use of rocket launchers in East 
Germany. Such a weapon was used in the attack on Kroesen. 1 Recruibnent 
drives, in the form of hunger strikes (two since 1977), were boosted 
when Sigurd Debus died in Celle on 16 April 1981. This triggered small 
bombings and demonstrations in the following days. 
The emphasis on NATO and Western Europe in these attacks was to 
characterise the West German groups' operations in the eighties. The 
Mogadishu rescue was probably one factor in ending Middle East contacts 
between the RAF and the Palestinians. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 
1982 also contributed to a shift in focus for the terrorist groups, from 
1 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 28 July 1980; Times 1 August 1980; 
The Guardian 8 November 1980; Associated Press 25 October 1980; Die Welt 
1 September 1981; "Lauschen unterm pflaumenbaum" Der Spiegel 26/1991, 
95. 
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Palestine to Western Europe [ where they sought a new revolutionary 
basis. 2 
Diverse terrorist group motivation meant the Red Army Faction could 
not seek allies everywhere in Western Europe as the specific 
circumstances differed enough to hinder the union of arguably similar 
revolutionary ideas. Contact wi th the separatist groups such as the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Irish National Liberation Army 
was possible in the seventies. However [ the use of the name of a dead 
Irish hunger striker from the 1981 hunger strike for the 1 February 1985 
RAF 'Patsy O'Hara Commando' that cla~ned the murder of Ernst Zimmennann 
was not acceptable to the Irish. This probably indicates a sign of the 
non-cooperation between them [ as they prefer to remain under themselves 
for fear of informers amongst foreign groups. 3 Furthermore [ the RAF 
cannot offer anything to the Provisionals which they could not do 
themselves. 
The same is true of the Basques in Spain. No links have occurred 
between Euskadi ta Askatastma (ETA, Euskadi and Freedom) and the RAF due 
to the different objectives pursued by the two groups. ETA seeks a 'full 
amnesty' for its ~prisoned members [ while the RAF seeks the liberation 
of its members from prison by force if necessary.4 
Leftist European terrorist groups, however [ have a common 
ideological framework to organise campaigns around as was apparent in 
the anti-nuclear and peace movements campaign of the early eighties. 
This brought thousands onto the streets of European capital cities [ and 
appeared to bring the different terrorist groups together against USA 
and NATO targets. 5 While it would be incorrect to state that the Soviet 
Union directed the peace movement [ it can be stated that the communist 
parties furthered the peace movement as a means to spread their ideas 
and influence. In this way the Soviets were able to also assist their 
own desired end of non-deployment of the new nuclear weapons by NATO.6 
2 "1m Ziel, ~ Kampf", Der Spiegel 43 (20 October) 1986[ 24-7[ 24. 
3 Horchem (1987 II)[ 141; "Hocken drin" Der Spiegel 25 (18 June) 
1979[ 32-3; "Dublin Connection"[ Der Spiegel 34 (20 August) 1979[ 28-9; 
Independent 5 May 1990 f 2; n.n. Republican Resistance calender 1990 
(Dublin [?J 1989), lists O'Hara as an INLA member, while Hans Josef 
Horchem, Die verlorene Revolution: Terrorismus in Deutschland (Herford: 
Busse Seewald, 1988)[ 170, says it was the PlRA who stated their 
disapproval with the use of his name for an RAF commando. 
4 Horchem (1987 II), 152-3. 
5 S~ultaneously right-wing groups also targeted NATO as a sign of 
foreign influence and 'occupation. J. F. Pilat, "Research Note: European 
Terrorism and the Euromissiles", Terrorism 7 (1) 1984[ 63-70, 65, 67. 
6 Langguth, 256-61, 276; Vittorfranco S. Pisano, The Dynamics of 
Subversion and Violence in Contemporary Italy (Stanford, CA: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1987), 57-118. 
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The combination of similar types of targets across Europe and 
alleged terrorist meetings, created the 'Euroterrorist ' notion of 
cooperation and agreement between the different groups at an 
international level. Involved in this union were the RAF, the French 
Action Directe (AD), and the Cellules camrunistes canbattantes (CCC) of 
Belgium as the main members. To a lesser extent it seemed that the 
Revolutionary Group of International Solidarity- -Christos Kassimos, and 
the National Front, both in Greece, the Portuguese group, Popular Forces 
of April 25 (FP-25), and the Brigate Rossa (BR, Red Brigades) of Italy 
were also involved in the wave of Euroterrorism. 7 
These groups did not drop their own indigenous contexts and 
concerned themselves solely with the supranational 'Euroterrorism ' aims. 
While the RAF may have desired to coordinate activities with the 
'Euroterrorist ' groups in the mid-eighties, each group still had its own 
private concerns and issues that were also targeted, as represented by 
the RAF1s hunger strike in 1984/85. 8 
Despite the threat the 'Euroterrorists I posed in the beginning, 
they did not amount to much. The CCC were arrested in Decanber 1985, the 
Portuguese groups I activities ended, while those of the Greeks abated 
for a while l and the BR became semi-active after splitting into two 
groups, a 'militant I and 'movementist I faction, with the 'militarist I 
majority joining the RAF and the AD against imperialism. AD and RAF 
cooperation continued until early 1987 when a series of arrests wound up 
the AD for the present. 9 
Action Direct and RAF cooperation was based on more than money and 
logistic aid. The two groups provided a mutual support system for each 
other. AD had even less of a resonance in the French population than the 
RAF in West Germany, and benefited from a like-minded group for 
ideological and material support. The RAF was in the same situation. AD 
also had valuable contacts with the PFLP, Italian groups, and even the 
Lebanese Armed Revolutinary Faction. By working together the AD and RAF 
7 Pisano, 135; Konrad Kellen, "The New Challenge: Euroterrorism 
Against NATO", TVI Journal 5 (4) 1985, 3-6, 3-5. See also in the same 
issue, "A Chronology: Euroterrorist Actions 1984-April 1985", 18-22. 
8 Kurt Rebmann, "Das Interview: Fragen an Generalbundesanwalt 
Rebmann" Terrorisrrrus: Infonnationsdienst 1, 1986, 4-5, 5; Paul 
Wilkinson, "Support Mechanisms in International Terrorism" l in: Robert 
O. Slater, Michael Stohl ( eds. ) , Current Research on International 
Terrorism (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1988), 88-114, 92-3. 
9 Kahl, 171; Alison Jamieson, The Heart Attacked: Terrorism and 
Conflict in the Italian State (London: Marion Boyars Publishers, 1989), 
212; The Guardian 9 December 1986, 6; 23 February, 1; 10 March 1987 ,8. 
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justified their claim to be an international anti-imperialist front in 
West Europe. 10 
A side-effect of the cooperation was that the German terrorists 
radicalised AD. Prior to 1984 AD murdered defensively in the course of 
bank robberies J and post-1984 the group did this offensively in 
assassinations. Simultaneously J increased AD violence led to increased 
isolation from its home supporters11 in the same manner as the RAF. 
Joint AD and RAF operations such as the 8 August 1985 bombing of 
the US Rhine-Main-Airbase J and possibly the murder of General Rene' 
Audran on 25 January 1985 also offered heightened publicitYJ as did the 
joint communique issued on 15 January 1985. Joint operations also solved 
AD technical problems with RAF expertise and experience. For exampleJ 
the 'peoples prison' and notes in German found in an AD Orleans safe-
house in 1987 implied joint cooperation in an area of no previous AD 
experience. Cooperation was facilitated by the personal contacts of AD 
member Georges Ciprani J a trained printer in Frankfurt between 1972 and 
1983 J and RAF member J Birgit Hogefeld, whose handwritten notes were 
found in the Orleans farmhouse rented by Ciprani. 12 
Prior to any Red Army Faction and Brigata Rossa cooperative 
arrangements like those with Action Direct, there were supportive 
cornmuniques issued by the two groups. The RAF named the 'Commando Mara 
Cagol' J responsible for the murder of Karl-Heinz Beckurts and his driver 
on 9 July 1986, after a dead BR member, and the Brigate Rossa issued 
solidarity statements after the Beckurts and Gerald von Braunmuhl (10 
October 1987) murders. However, after the BR split into two 'positions' 
in September 1984, only the BR-PCC (BR-For the Building of the 
Combattant Caumunist Party), the international and anti-imperialist 
orientated so-called 'second position', praised the RAF in a communique 
after a robbery on 14 February 1987. The BR-UCC (BR-United Combattant 
Communists), the so-called 'first position', is more proletariat, class 
struggle orientated and does not offer support for the RAF.13 
The addition of the Brigate Rossa to the revolutionary struggle of 
the RAF in August 1988 failed to materialise when twenty-one BR members 
10 Michael Dartnell, "France's Action Directe: Terrorists in Search 
of a Revolution" Terrorism and Political Violence 2 (4) 1990, 457-488, 
469, 471; Christopher Dobson Ronald Payne, War without End. (London: 
Sphere Books Ltd.! Updated Edition, 1987), 240. 
11 Dartnell, 478-9. 
12 Kahl, 167; Horchem (1987 II), 153; Horchem (1988), 166-7; Wilhe~TI 
Dietel, " 'Action directe' am Ende?" Terrorismus: In£onnationsdienst 3, 
1987, 1-4, 2-3; Karl-Guenther Barth! "Jetzt ist Rebmann die Nummer eins" 
Stern 40 (32) 30 July-5 August 1987, 118. 
13 Bundesministerium des Innern (ed.), VerfasSlmgsschutzbericht 1986 
(Bonn: EMI, 1987), 138. 
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were arrested in Rome in September 1988. Nonetheless; the two groups 
issued a joint communique for the 20 September 1988 attack on Hans 
Tietmeyer in German and Italian / which placed him in the centre of the 
'imperialistic economic politics' securing the profit and power of 
international capital; and saw the attack as the beginning of a combined 
offensive to develop the 'fighting anti-imperialist front'. This was 
strengthened with a later paper that praised past RAF and AD cooperation 
as a definite step towards European revolutionary subjectivity in the 
framework of attacks against imperialism. BR-PCC added to this with a 
statement on 1 March 1989 saying that Brigate Rossa support for the 
hunger strike strengthened the 'fundamental importance of the active 
RAF-BR unit in the fighting anti-imperialist front. '14 
The suspected RAF commando operation in June 1988 in Rota, Spain, 
where three people were interrupted preparing a moped wi th explosives 
near the US Marine and Air Force base, can perhaps be taken as a sign of 
an RAF convergence of dialogue and contacts with the Anti-Fascist First 
of October Commando (GRAPO) in Spain. GRAPO view the RAF as lacking in a 
cQnmunist progrmnme and its goals as corresponding to those of the petty 
bourgeoisie, but there has appeared in the recent past a strong interest 
in both parties to develop their ties. 1s 
The development of cooperation between the Red Army Faction and 
either BR-PCC or GRAPO to the same level which existed with Action 
Direct would offer the same benefits to both partners. However, it may 
also be that the RAF is more isolated than the others at home and 
therefore has more to gain than the other two groups. Agreements might 
therefore be more difficult to negotiate than those with AD. 
Nonetheless, the Red Army Faction has not stopped its search for 
new partners. Their communique after the Detlef Rohwedder murder on 2 
April 1991 explicitly stated a desire for coordinated campaigns with 
common goals amongst those who find capitalism repressive and begin to 
14 "Rote Armee Fraktion: Kampf ohne Chance" TeITOrisrrrus: 
Infonnationsdienst 12, 1989, 1-2; 1; "Gespraeche zwischen RAF und BR" 
Terrorisrrrus: Infonnationsdienst 2; 1990; 4-9, 4; "Interview: Kurt 
Rebmann" Terrorisrrrus: Infonnationsdienst 5, 1989, 1-3, 2; BR-PCC, "Fuer 
die Einhei t der Revolutionaere im Kampf gegen den Imperialismus", in: 
Reihe- -Texte: ltalien: Dokumentation zur Zeitgeschichte 2 (Munich: 
Gruppe 2, 1989); 38-47, 38; 45.; Joachim Gross; "'Dem Kampf einen neuen 
Impulse'" Stern 42 (18) 27 April-2 May 1989; 268-9. 
15 Bundesministerium des Innern ( ed. ) , Verfassungsschutzbericht 
(VSB) 1987, 80; EMI (ed.), VSB 1988 (Bonn: EMI, 1989, manuscript 
version) 97-8. The three left behind explosives; weapons and notes in 
German. 
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act for their awn ideas of organisation. They know that without partners 
they stand alone and that the armed struggle is lost. 16 
3.2 State Sponsor hip of West Gennan Terrorism 
Until recently it was safe to say that there was no direct state 
control of the West German left"':'wing terrorist groups. An article in 
1980 stated that there never was any evidence of direct influence by the 
Soviets or East Europeans on the Gennan terrorist organisations, while a 
1987 publication said the Federal Prosecutor General had no evidence in 
recent history of this. It did, however, caution that there was a 
suspicion of East German money laundering aiding the terrorists based 
upon their high frequency of trips to East Berlin, and mentioned the 
possibility of East German money to leftist groups in the Federal 
Republic finding its way into terrorist coffers.17 
A danger of emphasis on foreign sponsored state terrorism is the 
assumption that if foreign supporters of domestic terrorist groups are 
removed, then the terrorist group will end. This ignores terrorists' 
local political bases. The quesion of state sponsorship must also be 
tempered by the caution of sponsors because of the potential ex~nple the 
supported group could set for the sponsor's own people if it is 
successful. Furthermore, there is the problem of control over the group, 
who may have its awn ideas, and the potential damage revelation of the 
support given to the groUp.18 
Given these caveats, it is possible to conceive of outright state 
control of a terrorist group, its funding of a group, and its toleration 
of a group operating from within its borders. Only the last two appear 
to have occurred with the West German left-wing terrorist groups. 
Before the West German terrorist groups were organised, Ulrike 
Meinhof and her former husband, Klaus Rainer Rohl, were secret members 
of the outlawed Communist Party of Germany from 1956 to 1964, when Rohl 
was expelled. From 1955 until 1964, Rohl, the publisher of the left-wing 
magazine konkret was funded by monies received from the East Germans. 
16 Red Army Faction, ffDokumentation: Erklaerung der RAP zur 
Erschiessung von Rohwedderff , Clash: Zeitung fuer Widerstand in Europa 3 
(April [?J 1991), 40-2; Hans Josef Horchem, ffDer Verfall der Roten Armee 
Fraktionff Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 9 November 1990, 54-61, 60. 
17 Hans Josef Horchem, ffTerrorism and Government Response: The 
German Experienceff Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 4 (3) 
1980, 43-55, 48; Dobson, Payne (1987), 133, 161. 
18 Wilkinson (1986), 193-4; Richard E. Rubenstein, Alchemists of the 
Revolution: Terrorism in the Modern World (London: I.B. Tauris and Co., 
Ltd., 1987), 54. 
57 
After the East Germans withdrew their support in 1964, the magazine 
stayed alive,19 and was outside of East German influence. 
Once the terrorist groups were organised the East Germans appeared 
to acquiesce the groups' passages through East Germany such as when the 
first RAF members went to Jordan in 1970, when Baumann of the Second of 
June went to Asia in 1972, and later when on his return journey they 
released him after three and a half months imprisonment in the GDR. 2 0 
This allowed the West German groups to use East Berlin as a backdoor to 
West Ber lin, and the East Bloc as a rest area where they could also 
contact other parties, such as when Action Direct arranged for Ingrid 
Barabas of the RAF to meet with the speaker of the PFLP, Bassam Abu 
Sharif! in an East Berlin hotel on 16 January 1985. He later offered 
PFLP support for the then current RAF hunger strike in a newspaper 
interview. 21 
Contact between West German terrorists and the 
Staatssicherheitsdienst (Stasi, Ministry for State Security) was 
unavoidable! because of the terrorists' travel in the Arab countries, 
some of whom had their security services organised and trained by East 
German security services. Similarly, using East Berlin's Schoenefeld 
airport brought them into contact, as the Stasi wanted to know who 
entered and left the country. Transfers through passport control were 
eased for the terrorists by special controls, and telephone numbers for 
each country, Iraq, South Yemen, Syria and Lebanon, which the West 
German terrorists could use when these special control procedures 
failed. Training of both the left and right-wing West German variety of 
terrorists in Palestinian camps was also done by East German, Cuban and 
Soviet trainers.22 
Conditions for terrorists in Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia were not 
always cordial. Four RAF members were detained in Yugoslavia between 28 
May 1978 and 17 November. If West Germany had agreed, Yugoslavia would 
have exchanged the four RAF members for eight Croatians. On 21 June 1978 
19 Cline! Alexander, 58; Dobson, Payne (1977), 145; Becker, 161-176; 
Krebs, 104-6. 
20 Michael 'BOllU1li' Baumann, Hi Ho: Wer nicht weggeht, koornt nicht 
wieder, (Hamburg: Froehlich und Kaufmann im Hoffmann und Campe, 1987), 
59-64. 
21 Karl-Heinz Janssen, "Die Hydra des Terrorismus" Die Zeit 23 (2 
June) 1978, 3; Horchem (1988), 167-8. See die taz 19 January 1985. 
22 Peter-Juergen Boock, "Fuer jeden eine NUllU1ler" Der Spiegel 25 (18 
June) 1990, 103-5, 103-4; Horchem (1987 II), 154-6; Cline and Alexander, 
67. 
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four Second of June members were arrested in Bulgaria and extradited to 
West Germany the next day.23 
At some point, however, the East Germans went beyond acquiescence 
of the West GenTIan terrorists' presence in their country and, with the 
support and approval of Erich Honecker, the General Secretary of the 
Socialist Unity Party and other high level officials, supplied identity 
papers, apartments and employment papers. 24 
In 1977 three West German terrorists fleeing Czechoslovakia asked 
the East Germans for help with their problems and were given a three-day 
hearing in East Berlin, after which they were flown to the Middle East. 
Assistance for ex-members began in 1980, with Inge Viett and Henning 
Beer allegedly joining the others later. 25 
The German Democratic Republic (GDR) provided housing for ex-RAP 
members, who in exchange travelled to the Palestinian groups in 
Damascus, Beruit and Iraq to maintain contact between them and the East 
Germans. Thus the stories of West German terrorists dropping out in the 
Middle East arose, while the GDR hoped the ex-RAP members could help 
them maintain influence with the Palestinians. The East Germans also 
hoped that by housing the Red Army Faction they would be left in peace 
by them. Any information gained by the East Germans through fonner and 
active RAP members could also be passed on to the Soviet Union, who had 
more direct concerns about Islamic fundamentalist developments and how 
these might affect its own Muslim population. 26 
Of greater consequence, however, it is also alleged that the May 
1982 paper of the RAP was outlined during one of their visits to East 
GenTlanY when they held a strategy session with the Stasi. Possibly then, 
or earlier in 1980 or 1981 (the dates are still unclear) the RAP agreed 
to focus on the 'military industrial complex' as a strategic concept of 
targeting, and to pass any useful information to the East Germans who 
were also interested in this area. Therefore plans of US barracks went 
eastwards, and discussions were arranged between stasi officers and RAP 
supporters who had been in the barracks and knew about their control 
23 "Ware gegen Ware" Der Spiegel 48 (27 November) 1978, 25-6; 
Michael Sontheimer, Otto Kallscheuer (eds.), Einschuesse: Besichtigung 
eines Frontverlaufs zelm Jahre nach dem Deutschen Herbst (West Berlin: 
Rotbuch Verlag, 1987), 179. 
24 "Oma im Altkader" Der Spiegel 24 (11 June) 1990, 86-9, 87; "'Eine 
perverse Kombination'fI Der Spiegel 25 (18 June) 1990, 97-103, 97. 
25 "Hier bleibt jeder fuer sich" Der Spiegel 26 (25 June) 1990, 82-
7, 85; "Die mit den Hueten" Der Spiegel 34 (20 August) 1990, 62-3, 63 
26 "Oma im Altkader" Der Spiegel 24/1990, 88; "'Eine perverse 
Kombination'" Der Spiegel 25/1990 f 99; Boock, Der Spiegel 25/1990, 104; 
Horchem (1990), 55. 
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systems. A master key to a barracks area was offered also (but not 
given) to the East Germans. 27 
The East Germans also exploited the RAF, when they kept group 
leaders in the country on the pretext of 'strategic discussions' in 
September and October 1980. They wanted to ensure that the RAF undertook 
no operations in the run-up to the Btmdestag elections. East Germany 
thus assisted Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's re-election against his 
Christian Social Union opponent Franz Josef Strauss. 28 
According to Michael Baumann, East German assistance in the West 
went as far as RAF safe-houses in the West occasionally being watched by 
Stasi agents, who could warn the members in the houses when danger arose 
so they could slip away in safety. 2 9 Boock maintains that, at least in 
his t~ne with the RAF, 1976 to the end of 1979, the active group did not 
use East Germany as a safe-haven after their activities in the West. 30 
In the eighties- -right until the Berlin Wall was opened in 1989- -
the East Germans supported the RAF with occasional plane tickets, money 
and training. This was documented by accounts found in Stasi records, 
and accounts from former RAF members. It also applied to Palestinians, 
members of the German Communist Party and right-wing terrorists like 
Oddfried Hepp and Udo Albrecht. This was part of the East German's 
, informal employees' network with contacts in various terrorist 
organisations in 1989, that included three people with the Abu Nidal 
Organisation, five with 'Carlos I, three with the Revolutionary Cells, 
four with the Red Anny Faction, three with the Japanese Red Army, and 
one with Action Direct.31 
The East Germans, however I did not directly support the active 
terrorists in their attacks with agents. The self-consciousness of the 
Red Army Faction alone would not allow this. They are proud of their 
self-sufficiency in arms and money thefts, etc. Nor did the RAF see the 
German Democratic Republic as a proper alternative to capitalism. The 
common demoninator was their wish to destabilise the West, and this is 
possibly why the ex-RAF m~nbers could stay in the East. 32 
27 Red Army Faction, "Guerilla f Widerstand und Antiirnperialistische 
Front", in: texte: der RAF (West Berlin: no publisher given, 
Ueberarbeitete und aktualisierte Ausgabe, 1983), 594-620; Helmut Voigt, 
"'Es ging um Schmidt/Strauss'" Der Spiegel 26 (24 June) 1991, 94-5; 
"Lauschen unterm pflaumenbaum" Der Spiegel 26/1991, 95. 
28 Voigt, Der Spiegel 26/1991, 95. 
29 "'Eine perverse Kornbination ' " Der Spiegel 25/1990, 99. 
30 Boock, Der Spiegel 25/1990, 104-5. 
31 "Denen trauen wir jetzt alles zu" Der Spiegel 14 (1 April) 1991, 
22-6, 23; "Stasi-Abteilung XXII/8 und der Terrorismus" Terrorisrrrus: 
Informatiansdienst 7, 1991, 1-4, 1-2. 
32 Boock, Der Spiegel 25/1990, 104; "Orna irn Al tkader" Der Spiegel 
24/1990, 88. 
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The effect of these Red Army Faction members going into retirement 
ended dissention within the terrorist group. This unified the alleged 
leadership of Christian Klar, Willy Peter Stoll, Brigi tta Mohnhaupt, 
Rolf Heissler and Knut Folkerts. 33 
The East German cla~n to help counterterrorism was a lie, even as 
they helped Middle Eastern terrorists plan the 'La Belle' discotheque 
bombing in April 1986, and did nothing to help the Federal Cr~inal 
Office find five wanted terrorists in the East in late 1986. Instead, 
the five disappeared again. The East Germans probably knew where these 
five and three other ex-terrorists were, because each ex-RAF menber had 
a phone number to contact their Stasi controller in emergencies, and the 
Stasi kept an eye on each of the former terrorists. 34 
Unlike when they were in the Middle East, the ex-RAF members could 
pass unnoticed in East Germany. There were no language problems, nor was 
it necessary, as in the Middle East, to arm themselves. 35 
One theory believes the West German authorities came upon stories 
of ex-RAF members in the East via interviews with newly arrived East 
Germans. However, it is more likely that the East Germans decided the 
suspected former terrorists were expendable, and a former Stasi member 
told the Western authorities about them. This theory is supported by the 
introduction of terrorist wanted posters in East Gennany, and explains 
why an East German citizen in Magdeburg could point to where Inge Viett 
was living in the hopes of receiving a 50,000 DM reward. 36 
The eX-RAF members living in the GDR needed to worry about West 
German television which could reach most of East Germany, and carried 
dangerous pictures when programmes about the Red Anny Faction were 
televised. After one such programme in 1987 Susanne Albrecht had a note 
put in her post box that asked: 'How can one live with such a past?' The 
Stasi moved Albrecht and her family (she had a husband and one daughter 
born in 1983) to an East Berlin suburb. Inge ViettI who lived in Dresden 
was moved to Madgeburg, where she worked in a heavy machinery factory 
organising holidays for the employees and their families, and helping 
the Socialist Unity Party successor, the Party for Democratic Socialism, 
in elections. 37 
33 "Hier bleibt jeder fuer sich" Der Spiegel 26/1990, 86; "Die mit 
den Hueten" Der Spiegel 34/1990, 63. 
34 "'Eine perverse Kombinat ion "' Der Spiegel 25/1990, 99; "Hier 
bleibt jeder fuer sich" Der Spiegel 26/1990, 84. 
35 "'Eine perverse Kombination"' Der Spiegel 25/1990, 100. 
36 "Orna ~ Altkader" Der Spiegel 24/1990, 87; "'Eine perverse 
Kombination'" Der Spiegel 25/1990, 99. 
37 "'Eine perverse Kombination "' Der Spiegel 25/1990, 102; !lOrna ~ 
Altkader" Der Spiegel 24/1990, 87. 
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Once in retirement, the eX-RAF members were supposed to forego 
violence and contact with both the active RAF in the West, and other ex-
RAF members. All the arrested ex-RAF members claim to have been inactive 
since entering the German Democratic Republic, with Henning Beer, 
Ekkehard Freiherr von Seckendorff-Gudet and Sigrid Sternebeck claiming 
not to have left the country. The Stasi also asserted that they had 
watched these people since their immigration. 38 
3.3 The Red Anny Faction 
The Red AnTIY Faction resumed large scale activities in 1984 with a 
hunger strike, and smaller bolTIbings building into larger ones, that lead 
to a joint corrununique with Action Direct, and then the murder of the 
industrialist Ernst Zimmermann on 1 February 1985. A new RAF had 
emerged, which used new operating patterns only previously hinted at. 
The new organisational structure of the RAF reflected its audience, 
and the group's perceived achievements. In the eighties this was not the 
general public, who did not understand the groups' activities, but the 
mobilised group of supporters around the hard-core of the RAF and any 
new members these could bring to the group. 3 9 
RAF membership prior to the '84/85 Offensive' was divided into four 
bodies i the cornmando level, the illegal militants, the legitimate 
fringe, and the prisoners. A position paper found in a safe house in 
July 1984 showed that the imprisoned members were no longer a daTIinant 
force in the group f although the authorities believed that before the 
'84/85 Offensive' began, imprisoned members were in contact with the 
underground to coordinate goals and operations. 4o 
The 'Prisoners of the RAF and the Anti-imperialist Resistance' were 
important to the active members, and consul ted when possible before 
operations. The prisoners fell in status since their release fraTI prison 
was no longer a key RAF concept as signalled by the change in emphasis 
from prisoner exchanges to the targeting of objects and persons. Better 
conditions for the prisoners are always sought, as reiterated in the RAF 
corrununique after Alfred Herrhausen' s murder on 30 November 1989 1 which 
38 "Hier bleibt jeder fuer sich" Der Spiegel 26/1990, 83-5. 
39 Dieter Schroeder 1 "Terrroristen ohne strategischen Plan: SZ-
Gespraech mit dem Hamburger Verfassungsschuetzer Christian Lochte"l in: 
Dieter Schroeder (ed.), Terrorismus: Gewalt mit politischem Motiv 
(Munich: Paul List Verlag, Sueddeutsche Zeitung Serie, 1986)1 66-76, 69. 
40 Horchem (1987 I) , 9 i Kurt Rebmann, "Aktuelle Probleme der 
Bekaempfung von Terrorismus, poli tisch moti vierter Gewal tskriminali taet 
und Landesverrat" Kriminologisches Bulletin 11 (1) 1985, 5-25, 10. The 
Justice Minister, Hans Engelhard 1 neither denied nor confirmed any 
contact between the prisoners and the outside in 1985, SUeddeutsche 
Zeitung l 9/10 February 1985, 5. 
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stated that the prisoners must be brought into the discussions about the 
new international situation for revolutionary movements 1 and their need 
to be brought together in larger groups 1 41 but the prisoners were not 
the operational focus they once were. Their importance lay instead 1 in 
their ability to recruit new members through hunger strikes 1 because the 
hunger strikes create opportunities through demonstrations, discussions 
and other activities for potential new recruits to identify with RAF 
activities 1 to learn about its ideas, and meet people 1 who could lead 
potential recruits to other members as is discussed later in chapter 
four. 
The 'Commando level', the hard-core leadership of the RAF in 1985 
had about twenty persons in the underground who undertook the bombings 
and assassinations for the group. They were recruited from the 
'legitimate fringe' in the mid-eighties. 42 
To minimise the risk to itself the underground group was buffered 
from the outside world by a close legal level of about 200 persons. 
These persons lived a legal existence, and so their names were mostly 
unknown to the authorities. The group logistically supplied the commando 
level, conducted small armed actions, and provided reconnaisance and 
planning operations in preparation for larger commando level operations, 
while also maintaining contact with the prisoners. 43 
In between the legal group and the underground hard-core were the 
thirty to forty person strong group of the 'Illegal Militanten der RAF' 
(Illegal Militants of the RAF), who conducted bombings as part of the 
RAF strategy. The group shares some logistics with the 'commando level'l 
and some had lived in the underground. 4 4 
After the '84/85 Offensive' the Red Army Faction organised the 
bombing of the US air base in Frankfurt which involved the murder of an 
American serviceman, Edward Pimental, to obtain his identity card to 
ease airbase access. His murder outraged the left more than the death 
and injury of the base bombing that killed two and injured twenty and 
forced the RAF to publish a separate statement that argued he was a 
legitmate target because he was an American soldier. 45 
41 Horchem (1987 I), 15; n.n'l Der Koenig ist Tot, Hilgar Kopper 
Nachfolger: RAF Dokumentation 30.11. -6 .1. 90 (Hamburg: no publisher/date 
given), 3. 
42 Bundesministerium des Innern ( ed. ) 1 Verfassungsschutzbericht 
1985. (Bonn: EMI, 1986)1 120. 
43 ibid., 125. 
44 Horchem (1987 1)1 9j"Im Ziel l 1m Kampf" Der Spiegel 43/1986, 24; 
EMI (ed.), VSB 1985, 124-5. 
45 Red Army Faction, "Zur Aktion gegen die Rhein-Main Air Base und 
die Erschiessung von Edward Pimental", in: Jean Paul Marat (ed.), 
Widerstand Heisst Angriff! erklaerungen, redebeitraege, flugblaetter und 
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'Offensive 86' comprised coordinated RAF and AD murders on 9 July 
(Karl-Heinz Beckurts, a Siemens director), and 10 October (Gerald von 
Braunmuehl, a ministerial director at the Foreign Office), as well as 
sporadic bombings by the 'Illegal Militants' from July to December, 
which targeted military (American and West German), defence, development 
and political party institutions and buildings. This was the last 
sustained campaign of the group. 
Since then, the Red Army Faction has (apart from 1987, which saw no 
RAF activity), perfonlled yearly assassinations. There was a failed 
attempt on Dr. Hans Tietmeyer, the State Secretary of the Federal 
Finance Office on 20 September 1988, the murder of Alfred Herrhausen, 
director of the Deutsche Bank on 30 Novanber 1989, and a failed attempt 
on Hans Neusel, the State Secretary of the Interior and Minister 
responsible for terrorism, on 27 June 1990. A planned attack in March 
1990 on Ignanz Kiechle, the Federal Minister for Food, Agriculture and 
Forestry was broken off by the RAF. 46 Detlev Rohwedder, head of the 
Treuhandanstalt, which oversees privatisation of former East German 
state owned companies, was murdered on 2 April 1991, and on 13 February 
1991 the RAF shot across the Rhine river at the American embassy in Bonn 
in connection with the Gulf war to oust Iraq from Kuwait. 
The 'Illegal Militants' began operating again in December 1989 and 
February 1990 with attacks against banking, and GenTIan mul tinational 
energy interests, while the imprisoned RAF members have, however r made 
up for the lack of outside activities through hunger strikes from 
February to April 1989, and a solidarity strike with other West European 
terrorists from January to April 1990. 
The RAF's attempts to include other militant groups in its fold was 
partially successful in propagandising its position in the prisons. The 
group has organised the 'Prisoners of the RAF and the Anti-Imperialist 
Resistance' which includes prisoners who have joined the RAF prisoners, 
but were not RAF members before ~llprisonment. These can join the ready-
made support of the RAF in the prisons and carry on 'the struggle' 
instead of remaining isolated amongst smaller groups. 
The RAF is organised into inner and outer hierarchical circles in 
the underground, and in the prisons whereby the non-RAF prisoners are 
relegated to the bottom. An example of this is the manner in which the 
RAF and their newsletter Angehoerigen Info handled the non-RAF prisoners 
who participated in the 1989 hunger strike. Although Manfred Klein was 
briefe 1977-1987 (Amsterdam: Bibliotheek voor Ontspanning en 
Ontwikkling, 1988), 221. 
46 Horchem (1990), 59. 
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on hunger strike more often and longer than any of the RAF prisoners r 
this was downplayed in a two-line note in Angehoerigen Info r who instead 
claimed that Rolf Heissler and Gabriele Rollnick were at the forefront 
of the hunger strike. When Klein reached his seventy-first day of the 
hunger strike r the Info mentioned this in a small note. When the RAF 
manbers reached this time period there were long articles about health, 
demonstrations outside prisons and other similar pieces. ObviouslYr some 
are more equal than others. 47 
Possibly the RAF hoped for another Sigurd Debus r the RAF periphery 
prisoner in CelIe who died during the 1981 hunger strike. Had someone 
died during the 1989 hunger strike the RAF could have then claimed the 
person for their own, and created another martyr. Martyrsr like Holger 
Meins r who died in the 1974 hunger striker bring the RAF publicity, and 
more recruits in the manner discussed previously with regards to hunger 
strikes in general. Meins 1 death also acted as an impetus for some 
people to end legality and move on to illegal means of struggle against 
the system. 48 
Communications from the prisoners to the outside are general in 
nature, allowing them to be placed in die taz r Zusanmen Kaempfen r or the 
relatives 1 publicationr Angehoerigen Info, which publishes information 
about the prisoners in the FRGr and throughout Europe every two weeks. 
Such communications allow the prisoners to contact a wider audience and 
pass the 'struggle 1 from themselves to the hard-corer who will have 
planned assassinations in the meantime. 49 
Reduced Red Army Faction activity since 'Offensive 86 1 is possibly 
due to several factors. One is the dialogue sought by the Greens in 1985 
with imprisoned RAF members about reconciliation and the end of 
terrorism. This dialogue had several long involved phases in 1988 and 
1989 and the RAF wanted to see its outcome50 (see chapter six). Second r 
the prisoners gained contact with the underground group and told them to 
discontinue operations during the 1989 hunger strike. The prisoners once 
47 Peter-Juergen Boock, "Wir haben Schuld auf uns geladen", Die Zeit 
16 (24 June) 1988 r 11-13 r 11-2; Gerhard Linner r "Die Karawane zieht 
weiter: Kritik an der Diskussion zum Hungerstreik", Schwarzer Faden: 
Vierteljahresheft fuer Lust und Freihiet 33 (4/1989), 7-10r 8. 
48 Kahl, 160; H.J. Klein (1981), 19-21; Meins reportedly bowed to 
authority r so Baader 1 s authori ty fascinated him according to Becker r 
245; which lends some credibility to H.J. Klein's (1979), 198, assertion 
of an order for someone to die in the 1974 hunger strike because of 
sabotaged medical treatment. 
49 Angehoerigen Info Nr. 36 r 15 March 1990; Helmut Pohl, "Brief vom 
Helmut Pohl", (October 1989) in: n.n. Der Koenig ist Tot, Hilgar Kopper 
Nachfolger: RAP Dokumentation 30.11.-6.1. 90 (Hamburg: no publisher/date 
given), 14-5; n.n., Der Koenig ist Tot, 7, 18-21. 
50 Pohl (1990). 
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again became the directing force behind the group, and decided the 
strategic concept. The possibility of the renunciation of terrorism, was 
deemed unthinkable, so a new direction was required. The opening up of 
East Germany, and unification with the Federal Republic of Germany, 
possibly led to a 'wait and see what happens' attitude in the run up to 
the arrests of former RAF members. That Neusel was targeted shortly 
thereafter shows that the underground might have expected these arrests. 
The communique from the Rohwedder murder, and confiscated papers from 
prisoners' cells, led the authorities to believe that the group seeks 
common goals with partners in a revolutionary movement with tangible 
results. They fear this may lead to a tactical change back to abductions 
in order to free imprisoned members. 51 
The arrests in East Germany left the RAF with the following 
supsected members in the underground: Sabine Callsen (29), Birgit 
Hogefeld (34) , Andreas Klump (33) , Wolfgang Grams (37) , Christoph 
Seidler (32), Barbara (34) and Horst Ludwig Meyer (34), Karl-Heinz Gerum 
(37) and Corinna Kammermeier (32). The last two are believed to have 
entered the underground in March 1990. 52 
This is disputed by people who knew Gerum, Kammermeier and the RAF, 
who claimed that, while they knew the two, they have parted ways. The 
same RAF document also claimed there was no hierarchy in the group, and 
that there are no legal, only illegal members, who have contact with 
other groups for discussion purposes to understand situations and 
processes in the left and in the resistance in general 53 ( see chapter 
five) . 
The above list of nine suspected RAF members means there are 
possibly between nineteen and twenty-nine unknown people in the RAF 
hard-core, the traditional number of the RAF 'hard-core' meubers. Added 
to this are the twenty to fifty 'Illegal Militants', around two hundred 
militants of the legal RAF and about 2000 other RAF supporters. 54 
51 Red Army Faction, Clash 3, 42; "Muss Bernhard machen" Der Spiegel 
25 (17 June) 1991, 30-2, 31-2. 
52 "Moegliches Ziel" Der Spiegel 31 (30 July) 1990, 60-2, 62. 
53 Red Army Faction, "Documentation: RAF about the Attack on 
Hafenstrasse", Clash: Newspaper for/of Resistance in Europe 1 (October 
1990L 18. 
54 Hans-Ludwig Zachert, "Die Gefaehrdung der verfassungsmaessigen 
Grundordnung durch den Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland", 
in: Bundesminister des Innern (ed.), Texte zur inneren Sicherheit: 
Gewal t und Terrorisnrus- -aktueller Stand (Bonn: Bundesministerium des 
Innern, Septeuber 1990), 37-56, 46. 
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3.4 The Revolutionary Cells 
The Revolutionary Cells in the first half of the eighties were not 
the same as the RZ of the seventies. The RZ in early 1982 apparently 
also operated with combined RZ groups in some instances 1 to overcome 
single cell manpower and other resource limitations for larger 
operations. Nor was there a 'Europe' or 'outside' level of the 
Revolutionary Cells. There was only the 'national' RZ level 1 and 
officials place the majority of the fifty to eighty cells at about five 
to eight members (i.e. 250 to 360 members) of the RZ in the Rhine-Main 
area, North-Rhine-Westphalia l and West Berlin. This number was believed 
to have been as high as 200 cells in the FRG until around 1983-5 1 when 
it declined. The high numbers could be due to cell collapses after a few 
weeks or months, the fact that some people are allowed to 'retire' from 
the terrorist scene,55 and the possibility of persons being involved in 
multiple cells. 
Carlos reappeared in the early eighties after Magdalena KOPPI a 
suspected RZ member, and Bruno Breguet, a Zurich student, were arrested 
after a shooting in Paris on 16 February 1982. The two claimed to be 
with the 'International Revolutionary Organisation', and two weeks later 
a letter with the fingerprints and signature of Illitch R@nirez Sanchez 1 
demanded Breguet and Kopp's release because they were not acting against 
the French goverrunent. Despite several bombings, believed to be the work 
of Carlos 1 the two were sentenced and later released in 1985. Kopp was 
handed over to the Germans, who could not hold her on any charge, and 
later released her. She went to Damascus via East Berlin, and reportedly 
married Carlos.56 
The RZ of the eighties was more disdainful of life. They knee-
capped individuals in West Berlin (31 May 1978, 28 October 1986 and 1 
September 1987) 1 and murdered Hans Herbert Karry on 11 May 1981 (while 
ostensibly attempting a knee-capping), and showed the same disregard of 
life in the bombing of public and private places. Rota Zora showed 
similar disregard of life in their campaign against Adler textiles in 
1987. 
The eighties Revolutionary Cells campaigns were less organised than 
those of the RAF, because of the autonomy within the RZ. Each cell was 
independent to act when and where it desired. The common direction of RZ 
(and Autonanen) cells seems only to occur when there is agreement 
through discussion of the issues in the alternative press, and at 
55 A. Schmidt, 288; Horchem (1987 1)[ 10-11; Schiller (1987 11)1 96; 
Revolutionary Cells (1985), 48. 
56 Dobson, Payne (1987), 302-4. 
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congresses. Discussion of the issues is found in chapter three, so here 
it is only necessary to mention the general trends. 
The early eighties saw the RZ active against nuclear power, NATO as 
part of an anti-imperialism campaign, and Startbahn West (new runway at 
Frankfurt airport). In the mid-eighties these issues widened to include 
the nuclear reprocessing plant at Wackersdorf, the NATO deployment of 
new nuclear weapons, anti -apartheid, and the Federal Republic's 
political asyluTI policy. 
Most Revolutionary Cells did not operate during the RAF' s '84/85 
Offensive', but those which did support the offensive allegedly operated 
under different names. The RZ become active again in March 1985 with 
several baTIbings in support of the British miners' strike. 57 
Many RZ cells were inactive during the RAF' s 84/85 hunger strike 
because they fel t the RAF did not address the proper issues. They saw 
the RAF moving against the wrong targets in their idea of 'NATO-
imperialism'. They felt that instead of attacking NATO, the concern 
should be with improving the daily life of people in struggles against 
poverty, progressive social deterioration and exploitation. 58 
The Rota Zora also supported these aims in women's issues. This 
included a 'successful' 1987 bombing and extortion campaign of the Adler 
textile company in order to force the company's re-employment of sacked 
women union members at their South Korean subsidiary. 5 9 Fortunately, 
this 'success' with Adler did not result in copycat campaigns. This 
campaign did not have public opinion and protest behind it. 
RZ acti vi ties slowed down in the late eighties. This could be for 
several reasons. First, there was successful police acti vi ty directed 
against them in December 1987 I from which they did not recover until 
later in 1988. 60 Second, some of their attacks are possibly receiving 
less resonance with their perceived public ( see chapter seven) in 
connection with gene and biotechnology, computers and political asylum 
rights, where there is minimal public opinion and protest. These 
campaigns could be seen as a sign of the Revolutionary Cells and Rota 
Zora moving towards a vanguard position similar to the one the Red Army 
Faction has traditionally held. 
57 Eine Gruppe aus dem 'Traditionsverein' der Revolutionaere Zellen, 
"Es ist zum Kotzen", Radikal 130 (1985), 21. 
58 "Das Bilanz ist schlimmlf, die taz 13 February 1985, reprinted in 
Radikal130 (1985), 21. 
59 Sueddeutsche Zeitung 25 June 1987, 27; die taz 29 September 1987, 
4; Heinrich Boge, in The Gennan Tribune 1 November 1987, 5. 
60 EMI (ed.), VSB 1989, 84. 
68 
3.5 Autonanen 
Amidst the radicalisation process of the fringes of various protest 
activities in the mid-to-late seventies there arose a group known as the 
Autonanen (autonanous) or as the Guerilla Diffusa who fight "not for 
ideology, not for the proletariat, not for the people, but rather for a 
self-determined life in all areas. "61 It is almost as if this group was 
a result of the effects of terrorism: they seek to withdraw from society 
and avoid public space. While others do this behind alarms and other 
protective measures, the Autoncmen do so because of the effects of 
capitalism they see in nonnal society and its attitude towards them. 
They are an ideologically and hierarchically free al ternati ve to the 
more disciplined Red Army Faction and ideological Revolutionary Cells 
that fight against society to maintain their own lifestyle. 
The Autonamen are visible at demonstrations as the Schwarze Block 
(Black Bloc) because they dress mainly in black. For special occasions, 
they can be gathered from all around the Federal Republic through 
notices in the left-wing press and bookshops and cafes/pubs, which might 
raise up to 2000 'real activists' and 1000 'lesser activitists' nation-
wide. Other estimates suggest there are 3000 hard-core and 6000 others. 
Special occassions for large scale demonstrations include visits by 
American presidents or vice-presidents, large protests against the 
nuclear recycling plant in Wackersdorf, the nuclear plant in Brockdorf, 
the new section of Startbahn West, or in support of the Hafenstrasse 
squatters in Hamburg. The Autonanen are believed to be responsible for 
around eighty per cent of all bombings in the country.62 
Some authors categorise the Autonamen as a seperate sub-section of 
the Revolutionary Cells. Reasons for this include their similar use of 
the cell structure, their disdain of hierarchical structures and their 
'mass perspective', believing they should employ 'direct democracy' to 
help social movements further along/ thus staying close to the masses. 
This is their long-term strategy.63 
61 "Wir machen Rambo auf Linkes", Der Spiegel 46 (8 November) 1987, 
17-24, 19; Langguth, 225, ascribes the name 'Guerilla Diffusa' to a 
borrowing of the name of splinter groups from the Italian Brigatta Rossa 
who accused the BR of using Stalinistic methods, and is s~nilar to the 
autonome of the Italian and French models. In Germany the nrune Guerilla 
Diffusa was only used by the media and not by any group itself. 
"'Traenengass ist der dritte Bildungsweg'" Der Spiegel 43 (24 October) 
1983, 108-26/ 124. The name did appear though as the title of a brochure 
in July 1981 that provided tips on bombs, cells, and security and 
sabotage. 
62 "Wir machen Rambo auf Linkes", Der Spiegel 46/1987, 11; Horchem 
(1987 I), 13; Kolinsky, 68. 
63 Langguth, 225; Schiller (1987 II), 95-6; Horchem (1987 I), 13-4; 
n.n. Das Tapfere Schneiderlein, 12. 
69 
The Autonamen's basis in collective action in cooperation with 
local groups and their potential ability to canbine themselves 
nationally have enabled them to achieve some successes in gaining 'free 
space' to organise their lives after their own fashion . Collective 
action is based upon the principle that each person has to work for 
their own freedom in collective activity with others without discussions 
over leadership.64 
For example, in the case of the Hafenstrasse squatters in Hamburg J 
some success was achieved through limited bombings and arson campaigns 
and through demonstrations and the support of public figures in Hamburg l 
Hanover, Bremen, Lubeck, Marburg and West Berlin. However, the 
Hafenstrasse question is not yet ended. Similar campaigns over other 
squattings (Hausbesetzungen) as occurred in Frankfurt in the seventies, 
and West Berlin in the eighties, have also had limited success, if 
success can range from delayed action by the developers, and sometimes 
limited rental agreements.65 
The suspicion and hostility of the Autonomen for the state has, on 
the one hand, led some security authorities to view the 200 and more 
bombings and arson attempts of the Autonamen per year as basic 
hooliganism. Others, however, see this as leading to terrorism, 
instancing the biographies of the first terrorists of the late sixties 
and early seventies, who started with small bombings before moving on to 
larger terrorist acti vi ties. This view is supported by the Red Army 
Faction, who see the 'free space' and potential numbers of Autonamen as 
a social basis they should mobilise in line with their May 1982 paper, 
which states the RAF are the ones to lead the revolution, independent 
of, and wi thout consideration for, other developments in the Federal 
Republic. 66 
An integration exercise occurred in January/February 1986 during 
the Frankfurt 'Anti - Imperialist Front in Westeurope' congresss. 
Autonamen attended, but distanced themselves fral1 the authoritarian 
64 Geronimo (pseudonym) J Feuer tmd Flanme: Zur Geschichte tmd 
Gegenwart der Autonamen. Ein Abriss (Amsterdam: Edition ID-Archiv im 
IISG, 1990), 162. 
65 On Hafenstrasse see: "Beil in der Tur" Der Spiegel 45 ( 3 
November) 1986, 60-8, 63; Michael Sontheimer, II 'Wenn ihr uns raeumt 
holen wir die Russen'" Die Zeit 26 Decelnber 1986 1 9-11; "Feuer und 
Flamme fuer diesen Stadt" Der Spiegel 1 (29 December 1986) 1987, 41-4, 
and the communique to the Hamburg firebolnbings in die taz 2 January 
1987; "Die wollen unser Leben klauen" Der Spiegel 3 (14 January) 1991, 
77-80, 80; and see Geronimo for sympathetic histories of the various 
squatting movements, 127-132 (Hafenstrasse); 94-104, 132-140 (Berlin-
Kreuzberg); 40-4 (Frankfurt a.M.). 
66 Schiller (1987 II), 96; Red Army Faction, "Guerilla, Widerstand 
und Antiimperialistische Front" (1983). 
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hierachical RAF and its indoctrination attempts. The RAF reinforced the 
differences between itself and other groups. For example, this occurred 
between the congress participants and a group against Startbahn West 
which wanted to organise an information meeting. 67 
This position was reiterated in the RAF communique after their 
failed attack on Neusel in July 1990, when they praised the self-
determined free-space of groups like those in the Hafenstrasse. Their 
communique after Rohwedder's murder repeated this and also directed 
itself towards the workers in former East Germany. Rohwedder's murder 
was to be their contribution to the East's freedom from Westerm 
imperialism at both strategic and tactical levels. 68 
Unlike the RZ, which appear to have slowed down in the late 
eighties, the Autonanen maintained a high level of acti vi ty , and 
conducted most of the terrorist attacks in the country. This is possibly 
because the other groups have provided an example to the Autonomen, who 
see problems and directly respond without the ideological issues and 
concerns of the RAF and the RZ. 
4. Sl.1IIII\aIY 
This chapter highlighted the source of left-wing terrorists 
identifications. The original source was the left-wing search for viable 
opposition to the conservative governments which had ruled since 1949, 
and a desire for a change from the previous generation's linkage to the 
National Socialist past. Internationally the desire to support and 
assist Third World governments efforts towards independence, was their 
reaction to perceived US guilt in its betrayal of democracy in Vietnam. 
These larger social concerns formed a backdrop to immediate 
situations mnongst the Left in the late sixties. These concerned how to 
reach the public with their message of social criticism, and how to 
respond to the death of one student and the attempted assassination of 
another. Later a group response to a member's arrest resul ted in the 
beginning of a major terrorist organisation. After the terrorist groups 
formed in the seventies they sought different identifications according 
to their needs and goals. 
67 Horchem (1987 I), 14i n.n. "Zur Ausseinandersetzung ueber den 
Schutz! Ueber die Schweriegkeit revolutionaere Politik zu machen und 
nich in Konkreten Situationen ein taktisches Verhaeltnis zu entwickeln", 
in: Jean Paul Marat (ed.), Widerstand Heisst Angriff! erklaerungen, 
redebeitraege, flugblaetter und briefe 1977-1987 (Amsterdam: Bibliotheek 
voor Ontspanning en Ontwikkling, 1988), 269-273. 
68 Red Army Faction, "Documentation: RAF about the Attack on 
Neusel", Clash: Newspaper for/of Resistance in Europe 1 (October 1990), 
37-8, 38i Red Army Faction, Clash 3, 40-2. 
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The Red Army Faction began with the above identifications, but later 
centred on their imprisoned manbers and how they could free them. After 
this was deemed no longer possible they changed their identification to 
an 'anti-imperialist West European front' which they sought to create 
with alliances to other European terrorist groups, and wi th Stasi 
assistance began to focus on the 'military industrial complex'. The 
focus on the prisoners remained, nonetheless, due to their recruitment 
potential amongst supporters, as is shown in chapters four and five. 
The Second of June began with an identification with the workers of 
West Berlin and claimed to use actions easily replicated by other 
groups. However, the group's identification shifted to that of the RAF 
and its concentration on freeing prisoners. In the end the B2J realised 
this, and most of its members merged with the RAF, while others joined 
with the RZ in West Berlin. 
The Revolutionary Cells began as an alternative to the RAF and B2J 
with their focus on militant aid to public protest groups. While the 
'German' branch did this, the 'Europe' branch of the group in the 
seventies sought the release of imprisoned terrorists. The 'Europe' 
branch did not survive into the eighties, while the 'German' RZ in some 
areas such as gene, biotechnology and womens' issues in the Third World, 
may have become as elitist as the RAF in their vanguard approach to 
issues. 
Some Autonamen similarly work with public protests by adding their 
weight to the issue. In general, though, Autonanen identification lies 
in their search for self-determination of their lifestyles. 
Thus the groups appear to move towards a vanguard position ahead of 
the public. The RAF began there, and the B2J left the workers as it 
moved towards the RAF. The RZ and Autonanen have managed to maintain its 
identification with the public in some areas, while other cells have 
moved to vanguard positions ahead of the public. 
These similarities occurred, despite the different groups' 
detennination to maintain their separate identities in opposition to 
their rivals. The B2J was to be worker orientated, in opposition to the 
RAF, in order to maintain public ties. The RZ and Autonamen also sought 
this goal of public ties with its illegal/legal structuce. 
Most of these efforts to fight for the common people have failed 
amongst the left-wing West German terrorist groups. The RAF and B2J were 
driven into the underground as a means of survival and this separated 
them from the public. The RZ have also found underground positions for 
some of its members, while others, and the Autonamen, have been able to 
72 
maintain their illegal/legal existence. Probably this loss from the 
public has come through their counter-culture lifestyle away from the 
common people. 
Each of these groups has fared differently since they began! and 
some of them have virtually faded away. This chapter showed that each of 
them also had different concerns indicated by the issues with which they 
have identified. These are discussed in the next chapter in more detail 
as are the determining factors for the selection of targets and the 
overall level of terrorism which this chapter outlined. 
CHAPTER THREE: LEFl'-WING TERRORISM IN WEST GERMANY 
AN ANALYSIS 
everyone, even the enemy, said pauli, talks of love, of 
learning, of work, of peace. just like us ... it is not 
the words, it is the interests that determine the value 
of a word. down there the gull, every fascist can do 
that too, whomever, wherever we aim it at, that 
characterises them, not the production company, the 
practise, not even the courage, the shot. 1 
The movement? We find ourselves in a phase of 
reorientation. The correct political path is not 
determined through the head and through theory, it is 
also crystalised in the practical struggle, its result. 
And practical struggle means armed struggle, building 
up an urban guerilla, the organisation of the 
underground! 2 
Because we could not reach the masses in our own 
country, and scorned them in principle, we consequently 
sought a new revolutionary subject: the impoverished 
and repressed of the Third World. 3 
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This chapter I s analysis of left-wing West German terrorism covers 
four aspects of the violence. First, the frequency of the incidents. 
Second, the types of incidents involved; kidnappings, bombings, murder 
and other incidents. Third, the themes represented by the incidents and 
acti vi ties of the terrorist groups. Fourth, an attempt to explain why 
and when particular targets are chosen. 
1. The Scale of Left-wing Terrorism 
Left-wing West German terrorism began in the late 1960s, as is 
reflected in Table 3.1 (page 74).4 The table shows that in the eighties 
there were over two and a half times more terrorist incidents than in 
the seventies. The rise of incidents possibly shows lower public 
identification with the state in the eighties than in the seventies, as 
more incidents caused less clamour. This is seen arguably in public 
satisfaction with democracy scores (average 78.4%, 1970s; average 72.5%, 
1980s), and defence against subversion scores (average 44%, 1970s; 
1 Geissler, 193. There is no capitalisation in the book. 
2 Boock (1988), 10. 
3 ibid. 
4 The word 'terror I itself only appeared in the West German press 
sometime after 1964, and then under sole proprietorship of the Springer 
press. The word entered public usage after the death of Benno Ohnesorg 
on 2 June 1967. Bowmann H. Miller, The Language Component of Terrorism 
strategy: A Text-Based, Linguistic Case study of Contemporary Gennan 
Terrorism Ph.D. Thesis (Georgetown University, 1983), 128, 131. 
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average 36.7%, 1980s), which were higher in the seventies than in the 
eighties. 5 
Table 3.1 Left-Wing Terrorist Offences f 1968-1989 
II YEAR OFFENCES YEAR OFFENCES YEAR OFFENCES II 
II 1968 9 1976 33 1984 222 II 
II 1969 48 1977 172 1985 299 
/I 1970 119 1978 58 1986 460 1971 88 1979 44 1987 242 I 1972 71 1980 77 1988 197 1973 70 1981 129 1989 101 
I 1974 106 1982 184 1975 45 1983 215 
Source: Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse, Politischer Extremisrrrus in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Band III Dokumentation (Cologne: Verlag 
Wissenschaft und Politik, 1989) , 132i BundesministeriuTI des Innem 
(ed. ) , Verfassungsschutzbericht 1988, (Bonn: EMI, 1989 (manuscript) ) , 
92i 1989[ 77. 
It is also potentially the case that the youths who contributed to 
early incidents aged and became the more relaxed public in the eighties, 
and that the government's definition of terrorism was widened to include 
transport obstructions and the toppling of power pylons, after these 
incidents increased in frequency.6 
A lower public identification with the state in the eighties 
occurred at great material cost. The Red Army Faction's 'Offensive 
84/85' (December 1984 to February 1985) cost about 20 million DM for the 
insurance companies. The Federal Cr~TIinal Office placed damage caused by 
the various terrorist groups at somewhere between 200 and 250 million 
DM.1 Another estimate for the years 1967 to 1981 counts 448 attacks on 
5 See Tables 7.1 and 7.2, pages 254, 255. The figures for Septenber 
1973 in table 7.1 and February-March 1970 in table 7.2 were left out 
because they differed in each table. Adding them would have unbalanced 
the figures for the respective periods. When added the figures became 
71.3% 'satisfied with democracy', and 39.2% for 'defence against 
subversion'. Otherwise the 'satisfied' and 'very satisfied' were added 
together for a single score. Where two dates occur in the year these 
were averaged together. From table 7.2 'defence against subversion' was 
used. 
6 Of 112 attacks on energy supply installations between January and 
November 1986 103 were attacks on power pylons. Rolf Goessner, "1m 
Schleppnetz des Sicherheitsstaates: Die Rationalisierung des 
Massenkontrolle", in: Rolf Goessner, Buergen kontrollieren Polizei 
( eds. ) , Restrisiko Mensch: Volkserfassung I Staatsterrorgesetz f 
Widerstandsbekaempfung (Hamburg: Instituts fuer Sozialforschung, 1987), 
5-11, 5. 
1 This was equal to about $100 million when the article was written. 
David Th. Schiller, "The Economic Implications of Terrorism: A Case 
Study of the Federal Republic of Germany" TVI -Journal 7 (1) 1986, 37-40, 
38. 
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property (compared to 1069 for all attacks between 1968 and 1981 in 
Table 3.1) at a cost of $75 million in damage. However, these are only 
rough estimates of damage. The reason is that not all arson and lesser 
attacks are classified under terrorist attacks, and follow up costs do 
not always enter into police reports. 8 
Lower public identification with the state in the face of higher 
levels of terrorism appears to exist despite high material costs. This 
may indicate decreased materialist values in the population and 
increased post-materialist ones. Between 1978 and 1988 the proportion of 
men and women supporting post-materialist values rose fran 16% to 25% in 
men and 9% to 18% in women. Post-materialists are less concerned with 
economic and physical security, and more concerned with self-expression, 
belonging, and quality of life. There is also a greater acceptance of 
unconventional protest amongst post-materialists. The Green Party also 
rose between the seventies and eighties. 9 
2. Types 
However, the next question is whether this explanation holds when 
the incidents are increased. A comparison between Table 3.1 and 3 . 2 
(page 76) reveals that left-wing terrorism itself is only a small 
fraction of all left-wing extremist offences. 
Table 3.2 contains both offences committed at demonstrations- -the 
general public are thus potentially included- -extremist acts directed 
against business and state, as well as operational and logistical 
terrorist offences. Operational incidents are the murders and bombings, 
and logistical offences are those that provide the means of operations, 
such as the six million DM the Red Army Faction stole or extorted by the 
eighties. Logistical offenses also include the theft of such items as 
weapons and identity cards, passports, etc., which the RAF routinely 
stole as mentioned in chapter two. Abductions such as that of Lorenz are 
both logistical and operational, because they provide funds and release 
imprisoned group members. The cost of all goods and monies stolen or 
extorted by left-wing West Gennan terrorists between 1967 and 1981 
8 Schiller (1986), 38; Christopher Hewitt, "The Costs of Terrorism: 
A Cross-National Study of Six Countries" Terrorism 11 (3) 1988, 169-180, 
171. 
9 Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.), Datenreport 1989: Zahlen und Fakten 
ueber die BLmdesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn: Bundesamt fuer poli tische 
Bildung, 1989), 152, 536. Ronald Ingelhart, "Political Action: The 
Impact of Values, Congitive Level, and Social Background", in: Samuel H. 
Barnes, Max Kaase (eds.), Political Action: Mass Participation in Five 
Western Democracies (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 1979), 343-80, 356-
7. 
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amounted to $22. 5 million in ransoms, $6 . 2 million in robberies, and 
$6.4 million in stolen goods, for a total of $35.1 million.lo 
Table 3.2 Left-Wing Extremist Offences, 1982-1989* 
I 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 II -M:-:-ur------:d-er------=..::::.=~~=--=-=::..::::..±...---=~~~~-=-=::~----=~~~~ 
II (Victims) 
II Explosions 
','I ::~lt Robberies 
Breach of Peace! 
Violence at 
Demonstrations 
Obstruction of 
Transport 
Malicious 
Damage 
All Violent Acts 
Violent Threats 
Other Offences 
Total 
68 
310 
212 
1 
119 
6 
1071 
1597 
43 
249 
1889 
55 
304 
41 
90 
5 
1045 
1540 
7 
157 
1704 
2 
47 63 
172 229 
65 88 
3 5 
117 112 
95 115 
770 
1269 
38 
216 
1523 
990 
1602 
74 
167 
1843 
3 2 1 1 
60 28 11 6 
395 210 144 68 
155 133 83 88 
221 3 
139 98 99 136 
153 99 43 18 
995 
1902 
97 
240 
2239 
925 408 517 
1497 790 837 
100 38 40 
258 127 206 
1855 955 1083 
* These figures also includes non-terrorist incidents. 
See Table 3.3 for strictly terrorist offences. 
Source: Eva Kolinsky. "Terrorism in West Germany." in: Juliet Lodge 
(ed.), The Threat of Terrorism (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd.), 1988, 
62. Bundesministerium des Innern (ed.), Verfassungsschutzbericht 1986 
(Bonn: EMI, 1987), 141; 1987, 83; 1988, 1989 (manuscript)), 118; 1989, 
89. 
The seriousness of the logistical offences is possibly doubted by 
some of the public, which lessens identification with the state. 
However, this is counterpoised by the fact that these are mainly 
undertaken by the underground RAF. The RAF and the Revolutionary Cells 
were also responsible for the murders (apart from two in 1987) and large 
bombing and arson activities. For example, the RZ exploded eight bombs-
-some simultaneously- -in eight different cities in 1982.11 
10 Hewitt (1988), 170; Kahl, 68; Horchem (1980), 51, says that 
between 1970 and April 1979 thirty bank robberies by terrorists netted 
5.4 million DM, and that another tenty-one robberies, probably by 
terrorists, raised 1. 6 million DM. A further 4. 6 million DM was lost 
through possible terrorist attacks on armoured cars. Karl Guenther 
Barth I "Mal ein paar Tage abtauchen" Stern 40 (45) 29 October-4 November 
1987, 250-1 1 251, adds possible terrorist connections to deparment store 
cash room and money courier thefts. 
11 Bundesministerium des Innern (eds.), Verfassungsschutzbericht 
1982. (Bonn: EMI, 1983), 103. 
77 
Between their beginning in 1973 and late 1984, the RZ were believed 
responsible for 200 arson and bomb attacks, 12 three knee-cappings over 
the years 1978, 1986 and 1987, and one murder in 1981. 
Table 3.3 Left-Wing Terrorist Attacks by Group, 1982-1989 
Arson 
Explosions 
RAF 
1 
1 
RAF Illegal RZ/ 
Millitants Rota Zora 
381 
8 12 
5 4 
13 3 
5 6 
17 
6 5 
7 2 
5 
13 
20 
12 
Other 
144 
92 
138 
244 
132 
116 
56 
31 
23 
24 
38 
23 
9 
Total 
1202 
164 
101 
154 
255 
149 
127 
65 
632 
51 
44 
60 
60 
28 
11 
1
1,1
1
1 
~~Ims/ 
Attempts) 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1982-84 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
15 
7 
15 
10 
5 
1 
2 3 
2 
6 I 
! II II I Other 1 
o 
2 
5 
1 
2 
5 
1 
1 1493 
58 
29 
1 Explosive and arson bombings are not seperated in 1982. 
2 'Other' is not seperated from RZ in 1982. 
150 
58 
29 
3 Transportation obstruction added to 'terrorism' offences. 
Source: Bundesministerium des Innern (ed.), VerfasslIDgsschutzberichte 
1982 (Bonn: EMI, 1983), 100, 103; 1983, 103; 1984, 110; 1986, 128; 1987, 
73; 1988 (manuscript)! 92; 1989! 77. 
This still leaves about 80% of the incidents commi tted by unknown 
groups (Table 3.3). The increase in lesser incidents is possibly because 
the perpetrators usually remain free. It is suspected that they belong 
to the circles around the Autonomen. 13 
The possibility is that identification with the smaller activities 
of unknown groups has set an example which others follow. Some of the 
12 Rebmann (1985 I), 11. 
13 Kolinsky I 68 i Langguth I 225; "Wir machen Rambo auf Linkes" Der 
Spiegel 46/1987, 17-24. 
78 
public may see models for their own activity in low level violence, and 
there may also be lessened sensitivity to political violence in general, 
due to its continuation since the late sixties. 
II 
II 
I 
I 
I 
Table 3.4 Left-Wing Terrorist Offences 
by Group and Target, 1968-1989 
1968-1980 
Pe0l2le (%) Objects (%) Other (%) 
RAF 46 (44.7) 22 (21. 3) 35 (34.0) 
B2J 13 (16.9) 46 (59.7) 18 (23.4 ) 
RZ/Rota Zora 5 (5.6) 85 (94.4) 
Others 5 (4.3 ) 94 (81. 7) 16 (13.9) 
Total 69 (17.9) 247 (64.2) 69 (17.9) 
1982-1989 
RAF 7 (41.2) 2 (11. 8) 8 (47.1) 
RAF Illegal 
Militants -- 96 (100) --
RZ/Rota Zora 2 (1.4) 142 (98.6) --
Others 2 (0.15) 1073 (81. 8) 236 (18.0) 
Total 11 (0.7) 1313 (83.7) 244 (15.6) 
1968-1989 (Minus 1981) 
Total 80 (4.1) 1560 (80.2) 313 (16.1) 
Total (%) 
103 (100) 
77 (100) 
90 (100) 
115 (lOa) 
378 (100) 
17 (100) 
96 (100) 
144 (100) 
1311 (100) 
1568 (100) 
1946 (100) 
II 
Source: (1968-1980) Friedhelm Neidhardt, "Linker und rechter 
Terrorismus: Erscheinungsformen und Handlungspotentiale im 
Gruppenvergleich." in: Wanda von Baeyer-Katte, Dieter Claessens, Hubert 
Feger, Friedhelm Neidhardt ( eds. ) , Gruppenprozesse: Analysen zum 
Terrorismus 3 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982), 437-8. 
Source: (1982-1989) The numbers are from Table 3.3 with people obtained 
from 'murder', except for the RZ kneecappings listed there under 
'other'. Objects are the totals for 'arson' and 'explosions'. 
Table 3.3 shows the high number of incidents perpetrated by groups 
without links to the RZ and RAF, and the procli vi ty of the RAF for 
attacks against persons, specifically murder, and the RZ' s preference 
for acts against objects. The 'Illegal Militants' support role for the 
RAF hard-core can also be seen in the potential for them to maintain RAF 
activity when the hard-core is inactive. The effect of changes in the 
criminal code terrorism definition in 1987 is also seen. 
Table 3.4 presents data compiled by different methods, because 
similar data was unavailable. The results show that more people were 
targeted in the seventies than the eighties, and that the number of 
objects targeted rose in the eighties. This possibly helps explain why 
the public identified more strongly with the state in the seventies, 
than in the eighties. The public did not feel as threatened in the 
eighties as it did in the seventies. The eighties have also not seen the 
abductions, hijackings and embassy sieges of the seventies, whereby the 
public could identify with the incident victims ( see chapter seven). 
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Instead, the eighties have had fewer murders, but more bombings and 
arson attacks against 'objects'. 
Table 3.5 Distribution of Targets by 
Category and Estima.ted Cost, 1967-1981 
Property Ownership 
Business 25% 
Government 18 
Security Forces 13 
Utilities 11 
Residential 10 
Political 9 
Vehicles 7 
CUltural, Social, 
Educational 5 
Bars, Cinemas, ect. 2 
Other 1 
Estimated Cost $44.2 million 
Individuals No. 
Deaths 71 
Injuries 1589 
Estimated Cost 
Cost (millions) 
$18.2 
$5.1 
$23.3 million 
Source: Christopher Hewitt, "The Costs of Terrorism: A Cross-National 
Study of Six Countries" TeITOrism 11 (3) 1988, 169-80, 173, 174. 
Tables 3. 3 and 3. 4 provide no details as to the types of targets 
chosen by the different terrorist groups. Knowing the types of targets, 
(banks, deparbnent stores, construction firms, etc.), can provide clues 
as to the issues that motivate terrorist groups. However, the caveat is 
that targets can also be chosen because of their vulnerability and ease 
of access as is discussed later in the chapter. Table 3.5 exhibits the 
identification possibilities of motivation for, and reaction against, 
terrorism in the high percentage of business and political targets 
'political', 'security forces', 'governmental' and residential targets, 
as well as the deaths and injuries. 
The types of terrorist violence help explain potential public 
identification for the state and against terrorists, as well as for the 
terrorists and against the state. The terrorist violence of the 
seventies was new and attacked more people than was acceptable to the 
public. Attacks against people fell. off sharply in the eighties in a 
shift towards attacks against objects. There was a rise in less 
sophisticated attacks as people identified possibilities to extend 
unconventional political activity. Both of these resulted in a lessened 
danger perception for the state as opposed to that in the seventies, and 
a higher identification with law level terrorism against objects. 
3. Issues Raised by TeITOrist Attacks 
The motivating identifications differed for the terrorist group 
founders and their successors. Some issues have remained consistent 
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between them, while others changed. Some targets have also remained 
consistent between them r while the issues connected to the targets 
changed. The issues discussed are not in any order of importance. 
3.1 The State 
A foremost issue of left-wing terrorist activity in the Federal 
Republic of Germany has been the state itself. The terrorists viewed the 
state as their enemy, and wanted to prove their strength against it by 
showing its vulnerability14 in order to obtain legitimacy as objects of 
identification from the public. The public would join the terrorists, 
the Red Army Faction thought, because the state produced too many 
contradictions, and it could no longer buy off the public with reform 
promises. Thus 
... in the measure that we make the correct actions and 
you [a prisoner support group] the correct propaganda, 
the guerilla will become anchored in the masses r a 
revolutionary process and consciousness will develop 
and advance. The consciousness that it is justified to 
act- -and possible!15 
The result in the seventies was that the Second of June Movement 
attacked police offices (3 March 1972)16 and judges (10 November 1974), 
while the RAF included the bombing of police offices on 12 May 1972, and 
the car of a federal judge (15 May 1972) amongst the first targets in 
their first bombing campaign in May 1972. 
The RZ targeted the State Court House in Hamm (15 May 1976), and a 
tax inspector I s home (16 September 1976) though not for the same 
vanguard reasons as the RAF. The Revolutionary Cells have always stated 
they are part of the masses because 
... in view of the reality that we see opposite us, in 
view of the horrible authori ty methods available to 
mankind that the powers have ... and against which we 
have to defend ourselves ... we can only finally overcome 
with violence, whereby 'we I naturally doesn I t mean 
urban-guerilla groups, but naturally, as said, only 
[urban] guerilla [tactics] practiced by the masses. 17 
However, these motives were not the only identification at work in 
the terrorists. They also identified with their members, and sought 
14 Red Army Faction, "Das Konzept Stadtguerilla" (1983), 357. 
15 Red Army Faction, "Tonbandprotokoll der Erklaerung der RAF auf 
dem Teach-in der Roten Hilfe Ffm. am 31. 5 . 72. ", in: Bewaffneter Kampf: 
Texte der RAP f Auseinandersetzung und Kritik (Graz : Ver lag Rote Sonne, 
1973), 181-3, 183. 
16 The dates here and elsewhere in the chapter refer to the 
chronology. 
17 Revolutionary Cells (1975), 216-7. 
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revenge for the deaths of fallen comrades- -the first motive of the 
RAF's second attack. They could not let the police and others go 
unscathed18 nor unanswered. Similarly 1 the attempted abduction that 
ended in the murder of Guenter von Drenkmann l by the Second of June 1 was 
because of the state's perceived responsibility for the death of an 
imprisoned terrorist, and as Drenkmann was a maUber of the 'hard core' 
of responsible state persons he had to realise that "whoever sows 
violence, will harvest violence".19 
In the seventies the Red Army Faction considered the Federal 
Republic an independent actor. This changed in the eighties when it was 
perceived as subservient to the USA. This meant the state was targeted 
for its connections to other issues l and not in and of itself as a means 
to overthrow the state, but to assist in the general overthrow of 
imperialism in Europe and the world. For example 1 the communique of 
Detlev Rohwedder's murder (2 April 1991) stated that this was an 
'instalment' against 'the bnperialst beast' and 'the reactionary greater 
GenTIan and western European plans to suppress and exploit people here 
and in the Third World.' This was a sign of the RAF's self-
identification shift towards that of an anti-imperialist group 1 
something the group always thought itself to be. However 1 in its early 
days this was not as heavily promoted as it was in the eighties. 2o 
The Revolutionary Cells in the eighties shifted their moves against 
the state towards support for specific protest campaigns which are 
examined in the following sections. The Revolutionary Cells, in this 
respect are like the Autonanen l whose low-level terrorism 1 sabotage 1 
bombing and disturbances at demonstrations are used to point out 
ecological and social problems. 21 
3.2 Anti-Imperialism 
The terrorists' self-identification as anti-imperialists means they 
target imperialists, whom they perceive as enemies of the Third World. 
The RAF sees 
... the urban guerilla [as] the connection between 
national and international class struggle. The urban 
guerilla is a possibility to produce relationships 
18 B.H. Miller (1983)1 214-24. 
19 Second of June 1 "Zum Attentat auf Berlins hoechster Richter: 
Terror oder Gegenwehr?!" 1 in: 'Holger der Kampf geht weiter!' Beitraege 
zur Konzept Stadtguerilla (Gaiganz/Ueberfranken: Politladen 
Verlagsgesellschaft l 1975)1 248-52, 251. 
20 B.H. Miller (1983), 232-3, 315-8; Independent 3 April 1991 f 1. 
21 Hans Josef Horchem l "European Terrorism: A German Perspective" 1 
Terrorism 1 (1982), 27-51, 27. 
between imperialistic authori ties in the consciousness 
of the people. 22 
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Their first target, the US Fifth Army Corp Headquarters on 11 May 
1972, was to answer American bombs with Red Army Faction bombs in order 
to eliminate secure areas for the US.23 
In 1973 the Revolutionary Cells underscored their displeasure with 
US-imperialism and supported the Third World by bombing ITT 
(International Telephone and Telegraph) offices in West-Berlin (17 
November 1973) and Nurnberg (18 November 1973) as their first official 
activity. These attacks were also linked with the company's involvement 
in the overthrow of Allende's goverment in Chile. 24 
In 1976 they added US military targets because: 
We understand our struggle as that of a colonised 
people, whose territory of the Federal German 
administration is given up to the US-imperialism as the 
main support area, and is made ready as the military 
and strategic headquarters for the subjugation and 
eradication of the European people, the people of the 
Middle East and during the Indochina war the people of 
the Far East. 25 
The eighties saw the RAF shift from attacks on unprotected American 
rear areas in 1972 to the RZ view of attacks on enemy strongholds. The 
RAF no longer attacked weak points, because of the imperialist's 
problems elsewhere, but attacked it in its homeland. By showing Gennany 
to be a centre of imperialist power it also pointed to Germany's role of 
servant with the real masters- -the USA. (via NATO)- -being in charge. 26 
The s~ne targets were attacked for different reasons. 
The May 1982 paper clarified the RAF's position by calling for an 
anti-imperialist front "within the framework of the world-wide struggle" 
whereby the major enemy/target is 'US-imperialism'.27 These targets had 
been underscored in 1981 by an attack on the NATO Air Force Headquarters 
in Ramsteim on 31 August, and by the attempted assassination of the US 
Army Supreme Commander in Europe, General Frederick J. Kroesen, on 14 
September. 
The RAF stated these attacks were a sign of the 
22 Red Army Faction, "Dem Volk dienen: Stadtguerilla und 
Klassenkampf" (1983), 374. 
23 B.H. Miller (1983), 212. 
24 Revolutionary Cells (1985), 25. 
25 ibid., 43. 
26 B.H. Miller (1983), 332, 341. 
27 Red Army Faction, "Guerilla, Widerstand und Antiimperialistische 
Front" (1983), 613. 
., .new political situation and the orientation of the 
whole political process in resistance against the 
reconstruction of the strategy of US-imperialism, with 
its pivot in West Europe and which the centrality of 
West Europe introduced a new phase of the world 
revolutionary process. 28 
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The RAP saw NATO as part of a US-imperialist policy for the West, to 
prepare for the Third World War by building up the military machine to 
change the military balance between socialist and imperialist Europe. In 
the RAP I s view, the Europeans would see what it is like in the Third 
World under the rule of the imperialists. 29 
It is incorrect to believe that the Red Army Faction has identified 
with both the Third World and its domestic public. The Third World did 
not interest itself in them and the RAP did not care about the West 
German public, because they believed the public never considered that 
their lifestyle was at the expense of those in the Third World. 3o 
3.21 Support for the Third World 
The terrorist groups identified with what they saw as the price of 
imperialism. In the case of Vietnam it was 
... the horrible experience of the people of the Third 
World that imperialism is determined to practice 
genocide on them, if there is nothing more to gain from 
them- -them as market, on a military basis, as natural 
resource supplier, as a supplier of cheap labour, to no 
longer join in ... 31 
Vietnam was an identification point for West German groups even in 
the sixties, as discussed in chapter two. Vietn~TI was also the focus of 
handbills written by Kommune I members in West-Berlin after a department 
store was firebombed in Brussels in May 1967. The handbills and the 
banting were both meant to awaken a new understanding of the Vietn~TI war 
by providing the West European public with a chance to experience the 
horrors of American bombings similar to those undergone by the North 
Vietnamese. One of the handbills stated that: 
If there I s a fire sanewhere in the near future, if an 
army barracks goes up into the air, if in some stadium 
28 Red Army Faction, "Erklaerung van 10.4. aus Stammheim zu den 
Aktionen 81", Zusarrrnen Kaempfen 1 (December 1984), 3. 
29 Red AnTIY Faction, "Kommando Sigurd Debus" I in: Jean Paul Marat 
(ed.), Widerstand Heisst Angriff! erklaerungen, redebeitraege, 
flugblaetter und briefe 1977-1987 (Amsterdam: Bibliotheek voor 
Ontspanning en Ontwikkeling I 1988), 70. 
30 Reiche, 16-7; Peter-Juergen Boock in Stern 41 (39) 1988, 271. 
31 Red Army Faction, "Die Aktion des Schwarzen September in 
Muenchen" I in: texte: der RAP (West Berlin: no publisher given, 
ueberarbeitete und aktualisierte Ausgabe, 1983), 411- 447, 413-4. 
a stand collapes, be little surprised. Just as little 
as when the [Americans] transgress the demarcation 
line, or bomb the city centre of Hanoi, or send marines 
marching into China. Burn, department store, burn!32 
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The same firebombing, and the trial of the Korrmune I authors, was 
also the inspiration for a firebombing by later members of the RAP in 
April 1968,33· whose identification with Vietnam was so strong for the 
founder Red Army Faction members that it was a central point of the 
courtroom defence strategy for Baader, Ennslin, Meinhof and Raspe. On 4 
May 1976 they asked a number of people to be called as witnesses to give 
evidence that 
... the US goverrunent, by military intervention in 
Vietnam and Cambodia, had committed violations of 
international law, that West German soil had been among 
the places from which they operated, and that 
accordingly it might be a relevant legal issue to 
consider whether, in its own turn, 'the use of force 
against certain mili tary establishments of the USA on 
West German territory, such as bomb attacks on US bases 
in Frankfurt and Heidelberg, was justified' .34 
By the time the 'second generation' RAP, and the Second of June were 
organised and operational in the Stockhofln embassy and elsewhere, other 
concerns were paramount, and the issue of Vietnam itself was decided. 
However, the targets need not change, only the object of identification 
and the message. 
Contacts between the pre-terrorist groups and Palestinians, which 
continued during the terrorists' early formation, led to identification 
wi th the Palestinians. The RAP founders were trained in an Al Fatah camp 
in Jordan in 1970 which was under the command of Hassan Salameh, who 
later organised the Black September attack on the Munich Olympics in 
1972. In the hostage taking Salameh required the release of Baader and 
Meinhof along with the release of Palestinians held by the Israelis in 
exchange for the Israeli Olympic team. 35 
Possibly in return, the RAP wrote a long essay about Black September 
and the Munich Massacre, in which the RAP praised the group and 
discussed its anti-imperialist, anti-fascist and international 
32 Langhans, Teufel, (no pagination) Flugblatt 8, 24.5.67. The 
original ended with the English phrase: ffburn, warehouse, burn! ff 
33 Aust (1987), 49-50. 
34 ibid., 343-4; see also: Red Army Faction, "Protokoll- -Ausschnitt 
Stamrnheim 22. Juni 1976", in: texte: der RAP (West Berlin: no publisher 
given, ueberarbeitete und aktualisierte Ausgabe, 1983), 491-5[ 491. The 
applications for these persons to appear[ and the testimony of those who 
came nonetheless, is provided in: texte: der RAF, 476-516. 
35 Aust (1987), 234; George Jonas, Vengeance: A True Story (London: 
Pan Books Ltd., 1985), 23. 
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characteristics. The RAF praised the action as an example of the 
periphery bringing the war to the centre of imperialism and 
multinational corporations. 36 
However, West German contact withAl Fatah did not last, and they 
changed their affiliation to the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine. The identification did not change. Both groups were action 
oriented, but as Al Fatah moved away from attacks outside of Israel, the 
German groups identified with the PFLP who did undertake attacks outside 
of Israel. The PFLP could offer the Germans training, weapons, and other 
items in exchange for money and services rendered as in the OPEC (1975) 
and Entebbe (1976) attacks. The PFLP, who hijacked a Lufthansa airplane 
in October 1977/ demanded the release of imprisoned German terrorists. 
In the eighties there was less direct contact with Palestinian 
issues after the Palestinians were pushed out of the Lebanon by the 
Israelis in 1982. However, there has been the use of commando names with 
Palestinian connections/ and an RAF position paper offered for a Middle 
East congress in Wiesbaden in Novanber 1986. The paper was presented by 
an RAF supporter and pointed out that the Palestinians- -the PFLP by 
name- -had learned the same lessons as the anti-imperialists in Western 
Europe: one has to work with others to free oneself from imperialism. No 
one people can do this alone, and the political and military aspects 
need to be fought together. This applies as much to the Middle East as 
to the struggle in the Federal Republic and Western Europe. 37 
The main Third World identification object in the eighties for left-
wing terrorists in West Germany (apart from the RAF) was apartheid in 
South Africa. To the other West German groups 
... South Africa means ... our hope for a life on the 
other side of the imperialist exploitative relationship 
and the unrealistic behavior combines itself wi th the 
independence struggle of the black youth/ women and 
men. That is why our actions are directed against those 
who are responisible for the repression! exploitation 
and hunger politics around the world. 38 
RZ theory placed the issue of black South Africa into the already 
present anti-imperialist schematic that the West in general feels it 
36 Red Army Faction, "Die Aktion des Schwarzen September" (1983), 
414. 
37 n.n. "Beitraeg zur Nahost Veranstaltung, am 16. Nov. 86 in 
Wiesbaden"; in: Jean Paul Marat (ed. ), Widerstand Heisst Angriff! 
erklaerungen, redebeitraege, flugblaetter und briefe 1977-1987 
(hnsterdam: Bibliotheek voor Ontspanning en Ontwikkeling; 1988), 341-8. 
38 Revolutionary Cells; "Solidaritaet mit dem Befreiungskaanpf in 
Suedafrika" 10.2.86, printed in: tot oder Lebendig: Zeitung fuer 
Polittourismus 3, 1986, 37. 
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needs South Africa to be under Western influence or control to maintain 
secure raw material resources. Furthermore, South Africa's role in 
southern Africa, like Israel's in the Middle East, is seen as that of 
the guardian of Western interests in an otherwise difficult area. 
Therefore, South Africa is supplied with the most modern weapons and is 
integrated into the strategy of NATO in order to secure the imperialist 
interests of the West. 39 
As a part of the anti -apartheid campaign, and as a part of the 
larger anti-imperialism campaign, the efforts against the mUltinational 
company Shell took on a special position. Attackers against Shell could 
easily justify their attacks without worrying about the positions of the 
national resistance movements like the African National Congress. 
Attacking Shell was not supporting any of the resistance movements with 
weapons or workers brigades as was done in Central America, but was 
simply "fighting the supporters of counter-revolution here in the 
metropole" whereby such militant activity helps the blacks in South 
Africa through the encouragement of disinvestment from South Africa. The 
international character of the anti-Shell campaign, with strong 
movements in Holland, Denmark, and Sweden and to a lesser extent in 
Norway, Italy, Finland and West Germany, presented the possibility of a 
West European internationalism. However, this was only seen as possible 
through systematically widening personal clandestine contacts. 40 
3.22 F:inance and the "Military Industrial Canplex' 
Identification with the Third World and anti-imperialism has led to 
its linkage with finance for the Third World as evidenced by opposition 
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank meetings held in 
West Berlin in September 1988. There were large demonstrations against 
the meetings, along with rioting by left-wing extremists. Twenty-five 
percent of the left-wing terrorist bombings in 1988 were also connected 
with the event. There was also the attempted murder of Dr. Hans 
Tietmeyer, the government official responsible for organising the event, 
on 20 September 1988 by the RAF.41 
The Red Army Faction saw Tietmeyer as the embodiment of 
international crisis management on the national, European and 
international levels. The RAF perceived the imperialists as responsible 
39 Revolutionary Cells, "Burn, Baby Burn", tot oder Lebendig: 
Zeitung fuer Polittourismus 3, 1986 f 38-9, 39; "RZ 13.10.1985", Radikal 
131, 76-77. 
40 "Shell to Hell! Diskussionspapier" Radikal 139 (November 1989), 
4-7. 
41 BMI (ed.), VSB 1988 (manuscript), 93, 103. 
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for hunger and death in the Third World as they used all possible means 
to balance the powers of ~nperialism against freedom movements. The RAF 
argue that by fighting against ~nperialism around the world, imperialism 
could be countered, eventually eroded and broken to allow "concrete 
perspectives for the end of imperialist rule".42 
To come full circle, the eighties also saw the Red Army Faction 
develop its 'militarisch-industriellen-karnplex' (MIK, military 
industrial complex) concept of attacking the strong centre of the 
imperialist enemy in West Europe in its political, military and 
industrial areas. Since then the concept has matured into the 
'antiimperialist front in Western Europe' through collaborative efforts 
which the RAF has sought with other West European terrorist groups since 
1984/85, as exemplified by its cooperation with the French terrorist 
group Action Direct. 
In their comnunique for the murder of Beckurts on 9 July 1986 the 
RAF wrote that the MIK comprises technological monopolies that increase 
Third World dependence on the West as contributors of the West's 
economic profits and growth. American capital, according to the RAF, 
leads the enterprise, and together with the other core states of West 
Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan, the Americans are 
strategically internationally reorganising their research and 
production, while Europe also increases its cooperative efforts in 
political, economic and military areas. 43 
The Belgian Combatant communist Cells, the French Action Direct, in 
joint work with an Italian Red Brigades offshoot, and the RAF were all 
targeting similar objects such as NATO pipelines, NATO institutions and 
defence contractors, as well as American military installations, 
BLmdeswehr (federal army) targets, defence industry sites, technology 
and research firms, individual politicians, state security people, and 
businessmen in the MIK area such as the two RAF victims, Ernst 
Zimmermann (1 February 1985) and Beckurts.44 The attacks against the 
'imperialist beast' and the 'reactionary greater Gennan and Western 
European plans to suppress and exploit people here and in the Third 
World', language used in the Rohwedder communique quoted above, show 
that the 'anti-imperialist struggle' of the RAF continues. 
42 Red Army Faction, "'Bekennerschreiben' der RAF zum Anschlag auf 
Staatssekretaer Tietmeyer", in: Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse, (eds.)f 
Jahrbuch Extremismus und Demokratie 1989 (Bonn: Bourvier Verlag, 1989), 
159-61. 
43 die taz 11 July 1986. 
88 
3.3 Technology 
The technology aspect inherent in the Red Army Faction's MIK concept 
is also underscored by the Revolutionary Cell's and Autanamen activities 
against technological issues. The RZ campaign began against nuclear 
energy in the seventies, and added computers and genetic technology in 
the eighties. 45 A simple explanation of the RZ and Autonomen attacks 
against technology would be an identification with ecology and romantic 
movements. The communiques also join up the technological issues with 
other ones as described below. 
In the 1983 RZ discussion paper on the peace movement they pointed 
out that the peace movement has not been so radical as to move beyond 
the basis of eliminating the Pershing lIs and Tomahawk cruise missiles. 
The RZ state that the movement must go further and eliminate the system 
that brought the missiles to Europe in the first place. 46 
In connection with the RZ campaign against Startbahn West the group 
targeted suppliers and builders of the new project, which they also 
perceived to be linked to the Hessian nuclear programme. 47 
Another issue area of the RZ has been computing centres and 
electronics firms. The reason for distancing themselves from computer 
technology is because "[ tJhe logic of the computer is the logic of 
capital: it serves the exploitation and subjection, the splintering and 
selection, the collection and repression. "48 Computers are thus evil, 
because they help their users to exploit chances and circumstances which 
might have otherwise been neglected. 
Computers and computer integrated manufacturing, according to the 
Revolutionary Virus Thomas Muenzer group (RZ offshoot) in Berlin, 
increases the influence of business and capital on research, which must 
always 'chase the coin' and is therefore undesirable. 49 
Attacks against gene technology research by the RZ and Rota Zora are 
grounded in the belief that "these experiments bring wi th them the 
destruction of natural diversity and unforseable ecological problems." 
The extremists do not believe that these research centres are for the 
44 "Angriffsziel: NATO" Stern 38 (35) 22-8 August 1985, 10-4, 14; 
"1m Fadenkreuz der RAP" Stern 39 (20) 17-23 July, 1986, 10-8, 133-4, 16. 
45 Geronimo, 72-158. 
46 Horchem (1987 I), 10, discussing: Jedes Herz eine Zeitbombe: 
Diskussionspapier der 'Revolutionaerer Zellen' zur Zukunft der 
Friedensbewegung", reprinted in: Revolutionary Cells (1985), 57-60. 
47 Revolutionary Cells (1985), 61. 
48 Revolutionary Cells, "Wie der Herr so das Gescherr", Radikal 131, 
77. 
49 Revolutionary Virus Thomas Muentzer in Radikal 135 (October 
1988), 46-8. 
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benefit of the people. One Rota Zora cell that bombed a cUltivation gene 
research centre on 18 August 1985 believed that: 
A consequence of these new forms [of plants is thatJ ... 
Their profitable use continues the social destruction 
process of the 'Green Revolution' and increases the 
power of the agricultural [ food and chemical 
multinationals. They do not conquer the hunger. 5o 
Rota Zora also perceives danger in racist selective processes on an 
economic basis, attacks on wanen, and economic exploitation in gene and 
biotechnology,51 because [ as discussed in chapter two, Rota Zora feel 
women's resistance needs to be furthered against what they see as 
patriarchal imperialism so that women's roles are changed both privately 
and socially. 
The technological issues are characterised by identification with 
the larger issues of the Third World, anti-imperialism, feminism and 
ecology. Technology poses dangers to each of these, according to the 
terrorist groups. 
3.4 HUman Rights 
The RZ idea of emancipation for the individual as a natural part of 
the emancipation of the people in the repressive state52 forms the basis 
for the Revolutionary Cells' identification with human rights. In 
particular this takes the form of support for political asylum seekers, 
and Rota Zora support of women's rights. 
The Rota Zora first came to the attention of the public on 4 March 
1975 when they bombed the Federal Constitutional Court building in 
Karlsruhe. The court had just ruled in Paragraph 218 of the Criminal 
Code that abortions were to be prohibited "in agreement with the 'free 
deomcratic basic order'" when the life of the mother or child was not in 
danger. 53 Rota Zora bombed the court building in order to 'protect' 
themselves from the court because they were against 
a constitution/that illegalises women- -driving many 
to death- -if they do not let the mafia of doctors and 
50 Rota Zora, "Rota Zora 18.8.85", Radikal 131, 75. 
51 Rota Zora, " 'Bekennerschreiben' der Terrorgruppe 'Rota Zora' zum 
Sprengstoffanschlag auf das Biotechnologische Zentrum der Technischen 
Universitaet Braunschweig" / in: Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse [ (eds.), 
Jahrbuch Extremisnrus und Demokratie 1989 (Bonn: Bourvier Verlag, 1989), 
161-4. 
52 Revolutionary Cells (1975)[ 213. 
53 Sueddeutsche Zeitung 8 August 1986; Rota Zora, "Erklaerung der 
Revolutionaeren Zellen zu ihrem Anschlag auf das 
Bundesverfassungsgericht!" / in: "Holger der Kampf geht weiter! I 
Bei traege zur Konzept Stadtguerilla (Gaiganz/Ueberfranken: Poli tladen 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1975), 242-4, 242. 
judges [abuse/violate] their sexuality, the int~nacy of 
their own bodies, [and] dictate the number of children 
allowed. 54 
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Rota Zora interest in women's treatment and role in life has 
continued in the eighties with attacks on marriage bureaux in 1983 that 
facilitated the arranged marriages of Phillipino wanen (about 200 
bureaux each arranged about 400 marriages a year), and the Phillipine 
Embassy in Bonn for its canplici ty in the marriages. They also damaged 
the private vehicles of owners of the marriage bureaux companies in 1988 
while these were parked outside their hanes to point out that their 
public and private lives were inseparable. The main Lufthansa offices 
were bombed on 28 October 1986 by Rota Zora because of alleged airline 
profits from both the deportation of people who had been denied 
political asylum in the FRG, and because it 'shamelessly' helped to 
expoit the misery of women in the Third World by flying to such centres 
of prostitution as Bangkok and Manila. These Rota Zora bombings were 
pointers towards the poverty of Third World countries, the repression 
and exploitation of women as objects in prostitution, sex trips to 
Thailand and marriage bureaux. 55 
Between June and September 1987 Rota Zora, and the Berlin offshoot 
, 
Amazons, directed a successful 'blackmail' arson banb campaign against 
the Adler textile company in Haibach. The two groups forced Adler to 
direct its South Korean subsidiary to rehire thirteen dismissed women 
union ernpoloyees. Rota Zora made the same demands as the South Korean 
strikers: the reinstatement of the thirteen women, free workers' council 
elections and a wage increase of 20%.56 
Since 1986 the Revolutionary Cells have targeted political asylum 
issues as part of their anti-irnperialst identifiction and support for 
the Third World, because they view political asylum as a reflection of 
the misery caused by the ~nperialists in their homelands, where the 
level of refugees reflects the level of capitalism in their home 
countries. The RZ seek to help open the borders of the countries that 
want to close them to secure their internal stability. The RZ feels it 
can contribute towards a reduction in the state's response towards 
political refugees by attacking police and social control points in 
order to create a free-space for political refugees beyond state control 
and regulation. For example, in 1986 the RZ attacked police foreign 
54 Rota Zora (1975), 242. 
55 Sunday Times 22 September 1983; Rota Zora, "Anschlag auf 
Kasseller Frauenhandler" Radikal 135 (October 1988), 31; Horchem (1987 
I), 11. 
56 Heinrich Boge in The Gennan Tribune 1 November 1987, 5; die taz 
29 September 1987, 4; Sueddeutsche Zeitung 25 June 1987, 27. 
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registration centres in Hamburg, Hamm and Hagen and the federal 
registration computer in Cologne. The loss of records and applications 
meant that thousands of asylum seekers had to start over, and could stay 
longer in the Federal Republic. This was the intention of the 
'Revolutionary Virusl The Youth Organisation of the RZ', (Revolutianaere 
ViTenl Die Jugendoragnisation der RZ) who fire bombed the Foreign 
Registration Offices in Berlin-Wedding. 57 
The political asylum issue is connected with the most violent RZ 
attacks. On 28 October 1986, the Director of the Foreign Registstration 
Office in West-Berlin, Harald Hollenberg, was knee-capped, as was the 
judge of the Federal Supreme Court in West Berlin, Guenter Korbmacher on 
1 September 1987. Korbmacher had become more severe in political asylum 
cases, by having applicants prove they were persecuted for their 
religious and poli tical beliefs. Threats of such persecution were not 
enough. 58 These two attacks account for the only attacks on persons by 
the RZ in the eighties, outside of the murder of Herbert Karry on 11 May 
1981 in connection with Startbahn West in Frankfurt. 
3.5 Imprisoned Terrorists 
A constant identification object of terrorists has been their 
imprisoned comrades. The apprehension of the founder Red Army Faction 
members in June 1972 brought this identificaiton to the fore with 
activity by prisoner support groups, hunger strikes, shootings of 
judiciary officials and representatives, prison escapes and hostage 
takings. The terrorists no longer identified with foreign groups and 
abstract ideas, but with their own comrades who became identification 
objects in their awn right, (see chapter seven) as well as linkages to 
other identifications such as the Third World, the state and anti-
imperialism as they sought to free old members and recruit new ones. 
However, it can also be argued that by involving themselves with 
efforts to free terrorists the West German terrorists neglected their 
original revolutionary aims on behalf of their own country's class war 
and the Third World peoples. 59 
57 Revolutionary Cells, "Erklaerung der RZ zu 'politischen Aktionen' 
im Jahre 1986", in: Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse! Politischer Extremisnrus 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Band III: Dokumentation (Cologne: 
Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1989), 148-50; die taz 8 July 1987, 20; 
die taz 9 July 1987. 
58 Sueddeutsche Zeitung 29 October 1986, 1; Guardian 2 September 
1987, 7. 
59 Otto Billig, "The Lawyer Terrorist and His Comrades" Political 
Psychology 6 (1) 1985, 29-46, 41. 
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3.51 Release of Prisoners 
Identification with apprehended comrades led to dramatic terrorist 
activity in the seventies. The RAF began its first action with the 
freeing of Baader from prison in May 1970, and the Second of June could 
also be said to have begun similarily on 8 July 1971 when two future B2J 
manbers llupersonated each other in court. The result was that the person 
who was to be sentenced to a prison term was able to walk out free as 
someone else, while the person remaining had to be let free, as he was 
not the sentenced person and was thus innocent of the charge. 6o The B2J 
also undertook many other successful prison escapes in the course of its 
history (see chronology). 
The Second of June was also, as discussed in chapter two [ the only 
group to secure the release of imprisoned terrorists in a hostage 
exchange when they abducted Peter Lorenz between February and March 
1975. As the government guessed, this was only the prelude to a larger 
hostage exchange attaupt by the terrorists [ which followed on 24 April 
1975 when an RAF commando occupied the West German Embassy in StockhODU, 
Sweden and held eleven hostages captive in exchange for the release of 
twenty-six prisoners in the FRG. The incident ended when the terrorists 
accidentally set off their explosives. 
In 1977 the RAF sought to force the SPD/FDP coalition to become 
harsher, or give in to the terrorists. The first half of the campaign 
began on 30 July with the attempted kidnapping of the Chairman of the 
Board of the Dresdener Bank, Juergen Ponto [ because he represented the 
international finance capital. When his abduction went wrong, he was 
shot.61 
On 5 September the RAF kidnapped Hanns Martin Schleyer, who 
supposedly represented the 
national economic policy (the fat businesses [ 
coordinated action, FRG as the international model of 
the social peace). That means the power in the state, 
which the SPD as the administrative party has to 
consider, if they wish to remain in the 
administration. 62 
The RAF believed Schleyer represented enough interested parties to 
force the government to release the remaining cadre in prison. However, 
even the coordinated Palestinian hijacking of a Lufthansa plane with 
similar demands for the release of RAF prisoners did not secure their 
60 Baumann (1979), 79-80[ 83-4. 
61 Red Army Faction, "Guerilla, Widerstand und Antiimperialistische 
Front" (1983L 618; Aust (1987L 406-8. 
62 Red Army Faction, "Guerilla, Widerstand und Antiimperialistische 
Front" (1983), 618. 
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release by the government. After the plane was freed Baader, Ensslin, 
Raspe and Irmgard Moeller, were found dead, or critically wounded. Hanns 
Martin Schleyer was found dead on 19 October.63 
November 1977 saw a shift from abductions for freeing prisoners to 
abductions for ransoms when the Second of June kidnapped the Austrian 
textile industry magnate, Michael Palmers in Vienna. The group received 
about 4.3 million DM for his release. 64 
The first hostage episode ended with the release of the imprisoned 
terrorists. The others resulted in dead hostages and terrorists, apart 
from Mogadishu, which left the hostages alive. This has not escaped the 
terrorists! attention. Since then they have swi tched the emphasis of 
their campaigns to reflect the fact that they no longer expect the 
prisoners! release, although there are police suspicions that this 
position may have recently changed back to a belief in the viability of 
hostage rescue attempts. 65 
3.52 Hunger Strikes 
Hunger strikes in West Germany were first used after regular 
protests against prison conditions proved ineffective in gaining normal 
prison conditions for imprisoned suspected and sentenced terrorists. 
They believed hunger strikes would achieve more publicity and thus add 
more pressure for change. This also led to the creation of the 
'Committees Against Torture!. Since the suspected terrorists were first 
arrested they had been held in special conditions of imprisonment, 
separated from other prisoners. Later hunger strikes were also used to 
prolong trials. This failed when the courts declared the terrorists had 
brought their weakened conditions on themselves, and that the trials 
would be conducted in their absence. 66 
Ostensibly the terrorists sought to be treated as 'normal! 
prisoners, but in effect they only drove a wedge between themselves and 
'normal! prisoners according to Mahler. He also later believed it would 
fail as society was immoral, and therefore the moral weapon of the 
hunger strike would not work. Mahler, instead, felt that the imprisoned 
terrorists should promote methods that would unify them and 'normal! 
63 Aust (1987), 500, 541. 
64 Kahl, 13l. 
65 Horchem (1987 I), 15i "Muss Bernhard machen" Der Spiegel 25/1991, 
31-2. 
66 Pieter Bakker Schut, Stanmheim: Der Prozess gegen die Rote Armee 
Fraktion (Kiel: Neuer Malik Verlag, 1986), 89-90, 99i Aust (1987), 243-
30; Billig, 35; Horbatiuk, 178. 
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prisoners. Creating an elitist group such as the Red Army Faction would 
only cause a loss of credibility.67 
However, while the prisoners were seldom able to enlist support for 
their aims amongst the left, they could nonetheless gain their moral 
support based on their claims for improved prison conditions. The list 
of the special conditions imposed on suspected and convicted imprisoned 
terrorists was long, as is seen in those imposed on Holger Meins in 
March 1973. The special conditions included physical searches after each 
visit, no one was to be placed in the cells around, above or below his, 
only known delivery people could enter the prison when he was out of 
doors, visits could only occur in the presence of the chief security 
officer and an assistant, exercise was only allowed when accompanied by 
two guards, and a daily cell and body search was to be perfoDned. 68 
These were similar to those imposed on Siegelind Hoffman in July 1980,69 
which would imply either that the government was immovable on the issue, 
or that the hunger strikes were not to improve prison conditions but had 
another purpose. Both could also be true. 
In the seventies the discussion about the prison conditions for 
suspected terrorists was to create opportuni ties for more acti vi ty by 
the commandos and other supporters. 7 0 As is shown below this was also 
true in the eighties, and arguably remains so in the nineties. 
Discussion outside of the prisons was originally organised by 
prisoner support groups ( see chapter two) who were interested in 
improved prisoner condi tions. These groups sought to improve the 
prisoners' conditions through public pressure before, during, and after 
hunger strikes as well as after 'suspicious' circumstances surrounding 
the death of prisoners, as was the case when Meinhof committed suicide 
in 1976, and when Baader, Ennslin and Raspe committed suicide in 1977. 
The open questions surrounding these deaths have been raised to 
questions of belief for terrorist supporters, who believe these persons 
to have been murdered by the authorities. 71 The result, as is shown in 
chapter four, is new recrui ts . New recrui ts were important as the 
lifeblood of groups whose members were invariably imprisoned or died. As 
shown above, freeing imprisoned members was difficult at best. 
In January 1981 Revolutionaerer Zorn observed that to free prisoners 
one had to take on a military aspect and confront the state as equals. 
67 Billig, 35-6. 
68 Aust (1987), 245-6. 
69 Pieter Bakker Schut (ed.), Todesschusse r Isolationshaft, 
Eingriffe ins Verteidigungsrecht (Selbstverlag, Eigendruck, Second 
Edition, 1985), 244-7. 
70 Klaus, 75. 
71 Aust (1987), 124. 
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The guerillas had the problem of little experience in an area where the 
state would use every means at its disposal to eliminate the armed 
groups. This does not mean the guerillas were doomed to failure. The 
Lorenz abduction showed that the groups must be sure to use the "certain 
political constellations [in order] to stand the actual power 
relationships punctually on their heads".72 
This was a tall order, but as a means of recruitment terrorists, as 
discussed in chapter two and as is elaborated upon further in chapter 
four, had found hunger strikes a mobilising power that did 'stand the 
actual power relationships punctually on their heads'. Their success, 
however, depended upon mobilising parts of the public and media to 
debate the issues of prison conditions and provide the suitable canvas 
for continued terrorist activity. 
Hunger strikes aim for an identification with the state or the 
striker such that it is difficult for the terrorists to lose. If the 
state does not accede to the hunger strikers' demands, and someone dies, 
then this is labelled murder. If the state steps in and force feeds 
people, then this is labelled an act of torture. When the force feeding 
cannot be employed because of the individuals' resistance, or is itself 
a life threatening procedure, then the state is further pilloried. 73 
The Federal Republic's dilemma comes from (1) the obligation of the 
prison to maintain the bodily and spiritual health of the prisoner, (2) 
they must also balance this with their obligation of health care which 
sometimes results in forceful handling and feeding, as well as (3) the 
doctors' ethical and legal obligations of assistance. The prisoners, on 
the other hand, have their own rights of personal self-development, 
bodily integrity, and self-determination, which means the state and 
prison staff cannot intervene until the prisoners cannot express their 
self-determination because they are comatose. At this stage 1 however 1 
medical assistance may also be life threatening because of the force 
feeding methods. 74 
The lack of success in freeing terrorists in the seventies and the 
deaths of some imprisoned ones 1 possibly reinforced the use of hunger 
strikes as recruitment drives in the eighties. It may also have 
reflected a new organisational structure of the Red Army Faction that 
did not place the prisoners at the tOPr as discussed in chapter two. 
Therefore abductions were replaced by assassinations as underground 
72 Revolutionary Cells (1985), 55. 
73 Mr. Beckmann (FDP) in Verhandlungen des Deutsche Bundestages 10. 
Wahlperiode l 117. Sitzungr 24 January 1985, 8643. 
74 ibid. 1 8643-4; "Recht an den Grenze" Der Spiegel 3 (14 January) 
1985 1 71. 
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activities that placed the outside groupls activities in focus, while 
the imprisoned members brought attention to themselves in long, death 
threatening hunger strikes. It is possible that they came to believe, as 
one Second of June member did, that concentrating on freeing prisoners 
means ignoring all the other repression in the world, and to 
misinterpret capitalism. Lastly, they "make themselves not only 
ridiculous, but invite the enemy to murder the prisoners."75 
This change was seen in the RAFls 'Offensive 84/85 1 , which also 
reflected a coordination of the various RAF levels that has not been 
repeated. Since then there have been no coordinated bombing c~TIpaigns- -
in connection with hunger strikes or otherwise. 
Ostensibly the hunger stike in 1984/85 sought: 
-consolidation of the prisoners from the resistance 
[against imperialism] and all fighting prisoners in 
large groups; 
-the abolition of single and small group isolation and 
the acoustic and optical inquiry and control; 
-lifting of the communications ban: visi ts , letters, 
books, free political discussions and information. 76 
Actually the hunger strike was to create the proper atmosphere for 
more public awareness and sympathy for the RAF prisoners. First, the 
legal arm of the RAF organised sixty discussion evenings f solidari ty 
meetings and demonstrations. Some family members of imprisoned RAF 
members and others also occupied the Bonn information office of the 
European Parliament on 10 January, and on 7 February 1985, after the 
hunger strike was over and Zimmermann murdered, RAF sympathisers 
occupied the Green party office in Frankfurt.77 
Second, the bombs of the I illegal militants I and the 'hard-core I 
highlighted the group by example. Third, the 15 January 1985 joint 
statement with Action Direct was designed to show that the RAF was not 
alone in its ideas, but part of "a united front to combat NATO 
imperialism". 78 This was also signalled by support activities for the 
RAF hunger strike in other countries ( the blockade of the Federal 
75 Ralf Reinders, II' Das Gewal tmonopol wurde durchbrochen I II Schwarze 
Faden: Vierteljahresschrift fuer Lust lIDd Freiheit 25 (3/1987), 25-9, 
29. 
76 Red Army Faction, "Erklaerung zur Zusammenlegung der Gefangenen 
aus der RAFII, Zusarrmen Kaernpfen 1 (December 1984), 5. 
77 Kahl, 151; Hans Josef Horchem, "Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland" Beitraege zur Kon£liktforschlIDg 16 (1) 1986, 5-23, 14-5. 
78 Red Army Faction, Action Directe, "Fuer die Einhei t der 
Revolutionaere in Westeuropa", in: Paul Wilkinson, "Support Mechanisms 
in International Terrorism", in: Robert O. Slater, Michael Stohl ( ed. ) , 
CUrrent Perspectives on International Terrorism (London: Macmillan Press 
Ltd., 1988), 88-114, 106-9. 
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Republic's embassy in The Hague, the consulate in Amsterdam, the offices 
of the International Red Cross in Geneva, the bombing of the Nato 
communications centre in Brussels, and a Mercedes-Benz office in 
Barcelona). The evidence of the RAF and AD union was the assassinations 
of General Rene' Audran on 25 January 1985 near Paris, and of Ernst 
Zimmermann, the business leader of the Munich Motor and Turbine Union, a 
defence contractor, on 1 February 1985 near Munich. Zimmermann was the 
civilian equivalent to Audran in the French-German military-industrial-
cooperation. 79 
These public activities provided opportunties for potential new 
recruits to idenitify with RAF activities, to learn about its ideas and 
meet people who could lead potential recruits to the 'illegal militants' 
or the underground as is shown in chapter four. 
The next Red Army Faction hunger strike from 1 February to 12 May 
1989 was different. There was no accompanying underground campaign, and 
the hunger strike grew slowly I two at a time, every two weeks I until all 
active members were on hunger strike. This prolonged the government's 
problem of reaction. The hunger strikers demanded the consolidation of 
all forty-three RAF prisoners in one or two prisons and the release of 
four, whom they deemed should be released for health reasons. 8 0 
One new factor in this hunger strike was the non-participation of 
ex-RAF members. Also die taz began with a page in a Saturday issue with 
addresses for RAF hunger strike support commi ttees and articles about 
the anti - imperialist struggle. It later wi thdrew support for fear of 
being misused. The Green-Alternative scene saw a possible chance of 
power then and did not want the RAF to ruin it. 81 
In the end there were no deaths, and the group was not to be brought 
into one or two large groups, but the Social Democrat states did agree 
to fonn small groups of terrorists and 'nonnal' prisoners. 82 
The hard-core and ' illegal militants' were not active during the 
hunger strike. Only in their communique for the attack on Dr. Alfred 
Herrhausen of the Deutsche Bank on 30 November 1989 did the underground 
79 Horchem (1986) f 12-3, 15; David Th. Schiller, liThe Police 
Response to Terrorism: A Cri tical Overview" , in: Paul Wilkinson f 
Alasdair M. Stewart (eds. ) , Contemporary Research on Terrorism 
(Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987 I), 536-48, 543. 
80 "Auf der Kippe" Der Spiegel 9 (27 February) 1989, 109-10, 109; 
Gerhard Spoerl, "Mattes Echo" Die Zeit 10 March 1989, 7. 
81 Non-particpants were Angelika Speitel, Peter-Juergen Boock, 
Verena Becker, Stefan Wineiewski, Gabriele Tiedemann and Klaus Viehmann. 
"Auf der Kippe" Der Spiegel 9/1989, 110; Spoerl, "Mattes Echo" Die Zeit 
10 March 1989, 7. 
82 Gerhard Spoerl, 
1989, 11. 
"Ein kleiner Hoffnungsfunke" Die Zeit 19 May 
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call for the 'consolidation of prisoners of the RAF and the resistance' . 
This was after Helmut Pohl, an imprisoned RAF member, had stated that 
the prisoners had not achieved what they wanted, and that the hard-core 
should take over. Shortly after this the 'illegal militants' came back 
to life with the bombing of the Bayer Plant Protection Centre in 
Mannheim, which was involved in gene and biotechnological research.83 
Presumably to highlight the RAF's international solidarity with the 
'uni ted front against anti-imperialism' they began a solidarity hunger 
strike with Spanish terrorists by having a group on hunger strike for 
one week, after which another replaced them. This began in January 1990 
and ended in April with AD and the Belgian CCC joining the others on 
hunger strike. 
After the arrests of ex-RAF members in East Germany in June 1990 
there were death threats against the East German authorities with the 
RAF signature- -but not from the Western RAF according to the 
authorities. These anonymous letters originated in the East, no doubt 
from around the circle that organised a demonstration in East Berlin for 
improved RAF prison conditions, and from those who threatened bombings 
in Leipzig if the arrested ex-members were not set on planes bound for 
Syria. It thus appears that there is a sympathiser group in the East. 84 
The arrest of suspected ex-RAF members in the East did not prevent 
the RAF from undertaking attacks, as evidenced by the unsuccessful 27 
June 1990 attempt on the Interior Minister's assistant, Hans Neusel by 
the ' Jose' Manuel Sevillano Commando' ( a Spanish GRAPO hunger striker 
who died after 144 days on hunger strike).85 
Past experience shows that, as mentioned earlier, the hunger strikes 
are not for improved prison conditions, but to offer identification 
objects for recruitment. The prisoners as identification objects can 
also be linked to other issues, when they join in solidari ty hunger 
strikes, and when the underground members conduct simultaneous 
campaigns. Thus the hunger strikes are both an issue- -improved prison 
conditions- -and a method of forcing an identification object on the 
public. Here identification is more than propaganda. Propaganda 
emphasises absolute justness of claims,86 whereas identification offers 
people individuals and groups to identify with and to become attached 
to. 
83 BMI (ed.), VSB 1989, 79, 81. 
84 "'Hier bleibt jeder fuer sich allein'" Der Spiegel 26/1990, 87. 
85 "Moegliches Ziel" Der Spiegel 31/1990, 61-2. 
86 Paul Wilkinson, " Terrorism and Propaganda", in: Yonah Alexander, 
Richard Latter (eds.) Terrorism and the Media: Dilenmas for Government, 
Journalists and the Public (MacLean, VA: Brassey's Inc., 1990), 26-33, 
29. 
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However, not all of the issue aims are like that of the prisoners, 
which use the issue to recruit new members as the Red Army Faction does. 
The Revolutionary Cells and Autonanen may desire new members and more 
cells, but they do not choose issues considered to attract members more 
than other issues. 
The issues of the RAF, the 'mili tary-industrial-complex' and 'the 
anti-imperialist resistance in Western Europe', are the group means to 
widen and anchor itself in the small social base in Germany centred 
around prisoner issues. It also seeks- -as it did with Action Direct- -
to anchor itself to another terrorist group in Europe, as discussed in 
chapter two. 
The RZ and Autonanen work towards an anti-imperialist struggle to 
aid the Third World in their attacks on single-issues, while living in 
the community. In general the two groups centre on immediate protest 
issues such as Startbahn West, anti -nuclear power, and anti -aparteid. 
Recently, however, the RZ and Rota Zora have raised human rights and 
technological issues. It might be that neither of these have the same 
type of public support which their earlier campaigns had. Perhaps the 
groups are moving towards RAF eliti@TI, because as the Rota Zora argue, 
their attacks against women's exploitation in the sex trade has brought 
these issues into the limelight. 87 This is discussed further in chapter 
five as part of group dynamics. 
4. Operational Timing of Terrorist Attacks 
The above discussion of the issues terrorist groups promote said 
little about the timing of their issue programmes, or why particular 
targets were chosen. Unfortunately as most terrorist attacks are 
perpetrated by unknown groups, why they chose to act when they did, 
remains unknown. 
From what is known the activities of groups can be due to several 
reasons. First, they are in response to the activities of governments, 
business, and other interests. In the early seventies the Red AnTIY 
Faction began targeting objects associated with the American involvement 
in Vietnam, judges and policemen associated with imprisoned and dead 
members, as well as the property of critics of the terrorists group's 
acti vi ties such as the Springer building in Hamburg. The bombs against 
the US Army can be explained somewhat by the activities of the US in 
Vietnam. 88 
87 Rota Zora (1989), 134. 
88 Aust (1987), 209. 
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More important for the RAF, however, have been actions associated 
with the prisoners. The RAF's first action was to free a prisoner, and 
countless similar actions associated with the prisoners and their 
conditions followed (Buback, Ponto, Schleyer, etc.). The hunger strikes 
were also designed to increase awareness and identification with the 
prisoners through publicity and committee work. All of these pointed 
towards an internal dynamic that united the group. 
The Second of June murdered Guenter von Drenkmann because he 
resisted an attempted abduction after the death of RAF member Holger 
Meins in the late 1974 hunger strike. His abduction must have been 
planned and prepared some time previously, and the decision to do it 
then was moved forward with Meins' death. 8 9 
The Revolutionary Cells and Autonomen activities also fall into this 
category. They generally occur in connection with public protests 
against similar institutions such as attacks against US and NATO targets 
when the peace movement was campaigning against the deployment of 
missiles in West Germany and elsewhere, or against construction and 
building firms connected with nuclear reprocessing plants and Startbahn 
West. The aim of the RZ acti vi ty was to support other protest issues 
wi th the pressure of their bombings, and to bring attention to these 
issues. 9o 
A second factor determining group activities is the necessity to 
time one part of a campaign to coordinate with another. The timing of 
the hunger strikes in the seventies sometimes seems to have been 
coordinated with outside activities so that the prisoners would be 
ready, if an abduction resulted in their release. For eX@TIple, the third 
RAF hunger strike ended on 5 February, and Lorenz was abducted on 27 
February. The timing of the Lorenz abduction may have been known to the 
RAF, but not who was to be released. The fifth hunger strike ended on 2 
September, just days before Schleyer was abducted. This had put the 
group in the public eye, 91 and the prisoners knew about the planned 
abduction. However, timing hunger strikes to coordinate wi th other 
events, says nothing about the timing of these 'other' events. 
The Schleyer abduction may have been organised to fallon the fifth 
anniversary of the Munich Olympic massacre, or it may be that that was 
the day he was in Cologne and not at his Stuttgart home. Chance may have 
89 Second of June, "Zum Attentat auf Berlins hoechsten Richter II 
(1975), 251. 
90 Revolutionary Cells (1975), 208, 226-7. 
91 See Tatjana Botzat, Elisabeth Kiderlein, Frank Wolff, Ein 
deutscher Herbst: Zustande 1 Dokrnnente f Berichte f Kcmnentare (Frankfurt. 
a.M.: Verlag Neue Kritik, 1978), 17-20. 
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allowed this to be on the fifth and not on the sixth or seventh of 
September. In any case it was organised without consideration of general 
leftist activity such as the anti-nuclear movement, which was affected 
by the resultant security clampdown.92 
Sometimes the coordination is also due to pressures outside of the 
group as in the case of Alfed Herrhausen' s murder. It was planned 
sometime previously, but was put on hold by the 1989 hunger strike, 
which itself had been agreed upon by the prisoners as early as 1987. The 
prisoners told the underground to wait while they pursued talks with the 
Greens and others. However, the prisoners waited and anticipated the 
hunger strike and eventually deemed the discussions fruitless, held the 
hunger strike and then after its conclusion told the underground to 
pursue group goals with other means. 93 
A third factor affecting group activities is the introduction of a 
new factor to upset pre-planned activities such as the arrest or death 
of members and the discovery of group plans. While the 'May 1982' paper 
called for precise coordination of underground, illegal militant and 
prisoner activities, as well as combined operations with other militant 
groups- -under RAF hierarchy- -arrests interrupted the flow of these for 
several years when the top echelon of Klar, Mohnhaupt and Schulz were 
arrested in late 1982 and a series of caches were also discovered. Only 
in early 1984 was the group ready again. Notably, however, this time the 
arrest of six members in July 1984 did not interrupt a major operation 
planned for autUTIn. The 84/85 campaign continued despite the arrests and 
the discovery of the strategy paper which outlined the offensive. 
Fourth, terrorist group activities are affected by the linkage of 
operations to other events, whereby group activities are only relevant 
wi thin the time frame of the other event. For example, the RAF attempted 
the murder of Hans Tietmeyer, the government organiser of the IMF and 
World Bank meetings in West Berlin immediately prior to these meetings 
in Septemeber 1988. The RZ and Autonamen activity linked to the meeting 
would only be relevant until the meetings ended. 
The same is true with regards to the Rota Zora bombing of the 
Federal Constitutional Court after the Lorenz abduction, and their 
campaign to reinstate women employees to their former posts at a West 
German subsidiary in South Korean. The same reasons probably led to the 
Second of June's selection of Peter Lorenz as a kidnap victim several 
days prior to the West Berlin elections which possibly provided more 
92 Tolmein, zum Winkel, 41, 79. 
93 Pohl (1990), 15. 
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publicity than would have otherwise been the case. His name had been in 
the news and made him more recognised than before hand. 
Fifth, terrorist group activities are affected by the larger 
question of why particular targets are chosen over other ones in the 
same issue area: why this building firm and not that one. When the 
target is one of many possible ones, banks, construction firms, petrol 
stations, etc., the decision is presumably influenced by the target's 
location (is it near lights, or in the dark), accessibility (how well 
protected it is) f and the impact of publicity or damage (high or low 
profile), as well as opportuntity such as inside information, or seeing 
a limited opening. 
For example, Detlef Rohwedder, who was murdered in April 1991, was 
not as heavily protected at home in Dusseldorf, as he was in his office 
during the week in Berlin- -despite being warned by Hans Neusel that he 
was high on a list of potential RAF targets. Nonetheless, to feel 
unhindered at home, he only had occasional police car passes and 
bodyguards for official functions while in Dusseldorf. Therefore, 
shooting him from a lightly concealed place across the street wi th a 
rifle was not difficult. Targeting him in Berlin where he had full-time 
bodyguards and an armoured car, would have been more difficult. 
Attacks on people presumably are also determined by these factors, 
as well as their functions within the targeted institution. For example, 
in 1981 when the Revolutionary Cells attacked Herbert Karry, the Hessian 
Economic Minister, he was the government minister who wanted to extend 
Startbabn West. 95 The RZ kneecappings in West Berlin were also due to 
the function of the individuals in connection with the political asyluTI 
of refugees (Hollenberg and Korbacher) , and another (Hohla) in 
connection to trials against Second of June members. 
Connected to this is the question of why groups attack a particular 
target in a particular way. Sometimes assassination is conducted with a 
gun, and other times with a bomb. One explanation is that the method is 
to express a message as the murder of von Braunmuehl in Bonn must have, 
because the group used the same gun that murdered Schleyer. It could 
have meant that the 'old' and 'new' RAF were the same, or that the 
murder was a revenge for Mogadishu, or a symbolic return to the question 
of Palestine, as Braunmuehl worked with Middle Eastern issues in the 
arena of European Political Cooperation. 96 
94 "'Da ist irgendwo ein Nest'" Der Spiegel 15 (8 April) 1991, 18-
24, 18-9. 
95 Times 12 May 1981. 
96 Frankfurter RLmdschau 13 October 1986; "Im Ziel, im Kampf" Der 
Spiegel 43/1986, 25-7. 
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Another explanation is the availability and possible influence of 
individuals in the group, who can bring particular talents to the group. 
The arrival of people wi th specialist skills in a group means that 
hitherto impossible operations are now possible. Instead of the Red Army 
Faction having to use less precise bombs manually triggered under the 
road, as they did with their attempt on Haig in 1979, the arrival of 
Horst Meyer (an apprentice electrician) to the group in 1984 meant they 
could use photo-electric cells to trigger the bombs to murder Beckurts 
in 1986, Herrhausen in 1989, and in their unsuccessful attempt on Neusel 
in 1990. There is also the possibility that they were trained in the use 
of photo-electric cells by the East German Stasi. While there is no 
direct evidence of this, the authorities suspect it. 97 
This concept is also applicable to low level terrorism in the 
Revolutionary Cells and Autonanen. For example, Radikal 131 carried 
several articles about the NATO pipeline system with communiques 
describing its importance, how it worked, and its breadth and width in 
the country, while Radikal 139 described the dangers and methods of 
bombing petrol stations with reference to the anti -Shell campaign. No 
doubt both of these issues resulted in damage done to pipelines and 
petrol stations. 
The final determinant will ultimately be a reflection of the 
group I s resources, the messages it wants sent, and the problems and 
possibilities of different targets. Had Rohwedder been as well protected 
in Dusseldorf as he was in Berlin, the RAF would have possibly attempted 
the murder of someone else on their list, or taken more time and 
precautions in their attempt. Well protected targets are not impossible 
to reach, as was shown with Herrhausen, Schleyer and Buback. 
5. Smmary 
The first two parts of the chapter showed why individuals might 
lessen their identification with the state because of possible 
unconventional poli tical protest and public desensi ti vi ty to political 
violence. The third part related that terrorists use different issues to 
(a) in the case of the Red Army Faction, identify with issues designed 
to bring them new recruits and a wider social base at home and abroad, 
and (b) in the case of the Revolutionary Cells and Autonanen to support 
public protest issues in the framework of their own broader issues. 
These issues are discussed further in chapter seven. Lastly, some of the 
97 Horchem (1988), 157i "Moegliches Ziel" Der Spiegel 31/1990, 62i 
"'Denen trauen wir jetzt alles ZUlli Der Spiegel 14 (1 April) 1991, 22-6, 
22-3. 
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factors involved in operational timing and targeting explained that the 
availability of a target may have as much influence as the coordinating 
efforts of imprisoned and underground members of the Red Army Faction. 
This concludes the general analysis of left-wing terrorism in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. The thesis now moves to the specific 
questions of indi vuduals, groups, government response, and media and 
public reactions. Chapters two and three provided a general historical 
and analytical framework for the following chapters f which begins with a 
study of individual terrorist motivation amongst terrorists in general, 
and left-wing West German terrorists in particular. 
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and biographical processes call lead some people to terrorist group 
maT~ership. Target~ were discussed in chapter ~~ee, weapons In chapter 
"Cwo, fu"1d ~'1e group leadership and organisational strllcture are discussed 
in chapter five. 
1. Individual FJOtiv-ation 
study of the individual terrorist is difficult for several reasons. 
First, ~'1ere lS ~'1e fear that ~'1e study of individual terrorists and 
their motivation might be viewed as condoniL"1g such behaviour. 5 Second, 
is ~'1e irr~licit rejection of terrorist derrKti"1ds for rrajor changes in ~'1e 
political order r which siluultaneously rejects their motivation. 5 D"1ird, 
is the i1T1pression of pointlessness. If all that can be done is to arrest 
~'1ern, then why should ~'1eir motivation be examiL"1ed? Lastly, lS the shock 
trmt leaves people with little curiosity to lli"1derstfu"1d why ~'1e terrorist 
act waS done. 1 
fu"1other reason for ~'1e underdevelo~T1ent of the study of individual 
terrorists is ~'1e reluctance of terrorists to sunTiit ~'1&T1selves to 
study.S West Gerrran terrorists, for eX&Tlple, pursued a strate~y of non-
cooperation with prison ana psychiatric authorities in order to rraiL"1tain 
~'1eir political identity.s D"1e result is study based on what some 
terrorists nave said and written, what otJ.'1ers r-mve observ·ed in their 
enCOlli"lters 1 fu"ld biographical studies as the basis for social science 
research. 
Research on iL"ldividual terrorists has broadly divided into the 
positions of sane' (rational-idealists) and 'insfu"1e' (psychologically 
disturbed) 1 as derivatives from the 'ccmrllli"lication' and 'war' model 
pairiL"lg discussed in chapter one. The model used deteLlldnes 
countellueasures employed. If terrorists are maiL"lly psychologically 
5 stephen Segaller, Llv-isible Armies: Terrorism iLlto tt'1e 19905 
(London: Sphere Books Ltd., Revised fuld Updated Edition, 1987), i i. 
5 Jefu-.tD.e i'i. Knutson l "Social and Psychodyn&T1ic Pressures Toward a 
Negative Identity: The Case of an American Revolutionary Terrorist", in: 
Yonfu'1 Alexfu"lder 1 Jor-.tD. H. Gleason (eds.) , Behavioral and Quantitative 
Perspectives on T6L-rorisul (o-LEord: 
105-6. 
Perg&T1on Press Ltd., .-: ~(');~ ). .L:::>O.L J f 103-150, 
1 Konrad Kellen, "Ideolo~y and Rebellion: Terrorism in Gerrrlany", in: 
Walter Reich (ed. ), vTi~.i.r1S of T6L-rorism: .i:'sycl"JOlogies, Ideologies, 
Tneol~.i..esf States of Mind (New York: CalT~ridge University Press, 1990), 
43-58, 48. 
B Segaller, 78. An excep"Clon to ~'1is is Hichael Ba'Lulifu-.tD.' s discussion 
witt'1 Lwe .oackes for his "Bio::1Laphisches .i:'OL i...ral"C: r-tichael ('ButliiTli') 
.oa'Lultfulll", in: IMe Backes, Eck,.'1ard Jesse (eds.), Jahrbuch ~tIerniSffi"llS und 
~-mokratie 1989 (Borll"l: Bouvier Verlag, 1989), 196-204. 
s Klaus l 11; Hat."ls-Dieter SchwiL"ld, "Bisher veroeffentlichte .r'lemlli"lgen 
Zll den 'Ursachen' des Terrorismus (Ueberblick)", in: hfu"1s-Dieter Schwwd 
( ed. ), UrsacrJEn des Terrorismus ill dar B"undesrepublik Deutschland (West 
Berlin: Walter de Grllyi...er, 1978), 45-59, 55. 
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disturbed persons f and not generally ideologically moti v""ated persons, 
then the military response predominates, and if the OPPOSite is true, 
tJ.'1en political socio-econanic solutions are sought.:!.o Ti!e 'war' model lS 
tJ.'1e answer to 'iX1Sfu"'1.e', fu"'1.d 'coiilffiunication' tJ.'1e resj?Onse to 'Sfu"'1.e'. 
Ti!is chapter eX&ulneS the two models and proposes a third that uses 
identification as a tool to uncover individual motivation. In the end 
tJ.'1e definition of an ~"'1.dividual's motivation to enter a movauent 
must [first] maKe prvvision for tJ.'1e individual maT~er's 
perception of his a~Usf fu"'1.d wust be able to relate tJ.'1is 
to his past experiences and his conduct. Second, tJ.'1e 
definition must aCCOUL"'1.t for tJ.'1e person's relationship 
to illS movement, includ~"'1.g 
cuUITllument. Ti!ird, l~ must 
to tJ.'1e objectives of 
the 11ature and degree OI illS 
relate the individual's a~us 
the mvvement, fu"'1.d must 
characterize the way in wT~ch membership Cfu"'1. be a means 
to the achievement to tJ.'1e m6lT~er' s objectives. Last, 
tJ.'1e def~"'1.ition of motives must point ~o specific 
solutions which tJ.'1e person finds inc~"'1.tive to action.:!.:!. 
Ti!e vverlapping identifications of maubers need ~o be UTlcovered III 
individual group maub.ers because ~"'1.centives for collective action 
are perceived solutions to perceived cuumon and shared problems. 
NonetJ.'1eless I each individual's motivation must be unique because of 
or her individual psycholo~y fu"'1.d biography.:!.2 
BotJ.'1 the 'psychologically disturbed' fu"'1.d 'rational-idealist' model 
seek to explain aggression in individual members of terrorist ~LOUPS. 
The 'psychologically disturbed' model places it source ill the individual 
and tJ.'1e 'rational-idealist' ill social conditions as is shawn below. 
BotJ.'1 models begin witJ.'1 two ty-pes of aggression: one 'benign' or 
defensive! fu"'1.d the other 'malignfu"'1.t' or cruel and destru.ctive. Tile first 
serves individual fu"'1.d species sUL-vival, fu"'1.d eno.s when tJ.'1e threat has 
passed. Ti!e second is without pUI~se, and found only in 
humans. Ti!e sources for tJ.'1ese two types of aggression are man's 
~"'1.st~"'1.cts (physiological orgfu"'1.ic drives) and 'character passions'. w!!ile 
human instincts are poorly developed, hU.iuan passions of lave! 
tenderness, freeduu! tJ.'1e lust for destruction, pO"wer fu"'1.d propeL i..y are 
answers to existential needs' tJ.'1at are the same Ior all, but differ 
with regards ~o wnich passions duu~"'1.ate.:!'3 
Although tJ.'1e question of wnat influences ones' 'character passions' 
differs between the 'psychologically disturbed' fu"'1.d 'rational-idealist' 
:!.o Corrado (1981), 
:1:!. tians Toch, Tne Social PsycholO::1.i of Social Movements (London: 
r·iethuen and Co. Ltd., 1971)! 201-2. 
:!.2 ibid., 202. 
:!.3 Erich Fru'Tu.'li, Tile Imatcmy of h"tuuan Dest.ruct.iveness (Hfu-mono.swoL ill: 
Pen~u.in Books Ltd., 1967), ~~, 26. 
-: ........ ;:; 
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IT~els, both agree that the 'character passions' are ~ifluenced by b~e 
relationship between the individual and b~eir environment. Tne social 
group and coromon structure of b~e socio-economic conditions help mould 
b~e individual character. Tney influence the desires OI the ~idividual 
not always to act Di w~e desired mariller, and to t6iTtper desires and 
actions to w~e social norm. Ti.'1US given different conditions 
individual might act differently given b~e saine type of stit'TIulus; e. g. 
b~ey are subrnissive to aub~ority and diJIl1~late their fa..T1ily. At best, man 
can be dc:mesticated. Hvwever, this does not mean b~at ITlO.J.i is ~illately 
aggressive. No su-pport has been fOwid for b~at thesis.:l. 4 
The two models differ as to which passions prediJITl~late ruiu are 
~ifluencial ; are they personal, or do religious ideological 
arguments also hold SwaY? In general the 'psychologically disturbed' 
would agree b~at b~e 'character passions' of love, pciwer f revenge and 
lust for cruelty and destruction are pvwerful before, and wTIile, ..... .:-1- __ .. _ VWlt:::L 
'lower' physiological needs are met. Tnis lS shawn b~uough the instances 
of suicide because of where b~ere lS a lack of love, power, revenge ruid 
The 'rational-idealist' model would add that religious and 
ideological motivation are a.iso pvwerful and can contribute to 
destl-uctive and cruel acts that outweigh love for one's children, 
parents ruid friends. The belief ill b~ese is such that w~e acts do not 
appear cruel and destructive to w~eir perpetrators, Cilid possbily b~is 
contributed to West Gel.'1TlO.J.i terrorists leaving b~eir children (Ensslin, 
Meinhof, Speitels to Susrullie Albrecht's 
participation in b~e murder of b~e family friend Juergen Ponto ~i 
1977.J.6 
Foresight ruid ~Tagination also widen the rruige of potential Ua!igers 
b~at could be foreseen for reli~ion and ideolo~y which must be defended 
against today so b"1at they are avoided in the future.:l.? This perhaps 
explains haw feelings of anger and revenge can becc:me generalised for 
b~e terrorist group into 'despair' of the situation ruiU its resolution 
b~ough words.:l. 8 D'1e Red AL-rr~ Faction murdered Sie~Lried 6uback as much 
H ibid., 121-3, 131, 305; apru L. friJIl1 i'Tvllilu' S review of the 
literature see also Paul Wilkinson, "Social Scientific Tneory and Civil 
Violence", in: Yonru~ Alexander, David Carlton, Paul Wilk~ison (eds.), 
Terrorism: TiI60LY and Practice {Boulder, CO.; Westview Press, Inc. f 
1979J, 45-72, 51-2. 
:l.5 Fromm, 30. 
:l.6 ibid. , 243-4; :Harion Scrueiber, "Wir fuehl ten UUb einfach 
staerker" Der Spiegel 20 (1 J:.fay) 1981, 82-108, 100; Indep8J.J.dent 27 April 
1991, o. 
1. 7 FraTrn, 265-6. 
:l.8 Rubenstein! 8. 
for the revenge of wie deaD~s of Holger Meins ruld Ulrike Meirillof, as to 
prevent G~e deaG~s of oG~er prisoners. is 
'ratiorJ.d.l-idealist' model would not hold wiG~ G~e 
eil..-cremes of this the person's ideolO3i, religion, 
foresight ruld ilnagirJ.d.tion can cOiTIbil1.e to make the individual almost 
Dlcapable of chfulging to rise above nOllT~l existence rulQ aLllost 
predestines G~em to failure. Their mairl disagreement would be that DY 
~nplication this means G~e person has no free-will or choice. 2Q 
1.1 The -PbjChologically Disi...urbed' r-mel 
The 'psychological disorder' model perceives the source of 
terrorism in Western dellocracies as personality disorders displayed as 
repression, antisocial personality disorder I narcissism, deaG~ wishes, 
and physiological ~llpairrr~nts. nie role of terrorism in ~uerilla warfare 
and oG~er contexts is not discussed. 22 
Tne model ar~ues b~at terrorists' justifications for G~eir acts are 
on.l.Y rationalisations for their psychological drives. They are people 
beyond Ivve and affection wiG~ ~w~sted hate and frustration. 
structural and political problells discussed in G~e group's ideolo~i are 
reduced to those of the personal problerr~ of individual terrorists, such 
as exhibitionism, and hero-martyr ambitions. wnere political motivations 
are also at work, this is perceived as G~e eil..j?loitation of h~l~l 
sickness for political purposes. 22 
Most of ~~e psychological disorders attributed to terrorists Crul be 
subs~lied WIder the of personality disorders, wnich are 
Dlflexible and rr~ladapti ve personality traits ~l1pair 
individual's behaviour in social or occupational situations, or does so 
generally through their subjective distress, and are ty-pical of trle 
is Red fulilY Faction, "kOilfmunique' des kOl'TiiT~dos ulrike meinhof zur 
hirrrichtlmg bubacks", in: texte: der RAF (West Berlin: llU p-ublisher 
given, ueberarbeitete und aktualisierte Ausgabe, 1983), 451-4. 
2Q Fro.Tim, 31-2; Wilkinson (1979), 68-9. 
22 Corrado (1981){ 294. 
22 Jerrold H. rost, "Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behaviour as 
a Product of Psychological Forces", in: Walter Reich (ed.), Ori'::l..i..ns of 
Tel.TOrism: Psychologies f .l.a9Olog..i..es I Tii90layies I states of J=.iind (Ne-w 
York: C&T~ridge University Press, 1990), 25-40, 25; Gerald HcKnight, Tiie 
t-tind of the Te.u.vrist t.i.JOndon: i-tichael Josepn Ltd., 1974), 13-4; .lan 
Kent, WilliaiTl Nicholls, "nie PsychodYT.i&llics of TeL.Lorism" r-ieJ."1.tal Healtr"! 
emd Sociei....i 4, 1977, 1-8, 7; Ji11irul Becker iLl Alexfulder, KaTharl (eds.) 
(1980); 197; Ronald Grossfui...h-i-:iaticek, Re-v-olution der GestGe.Li...en: 
I-iotiv-ationstruh."turen, 1d9Ologiet"1. und konfli.h.i...e OOi politisch et"1.ga'::lieI i...et"1. 
Si...udenten (Heidelberg: Quelle und [-ieyer, 1975), 93, ar~ues G~at personal 
problems accaunted for G~e West Gerrr~ student movem6Llt, because it 
enabled students to OVerCOllle G~eir personal irillibitions fuld neuroses in 
a situation tr~at waS displayed as political activity. 
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person's 10ng-teDm function~lg. None of b~ese categories, however, have 
shfu-ply delineated boi..mdaries between b~em, or between them and the 
category of ~no psychological disorder' Nor are all persons In one 
category siLllilar in b"le iL'Tlportant aspects, as b~ey may differ in ways 
apart fran b~e defining features of the disorder. 23 
nie b~esis b~at terrorists have an antisocial personality disorder 
{APD) rests on the premise b~at terrorists do not e~"Press guilt over 
their deeds. wneb~er b~is lS true or not lS unverifiable without 
clinical :L.lterview data, wi1ich are CULL ently unavailable. 2 -1 Amongst 
recanted wes"C Gaunan terrorists there has been hi b~erto no remorse for 
politically motivated criLTtes. 
n"1e interest in the study of individual terrorists as those who 
suffer from an APD lies In b~e apparent overlap of cI1aracteristics, 
despite b~e fact b~at both b~e teDm ~ terrorist' and ~antisocial 
personality disorder' are ill-defined. Overlapping terrorist and APD 
characteristics are considered to be b~eir innate self-righteousness, 
and an attitude b~at others are out of step wib~ them. 'Ynis can vary 
from aL"1 indifference to b'1e rights of others to an active hostility 
to-wards others not b~eir own personal code of conduct. 
Futherrnore, both ty--pes are interested drawing attention to 
b~emselves. Despite their actions ana. personalities the two can also 
gain sYlllJ:lathy frCirTt others, even from une~-pected quarters. 25 
Ho-wever, ob~er APD characteristics, such as wlpredictablity, do no"C 
lend th6!llselves to terrorism, wnich requires a degree of selflessness, 
perseverance, moral responsibility and dedication to projects. None of 
b'1ese qualities are fowld in those who suffer frCirll ful APD. Additior~lly, 
terrorists, wl1ike APD sufferers, sho-w an ability to learn frCirll past 
mistakes. 25 
narcissists are believed to have s~nilar characteristics 
with tel..rorists. Narcissism comb:L.les the need for constant admiration 
23 hTtericful Psychiatric 
of i·iental Dison"ters 
Association 1 
(Wash~l'.:1 Lon 1 
Diagnostic and 
DC ; h'Tterican 
Statistical 
Psychiatric 
Association 1 Third Edition/ 1980), 6 1 305. 
201 Corrado (1981) 1 297. Ob~ers have labelled. this categol...i as 
sociopab"lic or psychopathic ill b"le past, but bo"C.n of b~ese categories 
were deemed too vague and the teDm ~fultisocial personality disorder' was 
:L.ltroduced. D. T . ilYKnen ( "Psychopathic Personality", in: RaYllLOnd .j. 
Corsini (ed.) 1 CCirJSise Ency-cloped.ia of PsycrLiatry (New York: Jolm Wiley 
and 00ns, 1987), 926-7. 
25 H.H.A. Cooper, "Psychopab"l as Terrorist", Legal .Hedical Q1 iarterly 
2 (4) 1978, 253-262, 253, 255-6. 
25 ibid., 4U~; Wardlaw, 172; 
Perspectives in Terrorism", in: Yonah 
( eas. ) ( Terrorism: InteIUisciplit1ary 
Press, 1977), 270-282, 282. 
.joseph i:fargolin, "Psychological 
Alexfulder, SeYllour i:~well Finger 
Perspectives (New York: Jorm Jay 
111 
--..:: ,_ ........ cUiU/Vl. attention, eXll_ibi tionist need, lack of empathy 
consideration of others from APD along vacillatiIlg 
overidealisation, devaluation, fuld ffultasies of Ulll~T~ted success. 2: 
These are thought to e2>.-plabl terrorists' faith in b~eir ob~erwise 
depressing struggles against pvwerful enemies, wno Cful. hopefully be 
overcuTte b~llough tecrul.o1ogical irillovations, deab~-defying activity, fuld 
ill. causes wib~ world-wide cuTtpanions who identify with arid w~ll avenge 
each other. 2 a 
Like APD, narcissistic characteristics, like w~e inability to take 
criticism, the lack of success, ful.d the need for constfult attention, rray 
be difficult to rrabltain ~l. a terrorist group. Instead, terrorists need 
sacrifice, loyalty arid perserverance. 2S 
Repression lS b~e process of selective forgetting or denYblg of 
conflict fuld stress related e2>.-periences or b~oughts,3Q and could be 
exh.ibi ted f for example, by those wilO ignore their 'leftist-fascist' 
tendencies In D~eir stated a~Tt of fightill.g fascism wnen they seek to 
prvvoke their enemies into DecuTting fascists. 
Projection Cful be seen to work at D~e level of ill.dividuals and 
~l.OupS as part of D~eir belief systerr~, as discussed later, fuld is D~e 
attribution of personal characteristics or motives onto others, or see 
D~em as D~e cause of one's uwil pcrr l...icular characteristic. Tliis allows 
one to hold a constful.t world view that enables justification of one's 
actions. In its fullest form it lS said to be a narcissistic struggle by 
the terrorists to heal b~emsel ves b'rrough attacks on society. Tliese 
teLl.orists idealise D~eT~elves as eT~yill.g all D~at is good fuld project 
all that lS evil onto society as b~e source of their failures.3~ 
Alternatively, this cuuld be a displacement of chilili~ood quilt and 
arlger directed towards parents ful.d ersatz-parents in the form of 
authority, usually represented by a gOVeLTJiTtent. Tlie person feels w~ey 
Gailnot attack their parents or other groups close to b~eTt. Instead b~ey 
attack either the gruups w~e parents have taught the children are trieir 
enemies, or agablst persons in s~Ttilar authority positions. Tne a~Tt lS 
to produce e2>.~eriences in ow~ers which D~ey theTtselves felt earlier ill 
life. 32 
27 
za 
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The possibility of a death-wish motivating teLrorists canes frcxn 
tJ.'1eir apparent willingness to die, and to use virtually aliY meruis to 
achi~ve tJ.'1eir ends.~3 Eawever, a physiological eA~lfuiation possibly lies 
in tJ.'1e compounds that increase in the body in times of stress (botJ.'1 the 
terrorists and victiills eA~rience these), wuich may contribute "Co 
stereoty~d audience agitated tissue response'.~~ nlis could lead to a 
search for aTiotionally intense stressful environments. Like otJ.'1er 
st~llulants, stress needs to be increased over t~Tle to achieve the S&Tle 
results fuid tJ.'1e person must perform more stressful activities. Eawever, 
tJ.'1is does not expla~i haw terrorists would cope w~th tJ.'1e quiet t~lles ~i 
tJ.'1e underground described in chapter five.~5 
Psychological disorders, in general, do not appear to be tJ.'1e source 
of individual motivation for terrorism. Abnorrral characteristics hi 
peoplB, in the sense of deviation fruTi tJ.'1e norm I is only ~Tlportant fuid 
negatively evaluated when tJ.'1e individual eXJ,'1ibi ts tJ.'1aTl over time ill 
recurrent patterns of behaviour. nlat they also appear as cr~ninal 
tendencies is not a criterion of neurotic behaviour.~5 
nle ~psychological disturbed' model can gain credence in the media 
coverage of terrorist events when only the ~Tlmediate terrorist daTands 
are portrayed (see chapter seven). or distorts 1 tJ.'1e 
~ trfuisactions ' of terrorism tJ.'1at occur between the vict~TIS 1 audience 1 
tJ.'1e terrorist orgfuiisation l fuid the full context of the political 
situation in wuich it occurs 1 along WlWl tJ.'1e free-will of tJ.'1e terrorist 
orgfuiisation fuid its merr~ers to decide haw to al~loy tJ.'1eir strategic and 
tactical decisions; the when 1 wuere fuid haw of teLL orism. 3? 
~3 Abra1'1am Kaplan, :''rne Psychodyn&Tlics of Te.LLorism", Ter.corism .i 
(3j4) 1978, 237-254, 242. 
3 ~ Kent .wayne Cots 1 nlanas C. Wiegele, "Ter.corist and 
Psychiatric ana. Physiological Approaches fruTI a Social 
Perspective" Terrorism 8 \.ij .i:;0;:'1 1-321 7-8. 
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TerroL.i.sm", in; Hicheal i:)'COil.i (ed.) 1 T'ne Politics of Terrorism (N~w 
York; t·iarcel Dekker .inc. f 1979 L 1-19 , 5; Frederick J • Hacker, 
"Contagion fuid Attraction of TeLror fuid Terrorism" 1 in; Yonan Alexander 1 
Jol'm H. Gleason 1 (eds.) 1 Bef'..avioral and QuruLtitative Perspectives on. 
TeI.Lorism (G'Xford; Pergamon Press Ltd. f 1981) 1 73-85 1 1.:5-4; Robert A. 
Friedlfuider, "nle Psychology of Terrorism; ContaTiporfuY Views" 1 in; 
Patrick J. }fJ.Ontana, George S. Roukis (eds.) f i-jana~.llLg Te.L.Lorism; 
113 
Despite D~ese considerations, there lS no denial D~at D~e decision 
for fu"l individual to join a terrorist group is subject to conscious or 
unconscious individual psychological motivatior~. niis lS characteristic 
of reflective group activity which requires D~e gratification of the 
pal. Licipfu"lts to be delayed DY long, meticulous planning and 
orgfu"lisation. 36 
1.2 The 'Ratior.1Cil Idealist' r-mel 
'Rational-idealists' perceive a of terrorism WiD~ 
different goals fu"ld strategies used by various groups to achieve desired 
ends. 39 Their ina~"l premise lS that rationality does not consider 
psychological classifications, and d6iTands that behaviour confonTt Wlui 
social norms, but that D~e actor defit"les it as rational. nie actor lS 
presumed to wct.J."lt maxiillise uie utility of her .. . Deilavlour, illS or "Co so 
that if plfu"lt~"lg borOOs pays more dividends in illS or her plfu"ls dlfu"'1, 
writing letters to politicians, then he or she will do D~e forrr~r. nie 
person lS thought to act on what he or she believes to be the best 
available knvwledge at D~e t~ue, which sQuet~ues equals much less thfu"l 
me ideal of perfect knowledge. ~G 
'Rational-idealists' believe that if the study or D~e phenQuenon of 
collective violence lS concerned WiD'! '::;1l.0Up and normal' 
individuals r the 6iTtphasis of study should not dwell too heavily on D~e 
activities of the possibly pSychOpaD~ic mit"lority. Only a few people 
become tel.l.orists, whereas mfu"lY more e:A.I:-'erience same social 
circuT~tances fu"ld events of religion, literature, histOl.i, ideolo~i and 
cUl.-rent events. Tile concern should be what rrakes an individual becou~ a 
.+- ____ ....... ..: _~ :l.. "'!: L.O::::l.l. Ul. .L1:> L. .. -
'Rational-idealists' D'!erefore emphasise variations in individual 
psychological bio'::;1l.aphical cQTibined ...... ...:"'-':.... W.LW! variations histories in 
individual susceptibility "Co social and political it"lfluences ,.;:;: along 
wiD~ it"'1.dividual free-will to bear "the burden fu"ld freedQu of moral 
Stratey.i.es for the Corpol.<1te ~eC"'u.tive (London: Q'l1orum Books, 1983), 41-
54, 49. 
38 Crenshaw (1986), 385. 
39 Laqueur, 4-5; H. i::i"COill. l P.A. Fl6iml~"lg, "Terrorism fu"lQ Related 
Concepts; 'ly-pologies", in: Alex P. Sch.tuid, Albert J. Jon'::;1llann f Political 
Terrorism; A New Guide to Actors, Concepts, Data Bases, T'neories and 
Literai...ure (New Bruns-wick, NJ: Trfu"lSaction Books, Revised, e:A-panded and 
updated edition, 1988), 39-59. 
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responsibility" to the extent of deciding to break the law II -G'lat is 
niis allows people to choose terrorism, ana to 
decide to end it too. In this respect, the group and its members need to 
be examined in light of "Cneir socio-economic and political context. 
1.3 Identification: At"! Alterr..ative lW~roach 
The concept of identification meets -G1.e above requirements of -Gl.e 
'rational-idealists' It is a theory of iL"1dividual terrorist motivation 
-Gl.at integ-.cates -G1.e psychological characteristics of individual 
terrorists noted by OO"1alysts wi-Gl. empirical observations. It also draws 
froiil developmental psycholog-y, and social psycholo9'"',i in the subjective 
processes of -G1.e various ':;!l.OUp belief systems.';'; individual ---" CUlU :"":"n-_ .Llll::' 
subjective belief or a person's role in a given situation is important 
lJ."1 determining their behaviour, perhaps more so -Gl.an human motives in 
general. ';5 
The concept of identification is dependent upon allegiances being 
gained OO"1d lost . Individuals can identify wi -Gl. a group. A group can 
identify with o-G1.er groups or individuals wTIO are held up as eXfuuples to 
be follo-wed, OO"1d society can identify wi-G1. pOl.~icular groups or 
individuals OO"1d -G1.eir activities. 
A crucial aspect of identification is tT..at of individual identity, 
which is formed tTuough SOCial processes. Gnce it is formed, social 
relationships main taiL"1, modify and possibly change person's 
identity. niis occurs -G'l...uough -G1.e process of individual reflection OO"1d 
observation of ho-w the person is seen and judged by others significant 
to the individual.';6 
Individual identity, which is gained tTuough socialisation, is a 
group identity because it is only -G'1rough representation or an 
iL"1dividual as part of a larger 'we' -Gl.at 00"1 individual has an identity. 
This reflects batTl what one wants ideally to be, OO"1d what one thinks he 
or she should be. Identity is sQue-Gl.iL"1g reco,:;!llised, cQupeted OO"1d fought 
for, OO"1d is a belonging -Gl.at eL--presses desires frcm wilich demands OO"1d 
actions follo-w.';' 
Tne sharing of traits OO"1d characteristics does not automatically 
form collective identity feelings. GYlly when interests, positions, or 
obl.er elauents feel -G'1reatened f attacked or w"1justly affected, do 
collective identity feelings ,:;!l.o-w. Naturally, 
43 Wilkinson (1986), 20 . 
.;.; Crenshaw (1986), 390-1; Liebkind, 15, 17. 
45 Hacker, ¥. (1975), 65. 
';6 Berger, Luckmfu-u"1, 194; Erikson, 22-3 . 
.;, Hacker, F. (1975jI 131; Erikson, 300-1. 
-Gl.ese -G'1reats can be 
.l.lJ 
~uagined or exaggerated. T!l.e competing loyal ties of all. individual: s 
identification G~en detennine which ones will ga~l ascendancy over 
othoers. Here such factors as whether one felt a belOJ.J.g~lg to a group 
before G~e IT.treats, or only afterwa.rds, also detenn~les the outcome of 
identification. S~llilarly , so does selectivity of ~lfoImation 
considered by individuals and ~LOUPS.~s 
A swUiTIation of haw G~ese factors lead to terrorism Cful be eXfullined 
an adaptation from diverse physiological psychological 
disciplines. Here itldividuals are noted as wlable to enter into G~e 
fight or flight responses in modern society because G~e problems and 
situations that bring fOLw~ these responses do not ~Ilinish, fuld people 
carillOt usually leave. After repeated arousals I G~e itldividual seeks 
relief G~.trough aggressive actions, fuld also G~ereby removing G~e initial 
cause of frustration by achiev~lg political goals hitherto denied. ~9 
(see Figure 4.1) 
Figure 4.1 i-mel of Ter.corist Contay.ion 
Zl-> goal denied (Y1)-> frus~ation (Y4) <-media (Y7) <--Z4 
l' ... l;'- : / l\" 
/ , / 
I i 
/ i 
f I V l?-
personal contacts \Y~j-> arousal (Y5) 
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Z3-----------> attitude (Y3)--> terrorism (Y6) 
KE"y: Yl to Y7 are v~ariables ill the sy~tern~ 
Zl to Z4 are ag~Legate exogenous variables. 
\ 
! 
\ 
//\ 
! 
Thomas Wiegele, HTerrorist and 
Approaches from a Social 
1-32, 16. 
Adapted from: Kent Layne Oats, 
Psychiatric fuld Physiological 
Perspective" TeIl.orism 8 (1) 1985, 
Vict~ll: 
Science 
Of particular note in G~e rrcdel is G~e weight given to G~e role of 
personal contacts, wTIich is elaborated upon later ~l G~e chapter. 
Personal contacts can lead to identification wiG~ political goals, 
individuals, and influence one: s attitude to violence such that one 
feels aroused and frustrated enough to tUL-n tawards terrorism wiG~ 
others. 
~o Hacker, ro. (1975), 138-140; fuJ.d see chapter five. 
~9 Adapted from Cots, Wiegele, 16-7. 
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nie ag~Legate exterr~l variables (Zl to Z4) represent (Zl) all D~e 
factors leadiIlg to the denial of D~e SOU~ilt political goals, ( Z2 ) D~e 
factors leading to personal contacts, (Z3 ) tile factors leading to D~e 
~idividual develop~ig attitudes to alluw them to pursue political goals 
by violent means, and the factors affectilig media CUy-erage of 
teL-rorist even~s. 
The variables function wilen denial of D~e political goal (Yl), 
which was possibly influenced by persor~l contacts (Y2) beg~is to bring 
on frustration (Y4) In D~e potential terLorist. After arousal (YS) ccmes 
D~e Uluelieved flight or fight response, which is intensified by media 
presentations of terrorism (Y7) and discussions wi D~ personal contacts 
(Y2) wilicn add more arousal (Y5). Tne IT~dia (Y7) ruia personal contacts 
(Y7) also lead the individual back to frustration (Y4) as the person 
sees ruid nears of OD~ers successfully (~i their vie-w] using terrorism, 
while D~ey th6t11selves do noD~~lg. Frustration (Y4) ruid arousal (Y5) feed 
on one another, and attitude (Y3 ) enters Vla D~e person l s direction 
(violence rejection or violence acceptance) of arousal (YS) In response 
to media presentations of terrorism and personal contacts 
Attitude (Y3) and personal contacts (Y2] feed on one anoD~er ruid lead to 
D~e person potentially committing a terrorist act (Y6) , only the 
person is aroused (YS) in a violence acceptiIlg IT~-iller. nie cUlntlission of 
a ter£orist act (Y6) by a hiD~eLLo potential terrorist enters figure 4.1 
also in media presentation (Y7) of rulother terrorist act ruld it begilis 
aga~i. Here terrorism lS both psychological, social psychological and 
physiological. 
All of D~ese factors are accounted for in the definition of 
personal motivation offered earlier. nie indi vidual l s personal aims 
result in D~e fight or flight response D~at leads to frustration. The 
person l S relationship "CD D~e ';:lLOUP or muv6t11ent lS covered by D~eir 
personal contacts{ which also relate to how ';:lLOUP maT~ership Crui achieve 
D~e personls uwTI a~l1s arld are an incentive to D~eir actions. Trlioughout 
all of D~ese b~e person acts in what they perceive as a rational IT~-iller 
as discussed earlier in the 'rational-idealist' model. 
However, this IT~el is not wiD~out its difficulties. Currently D~is 
is a descriptive IT~el w"hich carL only be used to identify variables. Nor 
can it rru-Lk or measure D~e variables. Other difficulties are b~e 
aggregate factors ( Zl to Z4) and huw D~ese influence D~eir respective 
variables (Yl , Y2 f Y3 ruid Y7). Goal denial (Zl, Yl) lS discussed in 
chapters two ruid D'lree as to wnat group goals are ana huw D~ey are 
e2>.,t,.'L essed, wilile chapters six and seven discuss goverrlll1ent and public 
responses to the groups. Personal contacts (Z2, are discussed later 
In tt'1is chapter cuid ill chapter five as pfu L. of 'jLOUP dynamics, while tt'1e 
role of tt'1e media (Z4 , Y7) is hcuidled in chapter seven. Attitude ( Z3 , 
Y3 ) lS cov'ered in tt'1e remainder of the chapter with regards to belief 
systaus and as to why cuid haw ~idividuals jO~i terrorist groups. It is 
also discussed in 'jLOUP beliefs ana dyliruuics ~i cr~pter five. 
2. Belief SYbteirlS 
Belief systaus affect the attitudes cuid identifications of 
individuals, 'jLOUPS and society. Ti"1is section eXruuines tt'1e 
identification aspects of belief systeil~ on ~idividuals. Tne group 
dyliruuic aspects of belief systems are discussed in chapter five. 
Both chapters four and five shaw that different people 
terrorist 'jLOUPS for different reasons, but tt'1at all ~idividuals need to 
align tt'-1eir individual motives wi tt'1 tt'1e group's belief systaTI. Til.is 
determ~ies tt'1eir world vie-w and provides their reasons and 
justifications for action. Ti"1is will be a strong belief syst6Tt because 
tt'1e person: s and group's subjective beliefs are not ali'jlled witt'1 tt'1e 
objective world! and must maintain tt'1e group's position cuid ability to 
fThJCtion despite tt'1is misali'jllluent. 5Q 
The result could be a chcuige In personal beliefs wnereby 
individuals cuue to the terrorist group witt'1 a beat~ig heaL L. for tt'1e 
well-be~ig of hlliT~iity' cuid leave witt'1 'tt'1e rage of crazy self-conceit' 
because tt'1e public did not: identify witt'1 them, but with tt'1e state cuid 
its institutions. The Faction's calculated. actions, which 
sought to bring out state repression and possibly fascist activity, tt'1us 
cUllibined witt'1 their hatred of tt'1e people who went to tt'1e state's 
defence. Subjective aspects influenced. their objective perspective OI 
tt'1eir situation. 51 
Perhaps tt'1is also ex-plains how people jO~ied tt'1e terrorist q.coup 
cuid haw cui alignuent of personal cuid 'jLOUP belief systems occured.. Suue 
of tt'1e 'why' of tt'1is process is left for enlargauent in section tt~liee of 
tt'1e chapter. 
50 Friedt'1elm Neidt'1ardt, "uener Zufall I Eigendyliruuik und 
Institutionalisierbarkeit absurder Prozesse", in: Heine von AlaTtcu-ill, 
hfuis-Peter Tm.il.li (ed.s. ) I Soziologie ~i Weltbuergerliche libsiCl'1t: 
Festschrift fUer Rene Koenig (Cipladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 243-
257, 253. 
51 Juergen .oaecker I Horst Flfu'11er I "Zerm Thesen Zllr RAP" I in: Barbara 
Herzbach I Klaus Wagenbach ( ed.s. ) I Jfu"lrbu.ch Politik 8 (West Ber lin: 
Verlag Klaus Wagerlbach, 1978), 10-5 , 12-3. 
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also provide an outlet for personal emotions of anger and frLlstration 
wnich the ';:1.LOUp eh-plains as being located outside of tJ.'1e g-.coup in 
society.56 nris is discussed later ~1 section tJ.'1ree ru1d in chapter five. 
Violence can contribute to belief chru1ge in a hard, direct mru-iller, 
which polarises the solutions to probl~Tts by making the problem appear 
less cal~lex and difficult tJ.'1an lL is. The aura of v~olence's viability 
ru1Q beauty lS increased by tL'1e heroic appeal of its advocates and 
disciples. It also carries tJ.'1e Q.ru1ger of becoming an end in itself, 
~lstead of a means to ru1 end. 57 
Violence acts as ru1 intensifier of the belief conversion in 
situations "Where it can fur Lher disrupt ru1d confront tJ.'1e old belief 
systems witJ.'1 new eh-periences. n'1e meru1ings, for example, of old 
institutions such as the police ru1d otJ.'1er authorities, come into 
confrontation witJ.'1 tJ.'1e new experiences of police action and tJ.'1e ';:1.LOUp'S 
sources of legi timacy and world view. Violence, ru1d other intensifying 
factors, such as ~litiation processes (see chapter five) speed up tJ.'1e 
conversion of the individual from one socialisation to another. 58 As 
mentioned above, tJ.'1is led to ru1 eh-perience tJ.'1at confronted Klein's 
belief system, and as discussed ~1 chapter five, welds groups together. 
After tJ.'1e belief conversion and group membership, tJ.'1e new beliefs 
serve personal psychological needs, ru1d become central to tJ.'1e life of 
tJ.'1e person, such that previously ~llportru1t persons and ~-£titutions are 
devalued and diSiTdssed. This waS evidenced by some of the members 
leaving tJ.'1eir children, as was mentioned earlier. Part of this is tJ.'1e 
result of individuals restrLlcturing and reorientating tJ.'1eir new life 
witJ.'1 the ';:1.LOUp to take account of their past experiences of 
their conversion. Naw tt"1e g-.coup, its issues, and otJ.'1er m~Ttbers def ine 
tJ.'1e individual ru1d wno tJ.'1ey are. 59 Tnese form tJ.'1e person's new identity. 
nre new belief 51-stem can offer steadfastness ru1d value that raises 
individual self-este~TI ru1Q self-resilience so tJ.'1ey Cru1 work witJ.'1 and 
tJ.'1rough a group wnich prcmotes iNnat tJ."1ey see as a worthy and noble 
cause. n'1is can lead to very firm beliefs wnich carillot be cQTtprQTtised. 
Alter!!ative views are disregarded. n'1e lack of caTipraTiise adds to their 
56 Helm Stierlin, "FatTdlienterrorismus w1d oeffentlicher 
Terrorismus", FainilienuyuatTdk 3 (1978), 170-198, 187. 
57 Hacker, F. (1975), 79. 
58 Berger, LUCKmarill, 164-5. 
53 Jaeger, Boellinger, 154-6; Crenshaw (1988 I), 28; }Eurwell Taylor, 
Helen K"y-an, "Fru1aticism, Political Suicide and Terrorism" T8.L-rorism 11 
(2) 1988, 91-111, 91-~. 
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2.3 Rationalisation and Guilt 
Rationalisation of beliefs has tL'1e goal of supporting one's 
identity (group and individual) crllough tenet axioIuisationi g-.coup belief 
statements becuue ~Licles of faith tL'1at carlliot be criticised or held as 
false. niese articles must be SiiTlple <h"ld firm enough to witL'1stand tL'1e 
contradictions and uneas~!ess that led the merr~ers to adopt tL'1is belief 
system. The main aLLicles of ideological faith for tL'1e RAP are tr~t (1) 
tL'1e social reality is complete povel i...y and must be ch<h"lged; 
orig~"l of the evil lies 1n capitalism <h"ld its interr~tional form of 
~uperialism which both must be destroyed; (3) all small steps of reform 
by tL'1e goverrllTlent are incorrect, because tL'1ey only lead to a stabilizing 
of the unjust systsn; (4) wnile there is no mass basis for revolution Di 
tL'1is COUl"ltr'y, it must first be created <h"ld guerilla actions of terrorist 
groups are a suitable means for this.54 
The operationalisation of these axiuus \ 1. e., the group's actions, 
mlrrder, D:Jmbings, <hid other acts) has necessi tated tL'-~t they justify 
themselves by avoi~"lg responsibility, denial of the injustice they have 
done, <h"ld call~"lg upon higher moral autL'1orities. All of trlBse forced the 
group "Co itself fruu tL'1e norms that it wru":1ted the state "Co 
reject. 'X'his lost tL'1e ':::JLOUp support, <h"ld 1"c fOUl"ld itself increasingly 
isolated. 55 
Identification with tL'1e group and its beliefs pravides 
responsibility tL'-llough sr~ed belief in tL'1e authority and legit~T!acy of 
group beliefs. T'nis relieves the meT!bers from b'1e problaus of freeduu of 
responsibility- -makL"lg ~"ldividual decisions <hid tL'1e possibility of poor 
decisions and failure- -by postponing individual libeLi...y. Personal 
identity arises out of g-.coup demands as a basis for aggression ~"l the 
name of defended and promoted rights. 56 
'fne result is that while the group rray collectively accept 
responsibility for their actions, they deny responsibility as tL'1ose 
accountable for the ends; Buback's death, for eXfuuple, 'waS historical 
progress, applied to tL'1ose wno murdereq ~Ttprisoned group merr~ers.57 
The process is not due to altered personalities, but cO':::jl!itive 
reconstruction of violent acts as a defensive option wnere non-violent 
ones were tried, and wnere crle hoped for ends are deemed worthy enough 
to countenance the violence of tL'1e moment. The appeal of morali ty to 
64 Neidthard (1981), 254. 
55 ibid., 255. 
65 Kaplan, 248-9; Hoffer, 30-1; Hacker, r·. (1975), 133, 152-3. 
57 Edward Sagarin, Robert J. Kelly I "Political Deviance fu"ld the 
Assuuption of Responsibility" ~v~&"lt Betnv~or 7 (3) 1986, 217-242, 223; 
Red .fu.luy Faction, "ku1iiiiunique ' des kU1iffi<hidos ulrike meinhof zur 
hinrichtUlig bubacks ll (1983). 
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such situations adds further weight to the social revolutionaries who 
seek to end harmful social practices by making their opponents appear 
self-interested and calling upon higher social morals,68 such as noted 
in chapter three, with concern over prison conditions. 
The result is not simply mindless individuals. They would not do 
anything without orders. Rather, responsibility is reduced with various 
processes, some of them being defence mechanisms discussed earlier. The 
processes include: responsibility to superiors, displacement of 
responsibility on to others for any harm they cause, and diffused 
responsibility in division of labour (each person is responsible for one 
part of the action and may not know what the others are doing), group 
decision-making ( collective decisions), and collective action (no one 
person did anything, everyone did) where the individual can become lost, 
and not feel personally responsible. Responsibility can also be reduced 
when the consequences of actions are disregarded or distorted. This is 
especially easy when causal actions occur at a distance with remote 
control bombings, and hierarchical cornmands. 69 
The sophistication and types of justification that reduce 
responsibili ty hinge on the group being able to gain some element of 
credibility for their cla~TI that the government has done some wrong or 
injustice to which they have responded. 7o 
As mentioned earlier, the claims of murder against the authorities 
after the deaths of Meinhof and later Ensslin, Raspe and Baader, worked 
on the principle of guilt transfer to turn potential liabilities into 
assets. Repeated claims of murder were to plant seeds of doubt with the 
belief that there can be no smoke without fire. 71 
2.4 Immunisation of Beliefs 
The belief system of the group must withstand influences from 
outside of the group, and not upset the precarious balance between group 
beliefs and the real world. Therefore the deaths of Red Army Faction 
members need to be given weight within the group's belief system, that 
both failures and successes lead to success in the armed struggle. 
68 Bandura, 164-5. 
69 ibid., 175-7. After leaving the group, the moral responsibility 
returns, but not always the responsibility for criminal crimes. 
Friedrich, Der Spiegel 34/1990, 57. 
70 Maurice A.J. Tugwell, "Guilt Transfer", in: David C. Rapoport, 
Yonah Alexander (eds.), The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular 
Justifications (Emsford, NY: Pergamon Press, Inc., 1982), 275-289, 275-
6, 285. 
71 ibid., 281-2. 
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Otherwise doubts about the group would creep in and deter new members. 
Collective action thus becomes an end in itself.72 
Success for terrorists, it seems then, is not the same success the 
public sees. The terrorists look to the long time scale and the growth 
of public support, if not in reality, then in the terrorists' minds. 
When the terrorists do suffer a setback, this is perceived as minor by 
them, and in their eyes their members' who died or were arrested, have 
certainly failed honourably. By identifying wi th a sacred cause the 
members are sure in their convictions and actions. 73 
To maintain their belief system, terrorists use labels to change 
the appearance of activities and events. FOTInerly reprehensible acts are 
now justified and even respectfuF4 as noted already, with the 
'execution! of Buback as a historical process in which his death helps 
to prevent the deaths of prisoners. 
Linked to this is also dehumanisation, whereby policemen, for 
example, become 'pigs' or bullen to use the German. Dehumanisation 
distances people from empathy for others, and decreases similarities as 
they are turned into subhumans, who are seen as only repsonding to harsh 
measures. Dehumanisation thus engenders justifications for punative 
conduct towards others. 75 
Similarly, terrorists use language to imply that their activities 
are the result of passive agents such as 'the bomb that was brought to 
explosion'. Comparisons can justify action through passive agents. For 
example, while the RAF 'executed' Buback, the state 'under Buback's 
directorship' 'murdered', 'executed', 'liquidated', and 'eliminated' 
group members. These and other words were chosen by the RAF to 
illustrate the state's immorality and guilt. 76 
Belief systems therefore are not changed overnight, but with 
supportive condi tions can change from 'a beating heart for the well-
being of humanity' to 'the rage of crazy self-conceit' which condones 
terrorism. However, the ' supportive condi tions ' have not been 
elucidated, and this has not explained why people might move from non-
terrorist to terrorist activities in West Germany. 
72 Neidhardt (1981), 255-6. 
73 Jeanne N. Knutson, liThe Terrorists' Dilemmas: Some Implicit Rules 
of the Game" Terrorism 4 (1980), 195-222, 208-9; Hacker, F.J. (1981), 
78. 
74 Bandura, 169-170. 
75 ibid., 180. 
76 ibid., 170-1; B.H. Miller (1983), 208, 275-6. 
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3. The Individual in West Gennan Left-Wing Terrorism 
The previous sections of the chapter examined individual terrorists 
in general. The remainder concerns specifically left-wing terrorists in 
the Federal Republic of Gennany in a study of the 'supportive 
conditions' requisite for a change in belief systems and of the 
'personal contacts' discussed in Figure 4.1 (p. 113). 
No one becomes a terrorist overnight. This is studied from the 
individual's viewpoint below, and from the group's perspective in 
chapter five. It appears that primary socialisation in general has not 
led to left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, but that 
family influences may produce dispositions that tend to facilitate the 
move to terrorism given key encounters with political events and 
individuals. 77 
However, it is not possible to chart definitive personal developnent 
progression to terrorism, because of its long gradual nature. Another 
complication is the simultaneous multiplicity of overlapping processes 
involved. There is the individual, the family, peer group(s) and 
society. These could be viewed as a four-ring circus, and depending upon 
which one is focused upon those activities become clear, but the others 
continue out of sight or in one's peripheral vision. 78 
3.1 The Psychological Question 
The above variables are studied here to the exclusion of the 
'psychologically disturbed' model, because that model has not proved 
sustainable for West German terrorism. Prof. Wilfried Rasch, who 
examined eleven suspected terrorists in 1975 at the request of the 
authorities, and with the consent of the imprisoned suspects, came to 
the conclusion that only one (an unnamed marginal member) was acting to 
draw attention to himself, and none of them could be diagnosed as 
'paranoid'. He met with Baader, Meinhof, Ensslin and Raspe among the 
eleven. As a caveat it must be added that Rasch did not examine them 
under optimal conditions. The suspected terrorists would not complete a 
psychological test, and instead of Rasch asking them questions, it was 
the reverse. The suspected terrorists asked Rasch questions in an hour 
and a half interview. 79 
77 Klaus Wasmund, "The Political Socialisation of Terrorist Groups 
in West Germany", Journal of Political and Military Sociology 11 (2) 
1983, 223-239, 223. 
78 Wolfgang Salewski, Peter Lanz, Die neue Gewalt und wie man ihr 
begegnet (Munich: Droemer-Knaur Verlag, 1978), 83-4; Stierlin, 173. 
79 Rasch, 80; Bundesgerichtshof, "Beschluss des Bundesgerichtshof 
vom 22. Oktober 1975", in: Wolfgang Dressen (ed.), Politische Prozesse 
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In April 1976 Dr. Wolfgang de Boor met the four survivors of the 
Stockholm embassy siege after the court authorities requested that he 
examine them. He found them uncooperative, and his results thus depended 
upon his interpretation of their gestures. Whenever they chose to speak, 
which was seldom, it was aggressively. He did not find them 
psychologically ill according to clinical standards, but he did think 
they were not that different from schizophrenics, who, like the 
terrorists, have their own standards of reality.8o 
A 1981 study of left-wing West German terrorists found that six 
percent of these (out of 227 individuals) had attempted suicide before 
they entered the left 'scene I. Six percent of the 227 had also at one 
time sought psychiatric or psychotherapeutic help. This was only one 
percent above the five percent average of the general public who had 
also sought similar help.81 
Another study claims that the West German terrorists suffer from 
psychological trauma that colours their perceptions in unreality, and 
motivates them to commit terrorist acts. This conclusion is based on the 
study of autobiographies and interviews with some of the apprehended 
terrorists, court statements and the behaviour of terrorists. On the 
other hand, it notes that many terrorists have enough links with reality 
to evade police efforts to locate and arrest them. 82 
III health could also affect psychological problems in individual 
terrorists. Half of those included in the 1981 study suffered from ill 
health, and one third were chronically or severely ill. This was the 
result of life in the underground, accidents and head injuries, to which 
could be added numerous hunger strikes (six between January 1973 and 
January 1979). Their ill health resulted in poor coordination and the 
frustration of not being able to match their idealised image of 
themselves. This could be especially severe due to their active 
requirements in the underground. 83 
While this is not conclusive data, there are no ideal clinical 
examinations, the exhaustive 1981 study found no psychological 
ohne Verteidigung? (West Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1976), 89-100, 
95. 
8 a Wolfgang de Boor, "Terrorismus: Der 'Wahn I der Gesunden", in: 
Hans-Dieter Schwind (ed.), Ursachen des Terrorismus in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (West Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1978), 122-
153, 122, 124, 128. 
81 Lieselotte Suellwold, "Stationen in der Entwicklung von 
Terroristen: Psychologische Aspekte biographischer Daten", in: Herbert 
Jaeger, Gerhard Schmidtchen, Lieselotte Suellwold, Lorenz Boellinger 
(eds.), Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen zum Terrorismus 2 (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 79-116, 101. 
82 Kellen (1990), 43-4. 
83 Suellwold, 102. 
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disturbances. This supports the above thesis that the 'psychologically 
disturbed' model is not valid for left-wing terrorism in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Psychological processes are involved, as elsewhere 
in political science, but the 'insane' model is not. 
3.2 Data on Left-Wing West Gennan Terrorists 
Two studies provide the main basis for examination of the lives of 
individual left-wing West German terrorists. They are not ideal 
references, but are, nonetheless, something to generate ideas of what 
mayor may not contribute to terrorist motivation. 
The examination contains the subjects' social origins, their 
childhood experiences with regards to moving home and problems with the 
authorities, socialisation after leaving home, key experiences and 
people, available options of protest and terrorism, and desertion from 
the terrorist groups. In each of these sections the concept of 
identification aids understanding the motivation of the individuals. 
In 1981 a study was published of 250 persons who, until the end of 
1978, had been 
ei ther sought for arrest, accused or tried because of 
proscribed actions against paragraph 129a StGB 
[Criminal Code Book], or (according to the contents of 
the convictions that were against them) were convicted 
if paragraph 129a StGB had been in force. 84 
Of the 250 persons studied, twenty-three were right-wing and the 
other 227 left-wing terrorists. 175 were men, and seventy-five women. 85 
This is not the best social scientific data gathering, making it 
appear that judicial and social scientific definitions of terrorism are 
equal. Nor does this data always provide comparisons with the population 
at large or any other type of control group. The study also exhibits the 
problem of uneven data compilation by the judicial authorities so 
slinilar data is not always available for each person. 86 The absence of a 
similar study based on a social science definition of terrorism forces 
the use of the study, which does offer a cQnparison of persons 
considered terrorists by the state. 
A less thorough study published in 1977 compared 350 terrorists 
active between 1966 and 1976 in eighteen different urban terrorist 
groups. The West German groups were the Red Army Faction and the Second 
84 Schmidtchen, 19. Between 1971 and 1980 209 people were sentenced 
for left-wing terrorist activities according to Die Welt 11 August 1981. 
Thus the 227 from the study is inflated with suspects and supporters. 
85 ibid., 77. 
86 Schmidtchen, 18; Post (1990), 28-9; Reinhard Kreissl, "Die 
Studien zum Terrorismus", Kritische Justiz 16 (1983), 311-324, 314. 
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of June Movement. Although, the authors did not state their definition 
of terrorism for the study,87 it is used as a comparison to the West 
German findings of 1981. No comparative study is available for left-wing 
terrorists after 1978. However, various other sources have provided data 
for occasional comparisons. 
The 227 left-wing terrorists in the 1981 study were convicted of 
"membership in a criminal terrorist organisation" (73%), "supporting a 
criminal terrorist organisation" (34%) , and "fonning a criminal 
terrorist organisation" (26%). As each person, on average, was accused 
of five criminal charges (the leaders six), they were also accused and 
convicted of murder (33%), causing explosions (32%), abduction (16%) and 
other acts. There were seventy-five Red Army Faction members, forty-nine 
Second of June members, eight in the Revolutionary Cells, and sixty-nine 
members of other groups. Twenty-six could not be documented as belonging 
to a groUp.88 
3.3 Social Origins 
One's social origins, where one lives and what one's parents do, can 
explain which social influences mayor may not have been present. 8 9 
Parentage determines one's primary socialisation into the world, because 
one's 'significant others' , those who influence one's primary 
socialisation, cannot be chosen, and one has no influence over how they 
present the world. Parents and others present the world to the child 
depending upon their own location in the social structure and their own 
individual idiosyncrasies. 90 
The individual will identify and internalise this world presented to 
him or her through 'significant others' by taking up their attitudes and 
roles to reflect back their own interpretation of their parents and 
other significant persons' image. Some doubt about the world, and its 
legitimacy about why things are the way they are, as presented and 
explained to them by their significant others, may set in later, but by 
and large this world is accepted. 91 
87 Charles A. Russell, Bowman H. Miller, "Profile of a Terrorist", 
Terrorism 1 (1) 1977, 17-34, 18-9. 
88 Scrunidtchen, 19, 62, 77. 
89 ibid., 22. 
90 Berger, LucIDnann, 150-1. 
91 ibid., 151-2, 155-6. 
Table 4.1 Demographic Profile of the Fathers of Left-wing Terrorists, 
1978 
II Last Profession Left-wing Drop Outs Population II 
_of Father Terrorist (Aussteiger) over forty 
Self-em:Qloyed 
small 7% 11% 6% 
middle 4 8 2 
large 4 x x 
Em:Qloyees 
Low level 6 14 
Qualified 14 111 16 
Managerial 9 11 5 
Civil Servants 
Low/Middle 5 x 4 
Senior 6 2 
Executive 14 162 2 
Workers 
Unskilled 3 273 8 
Trained 5 13 
Specialist 11 14 
Inde:Qendent Farmers 2 ..., ,J 
Professionals 10 14 1 
_Other/not employed 0 24 10 
Executives5 47 49 12 
x equals less than 0.5% 
1 includes low and qualified employees. 
2 includes senior and executive civil servants. 
3 includes all workers. 
4 includes farmers. 
5 all bold numbers. 
Note: 30% of the data on fathers is unavailable. 
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Source: Gerhard Schmidtchen, "Terroristische Karrieren: Soziologische 
Anlayse anhand von Falmdungsunterlagen und Prozessakten", in: Herbert 
Jaeger, Gerhard Schmidtchen, Lieselotte Suellwold, Lorenz Boellinger 
(eds.), Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen zum Terrorisrrrus 2 (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 13-77, 22; Karin de Ahna, "Wege zum 
Aussteig- -Foerdernde und hemmende Bedingungen", in: Wanda von Baeyer-
Katte, Dieter Claessens, Hubert Feger, Friedhelm Neidhardt (eds.), 
Gruppenprozesse: Analysen zum Terrorisrrrus 3 (Opladen: Westdeutscher 
Verlag, 1982), 477-525, 482. 
Comparison between the 1978 left-wing terrorists and a 1979 study of 
social demographic trends in the Federal Republic shows that 47% of the 
terrorists' fathers held jobs of higher social status (i.e., they were 
self-employed, high level officials and employees) whereas only 12% of 
the 1979 study were of the same level. 92 Snnilar findings from the 350 
92 Schmidtchen, 22, 30% of the data for the terrorists was 
unavailable. Baader's father was an historian/ archivist, Ensslin' s an 
evangelical pastor, Meinhof's a museum director, Klar's a grammar school 
headmaster, Albrecht's a lawyer, and Raspe' s a businessman. Salewski, 
Lanz, 132-4; Aust (1987), 116; Backes, Jesse, (1989 III), 276, 287, 297, 
305, for the short biographies of these people and Mohnhaupt, Baumann, 
Klein and Tiedemann. Other biographical data is found in Robin Smith, 
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urban terrorists shows that two-thirds of them were from higher social 
status f@TIilies93 (see Table 4.1). 
Parentage of higher social status for the subject group can mean two 
things. First, that this is a source of higher demands on oneself and 
one's environment, such that a leading position in society and one's 
profession is expected in the future. Second, that these were parents in 
the era of the economic miracle who believed it was acceptable to spoil 
children with bribes to compensate for lack of attention after the 
poverty phase of West German rebuilding was over.94 
These factors made it hard for the parents to understand the 
subcul ture that emerged in the sixties. The parents had worked hard to 
gain their material and physical security in the fifties, and were 
surprised when their children developed totally different priorities. 
The social criticism of the youths contrasted so sharply wi th the 
position of the parents, that political cOlTll11unication between the two 
was probably broken and could lead to the forced departure from the 
parental home when one identified completely with the new political 
ideas. 95 
Table 4.2 Sex and Age of Left-wlilg Terrorists, 1978 
Total RAP B2J/RZ Other 
Male 67% 66% 61% 67% 
Female 33 34 39 33 
100 100 100 100 
Born 1945 or earlier 34 46 18 22 
1946 to 1950 34 36 39 30 
1951 to 1955 39 15 41 35 
1956 or later 3 3 2 3 
100 100 100 100 
Source: Gerhard Schmidtchen, "Terroristische Karrieren: Soziologische 
Anlayse anhand von Fahndungsunter lagen und Prozessakten", in: Herbert 
Jaeger, Gerhard Schmidtchen, Lieselotte Suellwold, Lorenz Boellinger 
(eds.), Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen zum Terrorisrrrus 2 (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 13-77, 23, 24. 
The children generally had a negative identification with their 
fathers that resulted in poor contacts and few common interests. The 
parents possibly believed that after their own, more stringent 
socialisation during the previous decades, it was acceptable to purchase 
their childrens' affection with bribes. Due to the parents' need to 
"Daughters of the Gun" Observer Magazine 11 December 1977, 34-7, and Das 
Parlament 5 November, 24 December 1977. 
93 Russell, Miller, 23. 
94 Schmidthcen, 21. 
95 ibid., 20-2. 
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rebuild and maintain their material well-being, this was perhaps also 
linked to their sense of identity. There was also a lack of grandparents 
who possibly died in the war, or were elsewhere, which meant they and 
the parents were both unavailable to look after the children and pass on 
their socialisation potential. 96 
These children were unable to discuss things about the world with 
their parents, and when there was discussion, it was not discussion- -
give and take- -so much as dogmatic responses by the parents. This 
potentially hindered the reduction of aggression in the children. 97 
The full effects of post-war socialisation were also influenced by 
the age of the person. Some were born during the Third Reich, but most 
of them were born afterwards. Table 4.2 shows that almost half of the 
Red Army Faction members during the seventies were born before 1945. 
This includes Baader (6 May 1943), Meinhof (7 October 1934), Ensslin (15 
August 1940), Raspe (24 July 1944) and Mahler (23 January 1936), all the 
founding group leaders. 98 Mahler and Meinhof were born in the thirties 
and had memories of the war. Some of the group born before 1945 would 
also experience the economic difficulties of the post-war 
reconstruction. Perhaps this hardship also influenced the authoritarian 
character of the Red Army Faction. Most of the Second of June members, 
on the other hand, were born between 1946 and 1955. They all benefited 
from the 'economic miracle'r which perhaps influenced their anti-
authoritarian character. 
Many of the left-wing terrorists of the seventies had the benefit of 
being born after the war, but they could not escape its legacy. German 
youth had no national identity to attach itself to, and no elites to 
look up to. All they had was a model of how not to be. 9 9 
This possibly C~TIe partly from doubts in children who could not r or 
found it difficult, to identify with their parents. Instead of love 
being fostered between them r anger and aggression could occur, and 
possibly extended to the whole generation who found it diffucult to 
identify with the 'fascist past' of the previous generation. 1oo 
From the perspective of the left-wing terrorists, fascism had not 
been overcome in West Germany, and was growing once again in the late 
sixties. For ex~ple r after the war 90% of those responsible for the 
events in the country were promoted by the Allies to positions of wealth 
and power. Thus twenty years later 75% of the judges had also been 
96 ibid., 21, 23; Salewski, Lanz, 68-9. 
97 Salewski r Lanz, 61, 64. 
98 Rauball (ed.), 50, 54, 67, 76. 
99 Claessens, de Ahna, 20-1. 
100 Schmid (1983), 199. 
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judges in the Third Reich. The percentages declined only because of 
judges dying. Business showed similar trends whereby those who helped 
the Nazis to power were restored to their power after the war and 
opponents of the regime were still ineffectual. 101 
The terrorists and other youths in the sixties felt determined not 
to fall into the same seemingly helpless spectators' behaviour of their 
parents' generation in 1933. The younger generation wondered what their 
parents did between 1933 and 1945. Some felt ashamed of their 
nationality, and felt a demand to respond better in a similar situation, 
which they saw in German support for the American position in Vietnam. 
They felt morally responsible to work towards a better world, even if it 
involved sacrifices in the 'necessary' violence. 102 
The terrorist suspects sought by the Federal Criminal Office in 1991 
include twelve Red Army Faction hard core suspects (see chapter two). 
Friederike Krabbe, who is believed to reside in Iraq, was born in 1950. 
Wolfgang Gramms, Thomas Simon and Heins Gerum were born in 1953, Volker 
Staub in 1954, Birgit Hogefeld, Barbara Meyer and Horst Ludwig Meyer 
(husband and wife) in 1956, Andrea Martina Klump in 1957, Christian 
Seidler in 1958, Corina Kammenneier in 1960, and Sabine Callsen in 
1961.103 
Based on their date of birth it is likely that most of these 
suspected terrorists did not experience the same problems of their 
parents working and ignoring them which the first generations faced. Nor 
would their parents- -who were children in the Third Reich- -be 
associated with its legacy. Therefore, the negative identity with their 
parents as 'fascists' is probably inoperative with the current suspected 
terrorists. However, if the social strata is still largely middle and 
upper class- -this is unknown- -then it may still be true that the 
youths have increased post-materialist tendencies that reject their 
parents' affluence. 
3.4 Discontinuity and Troubled Childhood 
Secondary socialisation, the internalisation of other worlds beyond 
primary socialisation and the world of one's 'significant others', can 
sometimes cause crises when it differs too much from primary 
101 Kellen (1990), 46. 
102 die taz 5 October 1987, 19; Michael 'Bommi' Baumann, "Interview: 
The Mind of a German Terrorist" Encounter 51 (1978), 81-8, 81; Gerhard 
Baum, Horst Mahler, "Wir muessen raus aus den Schuetzengraben" Der 
Spiegel 53 (31 December) 1979, 36-49, 37, 39. 
103 "Frauen in der RAF" Terrorismus: Info:rmationsdienst 10, 1990, 6-
7; "'Da ist irgendwo ein Nest'" Der Spiegel 15/1991, 22. 
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socialisation. 104 The development of an individual identity can also be 
made more difficult by the stresses and strains resultant from the loss 
of parents and broken friendships by moving home and school. 
-
Table 4.3 Percentage Living with Both Parents 
I 0-2 2-6 6-10 10-14 14+ I I Age Household Terrorists Population I 
Both parents 87% 84% 82% 80% 76% 87% 
Mother only 11 12 14 14 17 9 
Father only 0 1 1 2 2 1 
With Relatives x 1 1 1 1 1 I 
With Foster Parents x 1 1 1 1 x 
Hostel/ 
Boarding: School 2 1 1 2 3 2 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: For 13-14 percent of the terrorists there was no I data available for all the different ages. 
Source: Gerhard Schrnidtchen, "Terroristische Karrieren: Soziologische 
Anlayse anhand von Fahndungsunterlagen und Prozessakten", in: Herbert 
Jaeger, Gerhard Schrnidtchen, Lieselotte Suellwold, Lorenz Boellinger 
(eds.), Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen zum Terrorismus - 2 (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 13-77, 66. 
Earlier socialisation in the post-war era was discussed with the 
assumption that one lived with both parents. This was not always the 
case. Baader and Raspe grew up with their mothers and aunts, while Fritz 
Teufel (Second of June) and Mahler, after his father's death, were 
raised by their mothers. Klein's mother died shortly after his birth so 
he grew up with his father. Astrid Proll (and her brother) had divorced 
parents. Meinhof was raised by her mother and then later by a foster 
mother. hnongst the founder terrorists, only Ensslin was raised by both 
parents .105 The loss of one, or both parents, however, was more a 
problem with the older terrorists. As Table 4. 3 shows, most terrorists 
in the group grew up with both parents. 
Table 4.4 (page 133) shows shows that over half of the generation 
born up to 1955 suffered the loss of one or both parents through death 
or divorce. Compared to a similar population sample, less than ten 
percent would have lost their father over the same time period. 106 Only 
the terrorists born after 1956 had divorced parents. This distorts the 
impression of Table 4.3 that most terrorists had both parents. The 
weight of Table 4.4 is increased by Table 4.2 which shows only three 
percent of all terrorists in the study where born in 1956 or later. 
104 Berger, Luckrnann, 158, 161. 
105 Schreiber, Der Spiegel 20/1981, 92; Backes, Jesse (1989 III), 
276-8, 287-9, 303-4, 305-6. 
106 Schrnidtchen, 29. 
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Table 4.4 
Decisive Biographical Occurances :in Left-w:ing Terrorists r 1978 
Year of Birth 
Total% 1945 1946 1951 1956 
or to to or 
earlier 1950 1955 later 
Orphan 5 13 3 0 0 
Death of father 15 19 14 12 0 
Death of mother 6 4 9 6 0 
Death of a parent 26 36 26 18 0 
Divorce of £arents 10 9 5 17 17 
63 81 57 53 17 
Source: Gerhard Schmidtchen, "Terroristische Karrieren: Soziologische 
Anlayse anhand von Fahndungsunterlagen und Prozessakten", in: Herbert 
Jaeger [ Gerhard Schmidtchen, Lieselotte Suellwold, Lorenz Boellinger 
(eds.), Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen zum Terrorisrrrus 2 (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 13-77, 66. 
The implications are that over half of the left-wing terrorists in 
the seventies lived without both parents, with an even higher percentage 
of the founder terrorists affected by this problem of only one immediate 
'significant other' for role model identifications. Where both parents 
are dead, this 'significant other' may not necessarily 'be a 'father' and 
'mother', but two aunts, as occurred with Baader. 
A possible speculation would be that not knowing one's parents' 
involvement- -and not personally knowing them- -would make the negative 
identification of 'fascist Germany' easier. Therefore the founder 
terrorists could be more easily moved to act against the state. 
Furthermore, it could be speculated from this data that the followers- -
mainly from whole families- -were not moved by the negative 
identification of the continued 'fascist state' , but by the 
identification with imprisoned persons that were held by the 
'imperialist state' as discussed in chapters two and three. 
The influence of the loss of one or both parents on problems with 
education and other experiences is highlighted in Table 4.5 (page 134)[ 
which shows that educational discontinui ty is more influential. 
Generally, the conflicts in society at home and in schools and 
uni versi ties, and encounters wi th the court and police systems, were 
found to go with discontinuity problems of moving home, school and 
training .1 0 7 
107 ibid.[ 37, 66. 
I 
I 
I 
Table 4.5 
Biographical OcCUITances and Discontinuity and Conflict 
Problems Arrong Left-wing Terrorists, 1978 
Number of Biographical Occurancesl 
Discontinuity Level Tota12 0 1 2 3-4 5+ 
Three and more 19% 19% 17% 8% 24% 45% 
Two 22 21 12 30 26 28 
One 23 20 29 22 32 18 
None 36 40 42 40 18 9 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
Authority Conflicts 
Two or more 38% 31% 32% 40% 59% 82% 
One 26 25 32 38 15 I None 36 44 36 22 26 18 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
II 
I 
I 
I 
1 Biographical occurances are not living with both parents after 
fourteen, death of one or both parents, divorce of parents, 
undesired leaving of one or both parents and similar problems. 
2 Total occurances of moving home, school or training. 
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Source: Gerhard Schmidtchen, "Terroristische Karrieren: Soziologische 
Anlayse anhand von Fahndungsunterlagen und Prozessakten" f in: Herbert 
Jaeger, Gerhard Schmidtchen, Lieselotte Suellwold, Lorenz Boellinger 
(eds. ) , Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen zum Terrorisrrrus 2 (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 13-77, 34-6. 
Another factor in the socialisation of West German left-wing 
terrorists is the protestant religion. While the religious beliefs of 
fifty percent of the terrorists are not available! 56% of those recorded 
were protestant! 19% catholic! and 25% other or none. This compares to a 
sample of 5000 youths showing 47% protestant! 41% catholic and 12% other 
or none. The influence of protestantism is increased when the faith of 
the parents is considered. 68% of the terrorists or their parents were 
protestant, 26% catholic, and 6% other or none. The comparison sample 
shows figures of 49% protestant, 46% catholic and 5% other or none. 108 
The influence of the protestant faith, apart from its theological 
component, emerges in secularism through its stress on the autonany of 
individual conviction! which adds weight to the legitimacy of one's 
actions. 109 This leads to searches for ideas and groups which are worthy 
of identification. 
Problems arise, however! when the individual's belief adds the new 
identification to their verbal mission, but the progress of the group 
fails. The danger is that the options are then limited to only 
resignation or violence. 110 
108 ibid., 31-
109 ibid.! 31-2. 
110 ibid., 32. 
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There are possibly two different types of families that the 
terrorists in the seventies came from. One is where the parents worked 
their way up to high social status through diligence, hard work and 
self-restraint. They had little time to offer their children any 
practical insights and guidance. In an attempt to compensate for this 
lack of attention, the parents gave the children material gifts, the 
same things the parents were working hard to provide for themselves. The 
parents wanted to instill in their children similar values of hard work, 
obedience to authority and the control of impulses and deterred 
gratification. 111 
A second type of family would be one with well-educated parents that 
provided their children wi th liberal ideas of freedom, equality and 
possibly socialism. This was done in a permissive atmosphere without 
enough self-restraint taught. These children had a hard landing in the 
real world after leaving home because they lacked enough orientation to 
manage successfully. 112 This leads to the argument that children of 
leftist parents did not learn to accept their emotional-erotic impulses 
and fantasies as part of themselves, but rather viewed these as from 
outside of themselves. 113 
This is simplified, but does represent the group that emerged from 
the ~TImediate post-war hardship, and the later group that emerged from 
the 'economic miracle I. These two types are also continuously found in 
any state, and would thus supply more youths that might prove 
susceptible to terrorist ideas. 
The suspected terrorists of the eighties did not appear to move 
around different areas, and all but one changed schools at least once 
before moving on to further study and/or training. Unfortunately there 
is little information offered about the family life: Birgit Hogefeld is 
one of three children, and Thomas Simon is the son of a tool and die 
maker with one brother. 114 
An important time and phase in the process of socialisation for 
individuals is that of adolescence, when a person questions the 
lifestyles available, the commitments that could be made, and who they 
might become. The trying and testing of possible identities is not so 
much the search for a permanent identity, but an accelerated phase of 
111 Herbert A. Kampf, "On the Appeals of Extremism to the Youths of 
Affluent Democratic Societies" Terrorism 4 (1980) 161-93, 168. 
112 ibid., 169. 
113 Grossarth-MaticekJ 20. 
114 Horchem (1988), 155-9; Lukas Lessing, "Schwarzwald Faktion" 
Wiener 11 November 1986, 58-74; Hans Oberlaender, "Die Taeter" Stern 
Extra: Terrorisrrrus- -Das Attentat: Mord an Alfred Herrhausen 4 December 
1989, 51-3, 52. 
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questioning about oneself and the world around one. This phase will only 
be successful, however, if the individual can resynthesise earlier 
identifications and formulate aspirations within their potential 
capability, which are shaped by their own experiences and the cultural 
situation of the time. 115 
Problems in the process could arise if the adolescent does not have 
a direction in which they eventually want to develop their identity, or 
if they develop a brittle rigidity towards new situations reflecting 
their vulnerable identity. Added problems arise when the person 
overreaches his or her aspirations, and cannot achieve the skills 
required for his or her intended identity. This engenders low self-
esteem. 116 
Identity exploration is normal in adolescence and at other times 
when a reconsideration of life goals and priorities occurs such as in 
the case of graduation from school and university, marriage, childbirth, 
divorce or job loss. The decision taken is affected by one's current 
level of satisfaction, the perceived need to make a decision and social 
expectations of parents, peers, teachers and employers. 117 Therefore the 
life at home will influence socialisation and identifications, but only 
so long as one lives at home or remains connected to the parental home. 
3.5 Socialisation Away from Home 
The move away from home enables one to leave the influence of 
parents behind, and, given that one is not dependent upon them for 
financial reasons, become independent individuals. Of the ninety-five 
left-wing terrorists who attended sane form of higher education 
(univerisityor polytechnic), 41% lived in a commune, 44% rented a room 
(38% alone and 6% with others), while 18% lived with their parents and 
4% with relatives. A comparative academic sample shows only 5% living in 
communes, and 29% renting a room ( 24% alone and 5% with others), wi th 
the largest percentage, 28%, having their own apartment, while 33% lived 
with their parents. None of the terrorists had their own apartment. 118 
Almost half (ninety-five) of the terrorists in the 1981 study 
attended higher education. A s@nple of 5000 persons between fifteen and 
thirty-five shows that while only 19% of the 5000 attended higher 
education, 47% of the 227 left-wing terrorists did. 119 
115 Weinreich (1985) , 53-5. 
116 ibid., 54. 
11 7 Harold D. Grotevant, "Toward a Process Model of Identity 
Formation" Journal of Molescent Research 2 (3) 1987, 203-22, 209. 
118 Schmidtchen, 29, 44, 77. Data on 32% of the terrorists is 
unavailable, and there were multiple responses totaled 154%. 
119 ibid., 25. 
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In the eighties, of the suspected terrorists mentioned earlier, four 
had finished their Abitur (higher school leaving certificate), one did 
not, and two others completed lower school leaving certificates. Of the 
five who attended university, four left without a degree. Three others 
received apprenticeships, which two completed. One person had no 
training, and did not complete her school leaving certificate.12o 
Many of the terrorists lived in collectives. 57% lived in communes 
and 36% in collectives (see Table 4. 7, page 143). This type of living 
provided solidarity and a chance to practice theories in al ternati ve 
lifestyles, and form new identifications in unique living 
arrangements.121 Generally the members are politically oriented to the 
left, and recruit new members from a relatively homogeneous group of the 
same orientation as the present commune members.122 
Sigrid Sternebeck, a later Red Army Faction mernber, felt that the 
traditional family lifestyle (father works and mother raises the 
children) was not enough, and founded a commune with five other adults 
and two children, as well as founding a childrens I centre with other 
parents. 123 Susanne Albrecht was dissatisfied at home and left there to 
move into a collective in St. Pauli saying she had had enough of the 
caviar lifestyle. 124 
Apart from the chance to put theory into practice, membership in 
collective living arrangements allows the members, both youths and older 
ones, a chance to feel accepted and a chance to prolong the necessary 
search for an acceptable lifestyle. Young people who were not adequately 
socialised before can now catch up in socialisation. The commune can 
become an emotional substitute for the family and the individual can 
gain from what now could be seen as a complete family. The collective 
lifestyle provided a safe haven for the person to experiment and to 
develop. 125 
One of the new experiences available was drugs, which seems to have 
been used by about the same amount of people in the terrorist groups as 
was normal in the counter-culture of the sixties. The use of drugs 
amongst the terrorists also increased with the number of problems and 
conflicts that occurred in the family and with the level of incidents 
involving conflicts with authorities. One interpretation of this is that 
drug consumption was an expression of non-conformi ty with the current 
120 Horchem (1988), 155-9. 
121 Schmidtchen, 28-9, 44. 
122 Suellwold, 82-3. 
123 Sternebeck, Der Spiegel 33/1990, 57. 
124 "Orna im Altkader", Der Spiegel 24/1990, 89. 
125 Suellwold, 85-6 
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roles and norms and offered a possibility of breaking these by accepting 
the social stigma associated with drug consumption in a heroic manner 
with others in group activity.126 
Drugs also offered the raising of feelings and personal value in a 
'setting' contrasting reality outside the group that eventually leads to 
increased 'binding' on the source of the need fulfillment. In an 
underground group such dependence could cause problems for dependant 
persons who were concerned about where the next fix would corne frau. 127 
Nonetheless, it was possible for Peter-Juergen Boock daily to take 
between four and eight ampules of heroin, morphine, cocaine, and other 
drugs from at least 1977 until May 1978 when he was held until November 
1978 by the Yugoslav authorities, who rehabilitated h~U.128 
Table 4.6 
Job Employment of Left-wing Terrorists, 1978 
II Elnployment 
II Full employment 
Part-time 
I Irregular 
Unemployed 
Education/training/ 
Left-wing 
Terrorists 
35% 
14 
18 
10 
without a trade 23 
100 
Population II 
Sample* I 
I 
48% I 
4 
o 
1 
47 
100 
* Population sample of 5000 youths and adults between 15 and 35 
years old. 
Source: Gerhard Schrnidtchen, "Terroristische Karrieren: Soziologische 
Anlayse anhand von Fahndungsunterlagen und Prozessakten", in: Herbert 
Jaeger, Gerhard Schrnidtchen, Lieselotte Suellwold, Lorenz Boellinger 
(eds.), Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen zum Terrorismus 2 (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 13-77, 25. 
The link between the high number of left-wing terrorists living in 
collectives and pursuing a new philosophy of life can be seen in their 
poor work habi ts prior to entering a terrorist organisation. Unlike 
their counterparts in the public, the terrorists had a much higher 
percentage in part-time and irregular work, and experienced discontinued 
job training and higher education. If one does not manage to find 
employment after completion of one's studies or training, then the 
reduced satisfaction found in part-time and irregular work can lead to a 
weak and potentially helpless position where the alternative 
126 Suellwold, 103; Schrnidtchen, 41-2; the survey showed that 26% of 
the left-wing terrorists had either tried marijuana, hashish or used 
drugs for longer periods. However, there was no data available for 73% 
of the terrorists. 
127 Suellwold, 102-3. 
128 Boock, Der Spiegel 9/1981, 116-7. 
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organisations of corrrrnunes and other philosophies promoting al ternati ve 
social structures, which allow one's lower personal value to be raised, 
appear attractive.129 They support an identification that fits the 
reality (see Table 4.6). 
3.6 Key Experiences and Persons 
The 1977 study of urban terrorists found that most were unmarried, 
but there were exceptions, which centred on the West German terrorists, 
of whom 61% were married, and 37% had a companion. Couples are not the 
only ones who have a 'significant other' influencing their life. People 
can identify with many different persons. However, the left-wing 
terrorists were found to be influenced by a politically homogenous 
group. They were without political pluralism in their discussions. The 
influence of the peer groups and corrrrnunes shows itself here. 130 
Through contact wi th new people in a collective the person could 
also widen their individual emotional contacts, while people who wanted 
to influence others, could also find outlets in corrrrnunes and group life. 
Both could fulfil personal needs with social rewards in group activity. 
Possibly too, the person entered the corrrrnune through contact with their 
partner who was already a member, and thus provided contact with the 
poli tical group. Not all contacts with political groups and collective 
living arrangements were initially due to the group's ideology or 
outlook. 131 The goals of the group were important to the individual only 
to the extent to which the group goals allowed fulfilment of individual 
goals. Group membership can itself be the goal, and not the goals 
available to groupS.132 
For ex~nple, the influence of couples is seen in that of Ensslin and 
Baader, Mahler and Monika Berberich, Ingrid 'Ina' Siepmann and Dieter 
Kunzlemann, Petra Schelm and Manfred Grashof. Friendships between 
Ensslin and Ingrid Schubert, and Meinhof and Irene Goergens had the same 
result of bringing someone into the group .13 3 The strength of the bond 
between Baader and Ensslin was so strong that she even visited him in 
prison in April 1970 before he was freed by the group in May.134 
The effects of the idols, the people identified with, can be to 
foster a protective, admiring r or affective attitude in the identifying 
person. If the idol is more educated, then it is possible that the other 
129 Schmidtchen, 24-6. 
130 Russell, Miller, 23; Scrunidtchen, 45-6. 
131 Schmidtchen, 86-7; Knutson (1980), 207. 
132 Jaeger, Boellinger, 152-3. 
133 Schreiber, Der Spiegel 20/1981, 90. 
134 Aust (1987), 84. 
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person feels less experienced and inferior in the company of someone who 
better expresses themselves. 135 
A survey of the top four influential people amongst left-wing 
terrorists showed 57% were members of the same group, 23% were 
influencial due to their idol and emotional status, while others, 
accounting for 9% each/ were influential because of their career, sexual 
desires or something else. No data was available for the other 23%.136 
Whereas key people and personal influences exert more of an 
immediate effect on people, key experiences may not always be 
immediately seen as such. Key events do not always cause decisive 
impulses, but can lead individuals already predisposed through 
socialisation towards a particular path. In the closed hanogeneity of a 
group, the choice of alternatives is already somewhat foreclosed and 
some options therefore appear more valuable than others.137 
Key experiences can also be long term in nature, where continued 
exposure to an influence has a lasting effect on a person's attitudes. 
This was the case with Angelika Spei tel ( and presumably others) who 
worked in Klaus Croissant's stuttgart office. The daily reading of 
prisoners' mail to Croissant became too much for her and she wanted to 
do more than office work so the Stammheim prisoners "could walk in the 
woods". Via a middle-man she made her first contact with the underground 
in 1976 when she met Peter-Juergen Boock. 138 
Sigrid Sternebeck wanted to work against the unfairness of the ten 
year sentence against Werner Hoppe in July 1972. He had been sentenced 
for three attempted murders in a 1971 shootout with policemen, although 
only one spent cartridge was found fran Hoppe's gun. This led Sternebeck 
to work with the prisoner support group Red Aid.139 
One suspected illegal militant member of the Red Army Faction wrote 
in 1988 that the emotions of working together in the militant scene of 
anti-nuclear power, defending squats and other protests can be that they 
are not focused enough, because one has not yet become a subject of the 
revolution and removed divisions between goals and means. This is what 
he says the Red Army Faction hunger strikes are to show by example, and 
is what those outside of prison seek to achieve. However, when the goal 
is unclear, the means are also unclear. This is where discussion with 
135 Wasmund, 230. 
136 Schmidtchen, 70. 
137 Wasmund, 231. 
138 Angelika Speitel, "Ein ungeliebtes Leben", Stern 39 (30) 17-23 
July 1986, 134-8, 138. 
139 Sternebeck, Der Spiegel 33/1990, 57-8. Petra Sche~n died in this 
shootout. 
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others can give direction to one's own experience which in the end can 
motivate people. 140 
The subjective value of these examples is difficult to calculate, 
but it is thought that individual political experiences and world and 
state political events gain value once the person joins a group and the 
person then needs to assimilate the group values by interpreting one's 
problems and conflicts in light of group ideology and beliefs. Before 
this the person has possibly joined the group, less because of its 
political orientation, than because of personal relationships and 
requirements. 141 In retrospect the particular political events or socio-
political experiences gain new meaning for individuals. 
These are the types of conditions that can lead to transformations 
of individuals' subjective reality, whereby the person 'switches 
worlds'. In doing so the person, in effect, goes through a second 
primary socialisation process, with the original primary one 
deconstructed and another erected in its place. 142 
To be successful, the world switching exercise must include both 
social conditions to provide new significant others to establish 
effective identifications and provide dependency for the individual. It 
must also include conceptual conditions to provide a framework for the 
new order of the reality that displaces the old one. 143 
While it is perhaps difficult to determine when particular events 
and experiences gain explanatory influence in an individual's life, it 
may be possible to examine the lives of left-wing terrorists to see what 
types of lifestyle they led shortly before joining terrorist 
organisations. 
The influence of communes and collective lifestyles on the 
terrorists is seen in Table 4.7 (page 141). Named examples show that 
when one person entered other acquaintances usually followed. Susanne 
Albrecht shared a three-room apartment with Silke Maier-Witt and Sigrid 
Sternebeck, while Adelheid Schulz lived with Guenter Sonnenberg, Knut 
Folkerts and her boyfriend, Christian Klar, whom she met when she worked 
as a maid in the Klar household. Brigitte Mohnhaupt, along with Rolf 
Heissler and Ralf Reinders , lived together and formed 'Tupamaros 
Munich'. Friederike and her sister Hanna Krabbe also lived together in a 
Frankfurt collective. 144 
140 Norbert Hofmeier, "Erklaerung von Norbert" Radikal 136 part 2 
(late 1988, no date given), 84-8, 84-5. 
141 Jaeger, Boellinger, 154-6. 
142 Berger, Luckrnann, 176-7. 
143 ibid., 177-8. 
144 Schreiber, Der Spiegel 20/1981, 92-4; "Wie wird man Terrorist" 
Stern 11 May 1978, 56-72, 62. 
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Table 4.7 (page 143) shows that, in general, the number of conflicts 
and problems a person has with authorities and the roles and norms of 
society increases with the individual f s isolation and involvement in a 
counter-culture lifestyle. However, it cannot be said that one causes 
the other, only that the two appear to coincide. Although the figures 
only represent 76% of the individuals, the isolation of members amongst 
people who think, speak and collectively live together is clear. Also 
evident are the poor interpersonal relationships of some members who 
change employment, friends and lovers. The framework for the people to 
switch worlds appears. 
In the case of Volker and Angelika Speitel (husband and wife) and 
Willy Peter Stoll, it was a case of living together between 1970 and 
1973, with all eventually quitting their jobs and picking up- -as many 
others did at the tirne- -light drugs, and identifying with the leftovers 
of the student movement Kammune I, Teufel and Langhans and the feeling 
of repression. They had fewer commitments than ever before, and the 
repression came from the daily duties, which they were not capable of 
due to laziness. This also made decisions for thern. 145 
145 V. Speitel, Der Spiegel 31/1980, 36-7. 
143 
Table 4.7 
Noticable Behaviour Amongst Left-wing Te:rrorists, 1978 
I Number of role and nonn I conflicts with 
I Terrorists parents and authorities 
I Total 0 1 2 3+ 
I 
Live in commune 57% 55% 56% 62% 45% 
Live in collective 36 21 44 34 43 
I Only contact with specific groups 65 57 60 72 75 
I Aggressive towards authorities 47 32 44 53 53 
I Stereotyped ideological speech 27 25 22 23 33 
I Increasing isolation 23 23 16 28 33 Strong change of influence person 11 5 8 13 18 
! Giving up of earlier hobbies 
II 
and interests 10 5 4 17 15 
Quickly changing career goals 10 7 6 11 15 
Strong mood swings 9 9 2 6 23 
Poor common feelings towards people 
with whom relationship exists 8 5 4 11 15 
I 
I Planless hanging/roaming about 8 2 2 11 18 I Unclear thinking 7 5 2 11 10 I 
I Feeling of living in a false world 7 7 4 6 15 
I Seeing the light e£merience 5 0 0 6 15 
I 331 258 274 364 416 
I Note: Data was only available for 76% of the 227 left-wing I I terrorists. 
Source: Gerhard Schmidtchen, "Terroristische Karrieren: Soziologische 
Anlayse anhand von Falmdungsunterlagen und Prozessakten", in: Herbert 
Jaeger, Gerhard Schmidtchen, Lieselotte Suellwold, Lorenz Boellinger 
( eds. ) , Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen zum Te:rrorisrrrus 2 (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 13-77, 47. 
Table 4. 7 says nothing about types of group affiliation outside of 
living arrangements. Affiliations to other groups and associations, even 
political parties, also tell what types of contacts and ideas a person 
is exposed to. Theoretically, any of these groups of people could have 
also entered religious sects, drugs or the alternative scene. The 
difference that brought the follow-on groups to the successive terrorist 
groups was the connection with the prisoner support groupS.146 
Table 4.8 (page 144) highlights the isolated circle of groups and 
people which did not force the individuals to confront ideas and 
thoughts different from their own. The identifications shown in chapter 
three appear here with a sizable number of womens' group members and 
even more belonging to prisoner help groups that would bring attention 
to the problems and ideas of 'political prisoners' . 
146 Schreiber, Der Spiegel 20/1981, 94. 
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Table 4.8 
Group Affiliations of Individuals 
Prior to Entering Left-wing Terrorist Groups, 1978 
All 
I. 
Terrorists RAF B2J/RZ Other 
Prisoner aid organisations 27% 20% 29% 39% 
I New Left 10 9 14 14 
I Student organisations 8 9 10 7 
I 
Independent communist or social 
revolutionary groups 7 5 8 3 
Corrununes 6 9 2 6 
Independent protest groups/movements 4 8 4 0 
I Womenls groups 3 0 12 3 
I Anarchist groups 3 1 0 0 Armed service resistance organisations 2 1 2 1 
I Youth groups 2 3 4 1 
I 
Parties 2 4 0 1 
Other 4 ..., 8 3 ;) 
No answer 48 51 49 43 
Total 126 123 142 121 
Source: Gerhard Schmidtchen, "Terroristische Karrieren: Soziologische 
Anlayse anhand von Fahndungsunter lagen und Prozessakten II, in: Herbert 
Jaeger, Gerhard Schmidtchen, Lieselotte Suellwold, Lorenz Boellinger 
( eds. ) , Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen zum Terrorisrrrus 2 (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 13-77, 71. 
The prisoner help groups enabled contact to be established between 
people outside of prison and the prisoners, and became a continued 
source of new members by providing contact with the terrorist groups, 
and reasons to join the struggle in the form of revenge and aid to the 
terrorists. The office workers of the defence lawyers saw the letters 
from the imprisoned terrorists and could be manipulated by the defence 
lawyers, who also organised the prisoner support corruni ttees ( see 
chapters two and five). 
As in the case of Sigrid Sternebeck the position of the prisoners 
built up pressure on the people to do something. In the case of those 
who held onto the legal scene after the death of Meins in 1974, as 
Sternebeck did, this was even more difficult after Meinhof l s death in 
1976. As she told herself: "How long do you still want to wait- -if it 
goes further, then they are all soon dead". 14 7 
The identification of the people in these pre-terrorist and 
terrorist circles could be intensified in confrontation with police and 
other authorities in support of the ideas of one I s group I as a large 
percentage were. They also exhibit a high level of participation in 
unlawful demonstrations, with more participating in these than lawful 
ones (see Table 4.9, page 145). 
147 Sternebeck, Der Spiegel 33/1990, 62. 
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These episodes could show and prove one's membership, and help the 
group gain effect and influence in the public arena. These acti vi ties 
also provide the group with an identity of what they stand for, and do 
or do not accept.148 
Table 4.9 
Participation in Demonstrations 
and Squatting by Left-wing Terrorists, 1978 
II 
Terrorists 
Total 
I
', Participation in illegal demonstrations 
Participation in legal demonstrations 
32% 
25 
17 
63 
i Participation in squats (Hausbesetzungen) 
II Confrontation with the police as an adult 
. * Experienced police measures in a demonstration 
Population II 
Sample 
4% I 
23 I 
1 I 
8* I 
I 
Source: Gerhard Schmidtchen, "Terroristische Karrieren: Soziologische 
Anlayse anhand von Fahndungsunterlagen und Prozessakten", in: Herbert 
Jaeger r Gerhard Schmidtchen, Lieselotte Suellwold, Lorenz Boellinger 
( eds . ) , Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen Zlnn Terrorisrrrus 2 (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 13-77, 47. 
It is also possible, however r that their collective street 
demonstrations will be seen as not enough. For example, Stemebeck 
interpreted the clearing of the Eckhoffstrasse squat by Hamburg city 
police in May 1973 as a sign of how strong the city was and how unable 
the protesters' method was to solve problems. The resul t was impotent 
anger, and a search for political activty that eventually led her to the 
Caumittees against Torture and Political Prisoners in 1974. 149 
The objective results the individuals achieve or not, are not as 
important as how they subjectively interpret the performance and record 
between what they feel capable of and what they feel they have achieved. 
Usually a person lowers their subjective ability levels after a failure. 
However r someone who perceives themselves as having raised ability 
levels, and has unsuccessful conflictual experiences, generally raises 
their expectations and goals even higher. They intensely hold onto their 
beliefs in high flying success. Terrorists who continually fail are 
similar. 150 
Perhaps this explains the move from protest to violent 
demonstrations to low-level ( arson and small bombings) and then high-
level (large bombs, assassinations, abductions) terrori@u. Their message 
did not have an effect at one level r so another one was sought. 
148 Schmidtchen, 47-8. 
149 Stemebeck r Der Spiegel 33/1990, 59. 
150 Suellwold r 89-90. 
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A person's perceived level of ability can also be raised by others 
who think a person must be able because of their intelligent 
presentation and ability. This raises the expectation level of others, 
and to avoid disgrace, one tries to live up to these, especially when 
the same person is looked up to as a leader. 151 
There is not much information known about the presently suspected 
terrorists. What is available shows that they all worked in the 
surrounding Red Army Faction legal network before entering the 
underground. Some had been arrested during their legal work, and several 
were involved in the squatting movement and RAF prisoner work. 152 
The personal contacts of suspected RAF members in the eighties were 
important. Three of the suspected terrorists were born in Wiesbaden 
(Andrea Klump, Birgit Hogefeld, and Wolfgang Grams), and entered the RAF 
scene in the mid-seventies. Hogefeld and Grams later entered the 
underground together in early 1984 after living together for some time. 
Klump was a friend of Grams who entered the underground in mid-1984. 
Together these three form the so-called ~Rhein-Main-Gruppe' (Rhine-Main-
Group) of the RAF.153 
The ~Stuttgarter-Gruppe' (Stuttgart Group) is believed to be centred 
on Barbara Meyer (nee' Metzger) and her husband Horst Ludwig Meyer. She 
is from Stuttgart and he later moved there from nearby Schwenningen to 
run a newsagent shop with her in Stuttgart. Both were active in RAF 
prisoner work in the early 1980s and entered the underground together in 
summer 1984 along with Thomas Simon. Simon had lived with the Meyers in 
a collective in 1981. Before entering the underground Barbara Meyer 
lived with Sabine Callsen from Hannover in Frankfurt a.M. in late 1983. 
Callsen entered the RAF underground in September 1984. 154 
Many of these people can be expected to have participated in illegal 
demonstrations and confrontations with authorities through their RAF 
activities before entering the underground. Some were arrested prior to 
entering the underground (Simon, Seidler, and Gr@TIs). Unfortunately, it 
is not known exactly why the people decided the underground was the next 
logical option. 155 A possible reason for so many entering in 1984 was 
that the group was building up to a campaign and needed more members, 
especially after the arrest of six members in July 1984, as mentioned in 
chapter three. 
151 ibid., 91. 
152 Horchem (1988), 155-9. 
153 Oberlaender, Stem Extra 4 December 1989, 52. 
154 Horchem (1988), 158-9. 
155 ibid.; Lessing, Wiener 11 November 1986, 61. 
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3.7 Available Options 
The end of the 'world switching' exercise may be uncharted for the 
individual and the group they have joined. Ideally there should always 
be the option of exit for those who do not want to enter terrorism. They 
should be able to disappear back into society without any attached 
labels in order to take up subjectively acceptable alternatives. 156 
On the individual level, the person must feel comfortable in their 
identi ty . If not, then they will continue to change and adapt to find 
one they are comfortable wi th. When they have been unable to acquire 
their first option, especially the identity with positive overtones, 
then negative ones become potentially viable. Posi ti ve and negative 
refer to the person's viewpoint which may, or may not, coincide with 
society's perspective.157 
The direction and options available to the person are dependent upon 
and influenced by the social structure and the culture in which the 
person finds him or herself. An influence on the person entering this 
stage of terrorism would be a desire to end the indecision and 
frustration they may have been experiencing with unacceptable roles and 
identities, by making a clear decision to do something decisive both in 
action and commitment. Peers and contacts may influence the individual's 
decision, especially when they are all homogenous in orientation. To 
this could be added outside pressures such as a police record, or the 
potential for arrest (see chapter five). The identity the person chooses 
will also be one that allows personal as well as poli tical (these may 
also come later) needs to be met, and may follow a severe disappointment 
of expectations158 which was mentioned earlier as a time for identity 
exploration. 
Chapter two stated that Baader and Ensslin went to Frankfurt in 1968 
after meeting two people acquitted of incitement to arson, while Meinhof 
decided to join in the escape of Baader to signify her resolve for the 
revolutionary ideas of the group. She was also seeking to overcome her 
isolation since moving to West Berlin after her divorce by maintaining 
contact with Baader and Ensslin who had recently moved to Berlin and 
sought her assistance in finding accommodation. Mahler also helped in 
this. Meinhof was also having difficulty in believing in the continued 
156 Neidhardt (1981), 246-7. 
157 Knutson (1981), 112. 
158 ibid., 113, 115, 122. This is the thesis developed from a neo-
marxist perspective in Micheal Horn, Sozialpsychologie der Terrorismus 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, 1982), which sees the 'career' option of 
terrorism at the end of a series of closed options. 
possibilities 
Germany .159 
of legal 
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extra-parliamentary opposition in West 
Sternebeck felt the death of Meinhof was too much, and sought 
contact with the underground, which did not pose any problems because it 
seemed to be her only possibility to help the prisoners, and she did not 
have many contacts holding her to the legal world. 16o 
Most llnportantly, the person must see this path as the most viable 
option available to him or her at the time. They must (a) see this as a 
positive choice to become actively committed to the identity of a group 
member, (b) where they will gain personal (and possibly political) 
benefits from group membership! and (c) see this as the most viable 
option available even though this means taking on the state. 161 The 
person will also be aware, even if only in an abstract manner, that they 
will be expected to commit murder if they come into particular 
situations where weapons will be used162 (see chapter five). 
For example, as Sternebeck mentions above, the group offered her 
more options thatn society, to which she only had severed most links. 
The shift of contacts from society at large to the counter-culture and 
the group also underscores the perception of the group as the person f s 
most viable option at the time when other paths have been narrowed of 
closed. 
Later, as mentioned, the person will be able to incorporate his or 
her earlier identities and experiences into a perspective placing this 
new identity as the culminating point of their life. This provides 
continui ty and explains their behaviour to them and provides a belief 
system that makes their behaviour acceptable to them. 
The conditions and ideas that prevailed in the fifties and sixties 
were quite different from the rules and norms of the eighties which 
determined the available alternatives with which individuals and groups 
could assert their idependence from parents .16 3 The concerns of the 
students of the sixties about peace and war served to widen political 
consciousness in general and to increase awareness about the environment 
as one effect. It also continued in the belief that peace and its 
159 Krebs, 202-8, 210-2. 
160 Sternebeck, Der Spiegel 33/1990, 62. 
161 Knutson (1981), 143; Wilkinson (1986), 94. 
162 Peter-Juergen Boock, Peter Schneider, Ratte-tot ... Ein 
Briefwechsel (Darmstadt: Sammlung Luchterhand, 1985), 111-2. 
163 Sibylle Huebner-Funk, ffGrowing up with Nazism and NATO: A 
Comparative Generational Approach to the Formation of Political 
Consciousness in the Federal Republic of Gennanyff International 
Sociology 1 (4) 1986, 381-396, 392. 
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continuation should not be left to the politicians; but required extra-
parli~TIentary pressure from below; as mentioned in chapter two. 
These later youths had the history and examples of violent 
demonstrations and of terrorist attempts to influence government in West 
Germany. These could either be positive or negative identifications 
depending upon the individual's biographical and psychological 
experience. They also have available the experiences and success of the 
Green party to show that reform rather than revolution is possible, as 
mentioned in chapter three. However; personal dynamics and acti vi ties, 
which in turn are influenced by social and political cultures and 
events; influence opportunities and limit available personal identities. 
Where extended poli tical struggles occur; some individuals will adopt 
these identities for their awn. 164 
3.8 Desertion and Leaving the Group 
One perspective of someone leaving a terrorist group (an Aussteiger) 
is that of an unsuccessful socialisation experience for the individual; 
where the asymmetry between their objective and subjective realities 
becomes too great.165 In chapter five other viewpoints on desertion and 
exit from West German terrorist groups are discussed from that of the 
group and decision-making process. Here the focus is on the individual. 
The discrepancies between the individual's objective and subjective 
worlds can occur because of the conflicting reports of 'significant 
others' as the person is socialised into the group. Possibly the person 
only recently arrived and still had some contact wi th the outside. 
Alternatively, the person's primary socialisation still maintained such 
a hold that subsequent secondary socialisation into the group was never 
successfully completed. 166 
This is less so when the person joined the group wi th high 
expectations of achievement because they came from political or socially 
motivated groups (21 Aussteiger came from prisoner or Red Cell groups); 
or when they joined out of a desire for justice in changes in the state 
(8 Aussteiger), or simply to be more effective in political work they 
had begun in the legal sphere which they saw as limited (12 Aussteiger). 
They confused their subjective expectations with objective reality.167 
164 Knutson (1981); 144. 
165 Berger; Luckmann; 183. 
166 ibid., 187; 191-2. 
167 Karin de Ahna, "Wege zum Aussteig: Foerdende und hemmende 
Bedingungen"; in Wanda von Baeyer-Katte; Dieter Claessens; Hubert Feger; 
Friedhelm Neidhardt (eds.) f Gruppenprozesse: Analysen zurn Terrorismus 
Band 3 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag; 1982); 477-525; 488-9. 
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When the person joined because it was a ~slipf into illegality after 
the dynamics of low-level terrorism led them to the group, then half of 
the Aussteiger felt less bound to the group and decided to leave. This 
affected mostly the Second of June members. Othertimes, where couples 
entered, if one left, the other generally left shortly thereafter. 168 
These problems are increased by potential discrepancies the person 
experiences after they join the group. The personal worth and solidarity 
that was once there can evaporate in the demands of the group f s 
activities and organisation. The person who wanted to give him or 
herself to the higher cause of the ideology of the group, cannot do so 
because of the lack of manoeuverability within the groupfs hierarchy.169 
The 1981 study showed fifty-eight left-wing terrorists deserting the 
various groups because of the means used (11%), the means and the goals 
(8%), the goals (2%) and personal grounds (4%). However, the reasons for 
75% of them leaving are unknown. 170 
A comparison of the Aussteiger with overall membership social 
origins shown in Table 4.1 (page 128) shows that as many of them came 
from executive families as the others. One difference, however, is that 
they held a larger percentage of workers and the self-employed amongst 
them, than the average of the terrorists. 
This perhaps explains the large percentage of experts amongst the 
Aussteiger. As discussed in chapter five, these are experts in the 
planning and organisation of operational equipment required for 
terrorist activities. Of those who left the groups, 49% were experts, 
18% supporters, 17% executors who carried out the actions, and 16% 
leaders. These figures show a possible explanation for experts leaving 
the groups because they are possibly not drawn as far into the group. 
They therefore have no orientation and conviction with regards to the 
overall group goals, which conflict with their own political ideas and 
goals. They are able to leave the group by maintaining their own 
identity through its orientation towards the political ideas and 
concepts of groups outside of the terrorist organisations, of which they 
feel they are members.171 
This is, nonetheless, a difficult process because of doubts about 
the ~ rightness f of the exit, and guilt over betrayal of the group. 1 7 2 
Perhaps the distancing of oneself from numediate contact with others in 
the group and the lengthy spells of isolation in onefs prison cell aids 
168 ibid. , 490. 
169 Wasmund, 236. 
170 Schmidtchen, 56, 77. 
171 ibid. , 56, 74. 
172 Wasmund, 237. 
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this process, for 60% of those who have left the group before 1979 did 
so while in prison. Only 17% did so after leaving prison, and 23% before 
their arrest.173 
Imprisonment and separation from the group does not necessarily 
lessen the fear of group vengeance. In one of the early hunger strikes 
one woman had her name added to the medical 'danger' list of hunger 
strikers, even though she was not on hunger strike. This allowed her to 
appear to be a member, when in fact she was not. She possibly feared 
retribution after her expected release from prison, in the same manner 
of Ulrich Schmucker's murder.174 
However, other prisoners are further radicalised because of the 
group socialisation and propaganda over prison conditions that are 
associated with 'isolation torture', 'destruction', 'brainwashing', and 
'special treatment'. These can increase the person's belief in the 
group's labelling of the 'system' and its objectives. If someone is 
exchanged for a hostage, then their time in prison acquires special 
meaning as a furthering to their actions in the groUp.175 
Most of the terrorists who left the groups were usually the first or 
an only child, and were possibly unfamiliar with, and unable to cope 
with the stresses and strains of the large family life in the 
underground, unlike children from larger families. Furthermore, they 
seemed unsure of themselves, showing a tendency to retreat and avoid 
conflict despite good communication skills.176 
4. Surrmary 
The first section showed that the concept of identification could 
provide a viable model to explain individual motivation by combining 
aspects of the 'psychologically disturbed' and 'rational-idealist' 
models. The belief systems section highlighted how apparently untenable 
ideas could appeal to individuals and groups, as well as how these could 
be supported through the terrorist group environment. The remainder of 
the chapter elaborated on the influence of personal contacts in left-
wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The left-wing West German terrorists were mainly from whole f~TIilies 
of higher social standing, and with incomplete university educations. 
The incompleteness of their education and training, coupled with 
possible conflicts with their parents and authorities led to a search 
173 Schmidtchen, 56; Jaeger, Boellinger, 172-3. 
174 Melvin J. Lasky, "Ulrike Meinhof and the Baader-Meinhof Gang" 
Encounter 6, 1975, 9-23, 10. 
175 Jaeger, Boellinger, 172. 
176 Schmidtchen, 58-60. 
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for a new identity which contrasted with that expressed by the society 
of their parents, and was accQnpanied by a strong belief in the ideology 
of their group that justified and legitimised their actions for them. 
'Ihe current RAP members, from what is known, seem to have less 
university education than previous group formations. However, this is 
compensated by more technical knowledge within the group. 'Ihese members 
seem to come from pre-underground cliques that enter the undergound 
together, hinting that individuals find 'significant others' in the sub-
culture and stay with them out of affection or admiration. 'Ihey also 
find enough other personal benefits in group membership to continue with 
the group as their only option available to continue with their chosen 
beliefs. Although less is known about the RZ and Autonanen, these 
conditions appear also to hold true for their members. 
No particular type of person emerges, because there have been a 
mixture of types of people that have entered the known groups. However, 
as this examination is based on incomplete data this cannot be 
considered a conclusive statement. A fresh study undertaken in the 
manner of the one published in 1981 may reveal a different picture. 
Now that the individual's motivation to opt for terrorism has been 
discussed, it is imperative to follow this through to their group 
membership to uncover which costs and benefits the person is subject to. 
Chapter five follows the individual through the group to examine the 
group dynamic aspects of terrorist motivation. 
CHAPTER FIVE: TERRORIST GROUP DYNAMICS 
I would rather not be alone, he thought as he went over 
the bridge. When it comes down to it lone is often 
alone. But decisive is whether one can know together I 
and that there is someone with whom one can know 
together. The more the better. 1 
first we are collective there, said feder I where the 
individual in the group finds no safe haven to gain 
their [individual] lifel no one sees any more terrain. 
none. simply does not want any. otherwise it does not 
work I because you have experienced this I the adoption 
of your life without the group does not work. 2 
if it goes properly, said marie I the faults of the 
individual are also the faults of everyone, and 
everyone learns from itl in that they seek the 
prOV1Slons of the faults in the collective. our 
collectivity means I to break so often and so long 
between US I that abject scheme of payment and guilt I 
this psychology of power l until we are people l stronger 
that the pack [fascist forces] I collective. 3 
Ohl you know, there must be lots that is in the 
interest of everyone [in the group], which nonetheless 
does not happen. The group is no island I there are 
power struggles and intrigues I strange coalitions, 
outsiders I all forms and positions I that you can 
imagine. With the interests of everyone, that is hard. 
It is really not much different from outside. Often it 
is in the greater interest of everyone that peace 
reigns in the gang. 4 
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This chapter follows the path of the individual member fran entry to 
exit in a terrorist group in an examination of the different processes 
encountered. These processes are dependent upon the type of terrorist 
organisation, and the group belief systems. Both of these are discussed 
before the individual's path through the group. 
1. Theoretical Types of Terrorist Organisations 
The behaviour and actions of the new recruit towards a terrorist 
organisation are determined by the specific hierarchy and structure of 
the group I which in turn are dependent upon the aims and goals of the 
group. The possibility of a group's goals changing means that the group 
can move from one model type to another as its situation and membership 
change over time. 
1 Christof Wackernagel, Nadja. Erzaehltmgen tmd Fragrnen.te (Reinbek: 
Rowohlt, 1988)1 32. 
2 Geissler, 273. There is no capitalisation in this book. 
3 ibid. r 436. 
4 Boock (1988), 95. 
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Three theoretical approaches are available in the literature on 
terrorism: ~instrumental', ~organisational' and ~expressive'. The first 
two approaches originate in the rational-actor and political 
organisation literature, while the third is from psychology. 
The ~ instrumental! and ~ organisational' models assume terrorist 
organisations are similar to other political organisations, except that 
they rely on violence to influence policy. Like political organisations, 
terrorist groups need to solve the same problems of recruitment, 
funding, competition and providing members selective incentives. 5 
Like other political organisations, the terrorist organisation's 
demands, if granted, would result in collective public goods in the form 
of government, business and other policy changes with costs and benefits 
to other segments of society. For example, terrorist groups produce a 
climate of fear amongst the elite, and ensures the employment of 
security consultants. The attainment of collective public goods does not 
rule out group peripheral activity (such as bank robberies) that may not 
lead directly to their goal attainment. Terrorist group activities could 
also be a mixture of legal and illegal methods in an effort to maximise 
utility of their resources. 6 
People join terrorist groups in the belief that membership benefits 
outweigh membership costs. The value of the public good may be more 
important in the ~ instrumental' model because the members perceive their 
own benefits in acting for the resultant collective public goods. 7 
The selective incentives, monetary and social, that are available to 
members may be more decisive in the ~organisational' model. The 
assumption in both cases is that the actor behaves rationally given his 
or her best available knowledge at the time. 8 
Group size limits the type and availabili ty of members I selective 
incentives. Large groups are thought to provide incentives or coercion 
(positive inducements or negative sanctions) separate from the public 
goods to generate members to help supply these. Small groups may be able 
to avoid these methods, because of the larger individual share of the 
public goods potentially supplied by the group. On the other hand, 
because of the greater face-to-face contact within the group, small 
groups can also employ peer pressure and moral persuasion to better 
5 Kent Layne Oots, "Organizational Perspectives on the Formation and 
Disintegration of Terrorist Groups" Terrorism 12 (3) 1989, 139-152, 139. 
? ibid., 140; Oots (1986), 38, 45. 
7 Martha Crenshaw, I'The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a 
Product of Strategic Choice", in: Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of 
Terrorism: Psychologies r Ideologies r Theologies, States of M:ind (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1990 I), 7-24, 8-9. 
8 Oots (1986)r 18, 64-5. 
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advantage than larger groups" These small group benefits and side 
effects lead to their use as decision-making bodies for larger groupS.9 
The ' instrumental' approach views terrorism as a deliberate 
strategic choice based on collective group values, and institutionalised 
decision-making procedures that calculate the consequences of their 
action and inaction, whereby terrorist means are related to the ends and 
resources. Terrorism is a decision taken by political actors to achieve 
changes in the political and social conditions of a country or region, 
as a response to external conditions such as government response and 
public perceptions in an attempt to produce change in the poli tical 
position of the government. The goals of the group may be agreed upon, 
but disunity between factions may exist over the best path to them, 
whereby some may extol short-term goals in publicity and recognition 
available through terrorism over the longer processes of other political 
protest means. Increased costs of terrorism will decrease its 
likelihood, and it will have failed when the group does not reach its 
stated political goals. 10 
The decision to use terrorism would be based, as mentioned, on the 
assumption of perfect knowledge. However, miscalculations and wrong 
decisions could occur due to the group's limi ted amount of outgroup 
contacts, as well as other psychological and physical restraints it may 
have. This could be the outcome of a learning experience: having tried 
all other perceived options, terrorism is the last one available. 
Additional factors could be: lack of majority support; its members may 
be unable to mobilise larger numbers; the perception that time is 
against them; and eagerness and impatience.ll All of these could 
contribute to a group deciding to use terrorism to try to improve its 
ability to influence political change. 
The 'organisational' approach examines internal group dynamics to 
explain the use of terrorism by groups. Terrorism is the result of the 
group's determination to survive by offering members incentives and 
rewards which, while they may not always bring the group's goals closer 
to achievement, do serve to maintain group loyalty and cohesion. Outside 
pressures on the group change the members incentives, group actions are 
therefore erratic and not always related to stated goals and ideological 
values. In this case increased terrorism costs only strengthen group 
9 ibid. { 48-9. 
10 Crenshaw (1990 I), 8; Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: 
Instrumental and Organizational Approaches", in: David C. Rapaport 
(ed.), Inside Terrorist Organizations (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 
1988 II), 13-31, 13-5, 27. 
11 Crenshaw (1990 I), 10-2. 
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cohesion, instead of lessening activity, but rewards may create 
incentives for some members to leave. Disintegration of the group leads 
to the end of terrorism, as achievement of the long-tenn ends could 
threaten their survival.12 
The ' expressive f approach to terrorist groups views terrorism as the 
result of frustration of other means in an attempt to draw attention to 
the act of terrorism. Long-tenn goals are not the prime consideration so 
much as the inherent satisfaction of the terrorist act itself.13 
Unlike the 'organisational f model that wants to maintain group 
survival, the ecstatic element of the terrorist act becomes almost a 
religious experience whose repetition is considered a primary motivation 
in the ' expressive f model. When this ecstatic element dominates I then 
terrorism is not a strategy to right wrongs, but specific violence 
motivated mostly by the experience of the terrorist act.14 
This refines terrorism to its essence as a 'spectacle' which 
mediates human relationships through their representation, instead of 
through their actual experience. Spectacles are politically 
institutionalised events where power actors appear as separate 
depersonalised untouchables. The public audience experiences ecstasy by 
seeing feared and admired secret desires played out by these political 
actors.15 
Expressive terrorism turn 'nonnal' events into 'spectacles' by 
twisting the event into something different. This could be the result of 
the politicised street theatre of the late sixties that occurred in West 
Gennany as an accompaniment to the protest movement. After it ended the 
terrorist groups sought to continue this tradition of festival with the 
world turned upside down. An example of this is the pudding attack 
prepared for US vice-president Hubert H. Humphrey's visit to West Berlin 
by Kamrune I in 1967. This was blown into a bomb attempt by the press 
and resulted in the arrest of commune members .16 
Attempts to apply the above three approaches to the left-wing West 
Gennan terrorist groups yield a mixed result. The 'instrumental' pattern 
is more in line with nationalist and separatist groups such as the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Palestine Liberation 
12 Crenshaw (1988 II), 27; Crenshaw (1990 1)1 13; Post (1990), 38. 
13 Martha Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of 
Political Terrorism", Orbis 29 (3) 1985, 465-489, 470. 
14 Wardlaw, 54. 
15 Aida Hozic, "The Inverted World of Spectacles: Social and 
Political Repsonses to TerrorismH , in : John Orr, Dragan Klaic I (eds.) I 
Terrorism and Modern Drama (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Uni versi ty Press, 
1990), 64-81, 66-7. 
16 ibid., 67, 71-2. 
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Organisation.17 However, an argument could also be made that this is how 
some of the Revolutionary Cells and Autanamen cells operate. They have a 
political objective of hindering and stopping construction of a nuclear 
processing plant, for example (as well as others described in chapter 
three), and then do so outside of the remit of other political 
organisations. The decision, admittedly, is not that of the legal 
groups, but one made by some members of the involved organisations. 
After the goal is achieved the cell ends. For this reason, and the RZ 
idea of being for and of the masses, the idea of an RZ cell striving to 
maintain itself with membership incentives only applies to possibly the 
'Europe' RZ of the seventies. 
On the other hand, the'organisational' model does apply to the Red 
Army Faction. After Baader and Ensslin were released during their court 
appeal they stayed together, and then freed Baader, after he was 
arrested again, to maintain the group. The same applies in the nineties 
when the group writes that it needs to have the armed group support the 
prisoners on hunger strike. 18 This is reminiscent of the '84/85 
Offensive' which sought to raise membership levels. 
The 'organisational' model also applies to the Second of June, which 
merged with the Red Army Faction, and became a cell of the Revolutionary 
Cells in West Berlin to survive. Thus the group I s operational capacity 
continued under different banners. 
Some RZ and Autonamen cells are perhaps also primarily 'expressive'. 
This would be the case when the activity was designed to turn events 
into 'spectacles I as discussed ~r lier , apd when the grou}tt Y@.q. more 
'r" t, • -" •• " '.I~ , 
interested in the activity than .. any political resul~, I they: ; might 
~~ ; ~ F/ :",; ' ... 
achieve. 
supplies, 
Exatnpl~s here .might be stopping military trams with.>.)~l\.TO 
- •. : ',_"-! " .... : ... !,,' 1 '-
and other official vehicles, as well as incit~ent and 
'.~.: ~ :' . " 
) 
proyocation at demonstrg:t;ions,. with molotov cockta.:i.ls. 
I.!. - -'.. . ~ • 
Extrapolation from.the wee models of group·motivation 
'-;.~ . , . 
leads to one 
suggestion that national~separatist groups are more 'rational' for u§ing 
- "I>: .::'.... '.:. ':"'-;'.- . •. ,"' , 
t~rrorism, than thpse ,which use terrorism .in·affluent li:!;>eral-
democracies. The latt:er m;:e .seen as having "more of a psychopatl:1alogical 
grain" .19 This would mean the proper response to the 'instrumental' 
model is the 'corrnnunication I model, while the 'organisational' and 
'expressive' ones should be countered with the 'war' model. As mentioned 
above these responses would b.e non-productive and, in the case of the 
'organisational' model solidify the otherwise potentially self-
17 Crenshaw (1988 II), 15; Within the PLO the 'rejection front' 
would be organisational however. 
18 "'Da ist irgendwo ein Nest'" Der Spiegel 15/1991, 20. 
19 Ariel Merari in Alexander, Katwan (eds.) (1980), 281. 
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destructive group. The countermeasure difficulties (discussed further in 
chapter six) highlight the overlap in each of the three group models, 
which are pure ideal-types rarely found in practice. Their purpose is to 
guide discussion and theory as is done further below. 
2. Group Beliefs 
In chapter four belief systems were shown to support the 
individual's new identification with the group and its members by 
offering solutions, preparing them for extremism and death, 
rational ising away their guilt, and immunising their beliefs from 
outside influences. There the emphasis was on how the beliefs affected 
individuals. Here the focus is on the effect of beliefs on the group. 
Group beliefs are thought to offer some explanation for terrorist 
group activity because these feed, support, justify and help bring new 
recruits to the groUps.20 As chapter four showed, the group beliefs may 
not be what brought the individual initially into contact with the 
group I but assimilation of group beliefs binds the person closer. 
The main belief that holds the group together is the members I common 
dream of goal attainment, which is shown below to be a dream or fantasy. 
The desired solution mobilises history and organisations for the group 
to overcome its current problems- -otherwise it would not be in the 
underground- -to continue until their self-defined goals are reached. 21 
The processes described in chapter four should leave the belief 
system strong enough for the group to move from "the intolerable present 
to the promised future"22 and outline behaviour patterns to cover all 
contingencies they might encounter. Like ideologically motivated elite 
soldiers, terrorist group members will be motivated to protect and 
promote their ideological position, and not to compromise their position 
by a 'cutting of losses I with regards to ideologically defined enemies. 
An extreme and absolute conflict requires extreme responses. 23 
The left-wing West German terrorist groups also gain the benefits of 
small size f as mentioned above I and those of primary groups where 
members I face-to-face contacts create and meet the primary and social 
norms I needs and ideals of the individual group members. When group 
beliefs reinforce these motivational factors they form a 'we' which the 
individuals will not want to disappoint. Together the ideological and 
20 Wilkinson (1988), 95-6. 
21 J. Bower Bell, "Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiency 
of the Underworld" Terrorism and Political Violence 2 (2) 1990, 193-211, 
195, 196. 
22 ibid. 
23 Elliot P. Chodoff 1 "Ideology and Primary Groups" Anned Forces and 
Society 9 (4) 1983, 569-93 1 578, 581. 
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primary group factors are enhanced by symbols, literature, group 
education and associations that portray the members as part of one whole 
of brothers, sisters, and comrades. 24 For terrorist groups the combining 
of these go hand-in-hand as is shown below. 
By definition a group comprises people who see themselves as 
separate from others, who also recognises this difference. 25 Terrorist 
groups have few contacts with others, and the challenge and rejection of 
the group's views appears to reinforce the validity of their beliefs. 
The group then identifies itself as a vanguard elite as it loses 
outgroup contacts with increased rejections, and it is believed that 
intra-group contacts increase to compensate for the loss of inter-group 
contact. 26 
The terrorist group acceptance or rejection of others, and of others 
accepting or rejecting the terrorist group, is the process of social 
comparison where the group judges itself against others. In individuals 
the comparisons occur in reali ty , but group comparisons occur more in 
fantasy.27 The isolation of the group increases this tendency, and it 
becomes more 'surrealistic' to serve as a mechanism to escape reality f 
rather than as a guide to action. 28 
Group beliefs based in fantasy can arise from their subjective 
interpretations of the political and social world through the filters of 
past political, social, economic and cultural (i.e., history, tradition, 
literature, and religion) experiences and memories. These beliefs, 
encouraged by the group to be inflexible and closed to change, as 
discussed in chapter four, aid the group members as cogni ti ve and 
motivational factors. They want something to hold onto through their 
turbulent situation, and they want something to further solidarity and 
cohesion, not something that questions their position. 29 
The belief system and fantasy of the group's position can be 
supported with multiple categorisations for their enemies and the 
causation of events such as individuals, the group, competitors, 
political parties, the public and media. No one cause is enough of an 
explanation,30 because extremists of the left (and the right) are 
24 ibid., 582-3, 586-7. 
25 Rupert Brawn, Group Processes: Dynamics within and Between Groups 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1988), 2-3. 
26 Claessens, de Ahna, 19-181, 113. 
27 Brown, 59, 66. 
28 Crenshaw (1989), 16. 
29 Crenshaw (1988 I), 12-3. 
30 ibid. I 14. 
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interested in sociopolitical affairs and integrate their knowledge into 
their beliefs. 31 
The belief system and fantasy of the group can also be supported by 
a structured place in history with a "rnacronarrative ' that links the 
past with the future through the group. The rnacronarrative explains 
past, present and future events to provide a comprehensive 
interpretation of events and the group categorisation system. 32 
This occurred when the Red Army Faction tried to identify its 
revolutionary past in the student movement,33 and later when it sought 
the working class as its revolutionary subject, as well as when the 
group claimed the tradition of resistance against the Third Reich, 
because they were involved in the anti-imperialist struggle against 
fascism. 34 The early terrorists of the RAP and Second of June did not 
see fascism overcame after the end of the Third Reich, and did not want 
to look on helplessly as their parents had. They wanted to do 
something. 35 
The left viewed the Federal Republic as tied to its worst historical 
aspects. Its development was not derived from the ideal of public 
democratic revolution and anti-fascist resistance, but rather chained to 
the concepts of restoration and preservation of reactionary power 
poli tics. The terrorists saw themselves as the undivided vanguard who 
acted, unlike the rest of the left who only talked. 36 
The Third World identification of the terrorist groups allowed not 
only evidence of the inhumanity of Western democracies, and a substitute 
for the lack of repression for Western revolutionary intellectuals. It 
also lifted the groups above their own individual doubts to a position 
where their struggle was objective and on a global scale. This increased 
its psychological importance for them. 37 
31 James Sidanius, "Cognitive Functioning and Sociopolitical 
Ideology Revisited" Political Psychology 6 (4) 1985, 637-661, 638-9, 
657. 
32 Crenshaw (1988 I), 20-1. 
33 Red Army Faction, "Das Konzept Stadtguerilla" (1983), 349. 
34 Red Anny Faction, "Dem Volke dienen: Stadtguerilla und 
Klassenkampf" (1983), 389-390. 
35 Baumann (1978), 81; Horst Mahler, "Terrorism in West Germany: 
Interview with Horst Mahler" Socialist Review 39 (May/June) 1978, 118-
123, 119. 
36 Reiche, 17; Hans Adamo, "Vorgebliche und tatsaechliche Ursachen 
des Terrorismus lf Blaetter flier deutsche tm.d inten:tationale Politik 12, 
1977, 1436-1448, 1442. 
37 Bernd Guggenberger, "Kulturkritik und Guerilla-Mythos: Die Dritte 
Welt als Identifikationsobjektll Beitraege zur Konfliktforschung 3 (4) 
1975[ 91-108, 103. 
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The power of these fantasies and macronarratives is shown in an oral 
history study of former female Italian terrorists. The ideas and images 
dealing with interpretations of resistance to fascism were seen 
... as overwhelmingly clandestine work and armed 
struggle; heroic stories of revolutionaries in other 
countries and other tiJ.nes; the legend of the hero or 
heroine who leaves home to help the oppressed against 
the oppressors .... 38 
These thoughts sustained them against everything. It does not 
explain why these women turned to terrorism, but does show how they 
persisted in their venture when its impossibility of success became 
increasingly evident. As the reality loomed larger, so did the shared 
mythical imaginary world. As the people could not create the future they 
wanted, they could nonetheless form tla common imaginary world to sustain 
their choice of action. tl39 That this occurs also in West German 
terrorist groups does not seem impossible. 
This assumption is supported by the above examples of how the West 
German groups place themselves into large macronarratives where they are 
the heroes overcoming the evil forces of imperialism in a long struggle 
as part of the psychological process of projection: the group sees 
external causes for their difficulties. The individual is idealised and 
all of the undesirable personal aspects are projected outwards to evil 
insi tutions. To a lesser extent people outside of the group are also 
seen as evil. 4o The members identify positively with people and 
negatively with institutions. 
The good inside and the evil outside increases group cohesiveness 
towards group objectives in its competition with other groups. This also 
applies to the ingroup's positive attitudes towards other ingroup 
members. Outside groups, their members and ingroup scapegoats, are 
viewed negatively.41 
The examination of belief systems in chapter four highlighted 
mechanisms used by the groups to distance themselves from their 
activities against the outgroup and ~traitors I within the group. The 
38 Luisa Parserini, "Mythbiography in Oral History", in: Raphael 
Samuel, Paul Thompson (eds.), The Myths We Live By (London: Routledge, 
1990), 49-60 1 54. 
39 ibid. 1 55. 
40 Schmidtchen, 55; J. M. Post, "Hostilite I, Conformite I, 
Fraterni te f: The Group Dynamics of Terrorist Behaviour" 1 InteID.ational 
Journal of Group Psychotherapy 31 (2) 1986, 211-224, 220; J. M. Post, 
"Group and Organisational Dynamics of Political Terrorism: Implications 
for Counterterrorist Policy" 1 in: Paul Wilkinson, Alasdair M. Stewart 
(eds.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen 
University Press, 1987), 307-317, 310-2. 
41 Brown, 194, 200-1. 
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addition of fantasy to their belief system caused relative deprivation 
because their social comparisons were inaccurate subjective positions 
that resulted in a discrepancy between their perceived expectations and 
their capabilites. 42 
The Red Army Faction think they are fighting against their defined 
deprivation, when in fact they are not deprived. They see their defined 
enemies of imperialism and fascism winning against them in 
maintaining/gaining support of the population thereby reducing them to a 
long struggle. In reality the group never stood a chance in gaining 
popular support, because they have been competing against non-equals on 
non-equal terms (the group fantasy) from the beginning. 
Group behaviour is also dependent upon who the group compares itself 
to in tenns of relative deprivation. 43 The deprivation experienced by 
the group when it compares itself to other terrorist groups, differs 
from that deprivation experienced through comparisons to the state. 
This also has implications for identification processes. Just as 
relative deprivation depends upon who the group compares itself to, 
identification depends upon which loyalty and identification process is 
in operation. 44 A group member could identify with individuals who once 
helped him and to whom he felt loyalty to help free from prison (Boock), 
or the person could feel that while they believed in socialism, the 
terrorists' manner of achieving socialism was incorrect (Klein). Both of 
these are just as valid as someone identifying with a prisoner who died 
and felt they needed to add their contribution to help ensure the other 
imprisoned terrorists were freed before others died (Speitel and 
Klein).45 At the group level, as chapter three showed, the terrorists 
use different identifications to (a) identify with issues that bring new 
recruits and a wider base (the RAF), and (b) support public protest 
issues in the framework of their own broader issues (the RZ and 
Autonanen). The key to identification and relative deprivation, is the 
subject of the group's (person's, society's) focused attention. 
The group can rationalise its cause by such means to better deploy 
its resources to achieve maximum effectiveness. Some clues as to what 
these will be in the formation of identity I both individual and 
collective, are (1) an awareness of what can be gained or lost; (2) the 
expected return from one I s actions i and (3) the formation of a 
42 ibid. f 188. 
43 ibid., 188-9. 
44 ibid., 245. 
45 Boock, Die Zeit 24 June 1988, 11; H.J. Klein (1979), 187, 195, 
198, 201; V. Speitel, Der Spiegel 31/1980, 41. 
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collective identity as the basis for future interpretations of members' 
individual identities. 46 
The time used for analytical thought by the group is thus devoted to 
their subjective reality, their ideology, and the ulitimate goals. The 
implications, such as the violence used by them, are less of a concern. 
In this way the group uses discussions and self-criticism as a form of 
.. faith ritual' to assure persistence of belief f 4 7 which helps maintain 
group survival. 
3. Paths into the West German Terrorist Organisations 
Chapter four showed that no particular type of person became a left-
wing West German terrorist, but that they did experience somewhat 
similar types of socialisation that might lead the person to join a 
terrorist organisation. The next section builds on the results of 
chapter four and the models presented earlier in this chapter to show 
what the person experiences as a member of a terrorist organisation. 
This section is based on the West German groups, but appears to be 
applicable to other groups such as the Brigata Rossa. 48 
People have to want to join a terrorist organisation because of some 
personal incentive or be coerced to join. If the person could benefit 
from what the group offered without joining- -being a free-rider- -they 
would not join. Their behaviour is thus potentially predictable, as is 
discussed below. 49 
Chapter four examined the chronological process of joining terrorist 
groups as a series of over lapping arenas that included key experiences 
and people, a breaking away from traditional social structures I and a 
commitment to a small social circle where eventually the number of 
options for the group is potentially narrowed down to terrorism. This 
process can be broken into segments. 
First, a disassociation phase which begins when the individual 
questions social and emotional ties. Then these ties are loosened before 
the phase ends with a total negation of one's previous existence as a 
form of internal and external liberation. The second phase is membership 
in counter-culture groups which form a substitute for the social and 
emotional ties left behind. The counter-culture includes groups ranging 
from those only wanting an al ternati ve existence, to those wanting to 
actively fight against society, and the person can move from unpolitical 
46 Richard Weiner, "Collective Identi ty 
Movements II, Psychology and Social Theory 3, 1982, 
47 Bell" 197. 
48 See Jamieson, 103-6, 266-8. 
49 Oots (1989), 143, 149-50. 
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to political groups. The person's commitment to ideas can also intensify 
and move from violence rejection to violence accepting positions. He or 
she can move from the vision of a new society, to a smaller group that 
is totally committed to the new society, to a violent vanguard that 
strives for the new society. Moving from one to the next group is 
progression from larger to ever smaller groups. 5 0 However, as chapter 
four showed, the move in any stage can be as much because of a personal 
identification as commitment to ideas. 
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Westberliner 'Scene' und die 'Bewegung 2. Juni III in: Wanda von 
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Neidhardt ( eds. ) , Gruppenprozesse: Analysen zum Terrorismus 3 
(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982), 19-181, 58. 
50 Wasmund, 226-7, 229; Rubenstein, 91. 
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Once the person is in a violence promoting group there is another 
round of phases before one enters the 'hard-core' of the underground. 
Figure 5.1 shows two paths through groups to the 'hard-core', one 
theoretical and the other practical. Both must be completed. 
The theoretical groups are: (1) 'pure' theorists, who work in the 
abstract; (2) 'engaged' theoreticians, who work towards specific protest 
issues; (3) people who understand the protesters' position; (4) 'weapons 
pennissive f persons, (5) people who wish them well but do nothing to 
support them; (6) passive supporters of the active supporters; (7) 
active supporters of the hard-core; and (8) the 'hard-core'. 
The practical groups are: (1) the 'total reservoir' of school, 
higher education, work, family and social circles who can be moved into 
the first stage, ( 2) social 'acquaintances', and through that, ( 3) the 
closed circle of other pubs, apartments and then, (4) new acquaintances 
made in the closed circle, to ( 5) the 'entrance room' of the terrorist 
scene where one meets people who can pass individuals on to ( 6 ) the 
supportive sub-terrorist group, before finally obtaining (7) membership 
in the 'terrorist group' which will mean something different for each 
organisation. 51 
There are no fixed boundaries in these groups with secret doors from 
one group to the next. Nor is the above a diagram of a specific group 
organisation. Rather it is an heuristic device applicable to all 
terrorist organisations. 
How fast someone moves from the outer to the inner circles depends 
upon the person's own perception of the situation and how the group 
perceives the person's role and function in the group: Will the person 
be more useful as a legal or as an· illegal member of the groUp?52 
Exactly where one ends up within these categories depends upon what 
the group needs, and what one can offer. One needs to be able to offer 
the terrorist group something, be it special skills like explosives, or 
criminal experience. 5 3 The four roles are: (1) operations personnel, 
where either individuals or groups perfonn operations; (2) experts in 
ideology and propaganda, organisation and processing of materials for 
mobility and cover in the underground, or for the planning and 
organisation of operations equipment ( explosives, weapons, logistics, 
etc. ); ( 3 ) leadership roles, amassing the groups and organising their 
51 Claessens, de Ahna, 57. 
52 H.J. Klein (1979), 49, says it was the RZ's decision that he be 
in the 'Europe' and not the national RZ group. 
53 Konrad Kellen, "Terrorists- -What are They Like? How some 
Terrorists Describe Their World and Actions" in: Terrorism and Beyond: 
An International Conference on Terrorism and: Low-Level Conflict (Santa 
Monica, CA: Rand Corp., R-2714-DOE/DOJ/DOS/RC, 1982)[ 125-173, 151. 
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links with the legals (lawyers, supporters and prisoners), planning and 
leading operations; (4) legal supporters who supply items and materials 
for the underground. 5 4 
Almost everybody falls into category one as operations personnel [ 
because in the Gennan groups everybody takes part in operations. This 
included Baader, Ensslin, Meinhof and others in the first generation, as 
it does the Meyers in the current one. 55 
The experts could be divided into those like Meinhof and Mahler who 
wrote the Red Army Faction's early position papers, and others like 
Boock who was a technical expert. According to Boock there were few 
technicians in the RAP so they tended to be active in many roles in the 
group. 5 6 In the current group Horst Meyer is possibly the technical 
expert, as he was trained as an electrician. 
Red Army Faction leadership roles have been filled by Baader and 
Ensslin, Haag and Mayer, Mohnhaupt, Klar and Schulz, and Barbara and 
Horst Meyer over the years. 57 The legal supporters have included some of 
the lawyers, and others like Volker and Angelika Speitel, who also later 
moved into the underground. The names of those who fill these last roles 
today are unknown. 
In the Revolutionary Cells the functions of group members differed 
between the national and international division in the seventies. Klein, 
for example, as a member of the international division, participated in 
the OPEC raid because of his mili tary training, which was then at a 
premium in the RZ, and because his participation guaranteed a 
renumeration for the RZ from the PFLP.58 
The national group in the seventies may have been similar to the RZ 
in the eighties, where it seems the group of people involved in each 
cell was smaller and led to the sharing of expert infonnation- -and 
maybe experts- -but this is speculation. This was the likely result of 
each cell not being necessarily self-sufficient in all skills. A case in 
point was the us~ of a particular type of clock in RZ bombings. 5 9 Other 
similar typ~s were not substituted, only the one particular model was 
used. This leads to the hypotheses that either a recipe for bombs went 
around the cells which was strictly adhered to- -the cooks not knowing 
how to subsi tute i terns- -or the bombs were all made by the same cell. 
54 Schrnidtchen, 49. 
55 Kahl, 46-7, 163. 
56 See Fetscher 1 Rohnnosser ( eds. ) (1981) ; Boock, Der Spiegel 
9/1981, 117. 
57 Kahl, 46-7, 112-3, 163. 
58 H.J. Klein (1979)1 53, 73. 
59 Gerd Elendt, Lisa Trunk, "'Die Luft ist raus!1I Stem 42 (19) 3-10 
May 1989, 236, 240, 236. 
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Replacement of members arrested or killed in the Red Army Faction is 
not a problem. In 1984 the authorities arrested seven of the twenty to 
twenty-five hard-core RAP members, and still the '84/85 Offensive' went 
ahead. This appears nonnal as the group remains active and maintains 
fifteen to twenty members in the hard-core, despite the arrest of 
seventy-eight hard-core members since the group's founding. 6o 
The media, and some security officials, see the new RAP recruits 
coming from squatters, anti -nuclear groups, and others associated with 
the .Autonanen. They believe that these groups, with their violent 
fringes, act as a 'pressure cooker' as the person moves from these 
groups to the RAP, which can offer more militancy in the long run than 
the other groups. 61 
This viewpoint overlooks that the AUtonanen are against hierarchy 
and group indoctrination, which are found in the RAP, and that any 
Autonanen members who joined the RAP were already members of RAP legal 
support groups62 (see chapter two). 
The usual route to RAP hard-core membership begins with visits to 
RAP members' trials, membership in one of the commi ttees seeking 
improvement of prison conditions, personal contact through prison visits 
or other persons such as lawyers, and participation at public 
demonstrations, seminars and other events. On top of this is added a key 
experience such as participation in occupying offices, or some other 
demonstration. 63 
A key experience is sometimes not necessarily one particular event, 
but long-tenn exposure to events, such as Christof Wackernagel's 
attendence at the Stammheim trials of Baader and others while working 
for the lawyer Klaus Croissant. During this job Wackernagel' s belief 
system shifted to a position that the government system could only be 
changed through violence, and he joined the RAF in 1977 .64 
All of the suspected Red Army Faction members in the 1986 campaign 
were all active for at least three years in the legal arms of the RAP 
before becoming hard-core members, and had joined the underground in 
60 Gerhard Boeden, "Die RAF und ihr Nachwuchs", Terrorismus: 
Infonnationsdienst 7 T 1987, 1-4, 1. The ten people arrested in the 
Gennan Democratic Republic in 1990 were all hard-core members, and had 
all 'retired' from active membership. 
61 ibid., 2, Boeden uses the word Durchlaufhitzer; Friedrich 
Zintnermann in Die Welt 25 October 1986. 
62 Horchem (1987 I), 13-4. 
63 Boeden Terrorismus: Infonnationsdienst 7/1987, 2. 
64 Frank Nicolaus, "Theater urn einen Freigaenger" stern 39 (35) 21-7 
August 1986, 152. 
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1984 or 1985.65 Then only the names of nine suspects were known. At the 
time of writing (autumn 1991) I as mentioned in chapter four I there are 
still only eleven suspects. 
The example of RAP supporters from the Federal Republic I 
Switzerland I Holland I and Denmark I who occupied European Corrmunity 
offices in Brussels during the 1989 RAP hunger strike shows how the 
group can offer a chance for IInon-militant" persons to participate in 
action instead of discussion. The participants were also offered closer 
identification with RAP and Action Direct hunger strikers by their own 
imprisonment and hunger strike in Brussels after their arrest. 66 
This was not a new method of radicalising members. Susanne Albrecht 
was arrested along with twenty-four others for occupying the Hamburg 
offices of Amnesty International to protest about Red Army Faction 
prisoners I conditions in October 1974. Along with her were also five 
other later hard-core members: Karl-Heinz Dellwo I Lutz Taufer I Guenter 
Sonnenberg I Christian Klar and Knut Folkerts. 67 
In the eighties special cases occurred in the RAP whereby some 
people do not seem to have remained long in the legal RAP groups before 
they entered the underground. These cases were where the individual knew 
the terrorists and others in the scene for many years, and that they did 
not need to prove their corrmitment in protest demonstrations like the 
ones described above, and thereby avoided the unnecessary risks of being 
noticed by the authorities. 68 An example of this is Sabine Callsen l who 
became an RAP supporter in 1981 1 lived with Barbara Ernst (arrested in 
July 1984) in 1983 and entered the underground in September 1984. Ernst 
had attracted police notice since she was arrested in January 1978 after 
pouring acid in a subway ticket machine which subsequently exploded and 
killed her companion, and in 1983 when she belonged to a group seeking 
to stop US munitions trains between Bremershaven and southern Germany. 
The assumption is that Callsen r who helped in the local Hamburg 
elections in 1982, and the national ones in 1983 I was radicalised by 
Ernst as they lived together. 69 
Presumably, after initial contact is established the new recruit is 
politicised by the RAF members through propagandistic use of the prison 
65 Horchem (1988), 156-9; "Im Fadenkreuz der RAF" SteIll 39 (30) 
1986 1 14-5. 
66 Zusammen Kaernpfen l Dokumentation zur Besetzung der ID-Kcmnission 
waehrend des HUngerstreiks. Bruessel 11.5.89 (No place/publisher/date of 
publication) I 5-6. 
67 Salewski, LanZI 134. 
68 Boeden I Terrorismus: Informationsdienst 7/1987 I 2-4. 
69 Horchem (1988), 156-7; Hans Schueler I "Ein Schuss durch die 
Decke" Die Zeit 13 July 1984 1 5. 
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conditions, the court trials and other means to recruit the new person 
after asserting that the person is not an undercover agent, but 'clean' 
and acceptable to the grOup.70 This might explain how people unknown to 
the authorities in cormection wi th the RAF or other terrorist groups 
reach the underground. The other possibili ty is the continued use of 
'middlemen' who could pass a cleared person on to the RAF, as Angelika 
Speitel was in the seventies. 71 
Personal contacts are used by the Revolutionary Cells to obtain new 
members. Here the difference is that the person rarely gives up their 
'normal' existence as a student, labourer, or whatever their profession 
may be. These people will also be able to participate in legal political 
activity and enjoy a social life. 72 
Personal contacts between the underground and legal individuals also 
enable such occasional supporters to offer their aid to the underground 
in single operations. This can be in the form of safe-houses and other 
logistical problems common in the seventies, with their legal existence 
and a few days of illegal activivity hindering the authorities' 
knowledge of who belongs to terrorist groups. 7 3 
Similarly, as the Revolutionary Cells are not always a collective in 
the same way as the RAF underground is, they also have a less dynamic 
structure than that outlined here. They may all know each other in the 
cell, some may even be from the same commune or collective apartment f 
but unlike the RAF, after the action- -be it a bombing or otherwise- -
they are once again alone until the cell meets again. They have fewer 
outlets to discuss their feelings about acti vi ties f and have to cope 
with this alone. 74 
Angelika Speitel also noted this feeling of isolation as a member of 
the Red Army Faction as she maintained safe-houses for the group, and 
was thus not always in contact with others. She wanted to participate 
more, but had inhibitions about it. Eventually, however, as she could 
not talk to just anybody in the street, she spoke with a cook. When the 
group found out "all hell broke loose".75 
70 Boeden, Terrorisnrus: In£onnationsdienst 7/1987, 2-3; Wasmund, 
232. 
71 A. Speitel, "Ein ungeliebtes Leben" stem 39 (30) 1986, 138. 
72 Wasmund, 232; H.J. Klein (1979), 172; "Der erste Besuch ist 
entscheidend" Der Spiegel 34 (21 August) 1978, 44. 
73 Aust (1987), 113; Barth, "'Mal ein paar Tage abtauchen'" Stem 40 
(45) 1987, 250. 
74 Geissler, 277. 
75 A. Speitel, Stem 39/1986, 138. 
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3.1. Group Benefits and Entering Processes 
Group membership brings psychological consequences wi th it as a 
result of different behaviour patterns than when one is an isolated 
individual. This follows from the different identi ty concepts that 
individuals have of themselves: personal identi ty and social identi ty 
that is acquired in a group. The social identity stems from personal 
acquaintances and acceptence of group attributes and norms as part of 
group membership.76 
Group membership is reciprocal. 7 7 The person loses their contacts 
with family and friends r which may have already been left behind along 
the way towards acquisition of a new belief systemr as discussed in 
chapter four. This is a cost of group membership. The group needs 
security and the person's abilities in exchange for the solidarity and 
other benefits it offers the individual. 
Prior to group membership the person forms an impression of the 
group based on the image of the group presented by the media. This is 
when the first positive or negative identifications with the group form. 
If the media image is desirable l then individuals could see their social 
status being raised by group membership.78 
The Second of June forerunner r Kammune Ir was always interested in 
press reaction to their activities r and played to it by planning their 
actions based on what the press reactions would be to them. This idea 
still held weight with Baumann after he left the B2J in 1972. He felt 
that as the groups were built up by the mediar they always feared a lack 
of attention from them79 (see chapter seven). 
The individual's internalisation of the group's identity brings any 
status or prestige associated with group membership to the new member. 
Thus Klein could speak of having good feelings about the new group he 
was a member of when he joined up with people in the left after a broken 
home and problems in his first job.8o 
This also means internalisation of the group macronarrati ve of its 
history r roles and reputation in society. Internalisation of the group 
macronarrative is influenced by group structure. In the Red Army Faction 
it begins as the individual enters the group's legal arm and identifies 
wi th group aims and acti vi ty . If the person moves into the ' illegal 
militants' he or she needs to also internalise the new factor of 
criminality and potential illegal existence r which is assured if they 
76 Brown r 5 r 6. 
77 ibid. r 20. 
78 Crenshaw (1985)r 478. 
79 Baumann (1978)r 83; Baumann (1979)r 28. 
80 Brown r 20; H.J. Klein (1979), 113. 
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move into the hard-core membership. Through these stages the 
macronarrative intensifies and solidifies around and within the 
individual. 
Membership in the Revolutionary Cells and Autonanen is different. 
They too have their macronarratives that are begun with entrance into 
the pre-terrorist circles in the alternative scene. In the seventies 
membership in the RZ may have involved contact with others already in 
the group! who could pass on their experience and aid in the 
internalisation of the macronarrative. 
The eighties! however! experienced spontaneously formed RZ and 
Autoncmen cells! which did not have the benefits of prior history and 
membership. For these the comments of the post-1984 version of the 
magazine radikal, which left Germany to establish itself beyond the 
reach of the German security services! must apply. radikal said the 
experience of organising the publication in illegality was not only a 
break with others! but also a development in which one learns and 
reflects on the meaning and consequences of each step. The RZ and 
Autoncmen cells are similar in that, while they can attach themselves to 
the marcronarrative of 'resistance against the state', they also form 
their own cells' separate macronarrative together with other members.81 
The social status associated with the group may also reside in the 
eyes of people other than the new recruit. Volker Speitel, who entered 
the Red Army Faction via the Committees organised around Klaus 
Croissant's Stuttgart office, said that the group recruited people on 
the principle that 'only in illegality and the armed struggle is life 
possible 1, and that whoever entered the underground was correct. The 
move from legal to illegal activities was a status rise in the eyes of 
those left behind as well as in the eyes of those seeking to help the 
cause beyond the level of handbills and Red Aid I to that of weapons. 8 2 
The move from legal to illegal means of struggle against society 
constitutes another reason for group membership. This could be seen 
especially after such events as the death of Ohnesorg, the attempt on 
Dutschke, or the death of Holger Meins. With Ohnesorg and Dutschke, 
according to Baumann I it was as if the police were going to get you, no 
matter what you dOl so now you need to fight back.83 For Speitel and 
Klein, as mentioned, the death of Meins signalled that all of the Red 
81 ID-Archi v im IISG ( eds.) radikal 1984-1989. Ein Interview 
(Amsterdam: ID-Archiv im IISG, 1989) I 30 j and see Weiner I 14-5 I about 
collective experiences. 
82 V. Speitel, Der Spiegel 31/1980 1 37-9. 
83 Crenshaw (1985), 474-5; Baumann (1979), 41. 
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Aid committee work had been in vain, because a prisoner had died despite 
their work to help the prisoners. All that remained was illegality. 
Others could be enticed by the monetary incentives of group 
membership that provided an income. In left-wing West German terrorism 
this was not an incentive for the founding members, but did become an 
issue for some in the 'Blues' to remain in the bank robbery scene 
instead of joining the Second of June. 84 
Money could also be used to bring people into the group, who would 
later have other incentives and sanctions to remain in the group. The 
RAP used this method in its early days to obtain the help of 'experts': 
a mechanic to change locks and fittings, and the body and engine numbers 
of stolen vehicles; and a metal worker to build and modify items for the 
group. The mechanic later voluntarily became a full member, but the 
metal worker needed to be coerced to remain in the groUp.8S 
This is an example of how the group could coerce cooperation through 
fear of the group and of the authori ties. The group could also, as 
discussed later, use the threat of expulsion to maintain order in the 
group. Fear thus recruited members and kept them in order. 8 6 
With this in mind, 'chance' can playa role in recruitment if the 
person is like the auto mechanic or metal worker above f who is on the 
sidelines and is presented with an opportuntity which is taken without 
thinking through the possible consequences. Those consequences are shown 
again in the next example. 
The work in Croissant's office in the seventies was divided between 
those involved with legal propaganda work and those with the illegal 
work maintaining contact between the illegals! the commi ttee members, 
lawyers' offices, and the prisoners. After someone was attracted to the 
group, then there was always the possibility to pull the person into the 
underground through fear of the authorities! or through contact with the 
illegals. At special times! such as just after Croissant left for France 
to seek asylum before arrest by the authorities, the group in the 
offices became infected with eagerness for the underground. They were 
ripe for picking by the illegals, who could play on their fears of 
arrest and excitement for the underground with the argument that it was 
better to go into the underground than to be arrested. This was the 
argument used by Baptist Ralf Friedrich! who went into the underground 
84 Crenshaw (1985), 478-9; Kellen (1982), 153; Baumann (1979), 104, 
does not name these people. 
85 Aust (1987), 106-8, 112, 188-9. 
86 Wasmund, 243; Wilkinson (1986), 95, 100-2. 
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after Schleyer's death because he had seen Mueller, Newerla and Speitel 
arrested and wanted to avoid that fate. 87 
The reason for entering the underground presumably influences 
individual initiation processes, which also serve different functions: 
(1) the symbolic function of marking the passage and change in identity· 
for the group and individual; (2) its role as an apprenticeship to the 
newcomer as an introduction to the new skills required as an effective 
group member; ( 3 ) as a means of gaining the newcomer's loyal ty , 
something that is normally associated with favourable treatment. 
However, terrorist groups perhaps demand dangerous and illegal 
experiences. ss 
There are several possible forms of initiation in terrorist groups. 
The simplest is an explanation to the newcomer of how they fit into the 
group: what is expected of them, and what they can expect from the 
group. This includes information about the securi ty arrangements they 
now have to adhere to for their own, as well as the group's, safety and 
freedom. The newcomer must understand this reciprocal aspect. 89 
A possible example of initiation is the 26 March 1984 Red Army 
Faction bank robbery in Wurzburg. The authorities believe the group had 
around one million DM then, which leads them to believe the robbery was 
a test of their abilities after a rest period, and to provide newcomers 
with a chance to prove themselves in advance of a later offensive. The 
money was useful, but not the sole reason for the robbery.9o 
Although susanne Albrecht was affiliated with the RAF by June 1977, 
she had only done courier services and worked with the committees. It is 
thought that her assistance with the groups' entrance to the Ponto 
household, because of his status as a godfather to one of the Albrecht 
children, was a trial for her entrance to the hard-core groUp.91 
In the extreme initiation could be the murder of a 'traitor' by a 
group seeking membership with another group I as is believed to have 
occurred with the group around Ilse Schwipper (nee' Bongartz), who 
wanted to enter the Second of June Movement. In return for membership 
the Schwipper group is believed to have offered to murder Ulrich 
Schmuecker to show their value to the Second of June. Schumuecker was 
believed to be working for the Federal Office for the Protection of the 
87 V. Speitel, Der Spiegel 31/1980, 39; V. Speitel, Der Spiegel 
33/1980, 31-3; Friedrich, "'Ich bitte urn Vergebung"' Der Spiegel 
34/1990, 53. 
88 Brown, 23-4; Wasmund, 233. 
89 "Der erste Besuch ist entscheidend" Der Spiegel 34/1978, 44. 
90 David Th. Schiller, "Current Terrorist Activities in Germany" 
TVIoJournal 5 (3) 1985, 14-7, 14-5. 
91 "Orna im Altkader" Der Spiegel 24/1990,88. 
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Constitution at the time. The Second of June was able to have sanething 
done which it thought too hot to handle itself, while the newcaners had 
a chance to prove themselves. 92 
One way of viewing ini tiation is as a means of bonding the group 
together. This is based on the belief that a group is only constituted 
when everyone perceives their fates to be linked together in order to 
achieve a common group goal. 93 In this sense, now that the new recruit 
has committed an illegal act and is in the underground, he or she relies 
upon the group for protection and assistance to survive. The other 
members are in similar positions- -their fates are linked to the group 
and to each other. Hence the use of fear wi thin the group to maintain 
order and control. A new recruit's irrevocable action ensured their 
loyalty to the group, because they could no longer return to the old 
system, and binds the group together. 9 4 The murder of Schmuecker also 
made others fear reprisals if anyone else left the group to betray them. 
Cognitive dissonance suggests how seemingly disproportionate 
membership costs can by carried by the new member. In the process of 
joining a group 
... people's awareness that they have undergone the 
unpleasant experience to gain entry to the group is 
inconsistent with their subsequent discovery that there 
are things about the group which are not as they had 
anticipated ... [T]his perception of inconsistency (or 
dissonance) is psychologically uncomfortable 
and ... people will look for ways to reduce it. Since the 
initiation may be too vivid or painful to repress 
easily lone avenue to reduce dissonance is to enhance 
one's evaluation of the group .... 95 
Thereby the initiation process raises the individual's estimation of 
the status of group membership by increasing the newcaner's 
internalisation of the group identity. 
The initiation is theoretically also important for the group because 
it moves the group fran a newly unstructured 'fused' group to one that 
is 'structured f. The members' pledge ( implicit or explicit) bonds the 
group together in mediated reciprocity I whereby this fOTIns a terror that 
allows the group to act upon itself as a defence against the fear of the 
enemy. This 'pledged group I seeks only to survive and may- -depending 
upon its situation- -develop into an 'organised group' with concrete 
objectives. Where no initiation, or 'pledge' exists; there is no common 
92 Claessens, de Ahna, 160. 
93 Brown I 28, 30. 
94 Frantz Fanon l The Wretched of the Earth (Hannondworth: Penguin 
Books Ltd., 1967)1 67 1 73. 
95 Brown, 25. 
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long term objectives for the group. In this concept the 'pledge' allows 
violence, internal terrorism wi thin the group, to keep the group 
together in the manner that killed Schmuecker. 96 
3.2. Group Hierarchy 
Newcomers find the group's activities balanced between task related 
( instrumental) and socio-emotional ( expressive) behaviour. In the course 
of achieving instrumental goals the means to the end may divide the 
group into factions, and the expressive behaviour will release some of 
the tensions between factions. 97 Sometimes in terrorist groups where 
weapons are available this can lead to persons drawing weapons on one 
another before the situation is defused. This is the result of waiting 
for the activity, which gives the group its meaning, and always being 
with the same people in the same places. In this situation tensions can 
build up between people. The result can be two members from different 
groups drawing guns on each other as happened when Baader argued with 
George von Rauch that the Second of June should be subordinated to the 
Red Army Faction. Baumann defused the situation when he dropped a wine 
bottle. 98 
The group hierarchy and leadership structure determines the person's 
roles in the group. As the group situation changes, through changed 
internal and external forces I some of the norms also change. The 
hierarchical structures are part of the group's achievement of 
instrumental tasks as a means towards the ends. The hierarchy delineates 
tasks and avoids the overload of anyone person, and provides order in 
the group, allowing expectations of one's behaviour, and as part of the 
formation of personal and group identities. 99 
As the situation (or the group's perception of the situation) 
changes, the hierarchy changes. The arrest of the RAF founder members 
meant the erection of the first 'info' network. Its collapse shifted the 
weight to the couriers and lawyers, while the leaders' suicide in 1977 
moved authori ty back to the underground. Later problems in the 
underground meant a recognition of the usefulness of the illegal/legal 
members in the establishment of the ' illegal Militants' described in 
chapter two. 
96 Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason (London: NLB, 
1976), 419, 430, 467. 
97 Brown, 33-4. These are not to be confused with 'instrumental' and 
'epressive' group models. 
98 Baumann (1978), 86. 
99 Brown, 47-8, 55. 
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As mentioned earlier, a person's status within a group is determined 
by their contribution towards the achievement of the group's goals. 
Apart from their particular speciality, this is also based on the level 
of terrorist means (illegal activity) and goals (political change) they 
represent. 100 In a group that falls under the organisational approach, 
the value of emotional behaviour may also be influential as this helps 
maintain group survival. 
The leader representing terrorist means and goals is the initiator 
of ideas and actions r and carries the consensual prestige granted by the 
group. This person, who may have introduced these elements to the 
organisation, is granted this status by the group who come to expect a 
certain kind of behaviour that allows predictability and expectations of 
competence within the group. If these aspirations are disappointed, then 
it is likely that a different leader will be chosen. Therefore, it is 
also possible that the leadership could remain with one person for 
instrumental acti vi ties, and transfer to another person for emotional 
ones, or for different instrumental activities.101 
Allegedly, Baader and Ensslin complemented one another in a 
symbiotic relationship similar to the instrumental and emotional 
leadership described here. Where Baader was action-oriented, abrupt and 
loud, Ensslin translated what he expressed on an intellectual level. She 
was the head and he was the heart. 1 0 2 
The addition of new members and different environments tends to 
change the leadership. 1 0 3 New recruits are generally less ideologically 
inclined,104 as highlighted already with Klein and Speitel, who joined 
less because of group ideology, but more for the purpose of improving 
the prisoners' conditions. 
In a terrorist organisation the size of the Red Army Faction, with 
fifteen to twenty members in the underground [ the implications of the 
above are a group of people with leadership roles [ whereas the 
Revolutionary Cells, with small cells [ will have a leadership of only 
one or two persons. The Second of June would have had more than the RZ 
but fewer than the RAP. Over time, as membership changed due to the 
arrest and death of members r a larger leadership would imply more 
stability of group concepts and strategy compared to a small leadership 
100 Groebel, Feger, 409. 
101 Brown, 54. 
102 Aust (1987)[ 92-3; Krebs [ 201. 
103 Brown, 56-7. 
104 Crenshaw (1988 I), 19. 
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which could be unstable if only one or two persons were central to the 
group structure of contacts. 10S 
A possible danger with a strong, stable leadership is over 
dependence of the cadre upon the leadership for guidance. This is the 
picture painted by Spei tel of the RAP after the initial founders were 
arrested in June 1972, and the first follow on group, the '4.2.' was 
arrested on 4 February 1974 without having undertaken any activities. 
The group was nervous about making mistakes and were arrested while they 
waited to begin activities. Other RAP followers all held this as an 
example of failure not to be repeated and organised themselves more 
effectively.lo6 After the deaths of the original leadership in 1977 this 
leadership dependence weakened. 
In the seventies the leadership of the Red Army Faction, with its 
information system, maintained its role as organisers and provided a 
continuity of concepts and strategy that could become entrenched due to 
the identification possibilities they offered to others in the group, 
and via the media, to potential new recruits. After the deaths of the 
original leadership its dominance of concepts and strategy continued in 
the vast amounts of literature left behind, and the general dearth of 
materials from their successors, which include only collected statements 
and pamphlets from them and their supporters.l 07 
Another important factor in the stability and leadership of a 
terrorist organisation is the amount of protection afforded the leaders: 
can they be contacted by the cadre, or can they only be reached through 
intermediaries? This raises the problem of how the group reconciles its 
securi ty with that of its control. It needs to be able to establish 
means of intra-personal contact in order to act, while also keeping the 
group secure from outside forces. The broader the organisation and the 
knowledge of identities among them, the more efficient are the 
communications and control. However, this is also more insecure.108 
Security concerns are intensified by elitist vanguard groups like 
the Red Army Faction which lend them increased feelings of privilege. 
Nor are the RAF as cooperative with other groups because of their fear 
of betrayal and pursuit by the authorities. Added to the privileged 
status is the status of martyrdom for dead members. The result can be 
behaviour and attitudes that change from one day to the next, with 
105 Groebel, Feger, 410. 
106 ibid., 411; V. Speitel, Der Spiegel 31/1980, 44. 
107 Groebel, Feger, 412; see Marat (ed.). 
108 J.K. Zawodny, "Internal Organizational Problems and the Source 
of Tension in Terrorist Movements as catalysts of Violence" Terrorism 1 
(3/4) 1978, 277-285, 278-280. 
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feelings of resignation and irrational aggression against fellow 
members, as well as mistakes. 109 
Insecurity can lead to group activity if the security of the group 
is breached. If, due to a possible informer or 'traitor', they fear the 
arrest of the whole group, they could pre-empti vely act in one last blow 
since they have nothing to lose. If they decide the danger is not the 
arrest of the whole group, they could murder the informer. The important 
point is that the group may feel it is necessary to act now instead of 
later when they feel better prepared. 110 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Table 5.1: Clique Indices of the RAF, 1970-1977 
Year , Total: Total , Expect-: Maxi- , Mini- , Percent: Large I I t I 
, N I number: ed avg.: mum , mum , of per-: clique , , , , 
, I of I clique I clique: clique: sons . I percent I , , , ill, 
, lcliques: size* , size I size I small I of the I , I I I 
, I , I , , cliques: total N I , I , I , 
---------------------------------------------------------------
1970 I 21 , 5 , 4.2 I 11 , 2 I 19% , 52% I , I I I I I 
1971 I 42 I 10 I 4.2 I 11 I 2 I 47 I 26 , , I I I , I 
1972 , 47 , 8 I 5.8 I 11 , 2 , 23 I 17 , I I , I I I 
1973 I 48 I 9 I 5.3 I 11 I 2 I 16 I 18 I , , I I I I I 1974 , 50 , 6 I 8.3 t 16 , 2 I 16 I 12 I , , , I , , 
1975 I 61 , 9 I 6.7 I 13 I 2 , 16 , 14 r , , , , , I 
1976 I 60 , 13 , 4.6 I 17 I 2 , 60 , 21 I I I , I I I 
1977 I 80 I 19 I 4.2 I 15 , 2 , 68 I 23 , I I , , , , 
Year , Distribution of the Cliques by Size I 
I 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 I 10: 11: 12: 13: 14: 15: 16: 17 , , , , , , I , , 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1970 , 2 , 2 , , , , , I I I 1 r I , , , , r , I J I I , I , I I I , I , I 
1971 I 3 , 2 I 2 I 1 1 1 I , I I I 1 I I , I , , I I , , r , , , , , I , , , , , 
1972 , 1 , 3 , I , I 1 I 1 I I 1 , 1 , I , I I , , , , I I I , , , I , I , I , , 
1973 , 2 I , 1 I 2 I 1 I I 1 I I I 1 I , , , I I I I I I I I I I , , , I I , , , 
1974 I 2 , , 1 , , , , I I 1 , I , , J , 2 I , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 
1975 , 3 , , 2 I , , I , , 1 , 1 , , 1 I , , , , I , I , , I , , , I I I I I I 
1976 I 6 I 1 I 1 , 1 , 2 , 1 I I I I j I , I I I 1 , , , , , , , , , , , , , , I , 
1977 I 5 , 6 , 3 I 3 I , , , , 1 , , , , , I , , I , I I , I I , , , , I , , I 
* The number obtained when total n is divided by the total number of 
cliques. 
Source: Jo Groebel f Hubert Feger, "Analyse von Strukturen 
terroristischer Gruppierungen" i in: Wanda von Baeyer-Katte( Dieter 
Claessens i Hubert Feger, Friedhelm Neidhardt (eds.), Gruppenprozesse: 
Analysen zum Terrorismus 3 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982), 393-
432, 424. 
In the early RAF (pre-1977) and the B2J the founding members who 
provided the concepts and strategies, were accessible to all the 
members, although they also used intermediaries on occasion to reach 
109 Vesper, 689. 
110 Zawodny, 280. 
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other people. The founders offered the possibility of motivating 
identification with others r who could join the armed struggle and fight 
'side by side ( with the leaders .111 Later membership motivation was 
identification with the same leaders to improve their prison conditions, 
or to help free them. 
Earlier the initiation of the Wolfsburg group with the murder of 
Schmuecker into the Second of June was mentioned. This highlights 
evidence of sub-groups or cliques wi thin the overall group. The new 
clique will remain linked closer together than with the other members, 
and in an analysis of the terrorist groups these cliques can be measured 
for size and proportion of the group that it covers over time. 11Z 
Table 5.2: Clique Indices of the B2J, 1970-1976 
I Year : Total 
I Total I Expect-~ Maxi- I Mini- I Percent: Large 
I 
I I I I 
iN I number I ed avg.: mum I mum I of per-\ clique I I I 
I I of I clique I clique: clique \ sons • I percent I I I , , ill, , 1 cliques 1 size* , size , size I small , of the , , , , I 
I I , I I I cliques: total N 
1 
, I , , , , 
---------------------------------------------------------------
1971 , 13 , 1 , 13 , 13 I 13 I 0% I 100% I , I , , I I 
1972 , 24 I 7 I 3.4 I 7 , 2 I 16 , 29 , I I I , , I 
1973 , 26 , 5 I 5.2 I 6 I 4 I 0 I 19 , I I I I I I 
1974 I 34 I 7 I 4.8 I 7 I 2 I 11 I 20 I I I I I I I 
I 1975 I 37 I 9 I 4.1 I 11 I 2 1 32 I 24 I I I I I I , 
I 1976 I 40 I 11 I 3.6 I 6 , 2 , 60 I 27 , , I I I I I 
-------------------------------------------------~----------
Year I Distribution of the Cliques by Size I 
, 2 , 3 I 4 , 5 1 6 J 7 I 8 I 9 I 10: 11: 12: 13 , , I I , , , I , 
-----------------------------------------------------
1971 I I I I , I I , , , I I 1 I , I I I I I I I , , , 
I 1972 I 2 I 3 , 1 I I I 1 I , , I , I , , , , , I I I I , I I 
I 1973 I , , 1 I 2 I 2 J , I , I 
, , 
I , I I , I I , , I , I 
1974 , 2 , , 1 I 1 I I 3 I , , I , I I I I I , I , , I , I I 
1975 , 3 I 2 I 1 I 2 I 1 I I I I I I , I I I , I I , I I I , 
1976 I 3 I 2 , 3 I 2 I 1 , , I I , , , I , , , , , , , , , , I , 
* The number obtained when total n is divided by the total 
number of cliques. 
Source: Jo Groebel, Hubert Feger r IIAnalyse von Strukturen 
terroristischer Gruppierungen" r in: Wanda von Baeyer-Katte, Dieter 
Claessens r Hubert Feger, FriedheIm Neidhardt (eds.), Gruppenprozesse: 
Analysen zum Terrorismus Band 3 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982) r 
393-432r 424. 
An examination of the cliques in the RAF and the B2J showed that the 
B2J had larger cliques to begin with than the RAF and that because of 
its equal contacts with everyone, the B2J was more stable in the 
beginning than the RAF which had a central clique holding the structure 
111 Groebel, Feger r 418. 
112 ibid. r 419. 
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together making it liable to control problems with loss of members (see 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2). 
The large ( over half of the group's membership) cliques that 
occurred in the founder terrorist groups did not last. The interaction 
of group acti vi ty and public reaction, both in the media and from the 
state authorities, caused the cliques to break down into numerous 
smaller ones with only up to ten percent of the members included.113 
The close contact at the beginning with everyone in contact gave way 
with the growth of the group and public reaction to more indirect 
contacts between members.114 This made leadership control over the group 
more difficult, and increased the distance between them and the cadre. 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 do not relate the quality of the contacts between 
the people involved. Some will be person to person, while others will be 
only through intermediaries or letters. Even amongst the legals the 
groups want to maintain some secrecy between the different sections of 
legals. Thus if one section is arrested, they can only betray part of 
the organisational structure.11S 
The growth of the number of cliques also points to the 
factionalisation wi thin the groups. While everyone may have worked 
towards a corrnnon goal along an agreed path in the beginning, it is 
possible to speculate that the rise of cliques also signalled a 
diversity of views about the proper path in later years. This would not 
have been as important in the Second of June, where sub-groups could 
enter and leave, but of significance in the Red Army Faction where exit 
from the group was more difficult in the seventies, as discussed further 
below. A further speculation would be that the rise in number of cliques 
supports the thesis that if 'organisational' model groups are left 
alone, they self-destruct due to a build-up of internal pressures. 
3.3. Group Orientation: The Organisational Approach 
Earlier the organisational approach to the terrorism of the Red Army 
Faction, and the Second of June, was seen as a contributory explanation 
to left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic. A lack of information 
about the internal dynamics of the RZ and Autanamen precludes discussion 
about 'instrumental' and ' expressive I model groups. The 'organisational' 
model views the terrorist organisation as a political organisation whose 
first goal is survival. The leadership of the group base their actions 
and decisions upon the perceived social conditions as filtered through 
113 ibid., 425. 
114 ibid., 425, 426. 
l1S Boock (1988), 75. 
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the belief systems of the collective group body. The variables of 
beliefs, ideology, social conditions, individual motivation, internal 
and external group influences, are integrated into the one approach. The 
crucial factor is the leadership's perception of available resources, 
opportuni ties, threats and possible reactions. 
The survival of the group as the determining goal of the group 
places entrepreneurship as 
an essential ingredient; the leaders who establish an 
organization must skillfully create and manipulate 
incentives to attract members. The founders must have 
an exceptional cormni tment to the group f s purposes and 
an exaggerated sense of the group's likely efficacy.117 
The three stages of task-accomplishment (orientation, evaluation and 
control) may therefore not be absolutely objectively determined as 
leaders manipulate the incentives to reach desirable decisions. These 
stages, however, determine the necessary sub-tasks of the terrorist 
organisation leadership to maintain the group. 'Orientation' involves 
acquainting the group with infonnation and points the members towards 
the task. 'Evaluation I is the assessment of the different ideas as the 
group moves towards a decision. 'Control' refers to the way people seek 
to influence decisions via control of the group members, and is 
discussed under desertion from the groUp.118 
Orientation highlights ideas that legitimise violence by the group. 
The leadership provide the 'moral dispensation' for the violent acts the 
members undertake. They promote ideas in a previously identified 
direction, which was determined by the members' acceptance of the group 
belief system discussed earlier. 119 
The leaders of the organisation, who have their own reputation and 
personal ambitions linked with the group, seek to influence the group 
orientation. They seek to maintain group cohesion and organisation 
survival because their own lives and those of the members are dependent 
on a minimum level of group cooperation and survival due to the limited 
options for the course of their actions. To maintain this state of 
affairs the leaders need to provide rewards and incentives for members 
of both an instrumental and an emotional nature, as described earlier. 
The rewards and incentives will reflect short, medium and long term 
116 Crenshaw (1985), 472-3. 
117 Crenshaw (1988 II), 21. 
118 Brown, 34. 
119 Zawodny, 284; Crenshaw (1988 I), 12; Crenshaw (1988 II), 21. 
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goals, but will not always relate to the overall proclaimed group goals 
as some will pertain to the members' rewards and incentives.12o 
The rewards and incentives the leadership can offer the members are 
similar to the ones afforded new members: (1) opportunties for action; 
(2) need to belong; (3) desire for social status; (4) material rewards, 
and (5) the 'chancel or 'accidental' factor which is sometimes also 
forced upon a person by other group members. Once inside the group these 
forces are used by the leadership to exert different pressures on the 
members to maintain the organisation's survival and viability to retain 
and maintain their controls over the group. 
Previously the changed incentives offered an auto mechanic and metal 
worker in the Red Army Faction were mentioned, as was the role of 
Albrecht in the murder of Ponto in 1977. She did not initially want to 
participate in this attempt to force the release of the prisoners in 
Stammheim (Baader, Ensslin, Raspe and others), so the group worked on 
her feelings by saying she did not have a political identity, and- -
despite what she said- -did not really want the prisoners' freedom. Over 
time in the small group without any free space to withdraw in, and the 
general lack of strength required to withstand such pressures, the 
result was like brainwashing. Albrecht was not threatened, but she was 
not left alone, and could not leave the safe-house alone. After the 
murder of Ponto she was convulsed with crying for days, and in normal 
conditions would have entered a hospital. 121 
The Second of June member Bernd Haussmann was trained in the 
Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine for a massacre at Ben-
Gurion airport in Israel in May 1976. He was not told that his suitcase 
was fixed to explode upon opening for customs inspection in Israel. One 
woman died and others were wounded. Haussmann' s girlfriend, Brigitta 
Kuhlmann r a Revolutionary Cells member f was told the Israelis murdered 
him, and that she could exact revenge if she participated in the 
hijacking of an Air France plane to Entebbe. She accepted.122 
The role of women in terrorist groups also affects their 
functioning. In general women have filled support roles like running 
safe-houses and reconnaisance trips, because an all-women household 
attracts less attention than all male one, and women can pose as wives, 
sisters or girlfriends to gain access to places men cannot. However, in 
West Germany womens l roles were operational too. They took part in one 
third of the bombings, bank robberies and other activities up to 1977. 
120 crenshaw (1985), 473-4. 
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Despite this, there were no womens' cliques in the Red Army Faction or 
Second of June, 12 3 but it is assumed that in any mixed group of women 
and men there inevitably exists a conscious or unconscious competition 
for women within the groups, and while these feelings may be supressed, 
they nonetheless affect relationships.124 
Sometimes too the emotional involvement of men and women in the 
group can also lead to the collective good of the group being endangered 
for the individual emotional values of one person for another. Hence, 
Baader was freed in 1970 because of Ensslin's attachment to him, and she 
disguised herself to visit him in prison before his rescue. 125 
Also as vividly exemplified in fiction, someone will move to protect 
a member, a loved one, despite the fact that by doing so, they possibly 
endanger others in the group. The individual remembers the other 
individual and forgets the group. The group and the individual may not 
want this, but have to cope with the possibility.126 On the other hand, 
Angelika Speitel, speaking of the mid-seventies in the RAF, said that 
there may be an attraction between members, but no love. Hate was the 
requisite feeling for group survival. 127 
Sexual interest along homosexual lines could also pose problems if 
there is only one homosexual in the group, and there is no outlet for 
their needs and desires. The danger is that the person will seek this 
release outside the group, and thus endanger group security.128 
Terrorist groups were organised because they preferred action over 
theory, and this continues to be a reward and incentive available to 
leaders. But, the group does not always act. It must also husband its 
resources to make their use decisive. The group leaders need to balance 
these two needs: they need to preserve the organisation itself and use 
its available resources to greatest effect, while also meeting the 
members' demand for action. Participation in the limited actions that do 
occur thus becomes a reward for some and an incentive for future 
possibilities for others. This is perhaps why Sternebeck felt relieved 
from the fear of discovery while waiting for her first Red Army Faction 
active service once she entered the underground. Waiting produced fear 
of discovery to which action was the antidote. 129 
The balance between action and group preservation has other 
implications for the nature of terrorist activity. Terrorism as part of 
123 Russell, Miller/ 21-2; Groebel, Feger, 423. 
124 Zawodny, 280. 
125 Aust (1987), 84. 
126 Geissler, 212-3. 
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a social revolution { which is what the groups in West Germany seek, is a 
slow I long-tenn strategy necessitating much planning and preparation, 
with supposedly up to eighty percent of the time spent meeting 
logistical requirements. 130 Between the RAF freeing of Baader in 1970 
and their first banbing campaign, two years elapsed in which they 
organised logistic requirements needed for life in the underground. 
Then, after practising their bomb-making skills and having prepared 
safe-houses and getaways, the RAF began their campaign in May 1972. 
The logistical and other acti vi ties can relieve stress and strain, 
while also functioning as a cohesive for the group. This occurs in 
several ways. The individual in the group has passed through whatever 
initiation procedure was required for membership, which may have 
involved illegal activity. Now the group acts as a defender of the 
individual against the authorities with each member defending the 
others: the group needs the individual and the individual needs the 
group. Each feel their personal and group identity threatened and join 
together against the external threat. 131 
The group is now a collective weapon to be used against the courts 1 
government and security forces. 132 The individual is not 'guiltY'1 the 
group is, and a stronger group-identity replaces the weaker personal-
identity.133 
Social status of members once in the group is also a means of 
balancing group tensions with rewards and incentives. Status and 
position may be granted or taken away fran members 1 depending upon their 
behaviour and compliance with group nonns and goals. The group can be 
divided into those who can 1 and those who cannot take part in group 
discussions. Under Christian Klar's leadership in the RAF only those who 
were participating in an action had a voice in discussions. All others 
had to keep quiet. 134 
Additionally, if the person is not trusted by the group, but is 
nonetheless needed, they can isolate the person within the group as was 
done with Boock. Sternebeck 1 who voiced dissension 1 and whose actions 
were 'unclear' in a critical situation, was asked to keep within the 
apartment for weeks to minimise any risk. 135 
130 H.J. Klein (1981), 47. 
131 Post (1986)1 218. 
132 Guenther Wagenlehner, "Motivation for Political Terrorism in 
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The individual's membership in the group is the last means of 
control for the leadership, and as a last resort this could be denied an 
indi vidual. 13 6 To remain in the group dissension is possibly therefore 
muted on occasion .13 7 If the person speaks out too much against the 
group, they risk separation from group activity, and could become- -like 
Boock and Sternebeck- -prisoners within the group. This is discussed 
later in more detail in connection with dissent and conformity in 
terrorist organisations. 
Sometimes too, the illegals ask for something to be done by the 
legals, who do not know to what end they do it. Although the legals may 
need to know something more for their long term motivation, they are 
only told what they need to know to fulfill their task in order to 
ensure security. The same occurs in the illegal commando groupS.138 
However, the illegals can also manipulate the legals and push them into 
illegality and underground work. 
After orientation is established the group needs to evaluate and 
decide upon specific issues. In terrorist groups, as in other insulated 
groups, several processes are simultaneously under way during dec is ion-
making. First, a 'shift to risk', or 'shift to extremity' process occurs 
as members move from the 'neutral I point of members' individual choices 
towards the individually favoured position. The degree of the extremity 
of the decisions depends upon the group f s original position. The more 
extreme the original position, the more extreme will be the shift in 
position.139 
The phenomenon of the 'shift to extremity/risk' occurs most 
noticably when a group is forming its position and establishing 
formalised procedures. Novel situations, where the group has no prior 
experience, may also induce the effect.140 
The 'shift to risk f in the Red Anny Faction could explain group 
decisions as in these examples. When the RAF began with the freeing of 
Baader in April 1970 it was ahead of itself by not having prepared the 
groundwork for its concepts f structure and logistics. Baader f s arrest 
upset their plans, and the group jumped ahead to the phase of armed 
struggle without having thought through all of the consequences. After 
the group returned from the Middle East they did not, as originally 
planned, opt for the legal/illegal life and contact with community 
136 Crenshaw (1985), 477. 
137 Post (1990), 34; and the opening chapter quotes. 
138 Boock (1988), 84-5. 
139 Brawn, 143-5. 
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groups, but upon Baader's insistence, went totally into the 
underground. l41 There were no half-way points, only extremes. 
When the group took the Stockholm embassy personnel hostage they 
murdered a hostage before stating their demands to possibly highlight 
their solid position about the release of imprisoned group members in 
exchange for the release of the hostages. This could also provide a 
motivation for the suicides in Stammheim after the rescue of the 
Lufthansa passengers in Mogadishu, because now there was no possibility 
of their release, and they wanted to show their highest identification 
with the group ideology. The group had no interest in indecisive 
measures. There was only success or failure, with nothing in between. 
A possible example of the 'shift to extremity' working away from the 
other RAF extreme- -attacks against people- -occurred after the Schleyer 
affair and the Stammheim suicides. Allegedly Klar wanted to kidnap an 
officer and his family and murder them. This bloodbath, however, was 
turned down by other members, because it was too far away from the 
perceived RAF identity held by the members.142 
There are three possible explanations for the 'shift to 
extremity/risk'. Firstly, as decisions are voiced in the group people 
discover that their position is further away from the group values than 
others' positions. The people are comparing themselves to others and 
find their personal identity is not matching up with their group 
identity I and then shift their position accordingly to be in a more 
preferred one.143 
Secondly, decisions in groups are not equally balanced between pros 
and cons, but rather there is a tendency towards one or the other 
position. In the course of the discussion over the decision people 
receive new infonnation to increase their tendency towards the general 
direction. Known evidence in this case is supported by additional 
evidence to shift their opinion further in the agreed direction.144 
Lastly, in an argument similar to the first I it is believed that 
when ingroup norms are supported or called for more heavily than usual 
over outgroup norms, then more extreme positions that are protypical of 
the group are preferred. This again raises the notion that novel 
situations are occasions for the 'shift to extremity', as this is when 
the ingroup will be most identifiable against the outgroup. All three of 
141 Krebs, 210-8, 220. 
142 "Die mit den Hueten" Der Spiegel 34/1990, 63. 
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these explanations are likely to be at work to differing degrees in the 
'shift to extremity' process. 145 
The second process at work next to the 'shift to extremity' is that 
of 'groupthink' f a mode of thinking engaged in when people are deeply 
involved in a cohesive ingroup, and when their "strivings for unanimity 
override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses 
of action.flU6 six features of groupthink can lead to 'bad' decisions: 
(1) a very cohesive decision-making body r (2) inSUlation from outside 
information r whereby experts are not utilised r and there is a selective 
bias against factual information from outside sources that do not 
support initial policy preferences r (3) decision-makers not searching 
systernatically through al ternati ve policy options f ( 4 ) time pressure 
pushes the group to reach a decision urgently, (5) a group dominated by 
a distinctive leader, and (6) little attention is paid to how policies 
could be sabotaged or hindered by accidents. The result is a loss of 
independent cri tical thinking supplanted by 'groupthink ' promoting 
irrational, dehumanising activity directed towards outgroupS.147 
These 'groupthink 1 conditions lead to symptoms of 'groupthink' which 
manifest themselves in eight ways in terrorist groups: (1) an illusion 
of invulnerability leading to over optimism and risk-taking; 
assumptions are dismissed in collective rationalisation; 
(2) key 
(3) the 
morality of the group is assumed; (4) the enemy is perceived as evil 
(which eliminates negotiation), and incompetent (which justifies risky 
ventures); (5) key beliefs are upheld in the face of individual 
members's challenges to these beliefs; (6) differing views are not 
expressed in the perceived group consensus; ( 7) the group believes there 
is an unanimity of position; (8) members withhold information to 
maintain the illusion of the group's positions on its decisions. 148 
The symptoms are intertwined and affect one another: if the group 
believes its members are unanimous in agreement f then challenges to 
decisions will not occur r or will be dismissed r and people will withhold 
their voices and information supporting differing positions. 
On some occasions these all apply to the Red Army Faction, at others 
times they do not. For example, after the Stammheim suicides in 1977 the 
leaders prepared retributive acts involving the deaths of many policemen 
wi th mined target areas. However f 'When the leaders discussed these plans 
with the other group members the leadership was dissuaded because this 
145 ibid. 1 154, 157. 
146 Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Miffin 
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might reflect badly on the public image of the group. The leaders had 
perhaps due to the 'groupthink I symptoms listed above, and discounted 
any possible oppossition in the group. The leadership had planted the 
mines f and now had to retract them .14 9 
The retraction of 'groupthink ! here meant the terrorists did not 
act. On another occasion, if the information is correct, then group 
consensus did not take account of how an individual member might 
sabotage activity he was strongly against because it did not have 
anything to do with the goal of releasing imprisoned group members. 
Boock says that he sabotaged the rocket launcher that was to be fired at 
the Federal Prosecutor's building in Karlsruhe in August 1977.150 
3.4. Leaving the Group 
After the new recruit has been with the organisation for some time 
the question arises of how the person copes with the apparent failure of 
the group to attract the masses to their cause. There are several 
responses enabling groups to maintain their cohesion in the face of 
failure. The 'cognitive dissonance' theory discussed earlier argues that 
because people voluntarily (in their view) paid a high entry price to 
join the group, then this must mean that group membership is valuable to 
them, even if the group does badly, and they will increase their 
identification with the group for this reason because they feel 
personally responsible through their voluntary actions. 151 
Personal responsibility, however, does not completely explain group 
cohesion in the face of failure, because groups also tend to attribute 
external or situational causes to their problems, and thus push their 
failures onto the actions of outside groups. Continuing with this 
justification process groups also see their opponents' failures as part 
of their nature, and their opponents' successes due to luck, whereas the 
group's own successes will be due to their skills and character. 152 
Should the members of a terrorist group not be satisfied with their 
membership, or the group want to bolster its own self-image, there are 
several avenues open to them to relieve their discomfort. This can be 
accomplished with the defence mechanisms discussed in chapter four and 
the fantasy building possibilities discussed earlier. (1) The person can 
leave the group physically or psychologically through denial of group 
membership: they are not criminals, but resistance fighters. (2) They 
can restrict comparisons between themselves and other groups to make 
149 "Die mit den Hueten" Der Spiegel 34/1990, 63. 
150 Aust (1987), 415. 
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ingroup outcomes favourable, such as comparing similars instead of 
dissimilars. For example, they could compare themselves to left-wing 
oriented terror organisations, instead of to different ethnic/religious 
based terrorist groups: compare the RAF to Action Direct, Brigata Rossa, 
instead of the RAF to the Provisional Irish Republican Anny and the 
Basques. ( 3 ) The person or group can sidestep the main dimensional 
comparison, invent new dimensions, or change their values, whereby the 
group twists the meanings of words to promote favourable outcomes so 
that, as mentioned in chapter two, in the name 'Red Anny Faction!: 'Red! 
highlights their supposed Marxist-Leninist credentials, and the 'Anny' 
implies larger numbers. (4) Promote the image of instability and 
illegitimacy in the status and power relationship in the state so the 
terrorists perceive a chance to raise their status and identity level 
from low or negative levels to higher ones. The status quo power, on the 
other hand, now feels forced to defend their position, which may be seen 
as a "fragile superiority".153 
However, these processes do not end group membership, and may not 
relieve discomfort for everyone. The result could be a group of 
dissenters in the terrorist organisation. 
Dissenters in a group can disagree with the majority for a number of 
reasons f but their options are limited. They can 'exit! from the group, 
or 'voice! their opinions. The extent to which they choose to 'voice' 
their opinions and exercise the threat of 'exit' from the group depends 
upon their 'loyalty I to the group. 
'Exit' and 'voice' are allegedly not available in terrorist groups 
where the former is considered treason and the later as mutiny .154 
However, examples in this chapter have shown these two conditions do not 
exist in the left-wing terrorist groups in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. People have left the groups f and others have raised their 
voices in dissension. 
When the dissenters in the terrorist organisation are unsatisfied 
with the direction f methods or practices in the group they can make 
protests in the group to change these. As discussed earlier I the 
increased costs of membership increased the value of membership 
according to cognitive dissonance. This implies that people do not want 
to leave I once they have joined a terrorist group f and would thus prefer 
to remain 'loyal! and dissent from wi thin I than to 'exit! the group .15 5 
153 ibid., 250-2. 
154 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voicer and Loyalty: Responses to 
Decline in Finns T Organizations T and States (cambridge, MA: Harvard 
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The effectiveness of any dissension within a terrorist group is 
influenced by the conditions within and outside the group. The voicing 
of dissent is generally seen as more serious than leaving the group 
because the cohesion and solidarity of the group are seen as paramount 
concerns due to security considerations, and because of their 
psychological significance for group morale. Where groups are formed on 
the premise of action over theory and discussion, as terrorist groups 
are I then dissension is liable to be interpreted as being directed at 
the leadership for not being representative of the organisation. To this 
end, the leadership relies on their past record, and on their 
interpretation of group ideology to legitimise their direction and 
leadership.156 Ideology can also guide the group in reducing dissension, 
for example r by arguing that innocent lives will not be lost in a 
department store bombing because the people who shop there are 
capitalists r and capitalists are never innocent.157 
Other considerations about dissension within the group are its size 
and the ability of the group to recrui t new members, should others 
leave. The more dependent the group is on these members, the more likely 
it is to adopt the dissenters' suggestions.158 
As already discussed, new members can also change the group because 
they are usually less ideologically inclined and more action oriented. 
The struggle may become the goal- -not the future society strived 
for .15 9 For the RAP and the B2J the imprisoned members and how to 
liberate them became the primary concern over the 'anti-imperialist 
struggle I as exemplified by the groups! exploitation of the prisoners! 
conditions to recruit new members. 
To mitigate these problems the leadership can use rewards and 
incentives to maintain group cohesiveness and membership loyalty. 
Additionally, there are the options of merger with smaller groups (the 
B2J merged with the RAP) I and the use of extreme discontent to increase 
motivation to change the group from inside when the option of leaving 
the group seems undesirable. 16o 
This defence mechanism of regression can also be the aim of 
fostering , loyalty I in the group so that dissension is used to the 
group's benefit.161 The lack of apprehended members providing state's 
evidence, and the existence of a prisoners' arm of the Red Army Faction 
156 Crenshaw (1985)/ 484. 
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might be taken to confinn this. However, this could also be a sign of 
the group's control over its members. 
Where 'exit f from the group is possible, several al ternati ves may be 
available. These depend upon whether there are other terrorist 
organisations available from which the person(s) can continue their 
activities l or where no other groups are available. The other 
possibilities are surrender to the authorities, and leave terrorism 
while in prison or afterwards. 
The option of working back towards as nonnal a life as possible, is 
also available, but difficult. Hans-Joachim Klein, Peter-Juergen Boock, 
Michael Baumann, Astrid Pro 1 1 , and others have tried this route. Klein 
is the only one who has not been apprehended since he left terrorism in 
1977 (see the chronology). This path carries the risks of pursuit from 
the authori ties, as well as from fonner members. Even those who are 
apprehended can still have fears of speaking out. For example, when 
Boock was arrested in 1981 he hinted at things, which only later in 1990 
did he elaborate on, after the arrest of fonner members in the Gennan 
Democratic Republic. 162 
A variation of this option is exit from terrorism altogether with 
the aid of the group as occurred in the Red Anny Faction. In the late 
seventies the group was torn with dissension to such an extent that the 
leadership had to find a way to mitigate the situation if the group was 
to survive and function properly as its leadership desired. The 
dissenters f risk to the group needed to be minimised, but was not 
discussed in great detail with them. Some possibilities were letting 
them disappear into the Third World- -Angola r Mozambique or Portugeuse 
colonies were mentioned. In 1980 everything suddenly moved quickly: the 
dissenters received new Federal Republic of Gennany passports and money 
for travel and moving expenses to travel from Paris to Prague by train 
in groups of two. Only there did they find out they were to move to East 
Gennany, which solved any potential language problems. Sternebeck and 
Friedrich went on ahead to East Berlin's Schoenefeld airport where they 
found everything ready for their immigration as West German citizens to 
East Gennany. The pairs had 'legends' of their past constructed before 
this, as apparently the East Germans they saw did not know their past. 
Several days later they met East Germans who did know their past. Only 
in 1986 did Sternebeck, allegedly find out that their 'contact f person 
who helped them settle in worked for the Stasi. 16 3 
162 Compare Boock, Der Spiegel 9/1981, 110-25 and Der Spiegel 
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Leaving one terrorist organisation for another depends upon whether 
there is an alternative group, in which case a change of allegiance is 
the necessary requirement. If no al ternati ve group exists, then one 
needs to find like-minded persons to form one. In West Germany it was 
possible in the early days to choose between three organisations f and 
some even (Hans-Joachim Klein, and Wilfried 'Bonni' Boese) experienced 
one (RAF) before opting for another (RZ), before discovering that (in 
Klein's case) nei ther was any better than the other, and opting out 
altogether. 164 There has also been the possibility, as mentioned in 
chapter four with Friederike Krabbe, of leaving the West German 
terrorist scene and entering that of the Palestinian groups, as some are 
believed to have done. 
If one group is preferred over another by members of one group who 
are dissatisfied with it, they may cause it to collapse and end by 
moving to the other group thus ending the competition between them. 1 6 5 
As described in chapter two, this is what the Second of June did when it 
split into an RZ group and others joined with the RAF. 
The other possible method of leaving the group is after arrest 
during imprisonment, where support, while easier to acquire, nonetheless 
still leaves exit from the group a difficult process. This is more 
carmon than the other methods, and includes the option of turning states 
evidence against one's former group members. This latter remains a rare 
option excercised by few.166 
The RAF for its part has much power wi thin the prison and can 
restrict contact ( in the past at least) between members and those 
questioning the group and its actions. Without the group in prison the 
collectivity is gone, and the individual is potentially alone without 
any guarantee that others will contact him or her. This is the fear of 
prisoners in the event of all prisoners being housed in the same prison 
should the group ever receive their demand of prisoner consolidation. 
This might mean that those who want to leave the group while in prison 
will be unable to do so when surrounded by other group members.167 
The loss of members, who have left the terrorist groups f does not 
seem to have noticeably harmed them. Same former members have provided 
state's evidence against members, but the groups have continued to 
164 Crenshaw (1985), 483; see H.J. Klein (1979). 
165 Oots (1989), 148. 
166 Karl-Heinz Ruehland, Gerhard Mueller, Hans-Joachim Dellwo, 
Volker Speitel, Juergen Bodeux, die taz 24 October 1986. More recently 
Werner Loetze and Susarme Albrecht have also turned state's evidence 
under the supergrass legislation due to expire in 1992. Indenpendent 11 
February, 8, 26 April 1991, 14. 
167 Spoerl, "Mattes Echo" Die Zeit 10 March 1989, 7. 
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function. However, the dissenters have also forged pathways out of 
terrorism and provided identification objects in themselves as examples 
for others to follow. This has led to others leaving the group. As 
mentioned in chapter four, this usually occurred after arrest in the 
seventies, and based on events discussed in chapter six, appears to have 
been also true in the eighties. 
The decision to leave a terrorist group is not easily taken. It 
involves the loss of one's group identity without the possible immediate 
replacement of another to give the person new meaning and identity.168 
Therefore, the psychological effort to give up the group that one was 
with through good and bad is immense and leaves guilt feelings, despite 
belief in the rightness of this, wi th the person who gives up their 
group identity through a lengthy process of detachment from the 
groUp.169 
This is where the government can find people willing to collaborate 
with the police and judicial system. In the past these have been minor 
persons in the group who were not wholly in the group. They were more 
outsiders, and less identified with the groUp.170 This presumably means 
that they suffered less stress and strain in providing evidence against 
the other group members. 
If this -government action is successful, then eventually the group 
could be defeated. It could be physically destroyed, or made inoperative 
through pre-emptive action. Al ternati vely, the government could raise 
the costs and risks of terrorist acti vi ty so that the group ceases to 
act, and possibly decides that other fonns of political behaviour are 
more expedient then terrorism.171 
Depending upon the terrorist organisation's behaviour, it is also 
possible that their actions caused a backlash against them. The result 
could then be that people leave the group and supporters and new 
recruits do not replace them. This could also occur because, as 
described earlier, group members' needs are not met.172 
4. Sl.l1ll1aIY 
The left-wing terrorist groups have the characteristics of the 
.. instrumental! (the Revolutionary Cells and Autonanen) , 'operational' 
(the Red Army Faction and Second of June Movement), and ' expressive' 
(Revolutionary Cells and Autonamen) models. Given that the Revolutionary 
168 Post (1986), 216. 
169 Wasmund, 237. 
170 ibid. 
171 Oots (1989), 140-1. 
172 ibid. 
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Cells and Alltonamen belong to two models there is a need for more study 
into categorisation of these models to see if one of them is a 
miscalculation. 
However I if there are ' instrumental' Revolutionary and Autonanen 
cells, then these should disappear as soon as their goals are achieved. 
As they seek long-term social revolution, this could be a long wait. 
The ' expressive' groups, if they do exist, will only end when the 
members are arrested or move into other organisations. Until then they 
could cause problems for the authorities if they become more violent. 
The 'operational' model Red Army Faction, in theory should self-
destruct if it were left alone. This option, however, would be too 
dangerous given the group's resources and experience. 
Additionally, the chapter showed that left-wing West German 
terrorist motivation also springs from within the group, which can 
employ its awn incentives and sanctions to maintain group viaDility and 
operational activity. Terrorist motivation does not stop once the person 
enters the group, but continues while the person is in the group, and, 
to some extent, after he or she has left the group. 
The possibilities available to employ these models in 
counterterrorism operations are discussed in the next chapter. It also 
discusses past counterterrorism policy in West Germany. 
CHAPl'ER SIX: 
THE DYNAMICS OF COUNTERTERRORISM 
Commentator: ... what is domestically, politically and 
policewise necessary, must also have a constitutional 
basis. It makes no sense to first make laws only when a 
particular situations arises. On the contrary, laws 
must be made to prevent the occurence of a particular 
situation. In this situation the parties must recognise 
their common duty and quickly pass the security 
legislation. 1 
All those persons [whom he met] have been identified 
unequivocally as chance encounters rather than planned 
contacts. However! I will not be persuaded that Miss 
Blum was also a chance encounter ... the fact that she 
apparently let him leave without saying good-bye and 
quite obviously showed him a way out of the apartment 
building that must have been overlooked by our strict 
surveillance ... Of course, we could not keep the entire 
area ... under complete surveillance ... In my opinion the 
best thing would be to let her run around freely so she 
can make a mistake, and probably the trail will lead to 
his present quarters .... 2 
I mention that only, because Jutta had been sought for 
two years as an 'anarchist I. Do you think that is why 
I'm suspected? Naturally my name and my address are in 
her notebooks... If it was the other way around, when 
she was the teacher and had lived with an anarchist f 
that would certainly incriminate her. But a man, says 
the mathematics teacher, the Office for the Protection 
of the Constitution! lets him have his own opinion. 3 
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The last two chapters established models of how individuals are 
drawn to terrorist groups, and how the groups function. This chapter 
integrates the models with the concept of identification to highlight 
its contribution to understanding terrorists f motivation due to 
government responses to political terrorism in West Germany. 
The chapter begins with government counterterrorism policy 
assumptions, overall policy balance, the resources provided for policy 
implementation { the policy strengths and limitations, and a concluding 
discussion of the dynamics of the terrorists and the government 
measures. The chapter shows a conflict of values between those held by 
the terrorists and the government I which exhibits itself in the dynamics 
1 Peter Schneider, Messer lin Kopf. Drehbuch (West Berlin: Rotbuch 
Verlag, 1979), 16. 
2 Heinrich Boell{ The Lost Honour of Katharina Blum. Or: How 
violence develops and where it can lead (Harmondsworth: penguin Books, 
1978), 63. 
3 Peter Schneider, ... schon bist du ein Verfassungsfeind (West 
Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1976), 19-20, original emphasis. 
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of the relationship between the terrorists and the criminal justice and 
penal system. 
1. Assumptions of Counterterrorism Policy 
This chapter ties together the models presented earlier in the 
thesis. Chapter one presented two models of terrorism that suggested 
paramilitary and police responses to the 'war' model r and socio-
political responses to the 'communication' model. Chapter three showed 
that the Red Army Faction mainly sought recruitment to its ranks and the 
Revolutionary Cells and Autananen supported protest movements. Chapter 
five showed these respectfully as the 'organisational' and 
, instrumental' models r wi th some RZ and Autonanen cells as examples of 
the 'expressive' model. 
The appropriate counterterrorism measures differ for each model. The 
'instrumental' model decreases terrorism with raised costs in either the 
'war' or .. communication' arenas depending upon the legitimacy of the 
issue. The 'war' response to the 'organisational' model was deemed 
inappropriate as it would increase group cohesion, thus 'communication' 
may have more success if a path can be arranged that allows non-violent 
group survival. Responses to the 'expressive' model would be those that 
raise its cost as in the 'instrumental' model, but no success can be 
guaranteed as its motivation is psychologically determined. 
In chapter four the suggested response to the 'psychologically 
disturbed' model was the 'war' model. The 'rational-idealist' model was 
to be countered with the 'communication' model because of terrorism's 
use as a strategy decided upon by rational actors. The rest of chapter 
four showed that left-wing terrorists were not 'psychologically 
disturbed', but identified wi th their belief system and acted 
accordingly. No single model is the proper response in all cases, and it 
is possible that several types of terrorism occur simultaneously- -each 
necessitating different responses. 
The 'identification' model combines the 'war' and 'communication' 
models whereby the 'war' and 'communication' models are short and long-
term options. Optimally, the 'war' model represents the tactical short-
term options, while 'communication' coordinates long-term 
counterterrorism policy to reduce terrorism in all areas and avoids the 
danger of overdependence on the 'war' model as the sole option available 
to the neglect of coordinated long-term planning. 
Assumptions about the source of terrorism influence the responses. 
The wrong response can increase terrorism, or reduce it at the expense 
of democracy. The correct response, an the other hand, may not guarantee 
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an end to terrorism either, only its reduced frequency. In democratic 
states responses are guided by the state's identification with legal 
principles that guarantee democracy, which limits counterterrorism 
response options. 
Democratic governments should be able to respond to soc iopoli tical 
changes in its citizenship and adopt legitimate reforms. Given that the 
government is effective, this is the best method of avoiding political 
violence. This long-term 'communication I aspect of the model needs to 
balance, on the one hand, legitimate adaptations with calls for others 
that would provoke, on the other hand, both violent responses from 
groups who see their positions threatened, and those reforms that would 
appear to be granted under duress and blackmail of the government. 
Beyond this is the danger that some reforms might lead to expectations 
of greater reforms than the government can reasonably rnaintain. 4 
Balancing these demands requires a clear internal security policy 
with clear objectives, the foremost of which must be the rule of law 
that guarantees both equal rights and treatment under the law, and equal 
protection of rights. The government's political will to undertake these 
goals must also be evident. Vacillation will, undermine public confidence 
in the government and the value of the law, and open exploitable 
positions for the terrorists to further harm the government's position. 
Overreaction lends credence to the terrorists' claim that the government 
is not democratic. 5 The 'communication' models seeks to relieve any 
tension that would lead to terrorism and to reduce support for such 
means. 
Government 'war' model short-term responses must be morally 
justifiable to the public I and not violate its own principles and 
standards. The danger of this si tuation is clear when it comes to 
justifying 'grave danger', a potentially 'slippery' term, which becomes 
doubtful when less dangerous opponents are met in a similar vein on the 
grounds that if left unchecked, they will become a greater danger. 6 
Equal rights for all entails the same court and prison conditions 
for terrorists as other criminals. Motivation plays no role. Special 
status can lead to terrorist enclaves which continue their organisations 
within prison. It can also lead to resentment from other criminals. 7 
The government must seek to both apprehend the 'hard-core' and to 
dry out the surrounding sympathetic group by using legal measures to 
apprehend people, while also being an enlightened preventative state 
4 Wilkinson (1986), 119-22. 
5 ibid., 123, 127-8. 
6 Bandura, 166. 
7 Wilkinson (1986), 131-2. 
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which views the justification of law as protecting and preserving 
general values. The government can counter terrorism as ordinary serious 
crime and not admi t to i ts expressive character by placing it in a 
special role, but rather stress normal criminal code barriers. 8 
The government must counter the problem that without arrests the 
legal system runs dry (how often has the 'hard-core I been dried up 
already?) with clear statements about government objectives, policies 
and problems in counterterrorism to help maintain public support. This 
avoids the problem that the more specialised the laws are made r the more 
difficult it becomes to continue saying that these are just ordinary 
criminals. However, the state has to remain wi thin its legal limits, and 
tie itself to rules that the terrorists do not. All of these require the 
government to have formed clear objectives about its policy with regards 
to the general nature of the society lived in, police powers, civil 
rights and the rule of law. 9 
The 'identification' model of counterterrorism fields the 
'corrrnunication I model as the long-tenn counterterrorism options, and the 
'war' model as the short-tenn antiterrorism options. The fonner is 
preventative and the later reactive. While the 'communication' aspects 
admit the political motives of terrorism, and seek to reduce these r the 
'war' model denies them as an example of equality before the law, and 
pursues terrorists as nonnal criminals. 
2. The COlmterterrorism Policy Options in west Germany 
This section outlines the Federal Republic of Gennany's decisions in 
counterterrorism policy. Alternatives to these decisions are offered 
later in section four. 
The Federal Republic of Gennany did not immediately understand the 
necessity of both the 'communication' and 'war' models of 
counterterrorism and began with 'war' responses. In both the abduction 
and murder of the West Gennan ambassador to Guatemala, Graf Karl von 
Spreti, in April 1970, and of the Israeli athletes at the Munich 
Olympics in September 1972, the government recognised the need for 
international cooperation. On the other hand, they were also prepared to 
resolve the situations with ransom payments and the release of 
imprisoned suspects including Baader and Meinhof.1 0 Beyond this the 
8 Friedrich Dencker, "Kronzeuge, terroristische Vereinigung und 
rechtsstaatliche Strafgesetzgebungfl Kritische Justiz 20 {i) 1987, 36-53, 
37-8. 
9 Dencker, 38, 44; Wilkinson (1986), 127; Wardlaw, 68. 
10 Jonas, 23; Willy Brandt, "Erschuetterung ueber den Mord an 
Botschafter Graf von Spreti" Bulletin des Presse- und Infonnationsamtes 
der Bundesregienm.g 46 (7 April) 1970, 437-8, 437. Hereafter the 
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government also wanted to end "conflict in or between other states being 
conducted with unlawful or violent means on the soil of the Federal 
Republic". Therefore the state would work with the separate Gennan 
states to do everything possible, while also realising that there is no 
absolute security against extortionate violence. 11 
After the arrests of the first Red Army Faction leaders in 1972 it 
understood the ability of the 'communication I model to undercut sympathy 
for the suspected terrorist prisoners. The government realised it needed 
to counter the terrorist propaganda definition of the justice system, 
and thirst and hunger strikes with explanations about how the terrorist 
suspects t health and well-being were being secured- -sometimes against 
their will- -to counter any suicide attempts by the suspects. The 
government did not pursue or imprison people because of their political 
beliefs or convictions. People were imprisoned, the government stated, 
who were suspected by legal judges of crimes such as murder, attempted 
murder 1 arson 1 and to whom arrest warrants were issued or court 
sentences applied.12 
The elements of counterterrorism policy were also known by the 
government. The state had to defend itself against its enemies while not 
leaving the floor of the law. Nor could it capitulate to terror. This 
meant that the state's enemies included whoever worked with murderers. 
Whoever hid, supported or rallied them was also guilty.13 
By the time of the Second of June I s abduction of Peter Lorenz in 
February 1975 1 these pledges of support for the democratic state 1 and 
knowledge of the terrorists' goals and methods were forgotten. Then the 
government first used adaptable legislation which could always justify 
its position. It hoped the release of five suspected and convicted 
terrorists would not set a precedent for further hostage incidents, 14 
without providing for adequate measures if it did. The government 
justified the terrorists I release with Paragraph 34 (Justified 
Emergency) of the Criminal Code which provides for the balancing of 
periodical is referred to as Bulletin. Walter Scheel 1 "Bemuehungen der 
Bundesregierung zur Freilassung von Botschafter Graf Spreti" 1 Bulletin 
54 (21 April) 1970, 501-3 1 501; Willy Brandt 1 "Wirksame 
Sicherheitsmassnahmen gegen den Terrorismus ll Bulletin 124 (13 September) 
1972 1 1537-8. 
11 Willy Brandt l "Internationale Massnabmen gegen Terror und Gewalt" 
Bulletin 153 (3 November) 1972 1 1817-8 1 1817. 
12 Werner Maihofer, "Erklaerung der Bundesregierung zur Inneren 
Sicherheit" Bulletin 137 (15 November) 1974 1 1373-6, 1373-5. 
13 Ernst Benda and Klaus Shuetz in: "Trauerkundgebung in Berlin fuer 
den Praesidenten des Berliner Karnmergerichts" Bulletin 142 (23 November) 
1974 1 1421-41 1422-3. 
14 Klaus Boelling 1 "Kein Freibrief fuer Terroristen 11 Bulletin 28 (4 
March) 1975, 284. 
200 
public interests when the danger of life, limb and freedom and honour or 
other goods can be relieved through actions that endanger these to a 
lesser extent.15 
The Red Army Faction's takeover of the German embassy in Stockholm 
in April 1975 showed that the terrorists' saw a precedent in the Lorenz 
abduction. The Chancellor sought to explain that the position in 
Stockholm was different because this time the known terrorists' location 
allowed police measures to save the hostages. Furthermore 1 imprisoned 
persons who were to be released included twenty-six persons, some of 
whom were accused of violent crimes. These persons would no doubt have 
returned to the Federal Republic if released. He also reaffirmed the 
belief that there are no patent recipes for security- -police methods 
alone do not suffice- -other means are also required to protect the 
state. nWhoever wants to reliably protect the legal state I must be 
inwardly prepared to also go to the borders of what is allowed and 
necessary by the legal state. "16 He knew how far he could personally 
proceed, and would feel comfortable working at these outer legal limits. 
However, the terrorists resolved the situation when they accidently 
set off their explosives. If they had not t perhaps the government's 
hard-line would have been more evident. The events of 1977 might 
therefore have been different. This inconclusive episode- -from the 
terrorists I viewpoint- -meant that next time the stakes needed to be 
raised. The government's position was underscored by their refusal to 
release prisoners in the course of the Entebbe hijacking. 17 
The middle of 1977 showed a clear government understanding of 
counterterrorism and antiterrorism policy problems. The murder of 
Siegfried Buback in April 1977 brought the government realisation that 
successful early apprehension of terrorist group members may prevent 
larger terrorist incidents, but was forcing the terrorists in the 
underground on to the defensive and to be less cautious and more brutal 
in their operations. Furthermore! terrorists who are firm in their 
beliefs against the liberal democratic state, and risk their lives in 
acti vi ties against it! may not be deterred by judicial sentences, but 
nonetheless must be arrested and sentenced. 18 
15 Federal Ministry of Justice, "Verantwortung aller Demokraten fuer 
den Rechtsstaat" Bulletin 30 (6 March) 1975, 299-300, 300. 
16 Helmut Schmidt, "Erklaerung der Bundesregierung zum 
Terroranschlag auf die Deutsche Botschaft in Stockholmll Bulletin 5 (29 
April) 1975, 517-20. 
17 Klaus Boelling, II Zur Befreiung der Geiseln aus der Gewal t der 
Terroristen" Bulletin 80 (6 July) 1976, 754. 
18 Werner Maihofer f "Erklaerung der Bundesregierung vor dem 
Deutschen Bundestag" Bulletin 27 (18 March) 1977, 241-5, 242; Helmut 
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Counterterrorism policy needs to include the judicial , legislative 
and police measures, wholehearted moral support of the people in their 
posts, and questioning of those who say the real danger of terrorism 
comes not from those labelled 'terrorists I by the state, but from the 
authorities who protect the constitution, as well as the moral isolation 
of those who sympathise and call for violence. They must understand that 
there is no right of resistance to the constitution, democratic majority 
and the laws passed under the constitution. Everyone has a right to 
express their political position within this framework.19 
The basic framework of what is allowed is found in the constitution, 
the Basic Law, which in Article 9 grants freedom of association, unless 
it is to break criminal laws, to conduct unconstitutional activity, or 
the concept of international understanding. Article 18 allows the basic 
rights of those who combat the free democratic basic order to be 
forfeited by the Federal Constitutional Court. Under Article 21 this 
court can also prohibit, when asked to do so by the govenment party, 
poltical parties who seek to abolish the free democratic basis order.2o 
However, the terrorist groups were not political parties, against which 
neither the criminal code prohibiting criminal organisations applied,21 
and Article 19 of the Basic Law stipulates that when basic rights are 
restricted that it must be done in a general manner and not solely in an 
individual case ,22 which would have happened if this was done wi th 
suspected terrorists. 
The government also understood the dangers of overreaction in 
momentary bitterness translated into legislative actionism, and that the 
duties of the democratic state were to check the effectiveness of 
measures and ensure that they meet new challenges. They also argued 
against special processes for terrorists. Every available legal measure 
would be used to concentrate and speed through the court cases f but 
terrorists f rights remain equal to others. The overall aim of their 
Schmidt, "Staatsakt in Karlsruhe" Bulletin 35 (14 April) 1977, 321-6, 
322-3. 
19 Hans-Jochen Vogel in: "Staatsakt in Karlsruhe" Bulletin 35/1977, 
326; Helmut Schmidt, "Erklaerung der Bundesregierung zur inneren 
Sicherheit und Terrorismusbekaempfung" Bulletin 40 (22 April) 1977, 361-
6, 364. 
20 Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Gennany (Bonn: Press and 
Information Office of the Federal Government, 1986), 16, 21, 23; Gordon 
Smith, Democracy in Western Germany: Parties and Politics in the Federal 
Republic (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Co., Ltd., Third Edition, 1986), 
206-7. 
21 Kevin G. Horbatiuk, "Anti-Terrorism: The West German Approach" 
Fordham International Law Approach 3, 1980, 167-91, 177. 
22 Basic Law, 21. 
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policy must be to foster identification with the free democratic state, 
which can only occur when it is protected and defended. 23 
The murder of Hanns Martin Schleyer's driver and bodyguards in the 
course of his abduction by the Red Army Faction called for the 
government's allegiance to its previous policy statements about the 
relationship between terrorism and the liberal democratic state. The 
government initially viewed this as a provocation that required a hard 
response and a cool head. Anyone who sought to excuse or lessen the 
serious danger of the situation, isolated thanselves from the others who 
identified with the rule of law and social order of the state. 24 
On 6 September the government decided- -in consultation with the 
opposition parties- -to follow three simultaneous aims as policy 
orientation guides. These were to free Schleyer alive, to apprehend and 
to try the abductors, and to maintain the state's freedom of action, 
which included non-release of the prisoners, and not to endanger 
domestic and foreign confidence in the state. Only when one of these 
goals forced a decision between it and another, would a decision over 
the prevalence of one over the other be taken. 25 These goals were not 
communicated to the public and the Schleyer family, who did not realise 
the conflict between the first and third goals. The conflict between not 
releasing the prisoners and the rescue of Schleyer alive would only be 
resolved if the authorities could locate and free him.26 Realisation of 
these goals was facilitated through a news embargo on the events21 (see 
chapter seven). These made public identification with Schleyer more 
difficult and eased an identification with the government because little 
information was available about the hostage I s condition, and more was 
known about the government efforts. 
Paragraph 34 (Justified Emergency) of the Criminal Code was used 
this time to justify the government IS' contact ban' on suspected and 
convicted terrorists to prevent them passing and receiving information 
about the events via their lawyers and to inhibit the release of the 
23 Schmidt, Bulletin 40/1977, 363, 365-6. 
24 Helmut Schmidt, "Erschuetterung und Empoerung ueber den 
Mordanschlag in Koeln und die Entfuehrung von Dr. Schleyer" Bulletin 84 
(7 September) 1977, 789-90. 
25 Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 
Dokumentation zu den Ereignissen tmd Entscheidtmgen im Zusarnnenhang mit 
der Entfuehrung von Hanns Martin Schleyer tmd der Lufthansa Machine 
'Landshut' (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 
1977), 17-9. Hereafter referred to as Schleyer Dokurnentation. 
26 Thomas Wittke, Terrorismusbekaempftmg als rationale politische 
Entscheidtmg: Die Fallstudie Btmdesrepublik (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 
1983), 216. 
21 II' Die Deutschen sind irrsinnig geworden' 11 Der Spiegel 36 ( 31 
August) 1987, 106-11, 108. 
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imprisoned persons in exchange for Schleyer and the Lufthansa 
passengers. Nor could there be any guarantee that freed convicted and 
suspected terrorists would not return to the Federal Republic, such as 
the five who were freed in exchange for Lorenz. The lesser good was 
sacrificed for the threatened greater good according to the values laid 
out in the constitution. 28 
The 1982 change of government from a Social Democrat and Free 
Democrat coalition to one between the Christian Union, Christian 
Socialists and Free Democrats, did not change the counterterrorism 
policy assumptions. The new government believed that the arrest of 
terrorists would not end terrorism because their 'fanaticism' was a 
constant danger and their hatred of the state and society blinded them 
to the 'real relationships' in the country, while their personal 
overconfidence could lead to serious attacks. The new government was 
also committed to confronting terrorism with all means available to the 
liberal democratic states, both alone and as joint efforts between 
states because of its international character. Nor would the new 
govennent accept legitimate 'resistance' against the state. This could 
arguably be allowed in dictatorships, where individual freedans were 
curtailed, but not in liberal democracies,29 therefore it is necessary 
to reduce the number who support and aid the terrorists in the Federal 
Republic, or who support their aims. A peaceful world can only be based 
on human rights and social justice. 30 
The government identified with the rule of law, equal rights, and 
the liberal democratic state. All things which the terrorists sought to 
eliminate in their identification with anti-imperialism and the end of 
the Federal Republic. The government's main counterterrorism assumption 
was that they needed to reinforce and widen public identification with 
itself. They were slow in understanding the long-tenn implications of 
counterterrorism policy, and sometimes wavered in the heat of the 
terrorist incident, such as in the Lorenz incident when they freed the 
prisoners, and in the Schleyer incident when they imposed the contact 
ban and other measures discussed later in section four. At other times, 
28 Schleyer Dokumentatian (materialien) 9, 49-55; (materialien) 4-6, 
for the crimes attributed to the people involved. 
29 Friedrich Zimmennann, "Erfolg und Chancen bei der 
Verbrechensbekaempfung" Bulletin 117 (23 November) 1982, 1063-4, 1063; -
----, flTrauerfeier in Muenchen" Bulletin 16 (8 February) 1985, 130-1, 
131; -----, "Sicherung des Rechtsstaats vor Gewalt und Kriminalitaet" 
Bulletin 99 (20 September) 1985, 877-9, 879. 
30 Hans-Dietrich Genscher f flAbschied von Gerold von Braunmuehl" 
Bulletin 125 (17 October) 1986, 1052-4, 1053-4; ,"Opfer des 
Terrorismus im Auswaertigen Amt" Bulletin 103 (14 October) 1987, 884-5, 
885. 
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the government did arrive at an understanding of the dilemmas of 
counterterrorism in between the extreme incidents when they spoke of 
using more than police measures. 
3. The Resourcing of Policy Implementation 
The value of the government I s counterterrorism policy assumptions 
could only be realised if these were adequately resourced and 
implemented with the desired results. In this section the 
counterterrorism resources in the Federal Republic of Germany are 
examined. '!his is followed with a discussion of policy implementation. 
Both sections are sub-divided into two different areas: counterterrorist 
measures taken before terrorist incidents to deter and prevent them, and 
antiterrorist measures taken as reactions to specific incidents. 31 
Despite the overlap with this categorisation- -police used to collect 
and analyse datar while also being the first response to incidents- -it 
provides a useful framework for analysis of responses to terrorism. 
Counterterrorism measures are passive (or proactive), and in place prior 
to an incident r while antiterrorist ones are active (or reactive)r and 
occur after an incident. 
3.1 Counterterrorism Resources 
None of the measures functions without money provided to the various 
state institutions with counter (and anti) terrorism responsibilities. 
Given the West German state's assumption that one needs to dry up 
support for political violence against the state this requires money for 
more than internal security. '!his necessitates monies for solving 
problems in social conditions r the edUcation systemr and housing at both 
the federal and regional (Laender) level, the later of which has a more 
direct everyday responsibility. '!he government must also clearly explain 
its position on defence, nuclear energy, and other issues which cause 
public concern r and form the basis for the terrorist activity described 
in chapter three. '!hese general measures will not prevent terrorist 
sympathisers from possibly becoming terrorists f but should reduce the 
number of people who become potential sympathisers. 
Table 6.1 (page 205) shows that government spending has remained 
fairly constant over the years r and that the major change over time has 
been the result of accounting changes r which highlight the large 
proportion of the budget devoted to social services. Otherwise spending 
on the armed forces has become 5.4% of the budget r down from its height 
31 Eric Morris, Alan Hoe, Terrorism: Tbreat and Response (London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1987), 126. 
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of 13.8% in the early sixties, and spending on public security, which 
includes the Federal Border Guard, federal police and fire se:rvices, 
public prosecutors, disaster aid and the federal intelligence se:rvices, 
has only fluctuated within a one percent spread. This would not appear 
to have warrented a label of excessive spending by the government. 
Year 
11 1961 
I 1965 1967 
1968 
II 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974a 
1974b 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Table 6.1 Budget Expenditure per Areal 1961-19871 
(in million DM) 
Total Armed % of Public2 % of Educa- % of 
A Forces A Security A 
95,275 13,175 13.8 3707 3.9 
140,581 18,899 13.4 5313 3.8 
155,944 21,024 13.5 5946 3.8 
159,190 17,514 11.0 6298 4.0 
174,723 19,886 11.4 6996 4.0 
196,330 19,831 9.7 7889 4.0 
225,182 21,840 9.9 9285 4.1 
251,271 24,843 9.8 10,338 4.1 
277,665 27,342 9.7 11,813 4.3 
316,504 30,734 6.9 13,957 4.4 
448,250 30,734 6.3 13,903 3.1 
511,710 32[357 6.2 15/253 3.0 
542,047 33,662 6.0 16,038 3.0 
576,293 34,336 5.9 17,364 3.0 
622,259 36,667 5.7 18,678 3.0 
671,251 38[582 5.7 20,313 3.0 
722,866 40,938 5.7 22,225 3.1 
791,199 44,200 5.6 23,526 3.0 
828[482 46,019 5.6 24,151 2.9 
849,178 48,465 5.7 24,864 2.9 
876,812 49,542 5.7 25/425 2.9 
907[266 50,849 5.6 26,465 2.9 
941,902 52,049 5.5 27,634 2.9 
978,851 52,997 5.4 29/120 3.0 
tion A 
8196 8.6 
14,283 10.2 
16[316 10.5 
17,458 11.0 
20,304 11.6 
24,784 12.6 
31,287 13.9 
35,651 14.2 
40,427 14.6 
47,281 14.9 
49,351 11. 0 
53,830 10.5 
54,921 10.1 
57,411 10.0 
61,327 9.9 
66,294 9.9 
73,008 10.1 
76,546 9.7 
77,583 9.4 
78,061 9.2 
77,572 8.8 
80,765 8.9 
83,523 8.9 
86,520 8.8 
Social % of 
Security A 
22,151 23 .2 I 
31,302 22.311 
34,968 22.4 
35,910 22.6 1 
37,249 21.31 
40,355 20.6 
45,242 20.11 
50,326 20.0 
52,123 18.8 
61,970 19.6 
189,073 42.2 
232,719 45.5 
249,378 46.0 I 
267,431 46.4 
283,530 45.6 
299,704 44.6 
319,880 44.3 
368[095 46.5 
389,649 47.0 
397,404 46.8 
412[978 47.1 
425,957 46.9 
443,501 47.1 
464,648 47.5 
~ alb old and new accounting methods 
~II 1 The percentages are part of the total budget for the year. 
The prices are not constant. 
I 1 includes federal border guard, federal police and fire 
II
I se:rvices, public prosecutors, disaster aid and federal 
.. intelligence se:rvices. 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistische Jahrbuch fuer die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1983 (Wiesbaden: W. Kohlhamrner, 1983), 412; 
1990 (1990), 443. 
Indeed, the suspicion that terrorism became a public concern that 
suddenly demanded the government find previously unavailable money to 
handle 'the problem', as it did with public education in the sixties,32 
is not borne out by the figures in Table 6.1, because the difference 
32 Heinz Schwarz, "Die Herausforderung des Terrorisrnus: Sicherhei t 
nach innen und Freiheitsrechte" Die Politische Meimmg 20 (158) 1975, 9-
20, 15. 
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between projected and actual costs for the security services amounted to 
an additional 0.6% of the gross domestic product ($2,696. 7 million) 
between 1970 and 1981. Instead it is possible to argue that these 
increases were due to population growth and programme expenditure. 33 
Table 6.2 Personnel in Federal Public Service, 1964-1988 
Year 
1950 
1960 
1964 
1969 
1970 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
II 1979 
II 1980 
~I ::~o 
x1970 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
x1980 
x1980 
Total Annedl Public2 
Forces Security 
62,400 ------- 200 
211,400 85,500 17,600 
255,036 195 / 417- 4177 
280,444 168,005 4568 
305,100 171,300 21,500 
284,988 171 / 317 4710 
290,203 175,400 5109 
295,567 178,473 5417 
300,743 
296,253 
322,000 
297,572 
299,028 
311,687 
323,830 
327,457 
306,200 
326,141 
1.04 
1.14 
177,447 
177,500 
177 ,450 
175,602 
178,935 
180,425 
172,200 
179,004 
1.01 
1.04 
328,414 179,397 
328,661 180,060 
315,600 172,100 
312,800 171,900 
311,800 171,100 
313,100 171 /300 
312,300 169,100 
0.98 
0.96 
0.98 
0.94 
5878 
26,700 
6199 
6580 
28,394 
29,426 
28,800 
29,426 
1.34 
6.39 
30,094 
30,107 
28,800 
27,700 
27,400 
27,200 
27,700 
0.96 
0.94 
Legal Social 
Aid Security 
200 100 
1200 1000 
1492 752 
1636 721 
1700 700 
1661 721 
1688 739 
1786 786 
1813 818 
1900 800 
1939 824 
1964 821 
2149 906 
2194 1044 
2000 1000 
2117 1173 
1.18 1.43 
1.24 1. 63 
2062 
2065 
1800 
1800 
1800 
1800 
1900 
0.95 
0.89 
1214 
1179 
1100 
1100 
1100 
1200 
1300 
1.30 
1.11 
1 Does not include border guard and armed units. 
2 See Table 6.1. 
II 
II 
II 
I 
~ 
NOTE: The bold figures are rounded off to exclude those on vacation by a 
considerable degree as is seen when they are compared to the other 
figures for contemporary years that were originally published. 
Source: Stati tisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland volumes 1965-1990 (Wiesbaden: W. Kohlhammer, 
1965), 453; 1971, 406; 1972, 411; 1973, 424; 1974, 411; 1975, 412; 1976, 
419; 1977, 405; 1978, 422; 1979, 421; 1980, 416; 1981, 429; 1982, 433; 
1983, 431; 1984, 440; 1990, 459. 
33 Hewitt (1988), 175. 
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Computers, armoured cars and bullet-proof windows do not apprehend 
and protect people from terrorists without people to analyse the 
situations, and make recommendations concerning improvements. Spending 
figures do not seem out of the ordinary for the category of public 
security, but perhaps the figures for personnel in public security are 
different. 
Table 6.2 shows several points. One is that the bold figures 
highlight a rise in personnel which peaks between 1975 and 1980, after 
which they decline in all areas except social security. These 
retrospectively rounded off figures published by the Federal Statistical 
Office since 1983 highlight large increases in public security between 
1970 and 1975, after which its growth slaws in 1980 and then falls. The 
non-bold figures, those published contemporaneously by the Federal 
Statistical Office, shaw a much slower growth rate for public security 
between 1970 and 1975, the formative years of West German terrorism. 
II 
11 
Table 6.3 
Personnel in the Security Apparatus I 1960-1980 
Year BGSl 1970 BKA2 1970 BfV3 1970 IDS/ 1970 Public 1970 Percent-
=100 =100 =100 BKA/ =100 Emplay- =100 age of 
I II III BfV(IV) 
1960 17,530 82 419 35 523 48 18427 78 
1965 20,338 95 548 45 920 85 21796 92 
1968 19,101 89 578 48 998 92 20677 87 
1969 20,673 97 933 77 1016 93 22622 96 
1970 21;370 100 1211 100 1088 100 23669 100 
1971 22,129 104 1529 126 1186 109 24844 105 
1972 22,557 106 1876 155 1259 116 25692 109 
1973 23,309 109 2062 170 1459 134 26830 113 
1974 23 /841 112 2212 183 1559 143 27612 117 
1975 24,544 115 2237 185 1585 146 28366 120 
1976 24,849 116 2424 200 1623 149 28901 122 
1977 25,650 120 2545 210 (1660) 153 29855 126 
1978 26,215 123 3122 258 (1700) 156 31037 131 
1979 25,869 121 3189 263 (1740) 160 30798 130 
1980 26,305 123 3339 276 (1780) 164 31424 133 
1 Calculated figures for all positions in BGS 
2 Planned and actual figures 
ees (V) IV in V 
211,397 69 8.7 
286,771 94 7.6 
296,016 97 7.0 
300,749 99 7.5 
305,096 100 7.8 
312,592 102 7.9 
317,957 104 8.1 
319,263 105 8.4 
319,995 105 8.6 
321;959 106 8.8 
319,672 105 9.0 
314,173 103 9.5 
315,173 103 9.8 
316,256 104 9.7 
316,229 104 9.9 
3 Published figures only until 1976, afterwards progressed ones 
Source: Heiner Busch, Albrect Funk, Udo Kauss I Wolf-Dieter Narr I Falco 
Werkentin, Die Polizei in der Blmdesrepublik (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus 
Verlag, 1985), 79. 
The large discrepancy between the bold and non-bold figures in Table 
6.2 for public security is probably due to the inclusion of the Federal 
Border Guard in the revised figures, which probably explains the sudden 
upsurge in public security personnel between 1975 and 1978. This also 
explains the change in statistical format that occurred and caused the 
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holes in the table. A view of Table 6.3 shows that although the figures 
differ for total public personnel, the rises are similar in volume. 
Table 6.3 also explains that between 1975 and 1978 the percentage of 
people in public security only moved from 8.8% to 9.8% which is 
consistent with the thesis that other unaccounted personnel were not 
included in Table 6.2 before 1978. 
Table 6.4 Laender Personnel in Public Service, 1964-1988 
Year Total 
1950 
1960 
1964 
1969 
1970 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1/ 1980 
x1970 
x1970 
722,200 
949 r600 
977 ,071 
1,111,285 
lr209,900 
1,154,193 
1,213,347 
1,269[771 
1,383,753 
1,376,293 
1,440,,200 
1,403,291 
1,494,284 
1,439,102 
1,680,380 
1,741,082 
1,567,900 
1,666,074 
1.30 
1.44 
1981 1,658,987 
1982 1,668,611 
1983 1,586,500 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1,571 /700 
l r559,800 
1 /548,300 
1,538,100 
x1980 0.98 
x1980 0.92 
Public 
Security 
94,000 
118 rOOO 
122,788 
135,650 
144,500 
144,468 
147,630 
156,072 
168,572 
175 r600 
175,567 
185,715 
199,674 
207,222 
204,500 
209,797 
1.42 
1.45 
214,100 
215,456 
212,000 
211,800 
211,700 
211,600 
211,500 
1.03 
1.01 
Legal 
Aid 
69 rOOO 
91,800 
96,556 
88,403 
104r900 
104,884 
106,397 
113,973 
113,973 
115,900 
115,933 
115,320 
127,611 
133,454 
123,500 
136,484 
1.18 
1.36 
140,600 
143,061 
131,600 
135,400 
136,500 
138r500 
139 r700 
1.13 
1.02 
Educa- Social 
tian Security 
204 r 000 46,000 I' 
295 r800 55,700 I 
279,309 46,488 I 
345,383 44,990 II 
487,100 46,200 
491,129 46,226 
533,359 48,026 
569,698 48,319 
615,022 
635,100 
458,192 
478,986 
594,970 
618,401 
713,000 
622,352 
1.46 
1.16 
630,700 
646,712 
718,700 
694,800 
681,400 
669,900 
659,700 
0.93 
1.06 
50,343 
49,500 
49,514 
49,641 
58,351 
60,911 
51,100 
60,540 1\1 
1.11 
1.31 
59,150 
59,699 
51,700 
52,000 
49,600 
49,600 
49,500 I 
0.97 
0.81 '\ 
NOTE: The bold figures are rounded off to exclude those on vacation by a 
considerable degree as is seen when they are compared to the other 
figures for contemporary years that were originally published. 
Source: Stati tisches Bundesarnt, Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer die 
B\mdesrepublik Deutschland volumes 1965-1990 (Wiesbaden: W. Kohlharnrner, 
1965), 453; 1971, 406; 1972, 411; 1973, 424; 1974, 411; 1975, 412; 1976, 
419; 1977, 405; 1978, 422; 1979, 421; 1980, 416; 1981, 429; 1982, 433; 
1983, 431; 1984, 440; 1990, 459. 
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Table 6 .2 also shows that the total personnel in federal public 
service has risen since 1964 with a cutbacks in 1974 and 1980, with 
apparent reorganisational exercises at regional and federal levels, 
because these are also mirrored in Table 6.4. Table 6.1 shows these were 
not due to budget reductions. However, while all the other sectors lost 
personnel, public security did not. It only suffered a personnel freeze 
in 1980. 
Table 6.3 shows mixed growth in the security services with 
responsibility for counterterrorism. The number of employees with the 
already large Bundesgrenzschutz (BGS , Federal Border Guards) did not 
grow much between 1960 and 1970, whereas those of the Bundesamt fuer 
Verfassungsschutz (BfV! Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution) more than doubled, and those of the BUndeskriminalamt 
(BKA! Federal Criminal Office) almost tripled during this time. By 1974 
the growth rate of the BKA had almost doubled, while the BfV grew by 
virtually half. In 1980 the BKA was nearly three times its 1970 size, 
while the BfV slowed its growth, only growing a bit more than half. 
Table 6.4 shows the same discrepancies exhibited in Table 6.2. One 
notable exception! however! is that while all of the categories in Table 
6.2, except for social security, peaked and then fell back in the 
eighties, those in Table 6.4 peaked between 1980 and 1983 before all but 
legal aid began to fall. Some of these also exhibited growth in the 
eighties so that their percentage of total Laender (Federal Republic 
states) public service personnel grew. Thus the growth of the security 
services highlighted by Table 6. 3 continued into the eighties. 
The increase in personnel in public security areas is only effective 
in improving the quality of public security for the citizens if these 
people have strong motivation I good morale and are provided with 
requisite materials to undertake their duties. An identification with 
them must also be conveyed and built up in the public to avoid their 
alienation and loss of confidence. 
Positions in public security became more attractive in the seventies 
with wage increases and an open door to any of the career paths in the 
police. Changes in the mid-seventies that enabled those with an Abitur 
(higher school leaving certificate) to apply directly to the newly 
established police college meant they could move directly into the 
higher police levels. Those with lower school leaving certificates 
(Real-! Volks- I and Hauptschule) could also move into the higher police 
echelons when a quota for Abitur students was imposed. Nonetheless, 
there has been a general rise in school qualifications for new recruits 
since the seventies. This has ensured a gap between everyday policemen 
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and the police hierarchy that lead the force, and also appears as a gap 
between the qualified technically able and the large mass of employees. 
Moves to widen the training of recrui ts and personnel during their 
careers have not necessarily led to individual flexibility, but rather 
to a flexible institution. 34 
Changes introduced since the mid-seventies have also led to a 
lessening of direct police experience with the social problems and a 
reliance on technically transmitted information. This has led to an 
information flood as discussed below. The increased information 
availability is obtained at the loss of the direct experience and 
shortened police personnel horizons, which has left the police with 
fewer personal contacts to the pubic. Now the police cannot always 
identify with the public, whom they only meet directly through calls for 
help. This in turn makes it harder for the public to identify with 
them. 35 
The working conditions for the police are not always optimal and 
many hours of overtime accrue, without the possibility of leave in lieu. 
For example, the Bonn police spent 496,558 hours in 1985 protecting 
people and buildings, and then saw this figure rise to 615,109 hours in 
1986. The large increase was due to a change in Red Army Faction 
targets. Once they had moved from top people like Schleyer and Buback, 
to the second and third rank people like Beckurts and von Braunmuehl, 
the Bonn police had to suddenly change from protecting seven individuals 
in 1985 to protecting up to 132 people and 267 buildings. The result is 
aver 7000 days leave, which never will be taken. 36 
The provision of modem resources for personnel in the securi ty 
services is highlighted in the example of computer information networks 
that grew rapidly from 1972 onwards. Previous to the introduction of the 
central computer system, INPOL (Police Information System) at the 
Btmdeskriminalamt each of the regional police forces had computerised 
their files with different computer systems. The goal of the new system 
was an on-line service available to all police officers. Eventually this 
system became available to the eleven Laenderkriminalaemter (LKAs, Land 
Criminal Offices), customs officials and the Passport Control Authority 
of the Btmdesgrenzschutz. However, this did not immediately end the use 
of different systems by the Laender and Btmd (federal level), as the 
34 Heiner Busch, Albrecht Funk, 000 Kauss, Wolf-Dieter Narr, Falco 
Werkentin, Die Polizei in der Btmdesrepublik (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus 
Verlag, 1985), 151-2, 168-9. 
35 ibid., 429-30. 
36 Joachim Zimmermann, "Bonn als Zielscheibe des Terrorismus" 
Terrorismus: Informationsdienst 10, 1987, 1-3, 2. 
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regulations allowed the two levels to achieve the goals with different 
systems. These then required compatibility modifications. 37 
Despite the fonnal division of the executive and the intelligence 
gathering anns of the police that separate the Btmdeskriminalamt from 
the Bundesamt fuer VerfasslIDgsschutz, both enjoyed direct access to each 
others' computer systems, INPOL and NADIS until 1979. Afte.rwards they 
interfaced each other's computer systems via telex machines. 3s 
However, information held in INPOL could only pass from the centre 
outwards to the regional offices. Access to the infonnation on other LKA 
computers could only be obtained by another LKA if the central computer 
also had the infonnatian on its files. This cost both time and money. 
Hence, the Laender interior ministers decided between 1975 and 1978 to 
develop a new system, DISPOL, that would overcome this problem. 39 The 
resul ts of the developments of INPOL f DISPOL and their connections to 
other computer systems is that any policeman, or other authorised person 
has instant access to countless files and search systems to enable quick 
and efficient access to infonnation. 
Fears of the abuse of this system that brings together information 
that would normally be difficult, or impossible 1 to combine without 
computer assistance 1 hinders public identification with public security 
officials. 4o These fears are also raised by the powers available to the 
public security personnel which can be used in combination with the 
available computer information. For example, whereas previously the 
authorities could only establish identity control points at border 
crossings, new legislation allows these where terrorist acts have been, 
or are considered to be, a threat, as occurred at the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank meeting in West Berlin in September 
1988.41 Added to this are the fears associated with computer readable 
identity cards. 42 
Although the West Gennan security services apprehended most Red Army 
Faction members in June 1972, shortly after their first bombing campaign 
in May, the first major changes to the criminal and court procedure 
codes began in 1974 after the discovery of the extent to which these 
37 Busch et. al., 119 1 121; Dieter Kuester 1 "Das INPOL-Systern: 
Zielsetzung und Ausbaustand 19821\ Kriminalistik 1, 1983, 18-20, 41-3 1 
19. 
38 Busche et. al., 217-9. 
39 ibid. 1 125. 
40 Jochen Boelsche l "Das Strahlnetz stuelpt sich ueber uns" 1 in: 
Jochen Boelsche ( ed. ) 1 Der Wag in den Uebe:rwachlIDgsstaat Reinbek: 
Rowohlt Verlag, 1979 1 13-107 1 14. 
41 Juergen Blume, Werner Mathias 1 "'Schwerste Aufgabe nach den 
Krieg lIf Stem 41 (39) 22-8 September 1988 1 262-3 1 262. 
42 See Rolf Goessner and Buerger kontrollieren die Polizei (eds.). 
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first suspected terrorists pushed the state I s legal limits to their 
outer edge. The rejuvenatory factor of terrorists- -the identification 
of recruits with imprisoned suspected and convicted terrorists- -meant 
that the apprehension and conviction of terrorists was only one part of 
countering terrorism. A thorough counterterrorism policy was required. 
The laws designed to counter terrorism in West Germany were mostly 
written between December 1974 and October 1978, with several repealed in 
1981 and more added in the late eighties. 43 The legislation that was 
introduced to counter terrorism can be found in four areas: (1) legal 
procedures and defence rights for persons suspected of terrorism; (2) 
legislation defining what constitutes terrorism and the state's monopoly 
of force; (3) increased powers for the surveillance of suspects and the 
police and intelligence apparatus, and; ( 4 ) legislation over weapons 
ownership and usage. 44 
These four areas cut across fundamental political differences 
between the major West German political parties, which could only agree 
that the liberal democracy should not be an unarmed society with passive 
loyalty to the nation, but have 'active democrats' as the cornerstone of 
counterterrorism. They also agreed that individual citizens' rights, a 
cri terion of liberal democracy, needed to be balanced by the need for 
further security measures. 45 
Otherwise, the Christian Democrats and the Christian Social Union 
considered themselves to have a special competence with law and order 
matters, one of their traditional concerns. The CDU/CSU often pushed a 
conservative view that argued terrorism derived directly from the events 
of 1968 and 'leftism' in general, whereby any form of social criticism 
challenged the established social norms and thus encouraged terrorists. 
The SPD, on the other hand, was less inclined towards such simplistic 
positions on terrorism due to the complexities of leftist ideology, and 
the fact that they did not want to alienate their supporters who ranged 
from moderate to radical left.46 The FDP and Greens are discussed under 
43 Uwe Berlit l Horst Dreier l "Die legislative Auseinandersetzung mit 
dem Terrorismus", in: Fritz Sack 1 Heinz Steinert (eds.) 1 Protest und 
Reaktion: Analysen zum Terrorisnrus 4/2 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 
1984) l 227-318, 229 1 Helmut Kerscher ( "Der Rechtsstaat setzt sich zur 
wehr", in: Dieter Schroeder (ed.), Te.rrorismus: Gewalt mit politischem 
Hotiv (Munich: Paul List Verlag 1 Sueddeutsche Zeitung Serie, 1986), 77-
87, 86-7; Horbatiuk, 167-191. Earlier counterterrorism legislation 
introduced on 16 December 1971 1 Article 316c StGB 1 covered attacks on 
aviation, and perpetrators thereof anywhere, and Articles 239a and 239b 
covered ransom and coercion. This article also contains translations of 
many other StGB and stPO articles. 
44 Kolinsky, 82, 83-4, 85. 
45 Pridham, 46. 
46 ibid. r 39. 
policy implementation, as are the SPD and CDU/CSU with regards to 
specific policy options. 
The legislation was designed for the apprehension of suspected 
terrorists before they committed crimes, and for quick and speedy trials 
afterwards. This necessitated the expansion of state prosecutor I s powers 
and of the police I s rights of search and apprehension. 4 7 The pressure 
for success, coupled with the added difficulties of counterterrorism, 
showed the borders of the legal limits more forcefully than previously 
had been the case for the executive and judicial institutions. 48 These 
are discussed more fully in the next section on antiterrorist resources. 
Legislative measures are mentioned here briefly because preventative 
and reactive measures overlap. There are grey areas between them, 
especially when measures designed to be used reactively are used 
preventatively as mentioned in the case of the IMP meetings in 1988 when 
Federal Prosecutor General Rebmann used Para 111 Criminal Court 
Procedure Code in connection with 129a Criminal Code to establish 
control points before, 
incidents. 49 
instead of after, suspected terrorist 
Public trust in the security services is a delicate affair developed 
through media presentation of incidents and government policy, as well 
as general political education of the democratic political system (see 
also chapter seven). Part of the general political education is 
undertaken through the Btmdeszentrale fuer politische Bildung (Federal 
Office for Political Education) created in 1974 to promote political 
understanding, democratic consciousness and public participation in the 
political process. It is independent of the political parties and falls 
under the organisational reponsibili ty of the Interior Ministry. 50 The 
office organises conferences, seminars and provides free publications 
for interested persons. 
The effectiveness of counterterrorism policy resources does not rest 
solely with the provision of material resources, but also in the 
intangibles of conventions and legislation to reduce the attractiveness 
of terrorism and aid in the apprehension of suspects in other countries. 
For example, the need to overcome difficulties in radio communications 
between the police forces of different countries, and the regulations 
and suspicions about foreign policemen on home territory contributed to 
47 Berlit, Dreier, 232. 
48 Heinz Giehring, "Die Reaktion des Gesetzgebers auf den 
Terrorismus If , in: Jugend und Terrorismus: Ein Hearing des 
Btmdesjugendkuratoriums (Munich: Juventa Verlag, 1979), 61-83, 61-2. 
49 Blume, Maithes, Stern 41/1988, 262. 
50 "Erlass ueber die Bundeszentrale fuer politische Bildung" in Das 
Parlament 9 August 1980, 14. 
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turn a multinational effort to apprehend extortionists operating in 
Europe into a farce. Had the regulations restricting the operation of 
foreign policemen in different countries not been overcome and the 
effort a success, this may have led to more serious problems in future 
cooperation, because suspicions would have been proven justified. 51 
While the FRG efforts of cooperation outside the West, where group 
efforts may conflict with its own interests, have not been as beneficial 
as some would like, its cooperation within the West has been 
substantial. 52 One problem with international cooperation is its 
tendency to mirror the domestic policy of 'no concessions I discussed 
earlier in the counterterrorism assumptions. In foreign policy this has 
extended to the 'self-help' of the Mogadishu rescue. 53 
Perhaps its strongest bilateral cooperation efforts have been with 
France. The 1963 Franco-German Treaty of Friendship, provided a 
convivial context for discussions about terrorism when it became a 
problem in the seventies. The two states added to this with the February 
1977 aggreement on joint customs and police posts. The February 1985 
efforts initiated by the two Interior Ministers to improve cooperative 
police and intelligence efforts, with irrnnediate information exchanges, 
bloomed in April 1987 with an agreement over constant contact between 
Gennan and French officials who would aid the exchange of internal 
security, legal, and investigative procedure information through their 
particular expertise when in the neighbouring country. Ideally this will 
lead to similar cooperative efforts with other European states. 54 
The lack of a general international agreement on terrorism makes it 
more difficult to counter. Agreements that specifically list the 
extradi table crimes have proved unworkable in the past, and new ones 
which list crimes not covered by the treaty are in use. Fortunately, 
terrorism is less often considered as an excludable political crime so 
progress is being made. The best way forward, however, is a hannonising 
51 Sepp Ebelseder, "Katastrophenalann beim 'Party-Service I II Stern 43 
(9) 22-8 February 1990, 214-5, 214. 
52 Busch et.al., 216, 231, 309. 
53 Martha Crenshaw, "Introduction: Reflections on the Effects of 
Terrorism", in: Martha Crenshaw (ed.), Terrorism, Legitimacy r and Power: 
The Consequences of Political Violence (Middletown, Conn: Weselyan 
University Press, 1983), 1-37, 13. 
54 Malcolm Anderson, Policing the World: INTERPOL and the Politics 
of Inte:rnational Police Co-operation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 
136, 156; SUeddeutsche Zeibmg 6 February 1985, 1; Die Welt 9 April 
1987; "Zusamrnenarbeit" Terrorismus: Infonnationsdienst 6, 1987, 5. 
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of criminal legal systems so that involvement in the activities of 
terrorist organisations is a crime in all states. 55 
Another main area of furthering international cooperation is that of 
practical measures such as the prevention of terrorist acts. This can be 
furthered by forming a European databank network similar to the German 
intelligence services system which would list the files of information 
in their national databanks. This avoids the national legislation 
problems about the transfer of data on individuals and its end use. At a 
minimum, such a system would speed up the transfer of information. A 
similar information exchange already exists between the TREVI members, 
as they exchange information about terrorist organisations, suspects, 
stolen weapons and explosives with possible terrorist connections. They 
have further agreed to conduct evaluations of terrorist threats to 
Europe and report these through the secure TREVI ca;rnunications 
network. 56 
TREVI was organised as a loose inter-governmental structure at the 
suggestion of the British Foreign Minister James Callaghan in 1975, and 
forms an important part of the European Political Cooperation process at 
the ministerial and official level of the European Canmunities. The 
United States and Canada are observer members.57 
The removal of borders within the European Community by 31 December 
1992 means that cooperative efforts are required sooner rather than 
later. The Schengen Agreement designed to remove borders in 1990 between 
the Federal Republic, France and the Benelux countries signed on 14 June 
1985 has highlighted the difficulties involved. This area was widened to 
inclUde Poland due to the removal of visa restrictions for Poles 
entering the Federal Republic after 8 April 1991. Spain and Portugal 
also signed the agreement in June 1991. The implications of this are 
heightened further when it is noted that between 1971 and 1982 border 
crossing in West Germany rose from 687 to 880 million and currently 
stand at over 900 million a year. Between 1971 and 1982 the number 
detained at borders rose from 41,096 to 89,200, and those arrested from 
55 Kurt Rebmann, "Probleme und Moeglichkeiten der Bekaempfung des 
internationalen Terrorismus" Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 30, 1985 
(II), 1735-8, 1737-8. 
56 ibid., 1738; "TREVI", Terrorismus: Info:rma.tionsdienst 1, 1987, 4; 
IITREVI", Terrorismus: Info:rma.tionsdienst 6, 1987, 4. 
57 Named after the fountain in Rome, and as the abbreviation of 
Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, Violence, International, Anderson, 3; 
Friedrich Zimmermann, "Europaeische Zusamnenarbei t bei der Bekaempfung 
des Terrorismus fl Bulletin 2 (5 January) 1983, 10-11, 10. 
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7,265 to 14,073. However, these difficulties have also hindered the 
treaty's enactment, which the members hoped would be in late 1991. 58 
An extent ion of the European Community's outer borders requires 
enhanced security in less secure border countries like Greece and 
Portugal through such speculative measures as employing multiple 
national police forces at border crossings, i.e. German border guards in 
Greece and Portugal. Another option is pursuit over borders by police 
authorities, even if only to observe. Lastly, there could also be Euro-
wide searches for terrorists to reduce their safe-havens. 59 
However, international cooperation can, at best, only reduce 
terrorism. It cannot be eradicated. Cooperation can be maximised with 
corrrnon rules of behaviour, rewards to shift the perspective of states 
from short-term (release of hostages, or remove threat of reprisals) to 
the long-term security benefits via raised international prestige and 
economic rewards, and penalties for non-cooperation which range from 
political, economic, and diplomatic levels to the extreme example of 
military reprisals such as the USA raid on Libya in April 1986. 60 
3.2 Antiterrorist Resources 
After the experience of centralised police forces in the Third Reich 
the new republic separated the executive and investigative tasks of the 
police forces and gave the main responsibility for police powers to the 
regional Laender, while the federal level could be called for assistance 
when requested. The BKA and regional police forces have the powers of 
arrest, while the intelligence services of the BfV, its regional offices 
and the Federal Intelligence Service have no powers of arrest. The 
intelligence services therefore work with liason members from the BKA 
and LKAs.61 
The Btmdeskrirninalamt was created in 1951, but until 1970 remained 
mainly a letter box institution, where officials were only involved with 
filing information. Although the BKA could be called in by the regional 
58 ibid., 25; Busche et. al., 297; Anderson, 25; "Interview: 
Eckhardt Wertebach" Terrorismus: Info:rmationsdienst 7, 1991, 4-5, 5; 
Independent 9 April 1991, 26 June 1991. 
59 llInterview: Kurt Rebmann" Terrorismus: Info:rmationsdienst 5, 
1989, 1-3, 2-3. 
60 Crenshaw (1989), 38, 44-6, 59. 
61 Busch et. al., 107-8; Juergen Thomaneck, "Police and Public Order 
in the Federal Republic of Germany", in: John Roach, Juergen Thomaneck 
(eds.), Police and Public Order in Europe (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 
143-184, 150-1; Diethhelm Damm, If Die Praktiken des Verfassungsschutzes", 
in: Peter Brueckner, Diethelm Damm, Juergen Seifert, 1984 schon heute, 
oder wer hat Angst vorm Verfassungsschutz? (Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag Neue 
Kritik, 1977), 7-106, 12. 
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Landkriminalaemter to take over difficult cases, this occurred only five 
times prior to 1970. 62 
The computerisation of the BKA in 1972 was organised by Dr. Horst 
Herold, who became president of the BKA on 1 September 1971. 
Computerisation did not occur sooner because the previous president I 
Paul Dickopf, did not see the institution as a leader for new technology 
and systems in criminology, and disliked canputers. This led to regional 
LKAs computerising their files and offices on their own,63 which 
remained after national canputerisation and necessitated 
interconnections between the different systems. Some of the alternative 
systems required birthdates to locate files, and others not. Some could 
enquire about stolen vehicles, others not. 64 
Legislation later widened BKA responsibility fran information 
storage to investigative responsibilities. In 1969 the BKA received new 
regulations to enable it to direct people to assist the Laender, and 
when the Baader-Meinhof group was at its climax in 1971/2, the BKA was 
directed by the Federal Interior Minister to handle all politically 
motivated acts against 'constitutional institutions' .65 
The lack of success in apprehending the early Red Anny Faction 
created pressure for BKA powers to direct special canmissions in the 
Laender. After success in June 1972 this was quickly changed back to the 
other system, and the BKA had to request to have automatic control over 
the Laender firmly established. Legislation in 1973 charged the BKA with 
responsibility for investigation into terrorism, international weapons 
trade, drugs and counterfeit money.66 
Bundeskriminalamt authority was further entrenched in 1975 after the 
Lorenz abduction when the Federal Interior Minister insti tuted 
'cooperative federalism' with the BKA storing and compiling all 
information on terrorism, and the Laender canmitting themselves to 
follow the ;requests and suggestions of the BKA. As the Bundeskriminalamt 
has no searching capacity with officers in the field apart from BKA and 
LKA cooperative targeted searches for individual terrorists, the 
regional police forces have sole responsibility for these measures,67 
and so the BKA must rely on the LKA work. 
62 Busch, et. al., 83, 84. 
63 Boelsche, 17; Annand Mergen, Die BKA Story (Munich: F.A. Herbig 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1987), 175-6. 
64 Karl-Heinz Krurrun, "Terrorbekaempfung und Foederalismus", in: 
Extremisnrus- -Terrorisnrus- -Kriminalitaet (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fUer 
politische Bildung, 1978)/ 80-3/ 81. 
65 Mergen, 80-1. 
66 ibid.; Busch, et.al./ 84. 
67 Krurrun, 81-2. 
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Beneath the BRA and LKAs are regional uniformed and criminal police 
units which comprise the majority of police persons. About a hundred 
years ago, there was one policeman for every 1500 citizens. In 1971 it 
was one to 466 and in 1987 one policeperson for every 361 citizens. 68 
The Bundesamt fuer Verfasmmgsschutz is the internal intelligence 
gathering and analysis institution of the country, which examines the 
threats posed to government stability and security by domestic and 
foreign enemies operating in the Federal Republic. In essence this comes 
down to their watching and analysing unconstitutional behaviour wi thin 
the country, whereby the BfV determines what is and what is not 
unconstitutional behaviour. 69 
The powers and scope of the BfV and the regional Landaemter fuer 
Verfassungsschutz (LfV, state Offices for the Protection of the 
Constitution) grew considerably when the Radikalenerlass (Radical 
Decree) was introduced by the Social Democratic government on 28 January 
1972. This required the BfV to screen personnel for civil service posts, 
which inclUdes education, post office and railroad employees, as well as 
local, regional and state goverr.m1ent positions. 
The Radical Decree was first introduced in SPD controlled Hamburg 
and then widened nationally, because both the Blind and Laender can set 
loyalty standards, and without wide agreement between them, each could 
have different ones. The Social Democrats instituted this to erect a 
strong demarcation line between itself and communist parties to avoid 
the label of communist sympathisers. This was also imperative with the 
widening of the SPD ' s Ostpolitik. 70 
The Radikalenerlass did not introduce any new principles regarding 
civil service employment, and was even based on the 1957 civil service 
law. The new concept introduced- -to avoid blanket exclusion based on 
68 Die Gruenen im Bundestag, "Zehn Jahre danach- -Offene Fragen und 
politische Lehren aus den 'Deutschen Herbst': Antwort der 
Bundesregierung auf die Grosse Anfrage der Gruenen", in: Die Gruenen im 
Bundestag (eds.), Ende der Bleieme Zeit? Versuch eines Dialogs zwischen 
Gesellschaft und RAF (Bonn: Die Gruenen, Bundesgeschaftesstelle, 1989), 
65-123, 82. 
69 Damn, 18; n.n., "Act Regulating the Cooperation of the Federal 
Government and the Laender in Matters Relating to the Protection of the 
Constitution'!, quoted in: Carl-Christoph Schweitzer (ed.), Politics and 
Government of the Federal Republic of Gennany: Basic Documents 
{Leamington Spa: Berg Publications Ltd., 1984), 183-4. In the former 
East German territory, that has been divided into five new Laender, it 
is expected that five new LfVs will be organised with 150 to 200 
personnel each, roughly half of whom will be from the West f lfWerber aus 
dem Westen" Der Spiegel 37 (10 September) 1990, 26. 
70 n.n. Deutsche Geschichte 1962-1983: Band 2 (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Fischer, 1985), 94; G. Smith, 223; page 224 contains a translation of 
the decree. 
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membership of 'hostile' organisations- -individual consideration of each 
case, which required an enlarged security service to cornpile the 
numerous individual dossiers. Foreign press attention was captured when 
the word Berufsverbot (job exclusion) became attached to the decree, 
because of the government I s monolopoly on training, development and 
employment in certain areas. If disqualified, where was the person to 
find work?71 
Under the Basic Law the anned forces can only play a role in 
counterterrorism policy if the matter should become so serious as to 
cause "a state of defence or a state of tension" (Article 87a Basic Law) 
during which time the Blmdeswehr carry out traffic control r building 
protection duties or support the Blmdesgrenzschutz. Beneath this 
threshold the BGS and other regional paramilitary organisations play a 
more active antiterrorism role. 
Between the two garrisoned federal paramilitary organisations, the 
BGS is more concerned with anti terrorism policy. The 18,000 
Bereitschaftspolizei (standby police) participate in regular police 
duties for use in situations such as subway station and building raids, 
for combing areas of land, and for protection duties. 72 
The Blmdesgrenzschutz has many roles in counterterrorism policies. 
The 20,000 BGS members, in addition to border protection, also supervise 
the frontier traffic with its Passport Control Authority.73 
The BGS was originally empowered to act only on the national 
borders. Nonetheless, sections were used as supportive police units at 
the request of interior police departments to help control 
demonstrations. Addi tionally { uni ts were stationed around Bonn to help 
protect the capital and the government. These practices were legalised 
with the BGS laws passed on 18 August 1972, and added to them in the 
fonn of disaster aid, seaborne operations, and other functions included 
in other legal directives, such as those covering immigration/ fireanns 
and the protection of airports and Gennan embassies abroad. 7 4 
The most famous subunit of the BGS, Grenzschutzgruppe (GSG , Border 
Protection Group) 9, was called into creation on 26 September 1972 by 
the Federal Minister of the Interior to carry out specific police 
missions that require, either covertly or overtly, the use of immediate 
force against criminals and terrorist organisations. This was a direct 
71 G. Smith, 223-5; Deutsche Geschichte 1962-1983: Band 2, 94-5. 
72 Busch, et. al. I 101-2; Thomaneck, 154; J. Blum, "The protection 
of Persons and Installations at Risk: The Gennan Way" Police studies 1, 
1978, 53-61, 57. 
73 Thomaneck, 160; Rolf Tophoven, GSG 9: Gennan Response to 
Terrorism (Coblenz: Bernand and Graefe Verlag, 1984), 13. 
74 Tophoven r 13-4; Busch, et.al., 100-1; Blum, 58. 
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response to the Munich Massacre on 5 September 1972. The unit originally 
had 188 members, but later grew to 200. 75 
GSG 9 is employed on federal territory when a state interior 
minister requests their assistance through the federal interior 
minister. Due to the 'machoism' or 'ego' of the states in the past, they 
have not requested the GSG 9' s assistance. Hence, GSG 9 only saw its 
first operation in Mogadishu, a place outwith federal territory.76 
At the regional level each state has its own units similar, but not 
equivalent in training and exPerience, to the GSG 9, which were also 
established in 1972. These are the mobile, special intervention, and 
marksman units. 77 
These special elite units are police units, and after secondment the 
members return to regular police duties (or the Border Guard in the case 
of GSG 9) with their home units. Therefore training is from the police 
background, and when called to action these units first contain the 
situation, save lives, and then apprehend offenders. 78 
The direction of the police and intelligence units comes from two 
sources in reaction to terrorist incidents. One is the council organised 
around the chancellor, and the other is the inmediate response system 
organised after the Schleyer abduction. 
In the Lorenz and Schleyer kidnappings, and during the Stockholm 
siege, Chancellor Schmidt headed political councils which included both 
coalition and opposition members. These were formed to ease the exchange 
of information and its evaluation, as well as to provide a forum for the 
voicing of opinions and ideas. A standard of unanimous decisions was 
formed. Not in order to distribute the responsibility, that always 
remained with the Federal Government, but rather it was considered self-
evident that when the life of an individual was at stake, the government 
and opposition leaders should gather to discuss and consider 
alternatives- -independent of their political persuasion and position. 79 
These were extraordinary councils which disrupted the regular 
channels of communication and hierarchy in the security services, so a 
new crisis coordination office was organised by the Interior Ministry. 
Similar ones were also established in the Laender. The office was 
75 Tophoven, 10-1, 18-25. 
76 ibid., 11, 13, 92-3. Previous to this the group had sent units 
abroad for security purposes at sporting events, and to advise the Dutch 
during South Moluccan attacks. 
77 ibid., 11-3; Blum, 57. 
78 Schiller (1987 I), 539-540. 
79 Schleyer Dokumentation, 20, (materialien) 37, 86; Helmut Schmidt, 
"Erklaerung des Bundeskanzlers zur Inneren Sicherheit am 5. Maerz 1975" 
Bulletin 31 (7 March) 1975, 301-2. 
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created after an Interior Ministers 1 Conference decision in Dusseldorf 
on 29 August 1978, which decided that the nation needed a coordination 
office to offer first response in any type of crisis situation ranging 
from terrorist incidents and abductions to natural and man-made 
disasters. The coordination committee office acts as an information 
clearing house to support political decision-makers. 8o 
Criminal and court procedure code changes were previously described 
as affecting both preventative and reactive counterterrorism measures. 
Such changes reduced the accused's rights, which had previously produced 
long terrorist trials. In the mid-seventies it was argued both that the 
terrorists and their defence lawyers were unnecessarily drawing out 
trials, and that they were using the system to its full advantage I 
because the court system favoured the accused. The authorities wanted to 
introduce legislation to aid the executive and judicial branches where 
they saw their manouverability restricted by legal limit, but yet 
balance this 'reactive crisis management f with the minimum necessary 
measures to counter the proportional danger of terrorism at the time. 
Overreaction was to be avoided. 81 
The first changes introduced to cope with terrorism were aimed at 
the management of affairs between defence lawyers and defendants, and 
the maintainance of courtroom order. The justice system was concerned 
that courtroom order be maintained to ensure that the rule of law was 
not placed in question by people seeking to make court and justice 
procedures difficult, if not impossible,82 or that they would be able to 
turn the court proceedings into a propaganda forum. This only worked if 
the court could first identify the political content in order to 
eliminate it. This was made more difficult by the establishment of 
motives for the crimes being tried, and by terrorists' non-cooperation 
policy,83 as discussed in chapter four, whereby they physically resisted 
80 H.J. Gebauer, "Aufgaben und Gliederung im Fuehrungsstab des 
Bundnisministers des Innern" Die Polizei 1, 1982, 13-20, 13-6. See also 
H.J. Gebauer I "Fuehrungsstaebe oberster Bundes- und Landesbehoerden mit 
Sicherheitsaufgaben" Die Polizei 12, 1979, 385-389. 
81 Giehring, 62-3; Gerhard Mauz, liEs ist nicht irrnner Haarmann, der 
kommt ... ", in: Wolfgang Dressen (ed.), Politische Prozesse ohne 
Verteidigung? (West Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1976), 7-11, 8; 
Detlef Krause f 'IThe Reform of the· Criminal Procedure Law in the Federal 
Republic of Germany" Judicial Review December 1979, 202-223 f 207 i Joerg 
Berkemann, "Die Bindung des Rechtsstaates" fin: ExtremiSllRlS-
TerroriSllRlS- -Kr:i.nrinalitaet (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fuer politische 
Bildung, 1978), 71-6, 74. 
82 Kerscher, 86; Hans-Jochen Vogel in: Herman Vinke, Gabriele Witt 
(eds.), Die Anti-Terror-Debatten im Parlament: Protokolle 1974-1978 
(Reinbek: Rowohlt Verlag, 1978), 26. 
83 Otto Horn, I1Vorschlaege des Richterbundes", in: ExtremiSllRlS- -
TerroriSllRlS- -Kr:i.nrinalitaet (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fuer politische 
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everything th~ prison and court staff wanted to do as a means of 
maintaining their ~political identity'. 
The courts had a for~taste of this during the Socialist Patients I 
Collective trials (see chapt~r two) several years before the 1975 case 
against Baader, Ensslin, Meinhof and Raspe. The SPK trials had public 
bench choruses that called out: 'special judge Gohl cooks the Nazi 
Kohl! 184 The accused would be more dragged than brought in, sometimes 
hitting out around them, while calling out obscene abuse at the judges, 
and their own lawyers. The courts, however, could only fine people up to 
DMlOOO, and sentence them for up to three days in prison. On 1 January 
1975 the fine was doubled and a prison sentence could be as long as one 
week. This was still not deemed sufficient. 85 
Ever since Meinhof was arrested in June 1972 with a note from 
Ensslin (who had been arrested several weeks previously) on her person, 
the suspicion of defence lawyers' collusion with terrorists has always 
been present. 8 6 Previous attempts to exclude defence lawyers had been 
found unconstitutional, so new legislation was required. New laws were 
passed on 20 December 1974, which limited three defence lawyers for each 
accused person, and excluded the combined defence of several persons in 
collaborative court defence. Later additions to excluding defence 
lawyers also occurred in legislation passed on 18 August 1976 and 14 
April 1978.81 
When these court procedure codes were combined wi th Para 129a 
Strafgesetzbuch (StGB, Criminal Code Book)88 (supporting, recruiting for 
or member of a terrorist organisation), then accuseds f rights could be 
further restricted. This also affected the defence strategy whereby 
judges could view correspondence between the defendent and the defence 
Bildung, 1978), 85-7, 85; Hans Buchheim, "Der linksradikale Terrorismus: 
Voraussetzungen zu seiner Ueberwindung" Die politische Meimmg 22 (170) 
1977, 7-18, 16-7; Hans Schueler, "Finale in der Festung Stammheim" Die 
Zeit 16 May 1975, 3. 
84 Kohl means cabbage in Gennan and Kohle is criminal argot for 
money. 
85 Erich Schwinge, "Terroristen und ihre Verteidiger: Blick auf den 
Baader-Meinhof-Prozess" Politische Meimmg 30 (158) 1975, 35-49, 41. 
86 see Wolfgang Dressen (ed.), Politische Prozesse ohne 
Verteidigung? (West Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1976); Schut (1986) { 
and Walter Althammer (ed.), Gegen den Terror: Texte/Dokumente 
(stuttgart: Verlag Bonn Aktuell, 1978. 
87 Kerscher, 86. 
88 The legal codes cited are found in: Dr. Heinrich Schoenfelder 
(ed.), Deutsche Gesetze, Samnlung des Zivil-, Straf-, und 
Verfahrensrechts. 14.-16. Auflage. stand: 10 Oktober 1987 (Munich: CH 
Beck I sche Ver lagsbuchhandlung 1988) and reference will only be made to 
the code. 
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lawyer in sane cases, and according to sane sources I the public 
prosecutor can also view these and other confiscated materials. 89 
During the Schleyer abduction the possibility of information passing 
between imprisoned persons and their lawyers was seen to engender the 
possible loss of "life, limb and liberty of a person". '!herefore, the 
government and opposition parties argued for legislation to prevent 
contact between suspected and convicted persons under 129a StGB. '!his 
included contact between themselves and their defence lawyers. '!he 
Laender justice ministers decide when to implement this, and if 
prisoners in several Laender are involved, then the decision rests with 
the Federal Justice Minister. 9o 
Defendants accused of Para 129a StGB may have their court case 
carried out in their absence if the defendant "intentionally and through 
his own fault placed himself in a condition which suspends his ability 
to participate in the trial", 91 such as through a hunger strike. '!he 
proceedings themselves may only be interrupted for up to thirty days. 
Conversely Para 231a Strafprozessordmmg (StPO, Criminal Code Procedure) 
also means that the accused can also take part whenever they desire, 
which itself causes delays, when the accused is informed of what 
transpired in their absence (Para 231a Art. 2 StPO).92 
Court procedure and criminal codes operate in tandem in the 
courtroan. '!hey also r however r influence apprehension through their 
definitions of what is illegal. 
Legislative changes to the definitions of crimes, and the creation 
of new crimes with new criminal codes r first occurred on 22 April 1976 
with the passage of Para 88a StGB r which sought to inhibit the spread of 
terrorism by controlling the manner of communication about violence. 
89 Berlit l Dreier 1 236-7; Iring Fetscher, Terrorismus und Reaktion 
(Cologne: Europaeische Verlagsgesellschaft, Second Edition, 1978), 83-4. 
90 Herbert Weber in: Vlnke r Witt, 275-6 r 278; Horbatiukr 183; see 
also Federal Ministry of Justice, "Contact Ban Between Prisoners and the 
Outside World- -Information about the Law to Fight Terrorism" r in: 
National Criminal Justice Reference Service 1 International SUmmaries: A 
Collection of Selected Translations in Law En£orcemen.t and Criminal 
Justice volume 3 (Washington DC: US Department of Justice 1 Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law 
Enforcement and Criminal Justice, April 1979)r 147-153 r 149. 
91 Horbatiuk l 179. 
92 Krauser 215-6. 
93 Kerscher r 86; Sebastian Cobler, "Das 'Gesetz zum Schutz des 
Gemeinschaftsfriedens I - -oder wie man Buecher verbrennt ohne sich die 
Finger schmutzig zu machen", in: Ulrich Sonnemann (ed. L Der 
misshandelte Rechtsstaat in Erfahrung und Urteil bundesdeutscher 
Schriftsteller r Rechtsanwaelte und Richter (Cologne: Kiepenheuer und 
witsch r 1977), 94-102 1 94-5. 
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These changes in early 1976, along with the creation of a new 
offence under Para 129a StGB on 18 August 1976 r brought an 'advancement 
of criminal zones t whereby previously unpunishable offences were made 
illegal in an effort to apprehend potential pre-terrorists before they 
became terrorists. This included Para 88a and 130a StGB which cover 
communication about violence r and Para 129a and 138 StGB, which deal 
with terrorist organisations and the non-notification of crimes. 94 
The discussions about these paragraphs centre on one's perception of 
terrorist recruitment, and what is or is not terrorism. If terrorism is 
perceived as the final stage on the path of political violence, then the 
imprisonment of violence accepting persons before they become terrorists 
is considered important. When one sees terrorism as a form of violence 
which puts the liberal democratic state in question, then other forms of 
violence which do not question it, call for a different response. 95 
Para 129 StGB, which prohibits criminal organisations, was first 
used to arrest and charge the original terrorists, and furthered the 
government I s case that the terrorists were criminals. The new 129a, 
which prohibits terrorist organisations r compromised the argument that 
terrorists were ordinary criminals, because of the other special 
regulations and powers the code enables. 96 
Worth special notice in Para 129a StGB is the lack of definitions: 
What is 'support' or 'recruitment' to a terrorist organisation, and what 
is an'organisation'? There is a large amount of semantic play in the law 
which allows the authorities manoeuverability. More interestingly, 129a 
does not have to be proven to arrest someone. Suspicion by the 
prosecuting authorities is enough. 9 7 
In 1986 Para 129a StGB was modified, in light of perceived terrorist 
recruitment I to include more people than those normally considered 
'terrorists'. These new people could feel endangered enough now to enter 
the underground r instead of remaining in society, because the new Para 
129a StGB amendments placed the persons in a special category in which 
they had previously not been included. 98 
94 Kerscher, 86; Berlit r Dreier, 232. 
95 Erwin Brunner, Karl-Heinz Janssen, Joachim Riedl, Michael 
Sontheimer r "Wunderwaffe Kronzeuge" Die Zeit 21 November 1986, 17-22, 
22; die taz 5 December 1986, 3; see also the Federal Interior Minister, 
Friedrich Zimmermann, in Die Welt 25 October 1986, 6. 
96 Berlit, Dreier, 267-8. 
97 ibid., 233. For a more detailed discussion of how this 
legislation can be used, especially in connection with the security 
services, communication and computer systems r see Rolf Goessner, Buerger 
kontrollieren die Polizei (eds.). 
98 Christian Lochte in die taz 5 December 1986. 
The widening of 129a also widens the concept of terrorism to now 
include formerly less serious crimes, thereby losing some of its 
political weight. Furthermore, it is also not proven that toppling of 
power pylons- -the main target of the modification- -is the work of 
organisations. If it is individuals, how can a code designed for groups 
be applied? These changes compromised legal principles. 99 
New criminal court procedure codes passed on 13 April 1978 widened 
the number of codes that were enabled by Para 129a StGB.100 In cases of 
Para 129a StGB the public prosecutor and their appointed assistants now 
had the right I in addition to judges I to allow the police to search 
apartments and other rooms in buildings where it is suspected terrorists 
or items connected with them are to be found (Para 103 StFO). They could 
also erect control points on streets and in squares for the purpose of 
checking and holding individuals to establish their identities (and hold 
their vehicles and belongings), if it is suspected a crime under Para 
129a ( or 250 Art. 1 Nr. 1) StGB was committed in the 'area I / an 
undefined term. (Para 103, 108, lllb, lllc, StPO) The person may 
additionally be held incommunicado if it is suspected that their 
normally allowed notification of either a relative or confidante would 
endanger the investigation. (Para 163b StFO) 
Physical resources are available in the form of security services 
and other institutions to counter terrorism. These are also supported 
with the requisite powers to undertake their duties. 
Based on the assumptions in the second section it appears that the 
West Germans reacted well to terrorism. They have provided institutions 
with funds f personnel and powers to respond wi thin the organised 
counterterrorism assumptions. The next section views whether these 
assumptions and resources were usefully implemented. 
99 Dencker, 45. 
100 Vinke, Witt (eds.), 312-3. 
4. Strengths and Limitations of Counterterrorism Policies 
Previously the chapter highlighted ample resources for the West 
German government's counterterrorism policies based on assumptions which 
mirrored general asssumptions on the subject. The government appeared to 
understand that the 'communication' model worked best if it was 
supported by the 'war ( model, and that both were necessary. 
This section examines how these resources and assumptions were 
implemented. For if policies were only half-heartedly implemented then 
the expected actual return of the policies would differ. Similarly, if 
implementation overlooked asp~ts which affected policy effectiveness. 
As in the section on resources the following one is divided into 
counter and antiterrorism aspects. Each of these focuses on how policy 
implementation succeeded or failed, and its affects on terrorist 
motivation and public identification with the government. 
4.1 Counterterrorism Policy Inplementation 
West German counterterrorism policy assumed that terrorism could be 
reduced through the reduction of its sources and causes by increasing 
the tolerance of different viewpoints in the state, i. e. the promotion 
of democratic ideas. The aim of this was to reduce the support base in 
which the terrorists move and recruit new members. Thus government 
counterterrorism policy examined efforts towards preventing and 
deterring terrorist activity, as well as efforts of removing people fran 
the terrorist scene of their own will. 
The promotion of democratic tolerance can occur in the education 
system- -although it must be realistic and not engender idealistic 
expectations. It can also be done through public participation in 
political parties and interest groups, as well as the manner in which 
the government explains its policies and decisions. 
The government's role in all of these must be to promote democratic 
non-violent means and goals. Where the initiative is not from the 
government r as is the case with the rise of the Greens, the government 
could not hinder the growth of new allies in the sense that, while the 
government may not agree with the policies of the group, it does support 
its democratic principles, and its abili ty to draw others away from 
violence. 
The overall effectiveness of these West German policies is arguably 
not as successful as desired , given chapter three I s opening discussion 
about the rise of terrorist incidents and lower satisfaction with 
democracy (see also Table 7.1, page 254). This implies less general 
public identification with the government. 
227 
Apart fran trying to convince people of the benefits of democracy, 
the German government also needs to deter people fran entering terrorist 
organisations. However, as mentioned, the government realised the 
futility of trying to dissuade people fran terrorism, who would risk 
their lives pursuing their goals. In this case legislation is not 
counter-, but antiterrorism when it becanes aimed at the apprehension 
and conviction of suspected terrorists. This is discussed later. 
On the government side, the success of efforts to dissuade people 
fran entering or forming a terrorist organisation depends upon proper 
institutional coordination, legislation that provides them with 
requisite powers to fulfil their roles, and incentives for these to be 
fulfilled. 
Fran the earliest days of terrorism West German federal and state 
institutional cooperation was a problem in the area of preventative 
surveillance and other intelligence operations designed to oversee the 
operations of the left-wing terrorist groups. 
The group of people in and around Kammune I, (part of the nucleus of 
the Second of June) f and the people around Mahler, Baader and Ensslin, 
who formed the Red Army Faction f were under surveillance by the West 
Berlin Landesamt fuer VerfasSlIDgsschutz since the summer of 1967 via the 
undercover agent Peter Urbach. He was involved in the 'pudding attack' 
preparations on US vice-president Hubert H. Humphrey that year, and 
supplied the molotov cocktails that burned out the Springer press 
vehicles after the attempted murder of Rudi Dutschke in 1968. Later in 
early April 1970 he met up with Baader, Ensslin and Mahler to help the 
group find weapons to begin their armed struggle. During one of these 
unsuccessful trips Baader was arrested. 1 
However, as arrest warrants had been issued for Baader and Ensslin 
earlier in MarchI the question is raised as to why only Baader was 
arrested at this time, and not also Ensslin and the others, although 
Urbach knew where they were to be found. Apparently he arranged for 
notice of Baader's vehicle to be passed on to the authorities. 2 
In 1987 the Green party asked the government whether an early 
release for Baader and Ensslin after serving one third of their sentence 
for arson in 1969 might not have ended their career before it began. The 
government said they did not know the grounds for the state of Hesse's 
refusal of an early release, but added that the two did not need to 
enter the underground, because the continuation of their prison sentence 
1 Aust (1987), 33, 47,56, 80-3. 
2 Scheerer, 318-9; n.n., Der Baader-Meinhof-Report, 25-8. 
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did not hang over them. They were to remain free. 3 This would imply that 
had Baader and Ensslin returned to court, they would have been placed on 
probation and continued their youth group project in Frankfurt. As they 
did not return, arrest warrants were later issued for their arrest as 
standard practice. 
The above case is not the only time undercover agents were near the 
group. Eight years later, in June 1978, an attempt to insert undercover 
agents into the Red Anny Faction was made by the Lower Saxony Landesamt 
fuer Verfassungsschutz, who were assisted by explosive experts from GSG 
9. The plan was to blow a hole in the wall of CelIe prison and fake the 
escape of two criminals who were to help a lesser RAF member, Sigurd 
Debus, back to the group and thus gain their entry into the group. They 
were unable, however, to enter the terrorist scene with the contacts 
they had previously built-UPI and the attempt failed. 4 
Apart from the police services not being informed about the true 
nature of the escape attempt from CelIe prison by the Lower Saxony 
intelligence service, other institutions were also not informed, which 
probably should have been. For example, the Interior Minister of Lower 
Saxony, Ruetger Gross, only knew of plans to insert someone into the 
terrorist scene, but not the details of hOWl where and when. After the 
state elections with the resultant Christian Democrat majority, the new 
Interior Minister I Egbert Mochlinghoff, was only partially informed of 
the plans with the assurance that the Federal Interior Minister, 
Maihofer, and Blmdeskriminalamt President I Boeden, knew and approved. 
Chancellor Schmidt also said he was uninformed. 5 
Both examples, Urbach and the 'CelIe Hole I show that preventative 
counterterrorism policies needed better coordination. Had Urbach's 
information been passed on to the police I Baader and Ensslin could have 
been arrested sooner I and the group around Mahler dispersed. Had the 
'CelIe Hole' been thought through properly, the authorities would have 
realised that criminals could not be moved into the terrorist scene 
without a working knowledge of the RAF, its ideology and knowledge about 
explosives which they reportedly used in the attempted escape.6 
When institutional coordination is better, there is still no 
guarantee that they can overcome differences of opinion between 
ministerial directors. For example, Adelheid Schulz and Christian Klar 
were not arrested until November 1982. Had Interior Minister Baum 
3 Die Gruenen im Bundestagl "Zehn Jahre danachfl, 100. 
4 Stefan Aust, Mauss: Ein deutscher Agent (Munich: Knaur, 1989), 
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5 ibid., 229-30 1 238. 
6 Robert Leicht, "Die Staatsbornbe" Die Zeit 2 May 1986, 1. 
desired, Klar and Schulz could have been arrested in 1980 when they were 
observed for an extended time by BKA officers. Against the wishes of the 
Federal Prosecutor General, Kurt Rebmann and BKA President, Horst 
Herold, who both wished them arrested, Baum decided to wait and see to 
where they would lead them. Needless to say, no one else appeared before 
the authorities lost the trail. 1 
Even worse, Klar, Schulz and Willy Peter Stoll could have been 
arrested in 1978, but eight BKA officers did not believe their eyes when 
the three terrorists joined them in a heliport restaurant for one and a 
half hours. This episode cost Gerhard Boeden, then head of the terrorism 
unit at the Bundeskriminalamt, his job. 8 Since then, however, he has 
risen up the ranks again to become the head of the Bundesamt fuer 
Verfasstmgsschutz. 
The authorities' security services also appear to have difficulties 
in understanding what the terrorists wrote. The BKA may have decoded the 
maps and details of the texts found when Klar, Mohnhaupt and Schulz were 
arrested in 1982, and found further RAF caches, 9 but on two other 
occasions they were unable to read into the text the meanings of RAF 
offensive plans. 
Twice the police have received detailed strategy papers for planned 
terrorist operations: preceding the 1977 murders, and again prior to the 
"84/85 Offensive'. This should have prepared the police with suitable 
responses to the terrorist operations which followed. Zimmermann's name, 
and papers relating to European Political Cooperation, which connected 
to von Braunmuehl's post at the Foreign Ministery, were found along with 
nineteen others, and accompanying press clippings and other materials on 
them, and 1000 other people. 10 
The security services cannot necessarily predict who out of a list 
of names will be chosen as the target. Chapter three explained how the 
final target is determined by various factors, which can inclUde 
determination to reach a particular target, regardless of how well it is 
protected. However, the authorities should have preparations in place 
for different contingencies, be they abductions, assassinations or 
bombing campaigns. None of these were in place prior to the Schleyer 
abduction. This is discussed more closely in the section on 
antiterrorist policy implementation. 
7 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeittmg 13 November 1982. 
8 Hans Schueler, "Kommissar Computer in Noeten" , Die Zeit 1 
September 1978/ 3; Guardian 23 October 1978 
9 Zimmermann, Bulletin 117/1982, 1063. 
10 Schiller (1986), 39; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeittmg 13 October 
1986. 
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Preparations, on the other hand, can only be made when target risks 
are properly assessed. And when this is done, they only work if the 
person wants to be protected. For example, Hans Tietrneyer's name had 
turned up after an arrest in August 1986 and he was placed in security 
bracket three: 'A danger is not to be ruled out' .11 As he was not a 
parliamentary state secretary the police of North-Rhein Westphalia 
covered his security. Grade three also ruled out bodyguards for him, and 
he felt he could save the state money by not ordering an armoured car. 
When he was designated organiser of the 1988 IMF meeting in West Berlin 
nothing changed, despite the rise of his image in association with the 
conference. The July 1988 security review left him at grade three, and a 
police car drove occasionally by the front door. Therefore the 
authorities would not notice several people lying in wait in the bushes 
fifty metres from his front door with branches trimmed for a good shot, 
and a car near-by for a quick getaway. Forty minutes before the attack 
in September 1988 someone looked around, and noticed nothing. 
Fortunately for Tietrneyer the gun jammed.12 
As discussed in chapter three, Detlef Rohwedder desired a freer 
lifestyle while at home on weekends in Dusseldorf and dismissed 
bodyguards except for when he attended functions. Again police only 
passed by occasionally. 
Had the authorities followed 'Concept 106' established by the 
'Working Group Criminal Police' in August 1986, these attacks might have 
been avoided. The group had noted the Red Army Faction's main target 
groups of the 'military industrial complex I, as discussed in chapter 
three. Defence of these people can only be done with the cooperation of 
the economic and security sectors, whereby in some cases private 
individuals are employed to observe suspected endangered persons. The 
main obervation focus being early morning and after work activity in the 
neighbourhood. Cormnuting routes need to be covered and continuously 
checked, and security needs to continue on the weekends. Photographs 
from the air should be periodically compared to uncover any new or moved 
obj ects , and to notice any paths and observation posts that appear. 13 
Had these been employed the attacks might have been dropped or, 
admittedly, taken another form. 
'Concept 106' has so far only proved itself on paper. Its major 
hindrance is a manpower shortage. For example, in Dusseldorf there are 
11 Security bracket one: 'An attack is to be expected', and two: 'An 
attack is not to be ruled out'. 
12 Rudolf Moeller, Gerd Ellendt, 11 Gefaehrdet, aber nicht geschuetzt" 
stern 41 (41) 3-12 October 1988, 225-6. 
13 ibid., 226. 
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120 people who should fall into the progamme, which would require 200 
securi ty personnel. Only twenty-seven are available. The programme is 
also hindered by lack of training and police dismissal of suspicions 
voiced by bodyguards. Both Herrhausen's bodyguards and those of 
Rohwedder I s neighbor, a Thyssen manager, reported suspicious people in 
the area, only to be told that the police did not have the time to chase 
down bodyguards' observations.14 
Part of the problem with West Gennan bureaucratic institutions is 
that the majority of the BKA, BfV, and other government personnel (in 
and out of the security services) are trained as lawyers and think in an 
analytical, if not always original manner, concentrating on how to 
present the case in the courtroom to gain convictions, instead of how to 
capture the terrorists in the first place. 15 Perhaps it is a sign of 
bureaucracies in general that once patterns and efforts are 
institutionalised f they tend to become impervious to external change. 
The money, time and effort involved in first organising the programmes 
remains the justification for lack of change in a changing 
environment. 16 
As a result, between the early seventies and 1978 some 35011 
terrorists were apprehended, of whom only sixty were hard-core 
terrorists. Twenty had been arrested abroad by foreign police,18 thirty 
were arrested because of terrorists' awn mistakes and an alert public. 
Only eight hard-core terrorists had been apprehended due solely to the 
sophisticated technological police efforts. It seems the police need to 
increase their fieldwork and conventional investigative efforts.19 Since 
1978 the police efforts have not been much better.20 Apart from the 
14 "'Da ist irgendwo ein Nest'" Der Spiegel 15/1991, 24; David Th. 
Schiller, "Die Schutzmaenner" Visier 5, 1990, 6-15, 14. 
15 Schiller (1987 I), 545; , "West Gennany Coping with 
Terrorism: The Evolution of a Police Organization" '!VI -Journal 6 (2) 
1985 (II), 28-32, 31. 
16 Szabo, Crelinsten, (1980), 342. 
11 This figure refers only to arrests. Die Welt 11 August 1981 
states that 209 people were sentenced between 1971 and 1980 for 
activities involving left-wing terrorism, and chapter four refered to 
227 suspected and arrested people. 
18 The Guardian 25 October 1978 refers to forty arrests since 
September 1977 with most of these being made abroad, while those in the 
Federal Republic occurred because of public tip offs. 
19 ibid.; Schiller (1985 II), 31; Anderson, 88. 
20 Between 1977 and 1980 340 people were arrested on SUsplClon of 
terrorist activities with most of them set free. Twenty-nine were 
suspects or sentenced to prison . Five further terrorist were killed at 
the time of arrest or died in accidents, and six others turned 
themselves in according to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 6 January 
1981. By late 1984 forty left-wing terrorists (and a further seven 
awaiting or under trial) had been sentenced since mid-1977. Rebmann 
(1985 IL 9. 
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arrest of Rolf Heissler in 1979, no terrorists have been caught due to 
police search efforts. Instead, every arrest was because of the 
terrorists I mistakes21 ( car accidents, 2 2 using the wrong passport, 2 3 
shooting weapons inside buildings) f 24 being recognised by the public25 
and turning themselves in. 26 
This success, or lack of success, affects politicians' and 
bureaucrats I conceptions of what measures need to be modified and 
adjusted to improve counterterrorism. The measures concerned are also 
influenced by party political concepts of the liberal democratic state 
and the sources and motivation of terrorism, which are clearly evident 
in the discussions about the changes to Para 129a StGB ( supporting, 
recruiting for, or a member of a terrorist organisation) and the 
Kronzeuge (states' evidence) in 1986. 
The Kronzeuge legislation was designed to allow the Federal 
Prosecutor General to offer reduced sentences to persons charged with 
129a StGB or associated crimes if the person explained the cr~TIes beyond 
their own participation, or helped apprehend other participants. The 
person could also be offered a reduced sentence if he or she explains 
crimes in which the person did not participate. 27 
New changes to Para 129a StGB were to widen the list of acts to be 
denoted as ' terrorist' and to increase the minimum length of sentence 
for people I who advertise for terrorist groups, or are members or 
leaders of terrorist organisations. 28 
The prelude to the widening of 129a and the Kronzeuge discussions 
occurred on 7 February 1985, the day of the burial of Ernst Zimmermann 
who was murdered by the RAF on 1 February, and the day the Blmdestag 
voted on two motions about 129a StGB. The Greens proposed its repeal, 
21 Schiller (1987 I), 542. 
22 Plambeck and Beer in July 1980. 
23 The passports of Andreas and Maria Risch were stolen from 
Luxembourg and that of A. Risch was found on Rolf Clemens Wagner at his 
arrest in zurich in November 1979, which alerted the authorities to look 
for terrorists when that of M. Risch was used. Siegeling Hoffmann used 
it in Paris six months later, and this led to the arrest of her and four 
others in May 1980. Frankfurter Rundschau 8 May 1980. 
24 In July 1984 a gun fired a bullet into the apartment below which 
alerted its occupants to phone the polices about suspicious people above 
them. Six suspected RAP members were arrested. Hans Schueler, "Ein 
Schuss durch die Decke" Die Zeit 13 July 1984, 5. 
25 Eva Sibylle Haule-Frimpong in August 1986, Ingrid Barabas in July 
1985. SUddeutsche Zeitung 4 August 1986, Frankfurter Rtmdschau 5 July 
1985. 
26 Rudolf Raabe in June 1980, and Guenther Maria Rausch in October 
1983. 
27 Dencker, 40. 
28 ibid., 39. 
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while the Social Democratic Party desired that advertising for a 
terrorist group be withdrawn from the code. 29 
The SPD believed that terrorist sympathisers should not experience 
the hardest reaction of the state, because this might encourage 
solidarity and support with the terrorist scene. The CDU/CSU argued 
against the motion with the suggestion that present terrorist attacks 
were only possible because of massive terrorist advertising for members 
and sympathisers over the last year. Furthermore f because gaining 
sympathisers was a goal of terrorist organisations, an increase in 
sympathisers leads to an increase in terrorist campaigns.30 
The Greens argued that because the normal rules and laws of liberal 
democracy were not designed for ... fair weather democracy I, but for its 
security in special situations, terrorism can be overcome with normal 
rules. If the regular rules were adjusted to handle special situations! 
these changes would affect other legal areas. For example, the state 
prosecutor can call witnesses or accused individuals for questioning (by 
force if necessary), which affects individuals' usual rights to lawyers 
and leaves individuals facing charges of complici ty or experiencing 
protective custody if they do not cooperate. Similarly, the availability 
of special protection cells for suspected and sentenced terrorists has 
now made these the disciplinary cells for normal prisoners. 31 
However! none of the other parties agreed with the Greens. The FDP 
questioned the Greens on how they imagined murders such as Zimmermann's 
occured. Was it due to a single 'crazy I that shot someone because of an 
overconfident need to move the world, or would the person not have been 
motivated without sympathisers such as the Greens who tell others that 
the criminal codes should be changed, which would lengthen court cases. 
The FDP also wondered whether the Greens stood for peace or change in 
society and what ends they had in mind for society, if they accepted 
violence as a means to achieving those ends, and if undermining the 
legal system was a part of this. 32 
The CDU/CSU concurred with these questions and saw the Greens as 
uninterested in counterterrorism because they trivialised it to a 
dangerous degree if they suceeded in having 129a StGB withdrawn along 
with other measures. Combined, these would end the inner security of the 
29 SUddeutsche Zeitung 9/10 February 1985, 5. 
30 Mr. Bachmaier (SPD) , Mr. Saurin (CDU /CSU) in Verhandlungen des 
Deutschen Bundestages 10. Wahlperiode, 120. Sitzung, 7 February 1985, 
8929 1 8930-1. 
31 Ms. Nickels (Greens) in ibid., 8933-4. 
32 Mr. Kleinert (FDP) in ibid., 8934-5. 
country and count the life, health and property of the citizens as 
acceptable costs. Nor did the SPD support the measure. 33 
These arguments turned on the point of the source and motivation of 
terrorism, but were not as intensive as those on 5 December 1986 in the 
Bundestag when the government coalition of CDU/CSU/FDP sought to widen 
129a StGB, reintroduce 130a StGB, and to change the traffic laws to 
allow the intelligence and police services on-line access to the 
cQnputerised vehicle registration files. The government had only shortly 
beforehand withdrawn its bill for the Kronzeuge so that the different 
government factions 
modifications. 34 
could come to an agreement over bill 
After the RAP murders of Beckurts in July qnd von Braunmuehl in 
October 1986, the government had discussed various new counterterrorism 
measures, even if, as in the case of the Kronzeuge, the party had voted 
against it in 1975 when the SPD had introduced a similar bill. In 1975 
the Kronzeuge was deemed ineffective if terrorist group leaders could 
offer up their members to the authorities, and claim the worst crimes 
for themselves. Thus the 'grassed I members would have little or no 
sentences, while the leaders who became the Kronezeuge received no 
sentence. There was also the problem of truthfulness amongst the 
'grasses'. In 1986 the acceptance of the Kronzeuge was argued to be due 
to an effort to try every possible countermeasure, as well as the need 
to be seen to do something, even if it is known. to be an unworkable 
measure. This role reversal for the FDP, who had in the past called for 
a review of antiterrorism laws and called for the preservation of 
liberal democratic principles in antiterrorism legislation, caused 
division within its ranks, as some members voted against and others 
abstained in the vote for the measures. 3 5 
The CDU/CSU introduced the new antiterrorism legislation because 
they believed that when liberal democracies are not content with 
existing legislation, then they must consider other possibilities to 
achieve terrorist apprehensions. They believed that someone who joins a 
group that murders people deserves a tougher sentence than someone who 
steals handbags. Similarly attacks against energy and transport 
installations should not be trivialised, but deserve hard sentences as 
33 Mr. Saurin (CDU/CSU) in ibid., 8931; Mr. Bachmaier (SPD) in 
ibid., 8930. 
34 Suddeutsche Zeitung 26 November 1986; Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung 6 December 1986. 
35 die taz 24 October 1986, 3; "Verbrennung vorm Dam" Der Spiegel 
44/1986 f 132-5 f 132, 135; "Sie haben uns den Todesengel geschickt" Der 
Spiegel 45 (3 November) 1986, 19-23, 21; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
6 December 1986. 
terrorist activities. 36 The CDU/CSU also rejected the argument that this 
increased the number of terrorists, because "people do not become 
terrorists through laws, but through terrorist behaviour. "37 
All of these were posi ti ve measures callpared to the opposi tion f 
argued the CDU/CSU, who claimed the Greens wanted to withdraw all 
terrorism legislation, end barracked police units and the intelligence 
services. Twenty percent of the Green members, according to the CDU/CSU, 
also had terrorist connections and they served as the ammunition of 
terrorists and other state enemies. The SPD, responsible for saving 
lives at Mogadishu, also wanted to introduce a Kronzeuge in 1975, but in 
1986 was seen by the press as against terrorism laws. The SPD failed to 
rise to the democratic unity required of all democratic parties- -the 
Greens do not count here- -in the fight against terrorism, according to 
the CDU/CSU.38 
Some FDP members argued that one cannot continuously ask the 
executive to do its utmost with the given materials to counter terrorism 
without also responding to executive requests to provide them with 
better instruments to conduct their work. Additionally, the criminal 
code changes to 129a StGB are not the goal, but rather the criminal 
court procedure possibilities this allowed. The same occurred when the 
SPD first introduced 129a to allow criminal court procedure 
possibilities, and not to offer new criminal code penalties for what was 
already regulated by other codes. 39 
Other FDP members, however! disagreed with the party majority and 
argued against the changes because legislators cannot allow themselves 
to be perceived to be running behind reality, as if the death of von 
Braunmuehl was the determining motivation for legislative changes! and 
the criminal energy of the terrorists determined the legal system 
changes. Furthermore, while they agreed with the Federal Interior 
Minister's proposition that one's actions, not the legislation, makes 
one a terrorist, they added that legislators decide which label to apply 
to which action. 4o 
The SPD was against the government's planned changes because they 
were perceived as widening the label of terrorist beyond the people who 
should be labelled as such. The SPD viewed everything the changes would 
cover as already included in existing legislation, and widening 129a 
36 Mr. Eylmann (CDU /CSU) in Verhandlungen des Deutschen Btmdestages 
10. Wahlperiode, 254. Sitzung, 5 December 1986, 19789-90. 
37 Mr. F. Zimmermann (CSU) in ibid., 19799. 
38 Dr. Stark (CDU/CSU) in ibid., 19802-3. 
39 Mr. Kleinert (FDP) in ibid., 19794-6. 
40 Dr. Hirsch (FDP) in ibid., 19803. 
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StGB may only push terrorist sympathisers closer to the terrorists. 
Furthermore, they perceived these changes as legislative actionism that 
will impress the terrorists as little as the extended criminal 
punishments will deter the terrorists and their supporters. The driving 
force behind the changes are thus the need to be seen to do something 
because the government does not have the terrorist apprehensions that 
the SPD/FDP coalition had in the seventies. 41 
The Greens argued that instead of being , laws for the fighting of 
terrorism' they were really 'laws for the criminalisation and repression 
of the anti-atom movement' which would maintain the government's nuclear 
programmes and construction of the nuclear reprocessing plant at 
Wackersdorf. The 'law for the changes to the traffic law' was actually 
the 'law to observe the citizen' because it brings the transparent 
citizen closer to reality with moving pictures of vehicles without the 
need to ask the owners' and drivers' permission. 42 
These laws were passed, but the Kronzeuge was not, and the 
government felt it was still a viable alternative that must not be 
overlooked. In 1986, when it was reintroduced, they had only arrested 
one terrorist, Eva Sybille Haule-Frimpong on 2 August 1986 f in the 
previous three years. The government hoped this would allow them to 
appear busy.43 
It was hoped the Kranzeuge legislation would break down the silence 
surrounding the hard-core Red Army Faction, which since 1985, has not 
left behind many fingerprints, letters or any other evidence which leads 
the authorities to individuals. Hence, the introduction of a law that 
would enable the circle to 'grass' on their colleagues, with the hoped 
for resulting loss of security and confidence therein. 44 
The counterarguments of money to murderers still rernained, as did 
that of the lack of evidence that terrorists at large desired to end 
their underground existence and rejoin society. In 1986 the government 
had invited twenty experts to offer their opinions on the matter. Only 
three experts were in favour of the law: Kurt Rebmann, the Federal 
Prosecutor General; and Heinrich Boger the Bundeskriminalamt president; 
and Helmut Tromeler, the president of the Bavarian Landeskriminalamt. 
Everyone else was against the law because it would solidify the 
41 Dr. de With (SPD) in ibid., 19792-3. 
42 Mr. Mann (Green) in ibid., 19797. 
43 die taz 16 October 1986; Wolfgang Schaeuble, liEs ist riskant, 
bringt wenig, aber es beruhigt" Stern 39 (45) 30 October-5 November 
1986, 252-5, 252. 
44 Independent 11 February 1991 r 8. 
terrorist groups and not, as Interior Minister Friedrich Zimme:rma.nn 
argued, put more pressure on the groups. 4 5 
Even the FDP I part of the government, was divided over the issue. 
Some members doubted its usefulness, whether it fulfilled liberal 
democratic principles, if it only applied to specific groups such as 
terrorists but not other criminals, and whether or not there should be 
minimum sentences. 46 
The Greens simply questioned what would happen wi th conflicting 
statements, as corrnnonly occurred in Italy, and would happen with changed 
statements in the course of court cases. The SPD argued that the 
Kran4euge would not contribute to counterterrorism because it was 
designed to satisfy emotions. 47 
In 1988 the Kohl government was finally able to pass Kronzeuge 
legislation, which came into effect in June 1989, expires on 31 December 
1992, and requires a minimum three year sentence for murder.48 
The Kronzeugenregelung was first used in the case of Werner Loetze, 
sentenced on 31 January 1991 to twelve years imprisonment, instead of 
two life sentences. 49 The severe sentence he received is believed to 
deter active terrorists from coming forward with evidence. Therefore the 
prosecutors (who wanted a sentence of nine years) and the defence 
lawyers will appeal the sentence. 50 His sentence has not, however, 
deterred other ex-RAF members arrested in summer 1990 from becoming 
Kronzeugen. Some of these people51 are allegedly accusing each other in 
full cooperation with the authorities, while others remain silent. 52 
Since its introduction the Kronzeuge legislation has not led to the 
self-destruction of the Red Army Faction, and not hindered murders by 
the group. However, it has brought new light into the working of the 
group in the seventies and early eighties. While this process of 
historical explanation aids the correct ordering of past events, it can 
45 Brunner et. al., Suddeutsche Zeib.mg 9/10 February 1985, 5; Die 
Zeit 21 November 1986, 17; die taz 24 October 1986. 
46 die taz 16 October 1986; Sueddeutsche Zeitung 23 October 1986. 
47 Sueddeutsche Zeitung 23 October 1986 r 25 October 1986. 
48 "Ohne Helm" Der Spiegel 21/1988, 25-6; !lQna im Al tkader" Der 
Spiegel 24/1990, 86. 
49 On 19 December 1986 life sentences were raised from fifteen to 
twenty years. Das Parlament 10 January 1987. 
50 Independent 11 February 1991, 8. 
51 Susanne Albrecht received twelve years and Henning Beer six and a 
half as Kronzeugen. Silke Maier-Witt is also mentioned as a possible 
Kronzeuge. 
52 Inge Viett, Sigrid Sternebeck and Monika Helbing; "'Die mit den 
Hueten 'fl , Der Spiegel 34/1990, 62. 
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only prevent future acti vi ty of the group f if this knowledge is 
gainfully employed. 53 
Monetary reward efforts are not successful either. Counterterrorism 
policy cooperation between the BfV and the American Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) offering monetary rewards of up to one million Swiss Francs 
for infonnation leading to the the arrest of terrorists f were begun in 
February 1987. The failure of this plan could have been seen in similar 
reward failures since 1980 when a group of industrial and banking firms 
put up a reward of 400,000 DM, and after the Beckurts murder in July 
1986, Siemens and other firms put up a total of three million DM reward 
for information leading to the arrest of terrorists. Neither the 
Kronzeuge or rewards reach the targeted people. The ones who would 
really help break the RAF and the RZ are the ones who pulled the 
triggers and planted the bombs, not the ones who supply the 10gistics. 54 
Both of these only reinforce the terrorists' ideology. The terrorist 
can say: look at the capitalist system, it has deteriorated so far that 
it now shows its true face by offering us money to help save itself. How 
'typically capitalist' this is! The hard-core terrorists reject the 
rewards because they believe in their higher moral position, and believe 
themselves justified in their actions. Rewards can only reinforce these 
beliefs. 5 5 Such attempts by the government to discourage the groups 
loses sight of the group's organisational reasons for existence 
discussed in chapter five. If the group exists to give the members 
identity, then they can ill-afford to betray it. Perhaps this is why 
only those who have left the group and found other viable identities 
that allow their non-violent opposition to the government have taken up 
the Kronzeuge offer. 
The Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz began a project in 1986 for 
terrorists wanting to drop-out, and allegedly organised the retirement 
of seven terrorists' through the terrorists' lawyer or a trusted person. 
While the BfV will nonnally contact other offices seeking to apprehend 
terrorists (to find which warrants are in force against the individual, 
and how much flexibility they have with the arresting authorities), the 
BfV is not always required to contact them. This is a grey area which 
they use to reduce terrorism, their main concern. 56 
53 See Alexander von Stahl, "'Es gibt keine glatte Loesung'" Der 
Spiegel 51 (17 December) 1990, 34-8, 38. 
54 Brunner et. al., Die Zeit 21 November 1986, 18; "Schnapp und 
greiff" Der Speigel 52 (21 December) 1987, 44-8, 45-8. 
55 Christian Lochte, "Abtruennig urn des Geldes willen?" Die Zeit 8 
July 1986, 8; Brunner, et.al., Die Zeit 21 November 1986, 18. 
56 Gerhard Boeden, "Auf saubere Fuesse stellen: Interview mit 
Verfassungsschutz-Praesident Boeden", Der Spiegel 12 (21 March) 1988, 
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Possibly this was another side of an anonymous letter sent in 
September 1986 to about forty people in the Federal Republic, who, the 
letter alleged, had contact with people in the terrorist scene, and 
might be willing to offer information leading to the arrest and 
conviction of suspected terrorists in exchange for up to one million DM 
and a new identity and freedom from prosecution. The letter offered no 
clues as to its author, but freedom from prosecution can only be offered 
by the state. Some of the letter's recipients considered this to be a 
way around the Kronzeuge legislation also under discussion then, and, in 
any case, could be used to elici t feelings of being under observation 
and sow distrust amongst the scene. 57 
The Kronzeuge and reward schemes only open doors out of terrorist 
scenes for those who provide something in return for the money and a new 
life elsewhere under a new identity. For those who refuse these schemes, 
other paths out of the scene are few. 
In an effort to begin the reconciliation process between the Red 
Army Faction and society, the Green parliamentarians Antje Vollmer and 
Christa Nickels had a poor start when they sent a letter to five 
imprisoned RAF members during the group! s hunger strike in 1984/5 .58 
After initial criticism about their approach which broke with the party 
position, their second public letter in the autumn of 1985 received a 
response and led to quiet discussions which grew and included more 
people in 1987 and 1988. 59 
However, these attempts to break the RAP ( s isolation by meeting 
others also depend upon government approval at both the federal and 
state level. Individual government ministers are also divided on the 
22-5; Gerhard Boeden, "Aussteiger aus terroristischen Gruppierungen- -
Probleme und Moeglichkeiten einer Hilfe durch den Verfassungsschutz", 
in: Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse ( eds. ) , Jarhbuch Extremismus und 
Demokraite 1989 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1989), 165-173; the programme 
gained more publicity with an October 1987 interview between the BfV and 
the Frankfurt city magazine Pflasterstrand, Hans Josef Horchem, "The 
Lost Revolution of West Germany's Terrorists" Terrorism and Poli tical 
Violence 1 (3) 1989 1 353-360, 359-360. 
57 "Kronzeugen-Suche", in: Goessner, Buerger kontrollieren Polizei 
( eds . ) , Restrisiko Mensch: Volkserfassung, Staatsterrorgesetze I 
Widerstandsbekaempfung (Hamburg: Instituts fuer Sozialforschung, 1987), 
68-9. 
58 n.n. "Gruene: Mut und Leichtsinn" Der Spiegel 12 (18 March) 1985, 
133-4. The letter was addressed to Christian Klar, Brigitte Mohnhaupt, 
Adelheid Schulz, Siegelind Hoffmann and to Elard Biskamp for his 
information, and is reprinted in SUedd.eutsche Zeitung 8 March 1985, 8; 
and Der Spiegel 13 (25 March) 1985, 66. 
59 n.n. "Zur Terrorismus-Diskussion" Gruenes Bulletin March/April 
1985, 6-8, 7; Janssen, Die Zeit 16 May 1986, 17-8; "Gruene Nachhilfel! 
Der Spiegel 12 (21 March) 1988, 21-2, 21; "Mythos und Bauchnabel" Der 
Spiegel 33 (15 August) 1988, 54-6, 56. 
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issue. The Federal Prosecutor General, Rebmann, and Federal Interior 
Minister, Zimmermann, were against the idea I while Federal Justice 
Minister Engelhard thought it worth an attempt. 60 
Discussions between active RAP prisoners and some Green members are 
also parallel to Green discussions with ex-RAP prisoners who seek 
reconciliation with society and have voiced the possibility of amnesties 
and pardons. These political positions argue that one cannot ignore 
these prisoners who believe that the RAP and the militant left lost 
because they did not win, and the kind of power necessary for them to 
win is not in sight, nor does anyone know how to achieve a victory. They 
also argue that they cannot remain in prison until they are very old. 
Their alternative is possibly death in a senseless hunger strike61 as 
this gives their life meaning if no other exit is possible. 
Arguments against amnesties came fran the position that not fighting 
to the end equaled capitulation. However, if no fight is in progress 
because the RAP is already defeated, amnesty is possible. It only 
requires the acceptance that one phase is over, and another has begun. 62 
These measures would show that the state does not assume 'once a 
terrorist, always a terrorist', with a fight to the bitter end. Rather, 
they argue that if society contributed, even in a small way, to 
terrorism, then it should also aid rehabilitation and provide a way out 
for those who want to stop.63 
The goal was a campaign of small steps; pardons and early release on 
parole after serving half of the sentence, or fifteen years where life 
sentences were sought. All measures used with 'normal' prisoners. These 
were discussed and sought by the Green intiiative in 1987. 64 
The question of amnesty and pardon came to the fore again in 1988 
when Angelika Speitel and Peter-Juergen Boock requested pardons from the 
Federal President, Richard von Weizsaecker. Weizsaecker was already 
60 "Mythos und Bauchnabel" Der Spiegel 33/1988, 56; Antje Vollmer, 
"Die einfachen Weltsichten aufbrechen" Der Speigel 5 (30 January) 1989, 
34-44, 34. 
61 Gert Schneider "Was Sie schon immer von der RAP wissen wollten, 
aber sich nie zu fragen getraut habenll, in: Peter-Juergen Boock, Peter 
Schneider, Ratte-tot ... Ein Briefwechsel (Darmstadt: Sammlung 
Luchterhand, 1985), 134-6, 134-5. 
62 Christoph Wackernagel, "Die Mythen Macken ", in: Peter-Juergen 
Boock, Peter Schneider, Ratte-tot ... Ein Briefwechsel (Darmstadt: 
Sammlung Luchterhand, 1985), 131-4, 132. 
63 Sternsdorff, Der Spiegel 43/1987,85, 88, 
64 "Gruene Nachhilfe" Der Spiegel 12/1988, 21; Johannes Eisenberg! 
"Bis ins naechste Jahrtausend? Argumente fuer eine Entspannungspolitik 
zwischen Staat und RAP", in: Michael Sontheimer, Otto Kallscheuer 
(eds. ), Einschuesse: Besichtigung eines Frontverlaufs Zehn Jahre nach 
dem Deutschen Herbst (West Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1987)[ 140-152, 144. 
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known to be in favour of pardons, because he sees each person and 
situation as unique and deserving of society's attention and help.65 
Speitel was pardoned on 8 March 1989 and a release date was set for 
30 June 1990, having served twelve years of her sentence, to be followed 
by a five year parole. Boock was refused as he had not yet served enough 
of his sentence. The Federal President's decision kept to the pattern of 
allowing pardons between nine and fourteen years of life sentences. 66 
Opponents of pardons feel that only tough measures work against 
terrorism, and that they should only be offered pardons if they are 
willing to provide evidence against others. Friedrich Zimmermann, the 
Federal Interior Minister, thought that by considering pardoning former 
terrorists, Weizsaecker was endangering his reputation, and that of the 
Federal Republic, for the danger he might cause. The RAP attempt on 
Tietmeyer in September 1988 enforced this position l which did not, as 
some feared, sabotage the pardoning process. These positions contribute 
to the problems of people distancing themselves from the RAF, for then 
they are attacked fran both sides: the group wants to know why I and the 
authorities want evidence of their sincerity.67 
Paths of resocialisation must be kept open for terrorists. Chapter 
five highlighted how their belief systems provide an alternative 
reality. The government and the public, as well as reform minded former 
terrorists, must do their best to reduce the group boundaries of the 
society that tighten cohesion within groups and widen gaps between them. 
For example, the government must not condemn, as some people do, any 
groups that also support such aims as reducing US military presence in 
Europe as sympathisers of terrorist groups, because terrorists also 
strive for this goal. 68 This amounts to guilt by association and 
reinforces group boundaries. 
One way of doing this is to acknowledge that it is necessary to 
fight more than the symptoms of the problem as a Bundeskriminalamt study 
published in 1977 found. 69 While reform will not solve all the problems 
of terrorism, government acknowledgement of legitimate problems and of 
the difference between the ends and means of terrorism, then the 
perceived legitimacy of terrorism may be reduced. 7o 
65 "Neue Einsicht" Der Spiegel 35 (29 August) 1988, 34-5, 34. 
66 "Sie hat ihre Tat aufrichtig bereut" Der Spiegel 11 (13 March) 
1989, 8-10, 8-9. 
67 "Gruene Nachhilfe", Der Spiegel 12/1988, 21; "Neue Einsicht", Der 
Spiegel 35/1988 35; "Weizacker muess allein entscheiden" Der Spiegel 39 
(26 September) 1988, 16-21, 17-8. 
68 Crenshaw (1983), 22; Kellen (1990), 51. 
69 "Wie wird man Terrorist?" Stern 11 May 1978, 65. 
70 Crenshaw (1983), 32. 
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Ideological groups can be destroyed by allowing a radical place for 
social dissension within society. Thus pre-terrorists can remain 
radicals instead of entering the underground, and ex-terrorists can 
return. All they must do is renounce violence and serve the sentences 
for their crimes. Not all terrorists can be eliminated, so they must be 
co-opted to non-violence and benefit society. If this option is not 
available terrorists stay terrorists, ei ther in prison or in hiding. 11 
Only some resocialise and benefit society. 
This provides an al ternati ve organisation to that of the 
'organisational' model terrorist groups so that exit from one to join 
the other is possible. It also provides a platform alternative to the 
, instrumental' model. Some 'expressionist' model types may also be 
coopted for non-violent 'spectacles'. 
However, West German counterterrorism policy has not always assisted 
or even accepted such a place in society. As mentioned, there is not 
always a tolerance for different viewpoints, and there can be a tendency 
to label all who seek similar goals as alike, despite the use of 
democratic means by some. This can alienate them and force their 
identification with others against the state. 
4.2 Antiterrorism Policy Implementation 
These are the measures employed in response to specific terrorist 
incidents. On one hand/ they could also be considered as the available 
options after failure of counterterrorism policy, while on the other 
hand/ they are also a continuation of wider counterterrorism policy 
because all counterterrorism policy must be based on efficient 
antiterrorism policies. 12 These also include measures designed to assist 
the security services and the judiciary in their work. 
The death of a hostage in a Munich bank robbery in 1971 highlighted 
the need for effective hostage rescue capabilities when a hostage taker 
was shot for the first time in post-war Germany.13 However, it was not 
until after the Munich Olympics Massacre in 1972 that efforts were taken 
to create an effective anti terrorist force at the state and federal 
levels, as mentioned earlier. 
Since then the authorities have done well when they can find the 
terrorists and have an actual response si tuation. However, the Lorenz 
11 Franco Ferracuti, "Ideology and Repentance: Terrorism in Italy", 
in: Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, 
Theologies, states of Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
59-64, 62 1 64. 
72 Morris, Hoe I 126, 133. 
13 Thomas Osterkorn l "Darf der Staat toeten?" Stern 42 (32) 10-6 
August 1989 1 28-30, 29. 
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and Schleyer episodes show that when a specific location for the 
terrorists is unknown and when a long-term response is required, then 
the responses are less effective. This was also true in the eighties and 
nineties where the level of arrests has fallen. 
The sort of problems experienced during the Lorenz abduction led to 
the BKA terrorism unit which was supposed to compile and store all 
information on terrorism, with the Laender binding themselves to this 
decision. The BKA also introduced new computer programmes like PIOS 
(persons, institutions, objects, articles) to bring together diverse 
data from different files in new data combinations and, hopefully, 
answers to questions. 74 
The Lorenz abduction was characterised by bad communication, 
coordination and demarcation of responsibility problems between the 
West-Berlin administration and the police units as well as within and 
between the police units. For example, they wasted efforts to establish 
Lorenz's fingerprints in the telephone box he used to call the police 
after his release and neglected to check the mileage on the van used in 
the kidnapping. The police also missed an opportuni ty to follow or 
capture involved terrorists or their accomplices, by not observing the 
apartment of a woman who was to receive money from the terrorists. 
Perhaps the single action which speaks volumes on the police 
infrastructure at the time was the ability of three men successfully to 
rob a bank of 45,000 DM in West-Berlin on the day after Lorenz's 
release, when 4000 policemen were on duty.75 
However, the implemented changes did not help the authorities in 
1977 when their capabilities and organisational structures were tested 
for coordination and effectiveness. The Hoecherl-Report found that they 
did not perform effectively, and sought to uncover why a 'hot clue' that 
was reported on 9 September, which could have led to Schleyer's 
location, was left hanging in the system. The information flood 
mentioned earlier which the police information system produced and by 
which the security authorities oriented themselves, became a tidal wave 
that produced 1200 telex messages in the first six days of the 
abduction, and 24,000 in one month, more than occurred in all of 1976. 76 
The Hoecherl report, which examined the authorities' efforts and 
activities for 1977, stated, when published in June 1978, that the 
authorities did not heed the warnings evident early in 1977 and failed 
74 Krumm, 81; Busch et.al., 136-7, Boelsche, 27. 
75 Dietrich stohmann, IIKeine Stadt der Angst" Die Zeit 7 March 1975, 
3-4, 4; Joachim Narowki, "Ein Schlag ins Wasser" Die Zeit 14 March 1975, 
2; -----, "Klagen nach dem Wasser-Schlag" Die Zeit 28 March 1975, 2. 
76 Werner Maihofer and Dr. Wernitz in Das Parlament 25 March 1978. 
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to organise their efforts accordingly. The authorities, Interior 
Minister Werner Maihofer, and BKA President Horst Herold, should have 
had enough indications at the beginning of 1977, when Buback and Ponto 
were murdered f as well as from the papers found on Haag and Meyer in 
November 1976, to introduce new legislation, organisational measures r 
and operational procedures to counter the terrorism that followed. 77 For 
example f the Bundeskriminalamt, which held competence in the affair, 
should have been prepared for this eventuality at both Bund the Laender 
levels. Instead they organised themselves as the events unfolded. 78 
Instead, what followed was that decision-making bodies had unclear 
jurisdiction, operational procedures for handling clues were changed 
three times wi thin forty-eight hours, and the lower police levels did 
not know the investigation goals, let alone the abili ties of the 
computer programmes available at the higher levels. These were the 
conditions that allowed a clue about the whereabouts of Schleyer to be 
neglected for two weeks, by which time the RAP and Schleyer had left the 
apartrnent. 79 
Added to these problems were also more familiar ones such as 
differing practices, and loyal ty orientations of the different 
institutions to their state instead of the federal levels. It was part 
of the problem of the Laend.er worrying that the federal institutions 
directing the investigation wanted federal competence under the guise of 
clear guidelines. This resulted in orders from above being carried out 
slowly under the impression that they were superfluous f wrong, or did 
not have adequate personnel. 80 
Hoecherl suggested that closer ties between the federal and state 
levels be introduced, along with more decentralisation for regional 
investigations coupled with more precise strategic leadership from the 
BKA of investigation and evaluation at the federal level, as well as the 
introduction of similar police computer programmes that produce the same 
results with the same procedures and in the same fonnat which all police 
personnel understand. Furthermore, all tried and trusted leadership and 
communications structures should not be changed, and unusual ones should 
not be established above or next to these. These structures should be 
tested with exercises.81 
71 Carl-Chistian Kaiser, "Verwirrung und Versaeurnung" Die Zeit 9 
June 1978, 7. 
78 Alfred Dregger in Das Parlament 25 March 1978. 
79 ibid. 
80 Krumm, 80, 83. 
81 Kaiser, Die Zeit 9 June 1978, 7i "Hoecherl-Untersuchung (Auszug)" 
Das Parlament 8 July 1978. 
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Similar problems, which Hoecherl sought to overcome, showed 
themselves again in 1979 in the 'Loreley' exercise designed to recreate 
another Schleyer episode to test departmental coordination between local 
and federal institutions and units. Unfortunately similar mistakes 
occurred in this exercise as occurred during the Schleyer abduction. The 
system was unable to cope with the large amounts of information which 
needed to be processed: 300 reports a day, or 30,000 during the whole of 
the Schleyer episode. As in 1977, vital information could be lying at 
the bottom of large stacks of reports. In 1980 the same type of exercise 
was run and this time it went as planned, Ii terally . Everything was 
coordinated in the scenario outline, which was followed, right down to 
the terrorists' surrender.82 
Preprogranmed exercises, like the one above, are the resul t of 
everyone trying to make themselves and their colleagues look gOOd while 
showing that they consider the worst case scenario as surmountable. As 
the terrorists become more experienced, moving forward with new 
practices, the police need to do the same. The terrorists read the same 
books as the police and orientate themselves accordingly.83 
The authorities are only as effective as the public in that- -due to 
their reliance upon the public to be their eyes and ears- -they rely 
upon infonnation being passed on to them. If the public do not 
understand why something like information registration with the 
authorities is needed, it will not be done. Public identification must 
be fostered via openness by the authorities as to why information is 
necessary and how it will be used, and why it will not lead to Orwellian 
ends. 
On the other hand, the authorities need to know how to collect and 
collate the information they demand. They should also be innovative and 
adapt to unscripted simUlations of abductions and other crises. This 
demands police identification with original thought and not standardised 
approaches dictated by their available technical means. Form of thought 
should not be constrained by the function of analytical instruments. 
The important and potentially dangerous aspect of the Lorenz and 
Schleyer cases is that the authorities and leadership wanted results 
during the abductions which pressured the police to produce these. 
Although Chancellor Schmidt said one needed to go to the legal limi ts , 
both cases show that he was prepared to stretch, and arguably breach, 
those same limits in the interest of obtaining results in the form of 
82 Schiller (1985 II), 31; Schiller (1987 I), 544-5. 
83 Schiller (1985 II), 31. See also the list of 177 titles obtained 
by imprisoned suspected and convicted terrorists in Klaus, 32-5. 
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arrested suspects. This was the opposite of the general portrayal of the 
hard government position owing to Chancellor Schmidt I s 'passion for 
reason! based on his democratic beliefs. 84 
The desire to arrest suspects after the release of Lorenz resulted 
in eighty-three searched houses and apartments, confiscated chemicals, 
radio transmitters and automobile registration plates r and the arrest of 
175 people, who were all later released, while 4000 automobiles were 
stopped and checked. According to those who had their homes searched, 
this meant devastation of government supported hostels, the use of tear 
gas in closed rooms and broken windows, doors and goods. Those arrested 
reportedly had no food for hours, no contact with their lawyers, and the 
police accused of these acts would not provide their badge numbers.85 
The aim of all of these searches ordered by the public prosecutor 
was to deprive the Second of Junemanoueverable space and to search for 
clues in the scene. Nonetheless, it is still questionable whether these 
necessitated the form they took. 86 The activities were fruitless, in 
this form. Perhaps they could have been effective in another form and 
manner. The police function best with the public behind them, and these 
activities did not further public identification with them. 
Several years after the Schleyer abduction Schmidt told an 
interviewer that he could now thank the German lawyers for not checking 
the constitutional basis for everything the government undertook. This 
characterised the division between his words and actions which 
proclaimed an emergency to capture murderers and hostage-takers. To this 
end he gathered all powers to himself and justified everything with 
Paragraph 34 (Justified Emergency) of the Criminal Code. 87 
In practice this meant control points, where instead of police 
checking vehicle registration docunents r which is allowed, they checked 
over the vehicle and passengers. They also checked through whole 
apartment buildings. Neither of these activities had constitutional 
underpinnings. 88 
Similarly the authorities had wire taps on all telephone kiosks in 
Cologne, and via the SWiss, to the B1.m.deskriminalamt on that of Denis 
Payot, the lawyer who acted as gO-between for the Red Army Faction and 
the government. They also tapped the phones of suspected doctor and 
lawyer sympathisers- -they had once helped or defended a terrorist, and 
84 Wittke, 221. 
85 Nawrocki, Die Zeit 14 March 1975, 2. 
86 Nawrockir Die Zeit 28 March 1975, 2. 
87 "'Die Deutschen sind irrsinnig geworden"! Der Spiegel 36/1987, 
106-8. 
88 ibid., 111. 
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the government thought they might be terrorist couriers. There was, 
however, no evidence that this was the case. 89 
The wiretapping of Payot in Switzerland was also illegal as the 
Federal Intelligence Agency can only operate in order to assess the 
danger of possible attacks against the Federal Republic. Such an attack 
from Switzerland was doubtful. 9o 
None of these examples held the two basic principles of 
proportionality and the rule of law. Proportionality was broken when the 
government decided to assume that all persons between the ages of twenty 
and thirty-five could be guilty when they decided to check all 
identification papers of these persons at all border-crossings and all 
vehicles in some areas against the INPOL police computer records. The 
principle of the rule of law was violated when policemen required more 
than just the vehicle papers fra~ drivers when they were inspected. This 
procedure was not incorporated in law until February 1978. Additionally 
the BKA sought to obtain a copy of car purchase papers during the 
Schleyer kidnapping, which again was without legal basis. 91 
The KontaktspeITgesetz (contact ban) passed on 29 September 1977 was 
against the wishes of the Federal Constitutional Court because it also 
forbade defence lawyer visits. The court agreed to the legislation, 
nonetheless, because the law would have lost its effectiveness if 
exceptions were allowed. 9 2 When it was passed, this legalised- -on a 
firmer basis than Para 34- -the practice of the previous three weeks. 93 
Para 34 of the Cr~~inal Code was the government's justification for 
its activities and avoided the regulated constitutional framework of the 
Emergency Laws passed in 1968. The Emergency Laws were designed to limit 
and regulate the government in such conditions, but in 1977 these were 
avoided and one conclusion could be that they moved towards a 
dictatorship. 94 
However, this conclusion confuses the official legal reason and the 
legal motivation of the contact ban. The legal reason was to break 
contact between accused and convicted terrorists, while the legal 
motivation was a lengthened abduction to gain time for successful 
searches and investigations. No parliamentarians knew this fact, which 
was restricted to the executive. Although the ban did not break contact 
between the terrorists and the outside world- -some justice ministers 
89 ibid. 
90 fl'Haben wir Fehler gemacht?' II Der Spiegel 37 (7 September) 1987, 
47-58, 43. 
91 Wittke, 227. 
92 ibid., 252. 
93 "'Haben wir Fehler gemacht?'" Der Spiegel 37/1987, 46, 50. 
94 ibid., 50. 
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ignored the order because they deemed it illegal- -its lack of success 
in gaining time must be questioned for suitability.95 
The parliamentarians were told by the SPD that the contact ban was 
necessary to break contact between the outside world and suspected and 
convicted terrorists to preserve life, limb and public security. This 
was supported wi th the legal agruement that 34 StGB was not enough, 
because some Laender had dismissed it as illegal, so that a proper legal 
code was required. Support for the bill also showed solidarity with the 
government who had CDU/CSU support before the bill's formal 
presenatation to the Bundestag. 96 
Both of the arguments also produced responses. One was that if there 
was already a SPD and CDU/CSU Grand Coalition for the bill, then public 
opposition to the bill needed representation in the Bundestag by 
dissatisfied SPD members. This did not affect FDP members. Other SPD and 
FDP members were dissatisfied because the new bill would imply the 
contact ban could occur again, while 34 StGB use implied a return to the 
status quo. Other FDP and SPD opposition centred on the loss of liberal 
democratic values with the contact ban and felt that radical opposition 
was necessary now to prevent greater losses in the future, while a small 
group of SPD members believed that it was not necessary to separate 
suspected and convicted terrorists from their lawyers. Another group of 
FDP members was concerned about the question of innocents and access to 
lawyers for people suspected of terrorism as highlighted by the case of 
Nora Poensgen, who was arrested shortly after the Ponto murder as a 
suspected terrorist. She was innocent, but would had great difficulty in 
proving this under the contact ban. 97 
In the end, party political arguments gained support for the contact 
ban as SPD/FDP members were told that this was the lesser of evils 
compared with other CDU/CSU suggestions aimed towards strengthening the 
executive. These included the use of the Federal Constitutional Court as 
the court of first instance for terrorist cases I which would shorten 
cases because appeals would be excluded if the cases began at the top. 
They also suggested the prohibition of public congregations that 
endangered public securi ty in order to prevent such incidents before 
they occurred when evidence of such possibily existed. Individual 
CDU/CSU members' suggestions included the introduction of the crime of 
state defamation, reintroduction of the death penalty f and shortened 
court cases for terrorist offences. 98 
95 Wittke, 203-7, 208-9. 
96 ibid., 173; 177. 
97 ibid., 172-3, 186-7j Botzat et. al., 151-7. 
98 Wittke; 191-2. 
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Both the Lorenz and Schleyer episodes were seen by the government as 
situations demanding police responses instead of balanced short and 
lang-term police and political responses. The short-term police response 
needed to be tempered by the long-term political reponse. 
At the time of the Schleyer abduction, Chancellor Schmidt and the 
rest of the crisis commi ttee- -wi th two exceptions- -all denied any 
ideological or political motives in the Red Army Faction activities, and 
held such thoughts to be held only by sympathisers. Only Horst Herold, 
the BKA president, and the Interior Minister, Werner Maihofer, believed 
the terrorists sought to bomb their way into society's political 
attention. Herold even respected the highly intelligent and moral 
terrorists, and saw the proper response as being the removal of the 
ground from which such ideas sprang. 99 
Arguably r because it broke a precedent, a case could be made that 
Federal Prosecutor General Rebmann overstepped himself by asking r and 
receiving permission fran, the Federal Constitutional Court to erect 
mobile control points wherever and whenever necessary during the IMP 
meeting in Berlin in September 1988. As a result all persons travelling 
into the city between 18 and 45 r who did not at first appear 
unsuspicious, were checked under 111 stPO. Normally this code can only 
be used after terrorist incidents. loo 
Earlier this chapter explained that the authorities reduced 
accuseds' rights and increased police manoueverability against 
terrorism. The two of these work together in terrorism with criminal 
codes providing justification for court procedure codes and vice versa. 
The government I s dilemma in framing legislation in these areas f as 
mentioned earlier, is balancing apprehension and speedy trials without 
framing special categories of legislation, which they arguably have with 
Para 129a StGB, as mentioned earlier. This means strengthening 
legislation where necessary and discarding or rewriting useless 
legislation. This was not always done as is shown below. 
Between January 1971 and Novemeber 1980 279 (left and right wing) 
persons suspected of committing and supporting those who committed 
terrorist crimes were arrested. Only in 24% of the cases were the full 
limits of court sentences required. (34.4% in juvenile cases.) Fines 
reached their limit 12% of the time. Crimes with sentences up to two 
99 "'Die Deutschen sing irrsinnig geworden" l Der Spiegel 36/1987, 
107-8; (I'Raben wir Fehler gemacht? III Der Spiegel 37/1987, 55-6. 
100 Blume, Maithes, Stern 41/1988, 262. 
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years were less often sentenced to probation than similar non-terrorist 
cases. 101 
The introduction of new criminal codes were also not always 
necessary. While Paragraph 129a StGB was often used after its 
introduction, Para 88a StGB was only used five times, four of them in 
connection with other codes, but only once solely. Para 130a StGB was 
never used. 1 02 
Court procedure codes that sought to shorten court cases did have 
the desired effect. While the longest allowable interruption of main 
court proceedings went from ten to thirty days, the actual number of 
court days declined from thirteen to ten at the state level, and from 
thirty to twenty-two at the higher state court level. 103 
Of the 279 cases, 67% were sentenced to imprisonment, 11% to a fine, 
10% to a juvenile sentence, and 11% acquitted. 104 This indicates, as 
stated, that the legislation in general is fine tuned to the needs of 
the country in counterterrorism. 
Since then, however, the effectiveness of Para 129a stGB is perhaps 
questionable. Between 1980 and 1987 2131 cases of 129a were 
investigated, of which five percent came to court. Of this 5%, only 
thirty resulted in successful convictions. That is a 1.4% success rate 
from the 2131 cases. 105 
129a is, nonetheless, deemed useful because of its ability to enable 
other activities such as control points, building searches, restrictions 
of defence lawyers' rights, and telephone tapping. This is what places 
terrorism into a special category. One result is that many things which 
are possibly not terrorism receive the terrorism label, such as a 
womens f rights group that organised an archive on gene technology . 
Likewise a twenty-three year old female doctor's assistant became a 
'terrorist' for spraying 'war on the palaces! on a subway wall, and was 
sentenced to one year imprisonment for supporting a terrorist groUp.l06 
Para 129a StGB allows the articles to be used in perhaps unusual 
circumstances. While it was normal to use Par 88a StGB against 
publications, as when it was used against early RAF publications like 
the Ueber den bewaffneten Kampf in Westeuropa in October 1971, or 
against Baumann's autobiography in 1975, it was rescinded in 1981. This 
necessitated the use of Para 129a StGB to supress a book of prison 
101 Bundesministerium des Justiz, "Ausreichende Stratvorschriften 
zur Bekaempfung des Terrorismus" Bulletin 77 (11 August) 1982, 692. 
102 ibid. 
103 ibid. 
104 ibid. 
105 Elendt, Trunk, Stern 42 (19) 1989, 236. 
106 ibid., 240. 
letters by former RAP members, because the introduction states that the 
current RAP prisoners are behind the book. Thus the Federal Prosecutor 
General viewed the book as an advertisement for the RAP. As when the 
BaUTIann book was banned, this one was to be published in a cooperative 
effort by publishers who felt the book contributed to the discussions of 
the helplessness of terrorism. 107 
Given this use of 129a StGB I' and the fact that 130a StGB was never 
used, the usefulness of its reintroduction in 1988 must be questioned. 
Perhaps a less direct purpose was fulfilled by these new, or revised 
legal codes directed against terrorism. The parliamentarian and public 
officials could be seen to respond to public concern about terrorism. 
They were seen to be acting, and not si tting idly by watching on the 
sidelines.10B 
5. Surrmary 
This chapter has shown that identification can usefully combine the 
'communication' and 'war' models into a coherent long and short-term 
counterterrorism concept. Furthermore, both of these aspects need to be 
addressed for an effective counterterrorism policy to develop. 
The Federal Republic did not realise this when it first experienced 
terrorism, but did understand this later. However, it also wavered in 
its dedication to both long and short-term counterterrorism policy in 
the heat of some terrorist incidents, such as during the Lorenz and 
Schleyer abductions. Similarly, there were also problems in the late 
eighties due to terrorist incidents without terrorist arrests, when the 
government felt under pressure to be seen to be doing something about 
terrorism. This was the government acting more on 'war' than 
'communication' assumptions. 
Resource provision for counter and anti terrorism policy has been 
adequately provided for in the Federal Republic of Germany both 
materially in the form of funds and equipment, as well as legislatively 
with criminal and court procedure codes to provide operational 
legitimacy. These later were sometimes seen to be overextended beyond 
their requisite levels. For example, the creation of 129a StGB erected a 
'special category' that justified security force activity beyond what 
was necessary if it only resulted in five per cent of all 129a cases 
coming to court. The widening of 129a in the eighties caused more 
107 n.n., Deutsche Geschichte 1962-1983, 122; Brueckner, Krovoza, 
24; Cobler (1977), 94-5; Hanno Kiechert "Toerische Zensur" Die Zeit 23 
October 1987, 81; see also die taz 10 December 1986. 
lOB Berlit, Dreier, 247. 
problems than it solved, because of the consequent rise in the terrorism 
figures due to the inclusion of hitherto non-terrorist offences. 
The possibility of exit from terrorism was shawn to be possible in 
this chapter (and the two previous ones). The government has enabled 
various routes back to society, some of which aid the government, and 
others which do not. Here the choice lies with the individual as to 
which is chosen. Whether or not this forms an adequate release passage 
from terrorism back to a 'radical' non-violent space in society is 
difficult to determine, but can be judged to meet some need as expressed 
by the larger number of ex-terrorists who did not participate in the 
1989 hunger strike than was the case in previous years, as mentioned in 
chapter three. 
The government and terrorist relationship, however, also depends 
upon the public, who can support either side. The position of the public 
is influenced by both the government and the terrorists, as well as the 
media and their portayal of the situation. These roles of the media and 
the public are discussed next. 
CHAPrER SEVEN: TERRORISM, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MEDIA 
Katharina on the front page. Huge photo huge type. 
KATHARINA BLUM 
OUTLAW'S SWEETHEART 
REFUSES INFOffi.1ATION 
ON MALE VISITORS 
On the back page he saw that the News had transformed 
his statement that Katharina was intelligent, cool, and 
levelheaded into ' ice-cold and calculating f, and his 
general observations on crime now read that she was 
'entirely capable of committing a crime'.l 
The same picture can often be seen on multiple screens, 
but there is no short circuit because of that. My 
objection: These are all reproductions, while here the 
reproduction of reality and the reality itself 
coincide ... can they handle that?2 
Then the claim to be part of a world-wide struggle, and 
that without noticable anchoring in one's own country. 
The international claim also contradicts that 
we ... carry out propagandistic inbreeding... Our 
statements are always directed towards the same circle 
of people, and are also only read by them. It's true 
the statements are often grammatically so composed that 
they can barely be understood. Thus we run the 
possibility of confirming the belief of being only a 
group of elitist middle-class kids. 3 
The relationship between terrorist organisations, the public and the 
media is different for each organisational model discussed in chapter 
five. Each model type identifies with a different subject and thus 
envisages its relationship to the media and the public accordingly. The 
'inst:rumental' model aims to achieve political goals and wants to gain 
public support to assist this aim. 'Organisational' model groups are 
mainly interested in self-survival and thus seek recruitment of the 
minimum necessary for replacement of lost members. The self-interest of 
the 'expressive 1 model types neglects the public. 
Public perception of the terrorist organisations' pursuit of these 
diverse aims is mediated to them through the media, who also pursue 
their awn goals, as was mentioned in chapter four. These goals may aid 
or hinder the terrorists' goals, and may also be influenced by the 
government. 
Discussion of the media and public is broken into four sections. The 
first concerns public opinion about terrorism, and the second the media 
1 Boell, 31-2. 
2 Christof Wackernagel, Bilder einer Ausstellung. Erzaehlungen 
(Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1986), 26. 
3 Boock (1988), 125. 
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and terrorism relationship. Both of these concern mainly theoretical 
issues as a prelude to the third section that discusses both the public 
and the media in relationship to the three models mentioned above and 
the different terrorist organisations in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. The fourth section concludes the chapter with a discussion of 
options available to the government. 
1. The Public Response to Terrorism 
Regardless of whether the 'war' or 'communication I model is used, 
terrorists need to gain legitimacy wi th the public to achieve their 
aims. They require public identification with them as opposed to the 
government. 
This did not happen in the Federal Republic. At times there were 
pockets of support for the terrorists, but never enough to endanger the 
government. The reasons for this are discussed in the third section. 
Table 7.1 Satisfaction with Democracy, 1973-1990 
Sept. Oct- Apr- Oct- May- Oct- .Apr. Oct. Oct. Oct." 
Nov. May Nov. June Nov. 
1973 1976 1977 1977 1978 1978 1979 1979 1980 1981 
Very satisfied 5% 13% 11% 9% 
Fairly satisfied 39 66 67 69 
" Not very satisfied 44 16 16 16 
" 
Not at all satisfied 11 3 2 2 
No reply 1 2 4 4 
Total 100 100 100 100 I N= 1957 1007 1005 999 
9% 9% 10% 12% 9% 
67 68 70 68 64 
16 15 13 12 17 
3 2 224 
5 6 5 6 6 
100 100 100 100 100 
996 1006 1003 1005 1008 
11% 
59 in 
100 
962 
II Mar- Oct. Mar- Oct. Mar- Oct- Mar- Oct- Mar- Oct-
I .Apr. Apr. .Apr. Nov. .Apr. Nov. .Apr. Nov. 1982 1982 1983 1983 1984 1984 1985 1985 1986 1986 Very satisfied 12% 8% 12% 7% 12% 11% 13% 10% 11% 12% 
Fairly satisfied 56 59 59 59 59 62 60 59 69 59 
Not very satisfied 21 22 18 21 19 21 19 22 15 22 
Not at all satisfied 7 4 4 3 3 5 5 4 2 4 
No reply 4 7 7 10 7 1 3 5 3 3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N= 1328 1012 1049 1058 992 1053 1007 1028 987 1084 
Mar- Oct- Mar- Oct- Mar- Oct- Mar- Oct- East EM 
~.~.~.~.~.~.~.~.~~. 
1987 1987 1988 1988 1989 1989 1990 1990 1990 1990 
Very satisfied 10% 
Fairly satisfied 65 
Not very satisfied 19 
Not at all satisfied 2 
I No reply 4 
II Total 100 
~ N= 994 
6% 13% 13% 10% 13% 15% 19% 5% 16% 
62 64 66 65 65 66 62 44 59 
25 18 18 15 17 15 13 34 17 
4 2 4 4 3 2 2 14 5 
3 3 2 3 2 2 433 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
957 1008 1051 1024 1202 1000 1000 1000 2000 
Source: Commission of the European Communi ties. Euro-baranetre, Public 
Opinion in the European Crnmunity: Trends 1974-1990 (March 1991), 20-1. 
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A glance at Table 7.1 shows that widespread dissatisfaction wi th 
democracy never appeared. As mentioned in chapter three [ the average of 
those satisfied with democracy was comparable between the seventies 
(71.3%) and the eighties (72.5%). However, given that the 1973 figures 
skew the average, without other seventies figures to balance them out [ 
their deletion raises the seventies average to 78.4% The figures for 
1973 reflect public concern over the Berufsverbot discussed in chapter 
six as a means for the Social Democratic Party to separate themselves 
from the communists in line with their Ostpolitik. 
Table 7.2 Basic Attitudes Towards Societyr 1970-1990 
'II Feb- Oct- Apr- Oct- May- Oct- Apr. Oct. Apr. Oct. 
1/ Mar. Nov. May Nov. June Nov. 
II Revolutionary 1970 1976 1977 1977 1978 1978 1979 1979 1980 1980 
II 
II 
Action 
Reform 
2% 
70 
2% 
52 
2% 
43 
2% 
41 
1% 
41 
2% 
43 
2% 
52 
3% 
50 
4% 
47 
4% 
46 
Defence Against 
Subversion 20 39 48 
No reply 8 7 7 
Total 100 100 100 
N= 2021 1007 1005 
50 
7 
100 
999 
50 49 39 38 37 43 
8 11 7 9 12 7 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
996 1006 1003 1005 1009 1008 
Apr. Oct. Mar- Oct. Mar- Oct. Mar- Oct. Mar- Oct- Mar-
Apr. Apr. Apr. Apr. Nov. Apr. 
1981 1981 1982 1982 1983 1983 1984 1984 1985 1985 1986 
Revolutionary 
Action 3% 4% 4% 3% 2% 3% 
Reform 41 49 44 45 49 48 
Defence Against 
Subversion 43 36 39 38 42 39 
No reply 13 11 13 14 7 10 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N= 1004 962 1328 1012 1049 1058 
2% 
48 
3% 
58 
2% 
56 
3% 
51 
35 32 32 36 
15 7 10 10 
100 100 100 100 
992 1053 1007 1028 
3% 
52 
37 
8 
100 
987 
Oct- Mar- Oct- Mar- Oct- Mar- Oct- Mar- Oct- East EM 
~.~.~.~.~.~.~.~.~.~~. 
1986 1987 1987 1988 1988 1989 1989 1990 1990 1990 1990 
I 
II 
~ 
II 
II II Revolutionary 
II 
Action 2% 
Reform 51 
'1\ Defence Against 
Subversion 39 
2% 
52 
38 
8 
2% 
57 
33 
8 
2% 
59 
2% 
57 
1% 
63 
2% 
53 
2% 
55 
1% 
58 
3% 
79 6~% \1:,1 
34 31 29 40 39 34 14 30 
I No reply 8 
Total 100 
N= 1084 
100 
994 
100 
957 
5 10 7 5 4 7 4 6 II 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1 
1008 1051 1024 1000 1000 1000 1000 2000 
Source: Commission of the European Communi ty . Euro-baranetre r Public 
Opinion in the European Gamrunity: Trends 1974-1990 (March 1991), 35-6. 
Nor 1 as Table 7.2 shows 1 was there ever large support for 
revolutionary action. Instead there was more heightened concern for 
256 
'defence against subversion' in the seventies (39.2%) than in the 
eighties ( 36 . 7%) as mentioned in chapter three. Similar to Table 7.1, 
the lack of other data in the early years before the rise of terrorism 
skews the figures. Deleting the figure for 1970 raises the seventies 
average to 44%. 
Table 7.2 also shows that the left-wing terrorist caused a public 
backlash. If the 'defence against subversion i figures are interpreted as 
public reaction to terrorism, then the 1977 figures show half the 
population against them, when they were at their peak. In 1970, before 
any deaths, the groups were still up against twenty percent of the 
public. The fact that seventy percent of the public wanted some reform 
possibly explains the amount of sympathy with which the groups began. 4 
Together both tables show the general public did not identify with 
the terrorists. On the other hand, the tables do not show a reciprocal 
identification with the government. The seventies saw the need for 
defence against subversion, while the eighties exhibited a need for 
reform. Both of these were supported by a belief in democracy. 
Both tables also exhibit some potential support for terrorists 
amongst the small percentage that believe revolutionary action is 
necessary, and who do not support democracy. These people could 
potentially be mobilised in some circumstances. 
Both tables also show in their figures fran former East Germany that 
there is a possible group of sympathisers for the various terrorist 
groups in the dissatisfaction with democracy and who are eager for 
reform. The reduction of these figures in the coming years would be a 
sign that the government is handling the concerns of these potential 
terrorist supporters in an appropriate manner. 
This small dissatisfied group is the basis for the ill-defined group 
of people labelled as terrorist sympathisers. When public concern about 
sympathisers was possibly at its height in 1977 a Spiegel magazine 
series concluded that sympathisers were those held to be such, and that 
the word had become a political tool. 5 This ignores those who state a 
willingness to assist the terrorists. These two groups are not 
necessarily identical, but indicates the extent of public support and 
belief of support for terrorists. 
A March 1971 survey showed that 16 to 29 year olds were the most 
supportive, with 25% of them, and 18% of the 30 to 44 year olds, viewing 
the RAF as political fighters. On average 51% of the public saw them as 
4 Christopher Hewitt, "Terrorism and Public Opinion: A Five Country 
Canparison" Terrorism and Political Violence 2 (2) 1990, 145-170, 157-8. 
5 "'Mord beginnt beim boesen Wort'" Der Spiegel 41/1977, 28-47, 30. 
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criminals, and 68% would not provide group members pursued by the police 
with shelter for the night. Of the 16 to 29 year old category, however, 
10% would provide shelter, as would 7% of the 30 to 44 year olds. 6 
In May 1977, after Baader [ Ensslin and Raspe were convicted in 
Stammheim, 60% of the population felt they had received a fair trial, 
while 10% thought their defence had been hindered, and 30% were 
undecided one way or the other. Again the 16 to 29 and the 30 to 44 year 
old groups were more inclined to support the terrorists' viewpoint. 14% 
of the 16 to 29 year olds, and 10% of the 30 to 44 year olds felt the 
group was hindered in its defence. 7 
The public in November 1977 perceived sympathisers as those who 
sheltered terrorists (95%) at one end, and as those who did not support 
the death penalty (18%) at the other. A few months earlier! 67% of the 
public had supported the reintroduction of the death penalty. The public 
also viewed sympathiser activities to be helping to ease the prison 
conditions of terrorists (67%), agreeing with the terrorists' criticisms 
of society (36%), and believing the terrorists act out of desperation 
(56%) .8 
When people were asked if sympathisers could be categorised by 
profession, 57% disagreed. The 43% who agreed this was possible 
suspected mainly students ( 38% ) and lawyers ( 32% ). Beneath these came 
communists (23%), university professors (18%), writers (12%), and right-
wing persons and former Nazis at 10%.9 
A summation of these figures would generally be a person under 
thirty, who was critical of the current poli tical system I and worked 
towards an alternative system. Whether the person supported 
evolutionary I or revolutionary means towards this end was apparently not 
always a determining factor for the public. 
This position is supported by a random questioning of 1800 people 
over eighteen years old in the Federal Republic in late August and early 
September 1978, which found the public's reactions to terrorism were not 
along a simple left-right continuum. For example, while 57% of the 
sample was 'very high/high' interested in terrorism (28% 'medium' and 
15% ' low I ), only 22% could name three or more terrorists. While 36% 
could name one or two terrorists,. 42% could not even name ohe terrorist. 
6 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (ed.), The Ge:rmans: Public Opinion Polls I 
1967-1980 (London: Greenwood Press, 1981), 163. 
7 ibid., 164. 
8 ibid., 166; Pridham, 42. 
9 ibid. 
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There is a large difference between interest in the issue of terrorism 
and the public's actual knowledge of the subject. 10 
This is a sign of the paradox of terrorism that it seeks publicity 
while trying to keep its organisational structure secret. The group may 
have publicity, but its members are only suspected names until their 
arrest. After the arrests come courtroom trials with more publicity, 11 
and more terrorist incidents by other group members. However, this may 
be true of the RAP, but does not apply to the RZ, which is shown below 
in section three to only seek publicity for its causes, and not itself. 
2. Terrorism and the Media 
The last example and Figure 4.1 (page 115) in chapter four both 
highlight the influence of the media on individuals and groups in 
terrorism. The publicity of the media- -favourable or not- -has created 
a symbiotic relationship between it and terrorism whereby the two are 
possibly inseparably entwined. 12 The media provides a medium for the 
terrorists f message, and coverage contributes to motivation for the 
individuals and groups. 
Some forms of terrorism cater particularily to the media because 
they are "pseudo-events", planned or incited events for the primary 
purpose of immediate reporting to wider audiences. This is in the manner 
of New Left activities (like the 'pudding bomb' in chapter two) in the 
late sixties and early seventies when New Left splinter groups turned to 
terrorism to attract the mass media to break out of their isolation and 
engender mass mobilisation.13 
Terrorist publicity campaigns have four main propaganda aims: (1) to 
convey the 'propaganda of the deed t with 'pseudo-events' and spread fear 
through the target group; (2) mobilise wider support for their cause 
both at home and abroad by emphasising the righteousness of their cause 
and its inevitable victory; ( 3 ) delegi timising the government and 
10 Gerhard Unholzer, "Zielgruppenhandbuch fuer die 
Oeffentlichkeitsarbeit gegen Terrorismus: Einstellungen der 
Bevoelkerungen zum Terrorismusproblem", in: Bundesminiterium des Innem 
(eds.), Ausseinandersetzung mit dem Terrorisrnus: MOeglichkeiten der 
politischen Bildungsarbeit (Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innem, October 
1981), 19-38, 19-22. 
11 JOM Orr, "Terrorism as Social Drama and Dramatic Fonn", in: JOM 
Orr, Dragan Klaic I ( eds. ) , Terrorism and Modem Drama (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1990, 48-63, 49, 51-2. 
12 Abraham H. Miller, "Terrorism, the Media, and the Law: A 
Discussion of the Issues", in: Abraham H. Miller (ed.), Terrorism r the 
Media, the Law (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers Inc., 1982), 
13-50, 13. 
13 Hozic I 64-81, 79, mentions as a counter example 1 the small 
coverage of the abduction of aid workers in the Third World; Schmid 
(1989), 541-3; Wilkinson (1986), 79-80. 
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security forces' counterterrorism measures with their portrayal as a 
tyrarmical and counterproductive overreation; ( 4 ) mobilise their 
supporters to incite more acts, boost recruitment and raise funds. 14 
An examination of media coverage about terrorism shows that the type 
of terrorism determines the intensity of the coverage such that 
terrorists can determine how the public is to be reached. Journalists 
and politicians create non-violent 'pseudo-events' to the same end. 1S 
Terrorism, as a method of propaganda for group publicity, has been 
deemed successful in making people aware of the group. Sometimes this is 
not only just publicity about the group's means, but also about their 
cause. This has not, however, legitimised the cause of the terrorist 
organisations. The media has also implied mental instability amongst 
terrorists and their leaders f which has led to the implication that one 
carmot negotiate with 'crazies' .16 
Nonetheless, terrorists believe in the 'propaganda by the deed' and 
courtroom coverage of trials by the established press was spread 
publicity further and more effectively than their own pamphlets. To this 
end they seek useful supporters in the media who will either consciously 
or subconsciously further the terrorists' ideas. 17 
Where terrorist groups can gain little or no publicity in their home 
country, by undertaking actions in foreign countries they can obtain 
international publicity with the foreign media. When the media carmot, 
or will not f come to the terrorists, they can travel to the media 
centres. The live broadcasts of the Munich Olympic Massacre in 1972 
ensured that while millions had not previously heard of the Palestinian 
cause, they would know about it afterwards .18 However, since the public 
has not rushed to join the terrorist groups, it seems that the exposure 
of the public to terrorists' ideas does not convert them .19 
The media contribute to the terrorist uses of publicity with their 
own six ways of terrorist motivation. First, on the one hand, the mass 
media can teach people models of action and experience from elsewhere, 
14 Wilkinson (1990), 30-1. 
15 Gabriel Weimarm, Hans-Bernd Bross ius , "Die Attraktiviteat von 
Gewalt: Ueber welche internationalen Terroranschlaege berichten die 
Medien?" Publizistik 34 (3) 1989, 329-39, 334, 335, 338. 
16 John L. Martin, "The Media's Role in International Terrorism" 
Terrorism 8 (2) 1985, 127-46, 134; George Gerbner, "Symbolic Functions 
of Violence and Terror", in: Yonah Alexander, Richard Latter ( eds. ) , 
Terrorism and the Media: Dilemna.s for Government r Journalists and the 
Public (McLean, VA: Brassey's Inc., 1990), 93-9, 95-6. 
17 Wilkinson (1990), 31; Alex P. Schmid, Janny de Graaf, Violence as 
Coomunication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media (London: 
Sage Publications, 1982), 121 14. 
18 Wilkinson (1986), 60; Schmid, de Graaf, 30-1. 
19 Nathan Leites in Alexander, Katwan (eds.) (1980), 268. 
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indicate goals and stimulate aspirations. On the other hand, television 
arouses people I but does not provide a release for this arousal, and 
leaves them feeling impotent. 20 
Contagion, the transfer of ideas from one place or person to 
another, contributed to the first bombs planted on 2 April 1968 after 
Ensslin and Baader talked to Langhans and Teufel of Kornmune I the week 
after their acquital in court for incitement to arson as mentioned in 
chapter two. Media coverage of US activities in Vietnam added both to 
their feeling that they had to do something about Vietnam because they 
wanted to avoid the mistakes of their parents' generation, and combined 
these feelings with ideas from the court case in their own arson 
attempt. 21 
Second, the media reduce complex political structures and events to 
the actions of individuals and institutions. This leaves the impression 
that if individual people are removed, or eliminated, then the problems 
are solved. 22 The public and government thus present the mirror image of 
the terrorists' belief systems as they dehumanise the terrorists as 
angry monsters, whose actions have no political significance and present 
images of the 'good' establishment and 'evil' terrorists. The terrorists 
lose their human features along with their contact to the social base. 
Choosing somewhere between the two is thus either backsliding or 
treachery.23 
Third, for people with hungry egos, the media provide publicity and 
visibility. People can be known and named by the media. Perhaps this is 
why Christian Klar left his fingerprints everywhere for the authorities 
to find and report. 24 
Fourth, the media can incite people, wittingly or not, to terrorist 
acts. The attempted murder of Rudi Dutschke by Josef Bachmann falls into 
this category. When Bachmann was arrested he had newpaper clippings of 
the right-wing Deutsche National Zeitung from 22 March 1968 that said: 
"Stop Dutschke now! Otherwise there will be a civil war. "2 S 
The first item above, contagion, was also apparently at work in 
Bachmann's assassination attempt on Dutschke. On 4 April 1968 Martin 
Luther King Jr. was assassinated in Memphis f Tennessee f over a week 
after the Deutsche National Zeitung article. Now f arguably, Bachmann had 
an idea of how to stop Dutschke, but had television, wi th i ts emotive 
2Q Schmid, de Graaf, 137-8. 
21 Aust (1987), 48-9. 
22 Schmid, de Graaf, 138-9. 
23 Orr, 53; Hozic, 73, and see the opening chapter quote from Boell. 
24 Schmid, de Graaf, 139; rr 'Da ist irgendwo ein Nest' rr Der Spiegel 
15/1991, 22. 
25 Aust (1987), 52. 
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images of King's assassination, not been available, it is unlikely that 
newpaper accounts would have been as effective at motivating Bachmann. 26 
Television may have provided an example of how an action could be 
conducted. 
Fifth, the media can motivate terrorists, because news must be new, 
which contributes to the escalation of violence in terrorism. The worse 
the incident is, the better it is as news, so terrorism, which remains 
unpredictable also excites interest. 27 
Six, the media want good pictures, and the terrorists want 
publicity, so the arrangements are sometimes made for the media to be on 
hand when the terrorist events occur. 28 It appears that they feed on 
each other. 
The conclusion here should not be that media coverage of terrorism 
causes more terrorism. That has not been proven, but nevertheless 
remains an assumption. Rather lit should be thought that the media 
contributes to terrorism by reinforcing already present personal 
contacts. 29 These are the effects seen previously in Figure 4.1 (page 
115). One's personal contacts can influence one's goals, attitude, 
arousal r frustration and ultimately one I s motivation towards terrorism 
if one is already inclined towards violence. The media can increase 
these arousals and reinforce one I s identifications with these other 
factors. 
The violence of terrorism polarises everyone concerned: the direct 
witnesses, the victims, and those who learn about it through the media. 
Those who share some characteristics with the victim usually identify 
with them r while those who share characteristics with the perpetrators 
generally identify with them. Sometimes there is an ambiguity of 
identification: the person disapproves of the means, but identifies with 
the terrorists I aims. The terrorists are in an apparent no-lose 
situation. Identifying with the victims brings psychological 
humiliation, disorientation, and intimidation- -a victory for the 
terrorists. A direct identification with the terrorists is also a 
victory bringing them new supporters. The terrorists see no middle 
26 Schmid, de Graaf, 128. 
27 ibid., 140; J. Bower Bell in: Yonah Alexander, Seymour Maxwell 
Finger, "Terrorism and the Media" Terrorism 2 (1/2) 1979, 55-137, 90-1. 
28 Schmid, de Graaf, 140. 
29 Robert Picard, "News Coverage as the Contagion of Terrorism: 
Dangerous Charges Backed by Dubious Science", in: Yonah Alexander, 
Richard Latter (eds.), Terrorism and the Media: Dilemnas for Government, 
Journalists and the Public (McLean, VA: Brassey's Inc., 1990), 100-110, 
101, 104-5. 
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ground of innocent bystanders. They assume the public will make the 
right decision if the middle ground is withdrawn. 3o 
The shrinking of the world through high-speed telecorrmunication 
links enables long-distance identification to exist whereby the personal 
knowledge of the imitator is unnecessary. This generally leads to more 
intense identifications because the lack of personal verification of the 
desirability and value of the identification object is unavailable. This 
long distance identification process was employed by the first West 
German terrorists I who took up the revolutionary struggles of Vietnam 
and the Palestinians I which they identified with as being on behalf of 
oppressed people suffering from injustice. 31 
Objects of identification closer to home were felt by the German 
youth to be tainted with their nation's and parents' past. Therefore 
they chose to take up distant, remote identifications. German youths in 
the sixties questioned what their parents I generation did in the Third 
Reich and did not want to be accused of similar behaviour in a similar 
situation I which the youths perceived with regards to German support for 
American involvement in Vietnam. 32 Allied to the youths feeling of 
wanting to react better than their parents was a perception that Germany 
did not overcome fascism in the forties, 3 3 but that Germany sought to 
restore and preserve reactionary power politics. 34 
This displeasure with the German youths' nationality and past meant 
that identification with the Third World provided evidence of the 
Western democracies' inhumanity I and also lifted the protest (and later 
terrorist) groups' awn doubts to a position where their struggle was the 
objective on a global scale. 35 These causes came to them via the public 
medial and the underground and alternative press,36 which also no doubt 
supplied them l to some extent, with the methods of terrorism. 
Identification also passes from the terrorist to the audiences via 
the mass media as "identification machines". Print media, which 
addresses the reader I s intellectual understanding I are less sui ted to 
this. Television, colourful moving pictures with accompanying sound, on 
the other hand I 
consciousness. 37 
is highly suited to bypassing the viewers' 
30 
269. 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
Schmid (1989)1 545; Leites in Alexander, Katwan (eds.) (1980)1 
Schmid I de Graaf, 46; Schmid (1989)1 543. 
Baumann (1978), 81; Mahler in Der Spiegel 53/1979, 37, 39. 
Mahler (1978)1 119. 
Adamo I 1442. 
Guggenberger l 103. 
Schmid, de Graaf, 46. 
ibid., 54. 
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Nonetheless f 'identification machines I work in roth directions. Even 
as the terrorists attacked functions and not individuals the death of 
these people brings aOOut a media inquiry and breath of life into who 
these people were and what they did. A murdered functionary f like 
Buback, becomes a husband with children and a pet dog, and the state 
acquires a human face. The terrorists, on the other hand, in a case of 
role reversal with the death of a member f do not mention the life of 
their former comrades, such as Beer and Plambeck, beyond their 
dedication to the 'cause' .38 
3. Terrorism, Public Opinion and the Media 
This section examines each of the organisational models in 
relationship to its characteristics and approaches to the public and the 
media. For each model type the relevant terrorist organisation is 
discussed (Revolutionary Cells as 'instrumental', Red Army Faction as 
'organisational' f and the Autonanen as 'expressive') with regard to what 
they expected of the public, how they viewed them, and why they did not 
receive public support, but the government did. The aims and 
expectations of the terrorists aOOut the media are also discussed. 
3.1 The Instrumental Model 
Chapter five stated that the 'instrumental' model applied to groups 
using terrorism as a strategic option to further political goals, and 
that this coincided, to some extent I with the activities and statements 
of the Revolutionary Cells. The RZ use terrorism to affect increased 
public pressures for change on the government or other targeted bodies. 
RZ activities use the public as the object of their actions, the public 
do not use the RZ as their object to increase pressure on the targeted 
bodies. 39 The 'public' for the group may be an exclusive one when aims 
are limited to particular causes chosen by the group. 
The Revolutionary Cells argue that they are part of the masses and 
want to help them help themselves. However, as the group began as 
afterhours activity by people in other political organisations and did 
not undertake large acti vi ties and publish pamphlets, the public could 
not identify with the RZ itself, but with the goals of the other groups 
the members belonged to, such as anti-imperialism, support for prisoners 
38 Hozic 1 74. 
39 Iring Fetscher, Herfried Munckler, Hannelore Ludwig, "Ideologien 
der Terroristen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland", in: Iring Fetscher, 
Guenter Rohrmoser (eds. ) I Ideologien und strategien: Analysen des 
Terrorismus Band I (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 15-271, 161. 
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and other activities. At that time the group was orientated towards 
discussion amongst people. 4o 
The group began with a securi ty consciousness that overrode other 
considerations and influenced its public presentation. It was concerned 
that the media and authorities had as little information as possible to 
turn against the RZ members, and there were other campaigns and 
organisations already publicising their issue areas. The lack of arrests 
or other names in connection wi th the group also assured that any 
publicity about the group led nowhere. As the group perceived itself as 
a part of other groups ,41 they did not want to overly publicise 
themselves to the detriment of their political aims. 
The publication of their awn annual magazine, Revolutianaerer Zorn, 
from 1975 to 1981, however, directed itself towards those leftists who 
fought against the political system, because one either fought against, 
or was part of the capitalist system. The magazine sought to further 
discussion about the theories and practicalities of such fighting. 42 
These were not directed at the general public, but at those who already 
approved of violence in general, but had not previously considered low-
level terrorism. Identification with the group was then only open to the 
far left who had access to RZ letters of responsibility in the 
alternative press as only larger RZ bombings and the murder of Karry in 
1981 attracted general press attention. 
Given the increase of Revolutionary Cell incidents in the early 
eighties, it would seem that the group reached new members and received 
public identification with some of their public audience. Others may 
have identified with the RZ, but not used their label and thus fallen 
under 'other' in government classification. This would show further 
identification success on behalf of the public as discussed in chapter 
three. 
Nonetheless, the Revolutionary Cells have not received widespread 
direct public support, although there may be support for their goals 
evident in other, non-violent citizen initiatives that deal with similar 
issues such as South Africa, and nuclear power. The rise to power of the 
Green party to membership in Laender coalition governments with Social 
Democrats has, no doubt, also reduced their public support in more 
recent years. 
The Revolutionary Cells are perhaps an unusual example of the 
'instrumental' model as they do not seek publicity for themselves, but 
40 Revolutionary Cells, (1975), 208, 226-7. 
41 ibid., 226-7,229. 
42 Revolutionary Cells, (1985), 24, 41. 
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for their chosen causes that are highlighted by their attacks discussed 
in chapter three. While the group seeks publicity for its causes amongst 
the general public, its recruitment efforts are directed towards far 
left readers of the alternative press. This follows the aim of focusing 
public pressure while remaining behind the scenes as members of the 
legal groups, who also conduct 'afterhours' activity. This 
'instrumental' nature of the RZ, however f is questionable with those 
cells that pursue issues without widespread public support as discussed 
in chapter three. 
3.2 The Organisational Model 
The 'organisational' model views terrorism as the result of internal 
group dynamics I with the group seeking to maintain cohesion and survival 
through members' incentives. Ideological goals may be secondary to group 
survival, as their achievement may end the group. The Red Army Faction 
may have sought to be an , instrumental' group, but became 
'organisational' as its emphasis shifted to obtain the release of their 
imprisoned members. Therefore the public is important only to the extent 
that it can help facili tate group survival, and whether the group 
survives or not, is only to be found through the practice of trial and 
error. The 'primacy of praxis' would show if interested third parties, 
the audience, came to the group's support. 4, 3 This occurs in publicity 
about the group to aid recruitment, and highlight ideological issue 
areas of group activity. As with the Revolutionary Cells the 'public' 
may equal the far left and not the general public. 
The Red Army Faction stated after they freed Baader that it was not 
directing itself towards the intellectual left, but rather towards the 
youths in juvenile centres, poor families and factory workers. These 
people would understand the need to free prisoners because they 
themselves were prisoners. They would understand that a 'Red Army' was 
theirs and support it with more groups who would follow their example. 4, 4 
However, as discussed in chapter two, the group contradicted these aims 
with the freeing of Baader before the logistical apparatus for the group 
was organised, and without a clear idea of how they were to achieve 
their aims from the underground. 
These were not insurmountable problems for the RAP J who saw their 
isolation from the public not as a sign of rejection, but the state 
43 Fetscher et. al., 43-6. 
44 Ulrike Meinhof, "Natuerlich kann geschossen werden" Der Spiegel 
25 (15 June) 1970, 74-5; Red Army Faction, "Die Rote Armee aufbauen", 
in: Reinhold Rauball (ed.), Die Baader-Meinhof-Gruppe (West Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1973), 83-6. 
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using unbelievable amounts of energy to separate the group from the 
masses. That the public was not waiting to join the group was only a 
sign that the concept of the armed struggle would arise in the 
collective class struggle when people were not demoralised but acted. 45 
Partly this is due to the "trail of the politics of the RAF" f whereby 
many people change their position towards the state because of state 
measures against the group. Now people began to realise the state was an 
imperialist repression machine against the people. 46 
The 'identification machines' of the media were enacted by the 
second phase of left-wing West German terrorism after the Red Army 
Faction founders were arrested and imprisoned. Through the help of their 
lawyers imprisoned RAF members were able to portray themselves as 
isolated and held in poor conditions in order to gain the support and 
sympathy of further young and idealistic people. By 'terrorizing' 
themselves through hunger strikes the terrorists could use public 
reaction for recruitment. 47 
The RAF founders took this even further on 18 October 1977 when they 
used 'pseudo-terrorism', with themselves as victims, to imply that the 
government was guilty of murder when they committed suicide after 
hearing about the Mogadishu rescue. The result was that many believed 
the state to be guilty, and the press was filled with speculation about 
their deaths. 48 
RAF group activities were less identifiable for the public. While 
the bombings of 1972 may have been clearly interpreted by the public, 
the murders of 1977 were less so. The murders in the eighties were even 
more difficult to explain and justify to the RAF's far left audience as 
confirmed by the discussion that arose after the murder of Pimental in 
1985 f as mentioned in chapter two, and their search for new allies in 
their development of a West European anti-imperialist front between them 
and other groupS.49 
None of these measures by the group brought greater public 
identification with them. Their activities have been less understood by 
the public as only those who developed a personal connection to the 
group were recruited, as discussed in chapter five. They do not appear 
to recruit others without this direct contact to either a member or 
45 Red Army Faction, !IDem Volk dienen: Stadtguerilla und 
Klassenkampf ll (1983) f 401-2. 
46 Original emphasis, Red Army Faction, "'Wir werden in den 
Durststreik treten'" Der Spiegel 4 (20 January) 1975,52-7,55. 
47 Hozic, 47. 
48 ibid., 49-50. 
49 Red Army Faction, "Guerilla I Widerstand und Antiimperialistische 
Front" (1983), 608. 
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someone who attends trials, and protests for the group. Thus the group 
dynamics play a more integral part, than the issues the group canvases 
for, and the public remains excluded. 
This group dynamic aspect makes the RAP an ideal-type 
'organisational' group. Internal condi tions drive the group, not their 
ideological goals. Their ideology can be used to justify their continued 
existence, but has the problem that it is not understood outside of 
their target audience. These are the people the group concerns itself 
with, not the general public. Within their recruitment field prisoner 
conditions playa more important role than underground group activities, 
which appear to show the group I s ability. 50 The lack of sustained 
campaigns since 1986 leads to this conclusion. 
3.3 The Expressive Model 
The ' expressive I model places the emphasis of terrorism on the act 
itself as the motivating factor. Long-term goals apart from the 
repeti tion of terrorist acts are not considered in this model which 
places a high regard on the 'spectacle' of terrorism. Some Autonanen 
cells are arguably of this variety and less inclined towards the 
, instrumental' model decribed above. As the focus of the group is inward 
on the 'spectacle' of terrorism, the group does not concern itself with 
the general public, only like-minded others. 
The Autonanen argue that their activities must be clearly understood 
by the public as resistance against the political system f to preserve 
the security of those who undertake these acts, which are to be part of 
already identifiable campaigns around the issue. Together this shows 
that resistance is possible, and some of the public who identify with 
the strength of the state because they see no strength in the masses, 
will identify with and imitate these resisters. 51 This mirrors the 
Revolutionary Cell arguments above. 
However, the Autonanen also hold the notion that their call to 
resistance happens once; and they are not responsible if people ignore 
the signs of their fighting. They do not care about people I s opinions, 
because all activity is done for themselves. 52 
Autonamen activities are responses to what they see in their daily 
lives. TheY do not want to relinquish their lifestyle to became workers; 
50 See Dowling, 16-7, on how insiders (supporters) and outsiders 
(public) receive messages from terrorist groups. 
51 n.n. Das Tapfere Schneiderlein, 11-2. 
52 n.n. Guerilla Diffusa, 12-3, 30. 
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but rather develop themselves. To this end they seek means for the 
expression of personal radicalism in public movements. 53 
The Autanomen argue that the public has difficulty identifying with 
terrorists because they only represent idols to resistance fighters and 
devils to others. The Autanomen see themselves, unlike the terrorists f 
because they use means- -fantasy and energy- -available to everyone. 
Autanomen do not seek to use methods available to underground terrorists 
like the RAF to conduct sophisticated attacks like light beam triggered 
bombs, but seek to use their imagination and enthusiasm to conceive of 
ways and means of turning events into ~ spectacles I wi th the limi ted 
means at everyone I s disposal. However, because the media present their 
acti vi ties out of context, they appear as mysterious, which hinders 
their identification building impact. 54 This is minimised though, as the 
Autanomen target audience is not the general public, but the far left, 
who they want to join their resistance against the ~system'. 
The Autananen exemplify the ~ expressive I model in their disregard 
for the public as they undertake resistance to develop their own lives 
as they see fit. Ideally they see this personal radicalism developed 
within public movements, but if not, then they believe others will 
understand their resistance to the system and join them. The public is 
superfluous to the scheme because the whole emphasis is on personal 
development. 
4. Terrorism, the Media and the Government 
The media is not monolithic, and different people will expend 
various efforts to obtain desired news, which may be presented in 
diverse quantities with attention to increasing their ratings over their 
competitors I. Terrorism attracts news media attention because it (a) 
arouses public alann with its ruthlessness and unpredictability, (b) 
could happen to anyone, which provides dramatic excitement as audiences 
generally identify with the victims, and (c) is critically important for 
governments when it signals dissension, highlights security problems, 
and creates political crisis. 55 
The media can also end rumours and counter erroneous and potentially 
harmful information, especially during on-going incidents such as 
hijackings and other hostage-taking acts. At other times, however I the 
media cause deaths in these incidents because they do not hold back 
information r as was partially the case with captain Juergen Schumann of 
53 ibid. r 64-5. 
54 ibid., 64. 
55 A.H. Miller, 27; Martin, 142; Schmid, (1989), 552-3. 
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the 1977 hijacked Lufthansa plane, 'Landshut'. He was murdered because 
the terrorists heard over the radio that he had smuggled out information 
to the authorities, and for taking too long- -due to Yerneni soldiers 
around the plane- -in returning from checking the landing gear after an 
emergency landing.56 
Al though all acts that are the same should have the same label, the 
media usually use the definitions of violence that are passed on to them 
from their information sources- -mainly the government with regard to 
terrorism. This does not deny that in other cases the news media have 
more information than the authorities, as is the case when they obtain 
interviews with suspected terrorists. The police, in some of these 
cases, have an information superiority over the media, who have 
editorial deadlines. The government can therefore preselect and 
offensively present their information to the media, which may be doubly 
handicapped. The media can become source dependent upon the government 
sources and wittingly, or unwittingly! disseminate government opinion. 
This can lead to news about terrorism that has no basis in reali ty , 
while other terrorist acts are never heard about, both of which distort 
public perceptions of terrorism. 57 
One example is the alleged theft of fifty-three mustard gas 
canisters from an army depot by the Red Army Faction that was reported 
in the press. Later the theft of the gas canisters was linked by the 
Bundeskriminalamt with a supposed gas attack on the Bundestag. Several 
months later the canisters were 'found', and their 'loss' attributed to 
inaccurate inventories. 5 8 The original report about the gas canisters 
has been included by authors who did not see the later corrections. 59 
Alternatively the government can suppress information from terrorist 
groups to enable it to create favourable conditions for policy 
implementation. In Stuttgart, press reports stated that the Red Army 
Faction planned to bomb the city centre on 2 June 1972. Before then a 
BKA authenticated RAF statement sent to several newspaper editors 
claimed this was a false report planted, most likely, by the police. The 
government suppressed the communique! and the result was a beleaguered 
Stuttgart on 2 June with thousands of police checking roads, vehicles 
and 'suspicious persons'. The government had created conditions 
favourable to the introduction of rewards, which, they felt, could only 
56 A.H. Miller, 25-6, 29; Aust (1987), 521-2. 
57 A.H. Miller, 17-8; Schmid, de Graaf l 64-5, 93. 
58 Cobler (1978), 45-7, contains this example and others concerning 
false reports of terrorist activities and their actual explanations. 
59 see how Robert H. Kupperrnann uses these canisters in: Alexander, 
Finger (1979), 60; and Wilkinson (1986)1 149. 
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be used if the public were confronted with spectacular events. If not, 
the rewards were believed to only add psychological weight to the 
terrorists. This was decided, however, in January 1972, i.e. before the 
May 1972 bombing campaign.60 Events of terrorist nature have also been 
conducted by the government and attributed to terrorist groups, as was 
discussed with regard to the 'CelIe Hole' in chapter six. 
Two more examples show how the media and government relationship 
works at opposite ends of the spectrum between unfettered and restrained 
media coverage in on-going terrorist incidents. For West Germany the two 
ends were the Lorenz abduction in February/March 1975, where terrorists 
virtually dictated broadcast policy to the government,61 and the 
Schleyer abduction coupled with the Lufthansa hijacking in 
September/October 1977 when the government requested, and mostly 
received, a news embargo on the events. This news embargo went further 
than anything else in a peacetime democracy.62 
Some resul ts of the Peter Lorenz abduction can be seen in its 
coverage in the Springer press publications. Between 28 February and 6 
March (from the day after the kidnapping to the day after Lorenz's 
release) the quality paper Die Welt used 42.8% of their political 
reportage space for the abduction, while the mass circulation Bild used 
72.51% of its political reportage space for the abduction. 
Comparatively, the Stuttgargter Zeibmg used 31. 7% and the Frankfurter 
Rundschau used 38.68%.63 
The Springer press writers used various writing techniques to 
communicate with their readers that they too were in danger from the 
terrorists. A 'diffusion I process was engaged to intimate that the 
terrorists were part of a larger network of intellectuals and others 
indirectly responsible for the abduction. Furthermore, by using various 
, intimacy building I techniques such as 'concretism ' (to provide the 
impression that the readers have all of the information), 'offers of 
identification I (which idealises the victims and brings them closer to 
the reader), and 'psychologising' (to reduce the terrorists' motives to 
purely private and psychological ones), the writers made the public feel 
endangered. All of these techniques were also employed to a lesser 
extent in the other newspapers. 64 
60 Cobler (1978), 169. 
61 Melvin J. Lasky, "Ulrike Meinhof and the Baader-Meinhof Group" 
Encounter 6, 1975, 9-23, 15-6. 
62 Schmid, de Graaf, 154. 
63 ibid., 79-80. 
64 ibid. I 80. 
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Combining this biased press coverage with large quantity press and 
other media coverage must have left the reader with the impression that 
the terrorists had 'carried the attack into the heart of the state' and 
distorted the reality of the event. While the media no doubt condemned 
the abduction, their large scale reporting of the event made the affair 
of one family an affair of the nation and forced the public to take 
sides and identify wi th one participant or the other. People could 
identify with the seemingly powerful terrorists, the impotent victim, or 
the equally impotent government that had decided the life of one 
individual was more important than law and order. Thus the 'information 
machine' was used by the terrorists to turn the violence against one 
into the violence against millions.65 
After the murder of Hanns Martin Schleyer I s bodyguards and driver 
and his subsequent abduction on 5 September 1977 a news embargo was 
introduced three days later that lasted forty-five days, with most of 
the 139 terrorist communications to thirty-seven media sources not 
reaching the public. The terrorists were unable to build up a wave of 
public sympathy and compassion to force the government to release the 
imprisoned terrorists in exchange for Schleyer and the airline 
passengers. 66 
The government news embargo covered 121 dailies in West Germany, and 
fewer than twelve ignored the government request. The government and the 
media were somehow able to contain the normally existent competi ti ve 
pressures. Additionally, the government press office monitored the 
German office communications of twenty foreign news agencies, seventy 
radio and seven television programmes f German dailies, foreign dailies 
and other magazines. If the government deemed something harmful it asked 
for the item to be blocked, issued a denial or a statement. This negated 
or placed the news in a different light and influenced the news before 
it reached the public. This also extended to foreign news agencies such 
as the BBC, who held back on reporting the GSG 9 flight to Mogadishu. 67 
Not everything was suppressed by the West German government. It 
allowed useful information through to the public. This included coded 
messages to the terrorists from the government, and later after an 
intermediary was introduced (the Swiss lawyer f Denis Payot) the 
government announced when corrununications were received and sent to the 
Red Army Faction. The content of these was not disclosed. The government 
also encouraged the reporting of ministers I moves to Algeria, Libya f 
65 ibid., 81, 152-3. 
66 ibid., 49, 154, 156. 
67 ibid., 155. 
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South Yeman! Iraq and Vietnam, which had been chosen by Baader and 
others as possible safe-havens for their exchange. These movements were 
used to win time for the investigation. However, the government was 
silent on the crisis management committee, and about the investigation 
for the abductors' location. 68 
The news embargo was to ensure the government's abili ty to keep 
their investigation secret because the terrorists had threatened 
Schleyer's death if it was not stopped, and feared they could not keep 
it secret if the media uncovered its continuation. The government also 
wanted to keep its strategy and tactics secret from the terrorists! and 
to prevent the media from being used by the terrorists for propaganda 
purposes.69 
However f the government news embargo was not completely successful! 
because some foreign media received terrorist corrmuniques (French and 
Dutch) which in turn were used by the GenTIan media. 70 Also the 19 
September issue of Der Spiegel carried a story of the crisis committee 
that said they would not release the prisoners, but sought to gain time 
through negotiations with the terrorists. Later an attempt by Schleyer's 
family to pay a $15 million ransom for his release was ruined when the 
time and place of the exchange became publicly known through the 
media. 71 
All the West German press could do was to corrment on the information 
the government provided, and on the RAP communiques that were printed in 
the foreign press. Thus! to some extent, the news embargo did not work 
and the terrorists received publicity.72 
The news embargo went against the basic feelings of journalists and 
their editors, who felt that while this is perhaps alright in 
exceptional circumstances, but should not become the norm. In this case, 
forty-five days was also too long. Amongst the public, 70-80% supported 
the news embargo. 7 3 
While the terrorists did not direct when and what was broadcast, as 
in the Lorenz abduction, there were frequent programme changes. For 
example I the funerals of Schleyer's guards must ~ve had an effect 
. ~. ,d • 
similar to what would have occurred without the embarg9: I~ The sarr.t!9:, ~ust 
68 ibid., 155-6. 
69 ibid. f 156. 
70 ibid. 
71 Gitta M. Bauer in Alexander! Finger (eds.) (1979), 134-5. 
72 Tolmein! zum Winkel! 39! 71-2; One side effect of the news 
embargo is that it provided the impetus to found die tageszeitung (die 
taz) in 1978. See die taz 5 October 1987! 20. 
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Graaf, 156. 
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have been true for Schleyer's own funeral which was broadcast, except 
that this one contrasted that given for Baader, Ensslin and Raspe. 
The government also allowed a two part programme on anarchism and 
Bakunism that idealised and glorified them, as well as portrayed them as 
opponents of the October revolution. Later anarchism and Bakunism, 
according to the programme, resulted in state bureq.ucratic socialism, 
and became the spiritual father of 'anarcho-terrorism' that affected 
Germany, This could be said to affect the public by pointing the finger 
towards Marxists as the origins of terrorism. 75 
The government had one large benefit in the news embargo- -it 
obviated the need to explain why it was not going to release the 
imprisoned terrorists for the hostages. They could portray an image of 
negotiation towards an exchange to the public, even though the other 
decision had already been made one day after Schleyer t s abduction. The 
goal of maintaining a strong state image at home and abroad was the 
hidden agenda behind the publicity of protecting Schleyer's life. 76 
Had the rescue at Mogadishu been unsuccessful, the government would 
have had a high price to pay for the lack of public understanding that 
would have been evident. This would have been different if the public 
had been continuously informed during the news embargo. 7 7 
That the news embargo had been a method of crisis management aimed 
at reducing public sympathy, and compassion to provide a free hand for 
government action in the kidnapping and hijacking, would be the cynical 
explanation. 78 On the other hand, the government could not reduce all of 
the identification possibilities to a choice between the terrorists, and 
the victims. In mid-September 60% did not want the government to grant 
the terrorists t demands (22% did). After the hijacking in October the 
public was evenly divided: 42% for, and 42% against supplying the 
terrorists' demands. This could be partially attributed to the fact that 
in the first case there was one life at stake in exchange for ten freed 
terrorists. In the second case there were eighty-seven more lives added, 
whom the public could identify with as holiday-makers. 79 
The implication of this is that, had the Mogadishu rescue operation 
gone wrong, then the public would have seen the government as defeated 
with regards to terrorism, despite the government's firmness against the 
terrorists' demands. In September 1977 48% of the public had thought the 
government had acted resolutely and deliberately, and 27% had thought 
75 Adamo, 1447. 
76 Botzat et. al., 61. 
77 Schmid, de Graaf, 157. 
78 Botzat et aI, 65. 
79 Pridham, 43. 
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not. A month later, 50% had thought the government been 'resolute and 
well-considered' f 35% not so, and 15% were undecided. 8o 
The West German news embargo's mixed results, and its 
inappropriateness where emphasis is placed on knowing what has been 
decided on the public's behalf, raises the question of other options. At 
the extreme end there is censorship of all terrorist incidents. In some 
cases this could lead to increased terrorist incidents when government 
supporters think they can attack suspected left-wing terrorists and 
their supporters without any fear of exposure or criticism by the media. 
Furthermore, the possibility of rumours that are worse than overheated 
news coverage is also possible,81 possibly damaging government 
credibility and thus aiding the terrorists. 
In between news embargos and censorship from above and unfettered 
coverage r are other possibilities. Codes of practice for the media have 
been suggested r but also have problems when each incident is considered 
unique and makes generalised rules inadequate. Additionally r each news 
organisation, radio and television stations and the press, are also 
unique. To force them all into one mould would be difficult and possibly 
futile. 82 
Delayed reporting has other difficul ties. For example, media and 
government credibility is on the line when lots of people already know 
what has happened r such as when buildings are cleared in bomb scares r 
and other incidents. Lies by the authorities and the media could be 
remembered, so it is necessary to avoid lies r in order that the public 
trust the media and the government next time. One suggested way out of 
this dilemma is for the media to not become part of the story, and to 
stay away from these problems. 83 
Another option, moving towards censorship, is that of banning 
television and radio interviews with terrorists and other proscribed 
organisations as a means of reducing propaganda outlets. 84 However r this 
is less of an option in the Federal Republic where such interviews are 
few and rare r than in the Uni ted Kingdom where they have been more 
frequent due to the availability of elected parliamentary 
representatives and Provisional Irish Republican Army spokesnen 
available for comment after terrorist incidents, who could speak about 
the 'armed struggle' . 
80 ibid.; Noelle-Neumann (ed.), 165. 
81 Schmid, de Graaf, 150, 157; Schmid (1989), 560. 
82 Charles L. Bennet in: Michael T. McEwan r Stephen Sloan I 
"Terrorism: Police and Media Problems" Terrurism 2 (1/2) 1979, 1-54, 4-
5. 
83 Jim Campbell in McEwan, Sloan (eds.) (1979), 33-5. 
84 Wilkinson (1990), 32-3. 
Interviews with terrorists can be dubious sources that may include 
inaccuracies, lies and exaggerations, and could be unwitting 
'identification machines' for the terrorists. The terrorists use of 
their awn language to define reality and to challenge the existing order 
in confrontation with public morality, may lead some viewers to ponder 
why the terrorists believe what they do, and to seek explanations. 8 5 
On the other hand, however, it must be remembered that terrorists 
are not intellectual supermen that appeal to everyone. Their messages 
are often confused, and they should be confronted with common sense, 
instead of being allowed to live in their isolated underground ghettos. 
The words the terrorists utter are less dear than the lives they take 
with their 'propaganda by the deed', and they should be able to send 
their messages without the cost of life. It could be argued that the 
public fear the pictures of the victims f not those of the terrorists. 86 
In combination with terrorist access to the media would have to be 
sound government arguments based on the truth that compared democratic 
realities with terrorist realities, and democratic ideals with terrorist 
ideals as a means of confronting the terrorists' tendency to compare 
their ideals with democratic reality. Part of this could be done in the 
form of countering terrorist pamphlets in a serious manner with properly 
refuted arguments. 87 These counter-arguments would reduce the effect of 
the terrorists' messages to their awn members and supporters and provide 
increased familiari ty with the terrorists I perspectives and its 
pitfalls, because its mystery would be reduced. 
Other possibilites are self-restraint and voluntary guidelines for 
the different media. 88 This would be part of consistent coverage of 
terrorism so the public can become aware of the problem and yet keep it 
in perspective with other events. This avoids the two extremes of 
articles about fear and terror on the one hand, and nothing in between 
the appearance of these extreme articles about terrorism on the other.89 
A benefit of this for the authorities would be a higher public 
recognition of wanted terrorists, especially if the government had its 
way, with televised videos of different terrorists in different 
disguises, i.e. with beard, without beard, long hair, short hair, etc. 90 
It also respects the media (s role of informing the public by enabling 
them to form opinions according to their awn desires on one newspaper's, 
85 Schmid, de Graaf, 14, 16 r 25. 86 ibid., 170. 
87 Schmid (1988)r 173-4. 
88 Wilkinson (1986), 177. 
89 David Anable in Alexander, Finger (eds.) (1979) 133. 
90 Schaeuble, Stern 39 (45) 1986, 255. 
or radio or television programme's subjectivity over 
recognises readers' preferences for entertainment 
inforrnation. 91 
5. SUrrmary 
[/b 
another, and 
value and 
Given coverage of terrorism, the public is concerned about its 
effects. The general public is not inclined to join the terrorists, 
al though parts of the far left might join one of the groups. This is 
partly because the general public is ignored by the terrorists- -only 
the ' insb:umental' group sought to reach them indirectly through their 
contacts in other movements. The " instrumental' groups only sought 
direct contact to the far left through the alternative press. The 
'organisational! type was interested in recruitment through personal 
contacts and raising general publicity as to its capabilities in the 
general press. The 'expressive' organisations had self-interest in 
personal development expressed through public movements. 
As only the 'instrumental' type Revolutionary Cells wanted to raise 
issues in the general media with the general public as part of the 
movements they support it would appear that coverage of these issues may 
reduce their perception of a need for terrorism to help further some of 
the issues raised by protest movements. As they did not argue that 
terrorism would raise the issues, but would add to the pressure, it is 
necessary to separate the means of protest from the ends in informed 
media coverage, which in turn, depends upon the issue, and its 
legitimacy. 
For the 'organisational' type Red Army Faction media coverage aids 
recruitment, so its reduction may reduce recruitment. However, this can 
only effectively end when the 'identification machine' of perceived 
injustice is reduced. This can be achieved by genuinely improved 
circumstances that bring about personal contacts to the terrorists and 
their lawyers- -prison condi tions- -and also through better discussion 
of the relationship between the state and the terrorists. 
The ' expressive' type groUps of possibly some Autonanen cells are 
not interested in the general media and rely upon the alternative press 
to spread their ideas of resistance. Their concern for themselves means 
that they might end their use of terrorism when they feel no need to 
fight the state, because they can freely develop themselves. A radical 
free space discussed in chapter six may aid this I as might the use of 
government articles inserted, either anonymously or with the government 
organisation's name, in the alternative press to open more discussion 
91 Rabe in Alexander, Finger (eds.) (1979), 70. 
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about terrorism and the goals of the groups. This is also applicable to 
the other two organisation types. 
This concludes the analysis of the different factors in the 
motivation of left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the concept of identification. Individuals, groups, government response, 
and media and public reaction have been studied with respect to both of 
these issues, and towards the general theories in each chapter. It now 
remains to bring these separate findings together for joint discussion 
over the theoretical and case study findings. 
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
The Three Agitators: 
No, a good question is followed by a better answer. We 
see that the extreme is already demanded of you; but 
still more is demanded of you .... ! 
The Little Monk: 
And you don't think, that the truth, when it is the 
truth, will prevail, even without us? 
Galileo: 
No, no f no. Only so much truth is accepted as we 
accomplish; the victory of reason can only be the 
victory of the reasonable ones. 2 
[I'd 
This chapter brings together the concepts discussed throughout the 
thesis with three different purposes. First, it offers a summary of the 
concept of identification with relevance to the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Second, it draws conclusions from the findings on left-wing 
terrorism in the Federal Republic as to its origins, causes f decline f 
and how these were affected by individuals! groups, government and the 
media. Third, it offers practical applications in policy options for the 
Federal Republic based on these findings. Fourth, it points towards 
future theoretical applications of identification in the general study 
of terrorism. 
1. Theoretical Surmary 
The thesis examined how the concept of identification contributes to 
understanding the motivation of! and responses to political terrorism as 
a means of integrating the numerous levels of terrorism study shown in 
Figure 1.1 (page 16). The three by three matrix (individual, group and 
society on both axes, one as object the other as subject) was covered in 
different areas of the thesis. Chapter four showed that individuals 
could meet and be influenced by 'significant others I, whom they could 
follow and/or cause to seek access to as group members, as well as rebel 
against one image and fight for another. Meinhof was attracted to 
Ensslin, who represented a group Meinhof wanted to become a part of as a 
means of working against the developing image of 'latent fascist' 
Germany as she strove for a different state. 
Chapter five highlighted how groups could identify with individuals 
whom they portrayed as martyrs, and how they sought examples in other 
similar groups. The Red Army Faction made its dead members into martyrs 
! Bertolt Brecht, "Die Massnahme" (978), 257. 
2 Bertolt Brecht, "Leben des Galilei" (1978), 519. 
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and identified with other groups like the Palestinians as they sought to 
destroy the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Chapters six and seven showed how society could identify with 
individual 'victims I I and groups that struggled against terrorism ( or 
for freedom) as well as with other societies perceived as similar to 
themselves or seen to be 'victims f. West German society could identify 
wi th individual 'victims' such as Schleyer or Lorenz, as well as with 
the government officials who struggled against terrorism (or a hijacked 
plane of holiday makers), and with the USA as it seemingly fought 
against protesters at home and abroad who were against its involvement 
in Vietnam and opposed America' s role in NATO. The German public 
understood- -in their view- -that America was their democratic champion, 
despite what the far left claimed. 
Chapter four presented identification as an approach that combined 
the diverse motivation factors seen in Figure 4.1 (page 115). In 
particular the abili ty of belief systems and of personal contacts to 
limit individual perceptions of available options in the choice of goals 
and what could be done when these were denied. 
Chapter five on group dynamics detailed how the limiting of personal 
contacts could amplify group belief systems on individuals by enlisting 
history and fantasy to support the terrorist group in their roles. The 
chapter also presented three organisational models of terrorist groups. 
The ' instrumental' model viewed terrorism as a deliberate strategic 
choice based on collective group values which identified with changes in 
the political and social context. The achievement of these changes 
should lead to the end of terrorism by the group. The 'organisation I 
model viewed terrorism as the result of group identification with 
survival through incentives and rewards offered to the members. 
Disagreement over the allocation of these and the best path for the 
group should lead to its self-destruction if it is left alone. The 
'expressive' model viewed terrorism as the result of group 
identification with self-interest, possibly as the result of frustration 
in other means. They appear to join public issue protesters only as a 
means to their ends of terrorism. These cells will only end after the 
arrest of the members, or when they find other fulfilling activities. 
Chapter six showed how the identification model used the 'war' model 
(paramilitary and police responses) in the short-term, and the 
'communication! model (socio-political responses) in the long-term. 
Optimally, the 'war' model represents tactical short-term options, while 
'communication' coordinates long-term counterterrorism policy to reduce 
terrorism in all areas and avoids overdependence on the 'war I model as 
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the sole option available to the neglect of coordinated long-term 
planning. Throughout this the government also needs to maintain its 
identification with liberal democracy and the rule of law as a means of 
maintaining public identification with them. 
These aspects of identification showed how people developed ties to 
individuals, groups and societies, and why these occurred in the Federal 
Republic of Germany amongst the left-wing terrorists in the areas which 
they did. Identification explained the effects of different group 
identifications whereby the ' instrumental' model looked for outward 
change { the 'organisational' model for survival, and the ' expressive' 
model for self-interest. The potential for these groups was seen to be 
reflected in how they viewed the public and potential recruitment. Only 
the 'instrumental' groups sought recruitment amongst the general public, 
but then only in their non-terrorist group activities. Identification 
also showed that while the government and the terrorists fought for the 
'public's' identification, the government did not understand this in the 
limited concept of the public which the terrorists used. Therefore, the 
government overreacted in some instances when they felt particularily 
threatened, and did not maintain their identification with liberal 
democracy as rigourously as they should have. 
2. Conclusion of Findings 
This section re-examines the· motivation of left-wing terrorism in 
the Federal Republic of Germany from the differing perspectives of the 
individual, group, government and media, with regard to its origins, 
rise and decline. In contrast to the theoretical aspects of the summary, 
this section concentrates upon the case study. 
2.1 Individuals 
Society, in the form of the extra-parliamentary opposition and the 
alternative culture in the sixties, contributed a perceived need to find 
alternatives to the present liberal democratic system. Many youths of 
the time wanted to avoid the mistakes of their parents' generation and 
its acceptance of the fascist goverrunent under the National Socialists. 
It also encouraged a search for more extreme and provocative protest 
methods to reach the public with their message of al ternati ves, which 
were more a list of undesirable aspects of the present system. The 
combined influences of society and other individuals led these first 
members to join with others to form terrorist groups. 
However ( the youths were not all the same. Those who became left-
wing terrorists in West Germany came from diverse backgrounds as was 
shown in chapter four. Some were from families without one or both 
parents, others from whole ones. Also, their parents' employment 
situations differed. Some had attended university, and others not. 
Some common characteristics do stand out. Almost half (47% ) of the 
terrorists suspected, arrested or convicted by 1978 had fathers whose 
last profession could be considered as an executive one, compared to an 
average population sample of 12%. Furthermore, the left-wing terrorists 
of that period were also more likely (21%) to come from a home without 
one or both parents, than the average population sample (11%). Prior to 
entering the terrorist group pre-terrorists were more likely (65%) than 
the average population (52%) to be unemployed, in higher education, to 
have part-time or irregular work. At this time pre-terrorists were also 
more involved (137% [multiple responses]) than the average population 
(36%) in demonstrations, squattings and police confrontations. 
Beyond these comparisons to the general public, there were other 
common characteristics that the terrorists of the seventies exhibited. 
Most (97%) were born before 1956, and 63% were either orphans, or had 
experienced the death or divorce of one or both parents. These also 
provided the foundations for later problems as seen in their likelihood 
( 64% ) to have suffered from moving home, school etc., and likelihood 
(64%) to have had encounters with police and juvenile authorities as a 
youth. The more problems occurred in the one area, the more likely it 
was that they also occurred in the other two areas. These factors also 
influenced the person's later lifestyle to varying degrees. 
These high percentage figures for the left-wing terrorists do not 
hide the fact that there was a sizeable proportion who did not exhibit 
these problems. There were terrorists who came from complete families, 
who only moved schools when they went up the educational ladder, who 
completed university and were in full time employment, or at university. 
The answer, therefore, as to the biographical source of terrorist 
motivation lies in other areas of life than those discussed above. 
The more significant areas for the terrorists were where individuals 
influence one another in their decisions of acceptable options for work, 
enjoyment and lifestyle. For example, 98% were married or had a partner 
when entering the terrorist group, 57% idolised someone in the group, 
and 23% fel t influenced by someone because of their idol or emotional 
status. There is presumably a large degree of overlap between partners 
and influential people, so one person brings their partner into the 
group, who is then influenced further by the original person who joined. 
The factor of key experiences also influenced individuals' 
decisions, both in the moves towards politically orientated groups, and 
as the person assimilated their past life wi thin the framework of the 
group's belief system. The counter-culture fonned one large generally 
homogenous circle within which the pre-terrorists lived and their own 
and their partner's experiences moved them towards others with similar 
ideas. The combination of key experiences and ~significant others' is 
the likely explanation for why people move towards the counter-culture, 
pre-terrorist and later terrorist groups. 
Once they were in the counter-culture individuals were also 
influenced by the group dynamics of the pre-terrorist group as it 
developed into a terrorist group. After the fragmentation of the extra-
parliamentary opposition in 1968 when the Emergency Laws were passed by 
parliament, collections of people without leaders gathered to discuss 
their options and opportunities. In this atmosphere of group fonnation a 
process of leadership selection and initiation of members for possible 
roles wi thin the groups occurred . Individuals were challenged to meet 
these group demands, which they wanted to join or lead. These would also 
support the ideas of provocative protest to spread the message, as well 
as theft and militant action to prove one's daring. 
The West Gennan government influenced individuals with their 
idealisation of liberal democracy, while they simultaneously re-instated 
and restored fonner National Socialists to positions of power in the 
Federal Republic, and supported and encouraged Third World dictatorships 
such as the Shah of Iran f and supported American involvement in Vietnam. 
Individuals were directly motivated against the government through their 
experiences as demonstrators. The individuals viewed themselves as 
peacefully protesting, while the goverrunent, in the fonn of the police, 
used repression to end their protests. Other individuals were influenced 
by agents provocatuers such as Urbach I who supplied protesters like 
Baumann with molotov cocktails and bombs, where none might have 
previously been available. These added to the influence of key 
experiences and 'significant others' described above. 
The media influenced individual's interpretations of world events 
according to the media perspective. The media could spread messages from 
protest leaders to wider audiences, or bring news of events that 
demanded a response, such as how a student was killed by a policeman, or 
a student leader shot. After a protest event, demonstration or bombing, 
the media also represented public responses to the event, which would 
detennine its effectiveness and possible need for adaptation in future 
protests. 
Once the 
individuals' 
pre-terrorist groups moved to the active RAP 
motivation changed group members and others f 
the 
who, 
nonetheless, were motivated towards group membership. West German 
society now had two focal points of concern about terrorists. The 
general public worried about the danger they posed, while the New Left, 
some of whom supported the group! were concerned with how society 
responded to the group and treated its suspected members. 
Individuals concerned with supporting the group could! at first! 
decide between group membership themselves, forming their own group, or 
supporting the supporters. The deciding factors in these decisions were 
key experiences and 'significant others', as described above and in 
chapter four. Sternebeck was enraged by a court decision over one 
terrorist, and further motivated by the death of Meinhof. Supporters of 
the RAF could work through the prisoner support groups r as the 
prisoners' position became a concern, and offer the opportunity for 
advancement to the lawyers' offices and the underground group. Others r 
who disagreed with the RAF I S methods r went on to found their own groups f 
the Second of June and Revolutionary Cells. Klein and Boese objected to 
RAF group practices and later left to work in the RZ, while Baader's 
efforts to co-opt B2J members into the RAF failed. 
Individuals in the terrorist group now had new motivations to remain 
members, and society now noticed group acti vi ty . Apart from the small 
group of the New Left r who wanted to support the grouPr society rejected 
them. This left the group as the only option for the person r unless they 
accepted the option of prison. The group protected the individual and 
the person protected the group by not speaking out to the authorities if 
arrested. This maintained the group and the person I s 'political 
identity' . 
Inside the RAF individuals found offers for their services to the 
group r and sanctions for unacceptable behaviour. The group's direction 
influenced the members I positions in the group according to their 
abilities, who they knew r and their commitment to the cause. As the 
person moved from outside support with demonstrations to legal support 
in the committees r and possibly later r in the defence lawyers' offices r 
until potential membership in the undergroundr the person was influenced 
by group manipulation (not being told the whole story that Meins was 
possibly told to die on hunger strike) r intimidation (because if the 
person did not continue to help the grouPr he would regret his 
decision), and incentives (like money and working with those who started 
the 'struggle'). Group security had its costs and benefits. 
Government actions affected individuals' perception of their options 
once the group was formed. If the person had been identified as a 
terrorist suspect, then the group offered security and the government 
~nprisonment. This could only bind the person closer to the group, who 
now had a stronger hold on the person, unless the government offered the 
possibility of prison sentence remission in exchange for states' 
evidence. This has proven of little attraction for most West German 
terrorists. The move away from the group by individuals has generally 
( 60% ) only occurred after the person's arrest. These have also been 
overly represented by 'experts' (49%) and only 16% of those leaving 
could be classed as groups' leaders. 
The government also affected individuals I perception of terrorist 
groups through its counterterrorism and anti terrorism acti vi ties. Fair 
and equitable treatment of suspected persons promotes the rule of law, 
while unfair and harsh treatment promotes protest acti vi ty and the 
search for al ternati ves. In West Germany the portrayal of unfair and 
harsh treatment of the terrorist suspects brought people into the 
prisoner support groups, and this eventually extended the terrorist 
groups, who took advantage of the peoples I fear of arrest to bring legal 
members into the underground. 
After terrorist groups fonned, the media continued, as before, to 
influence individual perceptions of the world, and, now had another 
'story I to inform the public about. The media could inform about the 
groups' activities, its beliefs and members, as well as about government 
and public concern and action against terrorist acti vi ty . The media 
coverage of the left-wing groUps excited some like Boock to help free 
imprisoned members Baader and Ensslin, who had once assisted him. Other 
people also identified with the position of the imprisoned members, 
whose position was conveyed to the media, and this assisted the 
formation of the 'corrmittees against torture I. For group members 
themselves, the media confirmed their suspicions about the government 
and society, which reinforced their beliefs about their activities. 
When the terrorist group begins to decline, as the Second of June 
has, and which the RAF arguably did in the late seventies and has done 
again since the late eighties, individual members experience new 
motivational pressures. The far left of society could intimate that now, 
more than ever, the group needs new members and support. Others could 
also imply that the group is worthless and that another group deserves 
their membership. A person I s choice will again be determined by their 
'significant others' and key experiences. 
Those signals from society that do reach individual members could 
move them to leave the group because its activities have not fulfilled 
expectations. They could also lead the person to believe that now is the 
time to change groups, if the person believes in the viability of 
terrorist activities, and as one group is on the decline, they need only 
to join another group. This occurred with the Second of June members, 
who are believed to have moved to the RAF and the West Berlin RZ. 
Group decline will affect the incentives and sanctions offered and 
imposed on individual members. The terrorist group may offer higher 
inducements to retain an individual, rather than have them leave the 
group. It is also possible, that the group might, as the RAF did with 
its members who moved to the German Democratic Republic, allow those who 
want to leave to do so, in the belief that this will enable the group to 
end the decline with renewed activities. 
Similar to when the group formed, government actions in its decline 
affect individual perceptions of their options. These may encourage or 
discourage individuals' exit from a group in decline, and may similarly 
affect individuals contemplating membership. 
Government treatment of defeated terrorist groups may be potentially 
more important than how it treated them when the group was active. Here 
the experiences of people like Angelika Speitel, who was pardoned, and 
Boock who left the RAF, are important as examples of possibilities to 
others. Similarly, the court sentences for the ex-RAF members arrested 
in East Germany will possibly influence others to leave or join the RAF 
or other terrorist groups. Sentences perceived as harsh will not 
encourage others to leave the groups / and those contemplating support 
may be encouraged to be more active in their support. For this reason 
the continuation of the RAF is not inconceivable. 
The media portrayal of these events and situations may encourage 
some to aid the declining group I while others will be drawn to other 
groups according to their own beliefs about group organisation. Some may 
feel more inclined towards the less rigorously organised RZ or the 
Autonanen instead of the RAF. 
2.2 Groups 
The first terrorist groupsr the RAF and the B2J, were motivated by 
society to form in the late sixties through incentives similar to those 
offered individuals searching for left-wing alternatives then, as well 
as others particular to groups. The fragmentation of the New Left after 
1968 encouraged group formation, as did the particular attraction of 
some individuals to others, who would follow them. This was instrumental 
in the freeing of Baader and the beginning of the RAF. The B2J, on the 
other hand, formed because of the attraction of two smaller groups for 
one another. 
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Pre-terrorist group groups also motivated members as discussed 
above, while leaders' and members r abilities were explored. More 
importantlYr the terrorist group beliefs were also formed into 
'macronarratives' to offer solutions to their problems, prepare them for 
the dangerous group acti vi ties I 
their beliefs from outside 
rationalise their guil t and immunise 
influences. At this stage the 
'macronarrative' formation was gathered from sources in the literature 
and experiences of the other groups upon whom the German groups modelled 
themselves (Tupamaros and Palestinians) r as well as from their own 
history (anti-fascist resistance) and experiences (youth work). 
Throughout this process of 'macronarrati ve' formulation ( discussed 
in chapter five) the group rejected and excluded various other groups 
and means of action as unworthy and inappropriate. Discussion was 
inappropriate, action was appropriate, and groups that supported 
discussion- -the political parties- -were unworthy. This concept of the 
primacy of action led to many small bombings in the late sixties, like 
the one planned and assisted by Urbach with Kamnme I which did not 
work, and the one planted by Baader, Ensslin and others in 1968. 
The formation of one terrorist group did not hinder the formation of 
others, which established competition between themselves. Despite the 
declaration of differing aims, this competition was friendly enough to 
provide one another aid and assistance when the new groups were formed. 
The RAP helped the B2J, who also shared logistics with the RZ. 
The government's contribution to group formation was similar to its 
motivation for individuals. TOe activities of groups with illegal aims 
were the subject of police scrutiny and to avoid this the groups had to 
remain clandestine until logistically and operationally ready to 
confront the authorities. The apprehension of members prior to this 
caused turmoil wi thin the groups, when no obvious leader was available 
to replace arrested ones. This contributed to the RAP's formation after 
Baader's arrest in 1970, because Ensslin would not continue without him, 
and Mahler could not replace him. 
The media provided coverage of the group's aims and government 
activities, which were part of the groups' justification. The media also 
provided models of terrorist groups and liberation movements to be 
supported and emulated. 
After the groups were formed, and society in general rejected them, 
this encouraged further activity to exhibit their commitment and 
necessi ty for more acti vi ty to exhibit the connection between 
themselves, their enemies, and their goals. Simul taneously this required 
that the groups reformulate their organisations according to whom or 
';"VI 
what they perceived as their social base. The original legal/illegal 
concept of the RAF and B2J were found unworkable. Instead the RAF had 
three sections (underground, legal base and prisoners) until the mid-
eighties when it added the illegal militants. The B2J used underground 
and legal supporters as their prisoners were integrated into the RAF 
prison system. Only the RZ was able to use the illegal/legal 
organisation, apart from its underground 'Europe' network in the 
seventies. These organisational structures also reflected their far left 
audiences, which became smaller over time. The only audience to have 
arguably grawn is that of the Autonanen who accounted for most of the 
terrorist incidents in the eighties. 
Terrorist group formation added to the 'macronarrative' with more 
justifications based on members' collective experiences. Deaths and 
arrests of members were worked into the 'macronarrative' as the result 
of government and police activity which demanded group reaction. As time 
progressed the 'macronarrative' moved further towards a position of 
'fantasy' based on the group's subjective interpretation of their 
si tuation. Their fantasy supported them in their acti vi ties. For 
example, this allowed the interpretation of the deaths of Meinhof, 
Baader and others as murders, instead of suicides. Similarly, they could 
also believe that they were in a position to endanger the liberal 
democracy of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Terrorist group support for one another over the years has assisted 
their motivation. This also applies to Palestinian and West European 
groups support and assistance for the West German groups. After one 
foreign group's assistance ended another was immediately sought to 
maintain sources of supply and safe-havens. When one group f the B2J, was 
deemed unnecessary it merged to continue the terrorist 'struggle' with a 
revitalised RAF and RZ West Berlin cell. 
The government's contribution to the rise of the terrorist groups 
lay in how its counter- and antiterrorism policies forced 
professionalism on the terrorist groups. The high number of group member 
arrests and deaths in the early days of the RAF and B2J forced the 
groups to adopt tighter control and increase their professionalism to 
maintain themselves. The terrorists' success with these measures lies in 
the fact that the government does not know who was personally involved 
in many of the left-wing terrorist incidents undertaken by the groups. 
Group professionalism and control have also, to sane extent, influenced 
the groups' operational targets and methods such that these have become 
deadlier. The RAF, for example, does not undertake abductions I but 
assassinations. However f this does not excuse the RAF, who, if they 
believed the benefits outweighed the costs, could probably mount an 
abduction. 
The government also affected group manbership and areas of activity 
for the RZ and Autonanen on local and regional issues when it was 
perceived as being unresponsive to issues in the regions. For example r 
the Hafenstrasse squatters in Hamburg, the runway in Frankfurt and 
nuclear power plants, highlight this motivational aspect. 
Media influence on the groups has been linked to their recruitment. 
Media coverage for the RAF was most effective during hunger strikes when 
it might encourage new people to join the corrmittees, and during 
abductions when it could add to the pressure of release prisoners. This 
was also determined by who the hostage was f as exemplified in the 
difference between public reaction to Schleyer and the Lufthansa 
passengers. More people thought the passengers should be exchanged for 
the prisoners, than thought Schleyer should be exchanged. Contrastingly, 
the RZ and Autonanen do not seek publicity beyond that for their cause 
and how people can also use similar political violence to support other 
issues. 
Terrorist group decline can be seen in low recruitment amongst its 
perceived audience. The RAF countered this problem in the late seventies 
with a merger of most of the B2J members, and through the removal of 
dissenting members to East Germany. Simultaneously f the group also 
sought out new audiences with its realignment towards the 'anti-
imperialist front in Western Europe', which became fully operational in 
the mid-eighties wi th Action Direct cooperation. The end of this 
cooperation between the two groups with AD arrests in 1986/87 resulted 
in a renewed RAF decline exhibited by no campaigns, but only single 
operations. 
The 'Europe f branch of the RZ declined and ended sometime in the 
late seventies, while the 'national' branch continued. RZ activities 
have declined in the late eighties, but it is unknown what has occurred 
in the slow period of potential decline in the RZ since late 1987. 
The groups are influenced in their decline by the government to the 
extent that it encourages or discourages group dissolution and decline. 
Increased pressures on a declining group may only encourage continuation 
as the group offers the best safe-haven to its members. This is possibly 
one result of the Kronzeuge on active RAF and RZ members, because no 
active members have accepted the offer. It could also be that the 
widening of 129a StGB has added members to the RZ and RAF because these 
people feel threatened by the possibility that they now fall under the 
shadow of 129a. However, these are only speculations without evidence to 
support or disprove them. 
The government can also encourage decline through efforts aimed 
towards open discussion in society about terrorism and reconciliation. 
Discussions with imprisoned members by parliamentarians, as has occurred 
with the RAF and Greens, may assist the end of the group, because its 
isolation is broken. Similarly the media may facilitate or hinder the 
end of the group through its coverage of the affairs. Sympathetic 
coverage may encourage others to open discussions with legal suppoters 
and thus curtail membership. Negative reportage of the issues may hinder 
the decline because it could reinforce stereotyped responses that 
terrorists are inhuman and that talking to them is fruitless. 
2.3 Government 
The government facilitates the organisation of terrorist groups when 
it ignores (or is perceived to ignore) legitimate public grievances and 
concerns. The New Left perceived this when it protested against the 
Emergency Legislation in 1968, and when it protested against the visit 
of the Shah of Iran in 1967. The responses to that demonstration, which 
included the killing of a student, added to the far left I s perception 
that the government I s reaction was 1.mfair and harsh to their 
demonstrations. Later the RZ formed in protest of government support for 
authoritarian Third World c01.mtries( and because of perceived harsh and 
1.mfair treatment of RAF prisoners. 
Individuals influenced government actions and contributed to the 
formation of terrorist groups for several reasons. First , individuals 
implement government decisions as the policeman who shot Ohnesorg, and 
as the prison official who ordered the prison conditions for Meins and 
others. Second, individuals are the ones imprisoned as the object of 
government decisions and who can thus elicit public support. 
Groups influenced government contributions towards terrorist group 
formation when they encouraged the perception that the extra-
parliamentary opposition was against the public interest, and that they 
should support the government. However r this was only a general 
condition. There are always groups for and against the government. 
The sheer size and compartmentalisation of the government 
bureaucracies allows that same will not know what the others are doing, 
and they may work at cross purposes. This possibly explains the presence 
of 1.mdercover agents in the New Left scene in the late sixties and early 
seventies who could facilitate the pre-terrorist groups' acquisition of 
bombs r molotov cocktails and the pursuit of weapons. 
The government assisted the rise of the terrorist groups and their 
formation when it discounted the arguments of unfair and harsh treatment 
of terrorist prisoners without giving them due consideration and 
adequate counter-arguments. The continuation of these arguments led to 
increased terrorist supporters when the prisoner support groups were 
taken over by the RAF. 
This mistake was repeated in several forms when the government did 
not completely refute the suspicions about the deaths of Meinhof and 
others while in prison. Had these prison conditions been adequately 
handled, then there may not have been as much continued support for the 
terrorist groups, because the 'macronarrati ve' would not have been as 
fuelled as it was by the prison conditions and deaths of these members. 
The government also facilitated terrorism because it has handled all 
terrorist groups in a single uniform manner, as if they were all enroute 
to RAP membership, instead of acknowledging the different aims and 
methods of the groups. The widening categories of people considered to 
be suspected terrorists, also possibily contributed to terrorism. 
The decline of the terrorist groups is encouraged by the government 
when it withdraws the social base from the groups. The government has 
not yet done this, although it has moved towards this position in the 
late eighties through discussions via Green party members with the RAF. 
However, the RZ and Autanamen still feel they have unheeded concerns to 
which their actions are responses. 
'!'he government has facilitated the end of individual terrorists I 
careers through treatment of each as individuals. The government belief 
in the ability of its supergrass legislation to aid the decline of 
terrorism has ignored the situation in the groups which excludes the 
possibilities of any 'traitors I to the group because of the personal 
relationships which have been established between them. This was 
probably also a sign that the government does not discriminate between 
different types of terrorist groups, but rather sees them all as more 
similar rather than dissimilar. 
2.4 Media 
In general, the media in the Federal Republic of Germany did what 
they always do. They presented world and national events that it 
considered newsworthy. It also encouraged a simplified version of the 
world in its concentration on individuals as responsible for events, and 
its presentation of terrorist group models from other parts of the 
world. Through the media's connections to the government they also 
presented the government viewpoint of protest groups and of the 
potential dangers these posed for society. Some papers were also 
affected in their competition to sensationalise events. 
In West Germany, in the late sixties and early seventies these 
factors affected nascent terrorist groups on some occasions- -along with 
the other items discussed above- -to encourage a small group to believe 
that terrorism was an available and useful option to achieve their ends. 
That the media facilitated these events is not necessarily their 
faul t. Sensationalisation may have contributed more than other factors 
to some incidents such as Bachmann' s attempted murder of Dutschke, but 
because many (47%) of the 1970's terrorists took some form of higher 
education, it can be assumed that they were not the readers of 
sensationalist publications. Therefore r it is more likely that the media 
only reinforced underlying beliefs with current examples. 
The rise of terrorism was facilitated by the same aspects as above I 
whereby the coverage encouraged some to join the groups because they 
represented goals which they deemed as worthy. Public identification 
with the terrorist 'victims I has also differed between the seventies and 
eighties, due to the media's ability to engage 'identification 
machines'. The seventies experienced more terrorist activities where the 
public could see themselves in the 'victims' I such as when Lorenz was 
abducted, or when the holiday-makers were hijacked. The eighties did not 
witness abductions, but assassinations, where 'identification' could 
only occur after the event. Nor were there, apart from Debus in 1981, 
any terrorist deaths from hunger strikes which the terrorists could 
transform into martyrs in order to aid recruitment. Current terrorist 
events are on a smaller scale with less coverage than before. Today I S 
coverage is also reduced because of the lack of the individual victims 
and perpetrators, such as Meinhof, of the seventies, who elicited more 
public support. There are no such people for the media to draw upon 
today. Reduced RAF activity also means less coverage of it, and it is 
difficult for the media to cover the activities of unknown groups like 
the Autonanen. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The origins, rise and decline of left-wing terrorism in the Federal 
Republic have been due to entwined factors at the individual, group, 
government, media and social levels. The mixture of these factors has 
varied over time to produce different results and activities by the 
different groups. This is partially due to a constant learning process 
by the individuals f groups, government, media and public. 
3. Practical Applications 
The concept of identification and the above findings offer several 
counterterrorism policy options. Given that prevention is the best cure, 
the first measure is to develop strong public identification with the 
Federal Republic's liberal democratic system to ensure that it 
adequately responds to legitimate grievances. Furthennore, as liberal 
democracies require robust opposition and government parties f a full 
spectrum of political parties should be encouraged in order to suit 
different political identifications. The purpose of this is to ensure 
radical spaces wi thin society that can absorb those who feel that the 
traditional parties are not suitable and desire the pursuit of 
alternative policies. If such parties are non-existent, then people may 
feel it necessary to fonn their own, and not benefit from open 
discussion with others if they are in the underground. 
Radical spaces will not absorb everyone with radical ideas, so 
adequate intelligence is required from security services both at home 
and abroad. Part of their work should also be countering the arguments 
of terrorist group statements anonymously in the alternative press. 
Nothing prevents the security services drafting counterarguments that 
promote non-violent alternatives to those policies promoted by terrorist 
groups. It is unlikely that all of these would be printed by the 
magazines, as that decision ultimately rests with the editors, but 
assuming that some of them would be, then there is the possibility that 
it may deter some from moving to terrorist violence. 
Identification proposed that terrorist groups could be categorised 
into 'instrumental r f 'organisational' and ' expressive' type groups. In 
reality it is unlikely that any of these will be one or the other. For 
example, the RAF began with statements saying it was an 'instrumental' 
type group, but its operations started as 'organisatinal' when it freed 
Baader. The murder of Schleyer after Baader and the others committed 
suicide was for no group purposes other than vengeance, and could 
therefore be classed as 'expressive'. Nonetheless, in general the RAF 
has been predominantly 'organisational' , the RZ and Autonanen 
, instrumental' and some Autonanen cells possibly , expressive I • 
The options for responses to 'instrumental' terrorist organisations 
depend upon their desired social-political aims, and legitimacy. 
Legitimate grievances should have been dealt with before they reach the 
stage of terrorism, but if they do, then they should be handled 
appropriately. However, when these are legitimate and some groups follow 
the democratic system, while others use terrorist means, the government 
should deal with the two groups separately. Governments need to 
discriminate between the means used to achieve ends. If the government 
treats all of those who strive for the same ends as terrorists, even 
when some use legal democratic means, then the government may alienate 
the legal ones, who might then identify more closely with the 
terrorists. The government needs to raise the cost for terrorists 
without alienating legal protesters. 
For example, the government should not have widened the criminal 
code for terrorism to include those who topple power pylons I as West 
Germany did in 1988 (see chapter six). This only increased the number of 
terrorist incidents to be investigated, and possibly moved the police 
effort beyond terrorist groups. There is no indication that pylon 
toppling in conducted by 'organisations'r which is what Para 129a seeks 
to counter. Instead the government should have used more analytical and 
preventative protection duties amongst the police and security forces, 
such as irregular patrols of the pylons. The changes in the criminal 
code may have deterred somer but not others, for the authorities still 
need to apprehend people before they can be prosecuted. This raised the 
costs, only for those who were apprehended, and may encourage implicated 
persons to become an ~operational' model group. 
The options for responses to 'operational' terrorist groups hinge 
upon the internal dynamics of the terrorist group and their source of 
recruitment. The stated aims of these groups do not necessarily relate 
to their main goal of group survival. Therefore, their source of supply 
needs to be shut down, and if possible the active group broken up 
through internal dissension. The main point the government needs to 
avoid f if possible, is to raise the cost of membership because this 
increases group cohesion. It may keep some of the public away, but will 
not encourage members to leave. 
Internal dissension in 'organisational' groups would be facilitated 
through the existence of the radical alternatives mentioned earlier, 
because it allows for those who enter the terrorist group to leave and 
pursue their ends with non-violent means and thus not lose their 
principle identification. This move is easier and less costly than one 
which required their total loss of a radical identification, which may 
not occur, and therefore means the person continues with terrorism. 
Such a radical place may also aid the usefulness of ~ supergrass ' 
policies aimed towards active terrorists turning on their fellow 
members, because it would mean they are not rejecting their ideals and 
goals, only their methods. The currently wanted West German terrorists 
did not have this type of situation before they joined the Red Anny 
Faction, and therefore cannot easily shift their identifications in this 
way. They are wedded to an organisation, not an idea, and that is why 
they do not respond to the 'supergrass' offers. The former RAF members 
from East Germany, on the other hand, have already broken with the 
group, and thus are not betraying themselves. 
Internal dissension within the 'organisational f group may also be 
fermented if its object of identification is lost, which in the case of 
the Red Army Faction would also mean their loss of recruitment. As the 
imprisoned members of the RAF are the active group's source of 
recruitment (see chapter five) their renunciation of terrorism would 
mean the loss of focus for the active group f who would then have to 
either declare themselves as having lost their 'revolution' or begin a 
reorientation phase to maintain group survival. This may lead to 
dissension and the loss of some group members. 
Renounciation of terrorism by imprisoned terrorists can only be 
achieved if they are confronted by other ideas and new situations which 
force a rethink of their belief systems. Some people can achieve this on 
their own if they have access to books, periodicals and other media, and 
are not confronted daily by other members of the group. Other people 
need to have alternative support systems available to them that are not 
controlled by other imprisoned terrorist group members. The members need 
to be trusted as individuals and not stereotyped as all being 
untrustworthy. The process of identification changes requires a stable 
trusting environment and if one is to change from terrorist to non-
terrorist! support facilities in the form of trusting people and 
information must be there at a supply equal or greater to that available 
in their fellow terrorist prisoners. 
This process could be facilitated by the grouping together of 
imprisoned terrorists into two or three large groups within the Federal 
Republic's prison system. This would confront the different generations 
of RAF terrorists with different people who have not previously met, and 
bring together possible confrontations of beliefs about the group. The 
added securi ty costs could be met in part by the closing down of 
multiple high security prisons around the country as the terrorists are 
concentrated into two or three large groups. 
The danger to avoid in this project would be the possibility that 
these larger groups were able to hold themselves together more 
effectively, because they mutually support their group identification, 
and thus negate any potential individuals moving away from terrorism. To 
counter this the prisoner groups must be exposed to outside ideas and 
people, possibly through the mixture of these prisoners with others, or 
through an influx of visitors beyond the usual scope of relatives and 
friends to include politicians, journalists and others in discussions 
similar to those begun by the Greens in the late eighties (see chapter 
six). The seclusion of the large terrorist group to themselves, without 
access for those who desire it to other support systems described above, 
would only lead to the increased cohesion of the group. 
The aim of this confrontation between imprisoned terrorists and the 
outside world is the internal group dissent sought in the underground 
active members, whereby the members undergo a world-switching exercise 
similar to that which they experienced while becoming a terrorist. Over 
tliue this should lead to the rehabilitation of terrorists to non-
terrorists, who can then offer their ideas and talents to society. 
Therefore, throughout the process they need to have access to other 
people and resources to facilitate an identification transfer from the 
RAP to a new group. Once again the existence of a radical space in 
society facilitates these measures. 
The "expressive' model can be countered with raised participation 
costs, i.e. arrests. However, the rise of "other' terrorist attacks in 
the statistics (see chapter three) would suggest this has not been a 
deterrent. Like "instrumental' model responses, the government needs to 
differentiate between those who seek legitimate ends and those who use 
illegal means, because the existence of a radical group or space within 
society may also channel some motivation to create non-violent 
"spectacles I in the manner of the sixties protests, because of some of 
this type of terrorism is possibly due to individual motivation for the 
act itself within the framework of public protest. 
Each of these three terrorist model groups differs sufficiently to 
deserve specific government responses atuned to that model type. This 
demands government flexibility in its counterterrorism responses. A 
final example highlights this. If, as has been suggested, the Red Army 
Faction returns to abductions, then these would need to be dealt with 
differently from those conducted by an " instrumental' or " expressive I 
model group. Each group has a different concept of "public' as discussed 
in chapter seven. Therein lies the key to the government response. 
If the RAP abducts someone in a bid to increase its funds and to 
free members, then the government needs to remember the group's aim of 
survival and its select audience. This means the general public will 
identify with the government and assist them. The government would not 
need to repeat the drastic measures used during the Schleyer abduction 
to subdue the media and check everyone within a specific age band (see 
chapters six and seven). Instead the government should seek a response 
that would divide the group. This would ideally be a split between the 
prisoners and the active members, or any subdivisions within the active 
and prisoner groups. This necessitates communication between the 
government and the terrorists, either directly or through an 
intermediary to conduct negotiations, but not concessions, which should 
be refused. As in the Schleyer case, the government should pursue the 
three goals of safe return of the hostage, pursuit of the terrorists f 
and the retention of the state's freedom of action and not endanger 
domestic and foreign confidence in the state. 
The .. instrumental' model would necessi tate only a few changes in 
government response to an abduction. One is to reconcile government 
reaction to a wider audience which the terrorists aim towards. The 
larger the terrorists' audience in this model, the more the possibility 
exists that an intermediary from the cause may be able to assist the 
government to defuse the situation in negotiations with the terrorists. 
In the unlikely event that an .. expressive' model group acquired the 
resources to undertake an abduction, it should be responded to in the 
same manner and methods as an 'instrumental' one. The only exception 
would be that as it is done in self-interest by the group with the 
context of public protest, the government would need to be sensitive to 
the protest group aims. 
In the end it must be remembered that a diverse political spectrum 
is the sign of a healthy liberal democracYr and that if the security 
services were able to apprehend all potential terrorists before they 
act, then it is possibly no longer a liberal democracy. Given this 
limitation, complete freedom from terrorism is impossible. 
4. Theoretical Applications 
One of the aims of this thesis was to contribute to research that 
would further basic conceptual and theoretical groundwork in the study 
of terrorism. Identification showed that, although it added new models 
to the study of terrorism, it can be used to orientate different types 
of terrorism, and explain terrorist motivation, public and government 
responses, and its continuation. 
The basic conceptual and analytical groundwork in this thesis opens 
several paths for the future study of terrorism with the concept of 
identification. One is to apply the concept to right-wing terrorism as a 
test of its applicability there. More challenging, howeVer, would be to 
use the concept to study its applicability to state sponsored terrorism 
and test the usefulness of the .. instrumental', .. organisational' and 
'expressive' models in a different context. 
1.,:)/ 
Although it could be argued that all state governments desire to 
remain in power (the 'organisational r model), it is also possible that 
some are willing to pursue their goals out of office (the 'instrumental' 
model), while other rulers are only interested in personal power (the 
, expressive I model) . It may be that these are single party states, 
liberal democracies and dictatorships. Identification would suggest that 
most cases of state sponsored terrorism fall into the f organisational' 
model, but that the case of Israeli use of their own contacts with 
terrorist groups to hunt down the organisers of the Munich Olympic 
abduction of their athletes, may be an exception to this. 
The concept of identification, with its emphasis on the influential 
forces on individuals, groups and society, can aid the study of 
terrorism in its understanding of motivation and responses to political 
terrorism. This thesis exemplified the concept's usefulness in its 
application to left-wing terrorism, and its theoretical usefulness in 
other areas of terrorism. Hopefully this small step will lead others to 
further good questions with better answers as more is demanded of those 
researchers who follow. 
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CHRONOLCGY OF MAJOR EVENTS 
2 June 1967: The student Benno Ohnesorg was shot at an anti-Shah of Iran 
demonstration in West Berlin. 
2/3 April 1968 (RAP): The Schneider and Kaufhof department stores in 
Frankfurt were firebombed by Andreas Baader, Gudrtm Ensslin, Thorwald 
Proll and Horst Soehnlein. 
11 April 1968: (Easter Week) Josef Bachmann attempted the assasination 
of Rudi Dutschke in West Berlin. 
13 June :)..969 (RAP): Baader, Ensslin, Proll and Soehnlein were released 
temporarily from prison. 
4 April 1970 (RAP): Baader was arrested in West Berlin. 
14 May 1970 (RAP): Baader was freed from prison by Ingrid Schubert, 
Irene Goergens, and Ulrike Meinhof. An institute employee, Georg Linke, 
was shot and wounded. 
8 June 1970 (RAP): Horst Mahler, Hans-Juergen Becker, Brigitte Asdonk, 
Manfred Grashof, Wolfgang Thans, Petra Schelm and Heinrich Jansen left 
for an Al Fatah camp in Jordan via Beruit and Damascus. 
21 June 1970 (RAP): Baader, Ensslin and Meinhof followed the others to 
Jordan were everyone stayed until August. 
8 October 1970 (RAP): Horst Mahler, Brigitte Asdonk, Monika Berberich 
and Ingrid Schubert were arrested in West Berlin. 
June 1971 (RAP): Rolf Pohle and other RAP members stole 75 US M26 
handgrenades from the US-Army base Niseau near Kaiserslautern. Some 
sources say the grenades were taken from Weilerbach in the Pfalz. 
8 July 1971 (B2J): Georg von Rauch escaped from prison with the help of 
Michael Baumann and Thanas Weisbecker, and the Second of June was formed 
afterwards. 
15 July 1971 (RAP): Petra Schelm was shot and killed in Hamburg and 
Werner Hoppe was arrested. 
22 October 1971 (RAP): The policeman Norbert Schmid was shot and killed 
in Hamburg. Margit Schiller was arrested. 
4 December 1971 (B2J): Georg von Rauch was shot and killed in Berlin. 
22 December 1971 (RAP): Five people robbed a bank in Kaiserslautern of 
more than 130,000 DM, and wounded the policeman Herbert Schoner. 
2 Febuary 1972 (B2J): Irwin Beelitz died when the British Yacht Club in 
Berlin-Gatow was bombed. 
2 March 1972 (B2J): Thanas Weisbecker was shot and killed in Augsburg, 
and his companion, cann.en Roll, arrested. 
2 March 1972 (RAP): Manfred Grashof and Wolfgang Gnmdrnann were arrested 
in Hamburg after a shootout in which the policeman Hans Eckardt was 
wounded. He died on 22 March from the wounds. 
3 March 1972 (B2J): State security offices in West Berlin were bombed. 
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7 May 1972 (B2J): Ulrich Schmucker, Inge Viett, Wolfgang Knupe and 
Harold Sommerfeld were arrested in Bad Neuenahr. 
11 May 1972 (RAP); The headquarters of the Fifth US-Anny Corps in 
Frankfurt were bombed by the 'Commando Petra SchelIn I. Colonel Paul A. 
Bloanquist died and thirteen others were wounded. 
12 May 1972 (RAF): The central police offices in Augsburg and Munich 
were bombed by the 'Commando Thomas Weisbecker I • 
15 May 1972 (RAF): The wife of Federal Judge Wolfgang Buddenberg was 
wounded by the 'Commando Manfred Grashof I , who planted a bomb to explode 
when the car started. 
19 May 1972 (RAF): The Hamburg Springer-Press building was bombed by the 
'Commando Second of June f. 17 people were injured. 
24 May 1972 (RAF): The headquarters of the US-Anny in Europe in 
Heidelberg was bombed by the 'Commando Fifthteenth of July I. The 
soldiers, Clyde R. Bormer, Ronald A. Woodward and Charles L. Peck, died. 
1 June 1972 (RAF): Baader, Holger Meins and Jan-carl Raspe were arrested 
in Frankfurt. 
7 June 1972 (RAF): Gudrtm Ensslin was arrested in Hamburg. 
9 June 1972 (RAF): Brigitte Mohnhaupt and Bernhard Braun were arrested 
in West Berlin. 
15 June 1972 (RAF): Ulrike Meinhof and Gerhard Mueller were arrested in 
Hanover. 
9 July 1972 (RAF): Klaus Juenschke and Inngard Moeller were arrested in 
Offenbach. 
14 July 1972 (RAF): The lawyer Joerg Lang was arrested. 
5 September 1972: The Palestinian group, 'Black September t, murdered 
members of the Israeli Olympic team and abducted the others, who died in 
the failed police attempt, as did five terrorists and one policeman. 
17 January 1973 (RAF): The RAF began their first hunger strike. 
16 Febuary 1973 (RAF): The hunger strike ended. 
8 May 1973 (RAF): The second RAF hunger strike began. 
20 June 1973 (B2J) : Inge Viett escaped from the women I s prison in 
Berlin-Moabit. 
29 July 1973 (RAP): The second RAF hunger strike ended. 
12 November 1973 (B2J): Till Meyer escaped from Castrop-Rauxel prison. 
17 November 1973 (RZ): The SEL/ITT building in West Berlin was bombed. 
18 November 1973 (RZ): The SEL/ITT building in Nurnberg was bombed. 
4 June 1974 (B2J): Ulrich Schnrucker was assassinated in West Berlin as a 
suspected 'traitor' . 
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12 June 1974 (RZ): The Chilian consulate in West Berlin was bombed. 
13 September 1974 (RAP): The RAP began their third hunger strike. 
4 October 1974 (RAP): The home of the Hamburg Senator for Justice, 
Ulrich Klug, was bombed. 
30 October 1974 (RAP): Members of the 'Committee against Torture of 
Political Prisoners' occupied the office of Amnesty International in 
Hamburg. 
9 November 1974 (RAP): Holger Meins died in hunger strike, and fifty 
demonstrations broke out after his death. 
10 November 1974 (B2J): Guenter von Drenkmann, the president of West 
Berlin's highest court, was murdered in his home in an attempted 
kidnapping. 
13 January 1975 (RZ): Two persons (Johannes Weinriech and Willy Boese?) 
attempted to shoot at a taxiing El Al airplane at Paris Orly with an 
RPG-7, but missed and hit a parked Yugoslav DC-9 and wounded a French 
policman. 
5 Febuary 1975 (RAP): The third RAP hunger strike ended. 
27 Febuary 1975 (B2J): Peter Lorenz, the CDU candidate for the Mayor of 
West Berlin, was kidnapped three days before the elections. 
3 March 1975 (B2J): While Horst Mahler refused to be released as part of 
the ransom arrangments for Lorenz, Gabriel Kroecher-Tiedmann, Rolf 
Pohle, Rolf Heissler, Ingrid Siepmann and Verena Becker, joined Pastor 
Heinrich Albertz, a former Mayor of West Berlin, in Frankfurt, and were 
flown to Aden. 
4 March 1975 (B2J): Lorenz was released in West Berlin. 
4 March 1975: Rote Zora bombed the Federal Constitutional Court building 
in Karlsruhe. 
25 April 1975 (RAP): The West German embassy in Stockholm, Sweden was 
stormed by the 'Holger Meins Commando' and hostages taken. Two hostages, 
Lt-Col. Baron Andreas von Mirbach and Dr. Heinz Hillegart, were 
murdered, and an accidental explosion of the terrorists' bombs killed 
one terrorist, Ulrich Wessel, and enabled the arrest of the others I 
Siegfried Hausner, Hanna-Elise Krabbe, Karl-Heinz Dellwo, Lutz Taufer 
and Bemhard-Maria Roessner. 
30 April 1975 (B2J): Ronald FritzSch, Gerald Kloepper, Hendrik Reinders 
and Paul Reverman, were arrested. 
9 May 1975 (B2J): The policeman, Walter Pauli, was murdered during a 
vehicle check in Cologne by suspected B2J members, Werner Sauber who 
also died in the shooting, Karl-Heinz Roth who was wounded, and Roland 
Otto was also arrested. 
21 May 1975 (RAP): The trial against Baader, Ensslin, Meinhof and Raspe 
began in Stuttgart-Stammheim. 
6 June 1975 (B2J): Till Meyer was wounded and arrested in a shootout in 
West Berlin. 
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25 June 1975 (RAP): Katharina Hanmerschmidt died in prison from a breast 
tumor. The court decided in 1977 that she died of the doctor's 
negligence. 
20 August 1975 (RZ): A letter bomb sent to the president of the Jewish 
Community in Berlin, Galinsky, was defused. 
9 September 1975 (B2J): Ralf Reinders, lnge Viett and Julianne Plambeck 
were arrested. 
13 September 1975 (B2J): Fritz Teufel and Gabriele Friderike Rollnick 
were arrested in West Berlin. 
16 October 1975 (RAP): The daughter of the Hamburg Senator for Justice, 
Dr. Klug, was murdered. A threatening letter with the RAP signature is 
sent to him informing him the next bullet is for him. 
21 December 1975 (RZ): Hans-Joachlln Klein and Gabriele Kroecher-
Tiedemann participated in the abduction of the OPEC ministers at their 
conference in Vienna with lilich Ramirez sanchez, 'carlos'. 
18 January 1976 (RAP): In Kenya Brigitte Schulz, Thomas Reuter, and 
three others attempted to fire at an El AL plane with a SAM-7. 
9 May 1976 (RAP): Ulrike Meinhof was found hung in her Starnmheim prison 
cell. Demonstrations and thirty small bombings followed. 
25 May 1976 (B2J): Bernd Hausmann died in the Tel Aviv airport after his 
suitcase bomb was detonated. 
1 June 1976 (RZ) : The headquarters of the Fifth US. Army Corp in 
Frankfurt was bombed. Sixteen people were seriously wounded. 
27 June 1976 (RZ): Wilfried Boese, and Brigitte Kuhlmann, participated 
in the hijacking of an Air France plane to Entebbe f Uganda. 
4 July 1976 (RZ): Israeli commandos freed the hijacked Air France plane 
in Entebbe. Boese and Kuhlmann died in the shootout. 
7 July 1976 (B2J): Inge Viett, Gabriele Rollnik, Julianne Plambeck and 
Mbnika Berberich escaped from the Lehrterstrasse Women's Prison in West-
Berlin. 
16 September 1976 {RZ): The Cologne home of tax inspector Kaussen was 
bombed. 
30 November 1976 (RAF): The lawyers Siegfreid Haag and Roland Meyer were 
arrested in Butzbach. Amongst the papers found on them was money from a 
15 November bank robbery in Hamburg. 
1 December 1976 (RZ): The Rhein-Main Officers' Club of the US-Air Force 
Base in Frankfurt was bombed. 
13 December 1976 (B2J): Waltraud Boock was arrested in Vienna after a 
bank robbery chase in which about 500,000 DM was stolen. 
18 December 1976 (RZ): The buildings of the US Army in Bad Hersfeld were 
firebambed. 
4 January 1977 (RZ): US Army petrol tanks near Lahn-Giessen/Roedgen were 
bombed. 
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5 January 1977 (RAP): Christian Klar wounded a SWiss customs official in 
a shootout at the swiss-GenTIan border in Basel/Lorrach. 
8 February 1977 (RAP): Brigitte Mohnhaupt was released from prison in 
Cologne-Bruehl. 
16 February 1977 (RZ): 'Commando Siegfried Hausner' bombed the car of 
the Dusseldorf public defence lawyer Heinz Peters, who was defending 
suspects of the Stockholm embassy siege. 
29 March 1977 (RAP): The RAP began a fourth hunger strike. 
7 April 1977 (RAP): Siegfried BubeCk, the West Gennan Federal Prosecutor 
General, was assassinated in Karlsiuhe by the 'Commando Ulrike Meinhof' . 
His driver, WOlfgang Goebel, and the Prosecutor's Office employee, Georg 
Wurster I were also murdered. 
28 April 1977 (RAP) : Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe were sentenced to 
lifetime imprisonment (sixteen years) by the Stuttgart court. 
30 April 1977 (RAP): The RAP's fouth hunger strike ended. 
3 May 1977 (RAP): Guenther Sormenberg and Verena Becker were arrested in 
Singen. 
3 May 1977 (RAP): Johannes Thinme and Uwe Folkerts were arrested in 
Karlsruhe. 
11 May 1977 (RZ): The cars of a West-Berlin jUdge and state prosecutor 
were bombed as revenge for sentencing two homeless asylum candidates. 
30 July 1977 (RAP): Juergen Ponto; the President of the Dresdener Bank, 
was murdered in his home near Frankfurt. 
9 August 1977 (RAP): The fifth RAP hunger strike began. 
25 August 1977 (RAP): A multiple-tube rocket launcher was found in an 
apartment facing the Federal Prosecutor's Office building in Karlsruhe. 
30 August 1977 (RAP): The associate lawyer of Klaus Croissant, Ar:min 
Newerla, was arrested in Stuttgart. Arndt Mueller, from the same office, 
was arrested a month later. 
31 August 1977 (RAP): Hans-Joachim Dellwo was arrested in Croissant's 
stuttgart office. 
2 September 1977 (RAP): The fifth RAP hunger strike ended. 
5 September 1977 (RAP): The head of the Gennan Industrial Association, 
and a member of the Mercedes-Benz board of directors, Hanns-Martin 
Schleyer, was kidnapped in Cologne by the 'Siegfried Hausner Commando'. 
His driver, Heinz Marcisz f and three accompaning police bodyguards { 
Reinhold Braen.dle; Helmut Ulmer and Roland Pieler I were murdered. 
22 September 1977 (RAP): Knut Folkerts was arrested after a shootout in 
Utrecht I Holland. 
30 September 1977 (RAP): Klaus Croissant was arrested in Paris and 
extradited to the FRG on 16 November. 
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13 October 1977 (RAP): The Lufthansa airliner, 'Landshut I, enroute from 
Palma de Majorca to Frankfurt was hijacked by the PFLP to Mogadishu, 
Somalia via Rome and Athens by the 'Martyr Halimeh Comnando' . 
17 October 1977 (RAP) : The 'Landshut I Lufthansa capt ian f Juergen 
Schuman, was murdered by the hijackers. 
18 October 1977(AAF): The 'Landshut' was freed by the GSG 9. Later the 
government announced the deaths of Baader, Enssl:in and Raspe, and the 
attempted suicide of Inngard Moeller in Stammheim. German businesses 
across Europe were bombed and burned by RAF supporters. 
19 October 1977 (RAF): The body of Hanns-Mart:in Schleyer was found in 
the boot of a car in Mulhouse, France. 
9-13 November 1977 (B2J): The Austrian textile manufacturer, Michael 
Palmers in Vienna was abducted and ransomed for about 4.3 million DM. 
10 November 1977 (RAF): Christoph Wackemagel and Gert Schneider were 
arrested in Amsterdam, Holland, after a shootout with the police. 
12 November 1977 (RAF): Ingrid Schubert was found hung in her Munich-
Stadelheim prison cell. Demonstrations and bombings followed the 
announcement of her death. 
20 December 1977 (RAF): Christian Mueller and Gabriele Kroecher-
Tiedemann were arrested on the French-SWiss border north of Bern after a 
shootout with the police. 
6 February 1978 (RAF): The security services blow a hole in the wall of 
CelIe prison in an attempt to introduce undercover agents into the RAF. 
10 March 1978 (RAF): The sixth RAF hunger strike began. 
20 April 1978 (RAF): The RAF hunger strike ends. 
27 May 1978 (B2J): Till Meyer and Andreas Vogel were freed by two 
alleged female B2J members from Berlin-Moabit prison. 
28 May 1978 (RAF): Peter-Juergen Boock, Siegelinde Hofmarm, Rolf Clemans 
Wagner and Brigitte Mohrihaupt were arrested in Zagreb, Yugoslavia. 
31 May 1978 (RAF): Two West-Berlin public defense lawyers representing 
suspects in the Lorenz/von Drenkmann cases were attacked: one, Hohla, 
was knee-capped, and the other found, and defused, a bomb in his car. 
23 June 1978 (RZ): The Heidelberg university student, Hennan Feiling, 
was arrested after a bomb he was making prematurely exploded. 
21 June 1978 (B2J): Till Meyerr Gabriele Rollnick, Gudrun Stuenner and 
Angelika Goder were arrested in Sonnenstrand, Bulgaria, and extradited 
the next day to West Germany. 
6 September 1978 (RAF): Willy Peter Stoll was shot and killed by a 
policeman in Dusseldorf. 
15 September 1978 (RAF): Astrid Proll was arrested at an auto repair 
station in London r and returned to the FRG on 23 June 1979. 
24 September 1978 (RAF): Angelika Speitel (wife of Volker Speitel) and 
Michael Peter Knoll were arrested in Dortmund after a shootout. Knoll 
died on 7 October due to the wounds. 
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17 November 1978 (RAP): Peter-Juergen Boock, Siegelinde Hofmarm, Rolf 
Clemans Wagner and Brigitte Mohnhaupt were declared undesirables and set 
free in the country of their choice. The FRG had not agreeded to 
extradite eight Yugoslaves in return. 
20 April 1979 (RAP): The seventh RAF hunger strike began. 
4 May 1979 (RAF): Elisabeth von Dyck was shot and killed in Nurnberg by 
a policeman waiting in her apartment. 
25 June 1979 (RAP): Members of the RAP unsuccessfully attempted to 
assassinate the Supreme Commander of NATO forces in Europe, General 
Alexander Haig, with a bomb under a bridge in Mons, near Brussels. 
26 July 1979 (RAF): The RAP hunger strike ended. 
2 September 1979 (RZ): The Delta factories in Worms were firebombed. 
19 November 1979 (RAP): Rolf Clemens Wagner was arrested in Zurich, 
Switzerland after an armed bankrobbery. 
Spring 1980 (RAF!B2J!RZ): The remaining members of the B2J merged with 
the RAP. Some in West Berlin f however, become cells in the RZ. 
5 May 1980 (RAP): Sieglinde Hofmann of the RAP, and the following B2J 
members, Ingrid Barabas, Regina Nicolai, carola Magg, and Karin Kamp-
Muennichov were arrested in a Paris apartment. 
25 July 1980 (RAF): Julianne Plambeck and Wolfgang Beer died in an auto 
accident near Stuttgart. 
22 January 1981 (RAP): Peter-Juergen Boock was arrested in Hamburg. 
2 February 1981 (RAP): The eigth RAP hunger strike began. 
10 February 1981 (B2J): Michael "Barmi I Baumann was arrested in London. 
8 April 1981 (RAF): RAF sympathisers exploded a bomb in the Cologne 
Neumarkt underground station wounding seven. 
16 April 1981 (RAP): Sigurd Debus died in the hunger strike in Hamburg. 
There were demonstrations and small bombings in the following days. 
18 April 1981 (RAP): The eigth RAP hunger strike ended. 
11 May 1981 (RAF): The Hessen Minister of Finance, Hans Herbert Karry 
was murdered. 
31 August 1981 (RAP): The NATO Air Force headquarters in Ramstein was 
bombed. 
14 September 1981 (RAP): The 'Commando Gudrun Ensslin! unsuccessfully 
attempted the assassination of the Commander of the US-Army in Europe, 
General Friedrich J. Kroesen, with an RPG. 
16 February 1982 (RZ): Magdelena Kopp and the Swiss Bruno Breguet were 
arrested in Paris. 
11 Novernber 1982 (RAP): Brigitte Mohnhaupt and Adelheid Schulz were 
arrested in Neusenstarnm. 
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16 November 1982 (RAF): Christian Klar was arrested in Sachsenwald. 
25 October 1983 (RZ): The Bundeswehr school for military intelligence at 
Bad Ems was bombed. 
July 1984 (RAF): In the first week of the month, Christa Eckes, Helmut 
Pohl, Ingrid Jackotmeister, Stefan Frey, Barbara Ernst and Volker-
Wilhelm Straub were arrested in Frankfurt. 
4 December 1984 (RAF): The RAF began their ninth hunger strike. 
18 December 1984 (RAF): An attempt to bomb the NATO school in 
Oberammergau failed due to the timer setting. 
20 January 1985 (RAF): Joharmes Thinrne died after a premature bomb 
explosion in Stuttgart-Vaihingen. His companion, Claudia Margarete 
Wannersdorfer, was wounded and arrested. 
25 January 1985: The AD 'Corrrrnando Elisabeth von Dyck' assassinated 
General Rene I Audran, the director of the French Ministry of Defence I s 
Export, Weapons and Al:maments Cooperation Society, near Paris. 
1 February 1985 (RAF): The 'Corrrrnando Patrick O'Hara' assassinated Ernst 
Zinmennann, the director of the Munich Motor Turbine Union (MTU), a 
defence contractor, near Munich. 
2 February 1985 (RAF): The ninth RAF hunger strike ended. During the 
hunger strike the 'Illegal Militants' of the RAF had carried out fifteen 
bombings and twenty-three firebombings of targets in support of the 
hunger strike. Half of these were against targets of military nature. 
8 March 1985 (RZ): The IG Mining offices in Boehum and the Coal Employer 
in Essen and Hamburg shipping office were bombed. 
8 April 1985 (RAF): The 'Illegal Militant Fighting Unit Johannes Thimme' 
bombed the International Society for the Study of Ships in Hamburg. One 
bomb exploded, and the other was defused. 
8 April 1985 (RAF): The 'Illegal Militant Fighting Unit Ulrike Meinhof' 
bombed the NATO pipeline near Ippingen. 
28 April 1985 (RZ): The Hoechst chemical plant in Cologne and the 
Deutsche Bank in Dusseldorf was bombed. 
5 May 1985 (RZ): The Central Committee of the All Metal Employers Union 
was bombed. 
30 May 1985 (RZ): The NATO pipeline near Frankfurt was bombed. 
3 July 1985 (RAF): Ingrid Barabas and Mariela Scbmenger were arrested in 
Offenbach. 
7 August 1985 (RAF): Members of the 'Corrrrnando George Jackson I murdered 
the American soldier Edward Pimental to obtain his identity card. 
8 August 1985 (RAF): The 'Commando George Jackson' exploded a car bomb 
at the US air base in Frankfurt. Two people were killed and another 
twenty wounded. 
18 August 1985: Rota Zora bombed the Max Plank Institute for plant gene 
technology in Cologne-Vogelsang. 
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6 September 1985 (RAF): Illegal militants bombed three mobile 'Hawk I 
anti-aircraft rocket radar stations at the US base in Freisen-
Reitscheid. 
27 September 1985 (RAF): Karl-Friedrich Grosser was arrested in 
Ludwigsberg. 
7 October 1985 (RZ): The showrooms of a Mercedes Benz dealership in 
Cologne were bombed. 
7 October 1985 (RZ): The Botanical Institute of the University of 
Cologne were bombed. 
19 December 1985 (RZ): A production and warehouse building of 
Brueggemann and Brand was firebombed. 
10 February 1986(RZ): The Bonn offices of the South Africa Foundation 
were bombed. 
9 July 1986 (RAF): A bomb planted on a roadside tree in Munich-
Strasslach by the 'Commando Mara Cagol l killed the Siemens director, 
Professor Karl-Heinz Beckurts, and his driver, Eckhard Groppler. 
24 July 1986 (RAF): The 'Illegal Militants Fighting Unit Sheban Atlauf l 
bombed the Frauenhof Institute for Laser Technology in Aachen. 
25 July 1986 (RAF): Illegal militants bombed Domier Aerospace in 
Immenstaad. The guard was warned before the bomb exploded. 
2 August 1986 (RAF): Eva Sibylle Haule-Frimpong, Luitgard Hornstein and 
Christian Kluth were arrested in Ruesselheim. 
11 August 1986 (RAF): Illegal militants exploded three bombs at the 
Federal Border Guard station in Heimerzheim. 
13 August 1986 (RAF): The American electronics firm of Westinghouse in 
Wuppertal was bombed by the 'Illegal Militants Fighting Unit 13.8.86. I • 
13/14 August 1986 (RAF): Suspected members of the RAF illegal militants r 
Norbert Hofmeir r Barbara Perau, and Thanas Thoene were arrested in 
Duisberg. 
8 September 1986 (RAF): The Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution in Cologne was bombed by the 'Illegal Militants Fighting 
Unit Christos Tsoutasouvis I. One man was wounded. 
16 September 1986 (RAF): The 'Illegal Militants Fighting Unit Anna Maria 
Ludmann' bombed the Munich Arabella building complex. The offices of 
Panavia Aircraft, and the military control agency, NATO MRCA Management 
Agency (NAMMA) were the targets. 
10 October 1986 (RAF): Gerald von Braunmuehl, a Ministerial Director in 
the Foreign Office, was murdered in Bonn-Ippendorf by the 'Commando 
Ingrid Schubert I • 
28 October 1986 (RZ): The main offices of Lufthansa in Cologne were 
bombed, and the director of the Foreign Registration Office in West 
Berlin, Harald Hollenberg, was knee-capped. 
16 November 1986 (RAF): The IBM research centre in Heidelberg was bombed 
by the 'Illegal Militants Fighting Unit Hind Alameh'. 
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17 November 1986: The AD murdered Georges Besse, the General Director of 
the state-owned Renault automobile manufacturer, in Paris-Montparnasse. 
19 December 1986 (RAF): The 'Illegal Militants Fighting Unit Rolando 
Olalia' bombed the German Society for Economic Development office in 
Cologne-Muengersdorf, The society was bombed by the RZ on 11 March 1984. 
21 December 1986 (RAF): The 'Illegal Militants Fighting Unit Mustafa 
Actas' bombed the educational building of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation 
in Bad Munstereifel. 
21 June 1987: Rota Zora attempted to bomb the main offices of the Adler 
textile company in Haibach, but the explosives were too damp to explode. 
7 July 1987): The Revolutionaeren Viren- -the youth organisation of the 
RZ, announced itself with the firebombing of the Foreign Registration 
Offices in Berlin-Wedding. 
7 July 1987: An unknown group exploded a bomb on 'Canada Day' at the 
Lahr base where Canadian Forces Europe have their headquarters. 
1 September 1987 (RZ): Judge Guenter Korbacher, of the Federal Supreme 
Court was knee-capped. 
1 November 1987 (RZ): Fifteen lorries of a foodstore chain in Wesel were 
destroyed in protest of their South African trade. 
2 November 1987: Two policemen, Thorsten Schwalm, and Klaus Eichenhofer, 
were shot by someone at a Startbahn West demonstration. 
18 December 1987 (RZ): Gabriele Tiedemann (now divorced from Norbert 
Kroecher) was extradited from Switzerland to the Federal Republic. 
17 June 1988 (RAF): Two men and one woman were interrupted in Cadiz, 
Spain when preparing a bomb on a moped that explodes prematurely. Later 
the police found hand grenades and notes in German in a bag left behind 
when the three escaped unharmed in a shootout. 
20 September 1988 (RAF): State Secretary Dr. Hans Tietmeyer of the 
Federal Finance Ministry escaped an RAF assassination by the 'Commando 
Khaled Aker' when the gun jammed. 
1 February 1989 (RAF): Tenth RAP hunger strike began. 
11 May 1989 (RAF): The tenth RAF hunger strike ended. 
30 November 1989 (RAF): 'Commando Wolfgang Beer' murdered Alfred 
Herrhausen, the director of the Deutsche Bank. 
7 December 1989 (RAF): Ute Hladki and Frank Holger Bodo Deikle were 
arrested in Husem. 
10 December 1989 (RAF): The 'Illegal Militant Fighting Unit Sheban 
AtloufjConny Wissman' attempted to bomb the Bayer AG Plant Research 
Centre in Mannheim near Dusseldorf, but the bomb was defused. 
21 January-6 April 1990 (RAF): 'Prisoners of the RAF and Resistance' 
began solidarity hunger strikes with three Spanish prisoners of the 
GRAPO and PCE(r) terrorist groups, who sought imprisonment in the same 
Spanish prison. The RAF and other Resistance prisoners were each on 
hunger strike for one week after which others took their place. 
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6 June 1990 (RAP): SUsanne Albrecht was arrested in East Berlin, where 
she has lived since 1980 under the name of 'Ingrid Jaeger'. She was 
married and had one daughter. 
13 June 1990 (RAP): Inge Viett was arrested in Magdeburg, where she 
worked in the Karl Liebknecht steel conglomerate. 
14 June 1990 (RAP): Werner Loetze, Ekkehard Frelhe:rr von Seckendorff, 
and Monika Helbing were arrested in Frankfurt an der Oder. cliristine 
Duemlein's arrest warrent had expired. 
15 June 1990 (RAF): Sabine Elke callsen was arresteq in Leipzig. 
15 June 1990 (RAP): Sigrid st.ernbeck and Baptist Ralf Fri-rorich were 
arrested in the GDR. 
18 June 1990 (RAP): Henning Beer was arrested in the GDR. 
19 June 1990 ~): Silke Maier.a.Witt was arrested in the GDR. 
27 June 19<,10 (RAP): The RAF 'Jose Sevillano Ccmnan(!o' unsuccessfully 
attempted to murder the State Secretary of the Interior Ministry, aans 
Neusel, on his way to work in Bonn. 
13 February 1991 (RAF): RAP members shot at the US embassy in Bonn from 
accross the Rhine in protest of the allies attack on Iraq. 
3 March 1991 (RAP): The RAP announced that they cancelled a planned 
attack on Ignanz Kiechele, the Federal Minister for Food, Agriculture 
and Forestry. 
2 April 1991 (RAP): The RAP assassinated Detlev Rohwedder, head of the 
government agency overseeing the privatisation of East German state 
owned firms in Dusseldorf. 
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